


Published Quarterly

JOURNAL
of the
Royal United Service
Institution.



Vol. LXII., No. 448.—NOVEMBER, 1917.



PUBLISHED AT THE

Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

Telegraphic Address: "RUSSATUS, PARL, LONDON."

ALL RIGHTS
RESERVED.

Sole Advertisement Contractor: C. GILBERT WOOD,
Norfolk House, Victoria Embankment, W.C. 2.

Price
Six Shillings

To give **precise poise and balance**
in Eyeglasses and Spectacles requires years of experience;
moreover, it is something unique.

AN UNBREAKABLE LENS IS SOMETHING MORE.

CALL, WRITE,

OR 'PHONE:

Mr. MELSON WINGATE,

The Inventor of the **TRIPLEX** Safety Lens,

30, WIGMORE STREET, W. ^{Phone:} Mayfair 2353.

TRIPLEX

SAFETY GLASS

*For
Aircraft
Automobiles
Etc.*



*For
Ships'
Goggles
Etc.*

THE TRIPLEX SAFETY GLASS
CO. LTD.
1 Albemarle St., London, W.1

Telephone:—Regent 1340.
Telegrams:—
'Shatterlys, Piccy, London.'

CONTRACTORS TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.



THE "NEW VALITE" ACETYLENE HAND LAMP.

As supplied to Officers and Men of the British Expeditionary Forces.

STRONG. SIMPLE. EFFICIENT.

As illustrated 15/6

If with Windproof Bonnet, extra 2/6

Postage to France, extra 1/4

MADE IN STEEL WITH
BRASS FITTINGS.

WEIGHT 2½ lbs.
HEIGHT 9 inches.

50 Candlepower for 6 hours with ½ lb. charge of Carbide.

VALITE, LTD., Adam House, John St., Adelphi, London,

Catalogues Post Free on application. W.C. 2.

NAVAL, MILITARY, SPORTING, AND MUFTI TAILORS



TAUTZ & Co.

THE ENGLISH FIRM. C. H. CURTIS, Proprietor.

12 GRAFTON ST. NEW BOND STREET, W.

BREECHES SPECIALISTS

BRANCHES:

Blandford, Dorset, CURTIS & SON.

Johannesburg and Pretoria, CURTIS & CO.



CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER, 1917.

1. FRONTISPIECE. CAPTAIN AND PRIVATE OF MARINES, 1790-1796.
2. SECRETARY'S NOTES xvii
3. MILITARY CHARACTER. By VICE-ADMIRAL WM. S. SIMS, U.S. NAVY 699
4. THE MARINES IN THE GREAT NAVAL MUTINIES, 1797-1802. By
COLONEL C. FIELD, R.M.L.I. (RETD.) 720
5. FRENCH WAR LITERATURE. By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON 747
6. "EMDEN." A PARAPHRASE OF THE ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY KAPITÄN-
LEUTNANT HELLMUTH VON MÜCKE. TRANSLATED BY A. C. HEARN 770
7. THE RED COAT IN THE ARMIES OF EUROPE. By LIEUT.-GENERAL F. A.
TYRRELL 787
8. GERMAN WAR-WRITERS ON THE "U"-BOAT WARFARE. By THOMAS
F. A. SMITH 793

Continued on Page 3.

PALACE HOTEL BLOOMSBURY STREET, W.C.

Select district, central for City and Shops and Theatres of the West End.

— 250 ROOMS. —

Inclusive En Pension Terms from 3 guineas weekly or 10s. 6d. per day.

Luncheon 2s. Dinner 3s. Afternoon Tea 9d.

BEDROOM, ATTENDANCE, BATH, TABLE D'HÔTE BREAKFAST, 5s. 6d.

Telegrams: "Epicure, Westcent, London."

Telephone: Museum 574 and 575.

Illustrated Tariff free on application.

ORCHESTRA DAILY IN MAGNIFICENT PALM LOUNGE.

THE "UNSOLDIERLIKE SUB"

A Letter from the Front.

There has come to hand, within the last fortnight, a letter from a Captain with the B.E.F., which is well worth reprinting in its entirety here, both in view of its distinctive difference from the majority of "letters from the Front" and of what has been published lately regarding the remarkable extent to which "Pelmanism" is being adopted by Officers of His Majesty's Army and Navy.

Here is the letter in question:—

"I should like to call your attention to the facts of the story of my Pelman Course.

"When I began I was looked upon with disfavour by the C.O. of my Battalion at home as being a sleepy, forgetful, and unsoldierlike sub.

"When I began your course my star began to rise—I had the ability, but had not been able to use it. I left the Home Battalion with my C.O.'s recommendation as being the best Officer he had had for more than a year, and came to France.

"I was then appointed as a Second-Lieutenant to command a Company over the heads of four men with two 'pips,' and have now three stars and an M.C.

"That I was able to make use of my abilities so successfully I attribute entirely to the Pelman System."

As an isolated letter, the foregoing might fail to carry much weight. But when it is taken as typical of some hundreds of similar letters from Army and Navy Officers, then, indeed, one is forced to concede that there must be "something in Pelmanism."

More than forty Generals and Admirals and well over 300 Naval and Regimental Commanders—to say nothing of 4,000 other Officers and a multitude of N.C.O.'s and men—have adopted Pelmanism since the outbreak of war, and every day brings reports from them as to substantial benefits derived. There is indeed "something in Pelmanism."

Let us take a few examples. A Naval Captain reports promotion to the command of a fine cruiser—thanks to his Pelman training. A Lieutenant-Colonel reports "a step in rank" within two months of starting the Course. A Major writes attributing his majority *and his D.S.O.* to the same agency. A General and a Rear-Admiral also write giving testimony which it is, at present, inadvisable to publish. There is not a rank or unit of either Service which has not supplied convincing evidence of the fact that Pelmanism is truly the short road to progress.

As a system, Pelmanism is distinguished by its inexhaustible adaptability. It is this which makes it of value to the University graduate equally with the salesman, to the woman of leisure and to the busy financier, to the Army Officer and to the commercial clerk. The Pelmanist is in no danger of becoming stereotyped in thought, speech, or action; on the contrary, individuality becomes more pronounced.

Every reader of "The Journal of the R.U.S.I."—whatever his position and whatever his aims and interests—should read "Mind and Memory," in which the Pelman Course is fully described and explained. A copy will be sent, gratis and post free, to any reader who sends a postcard to The Pelman Institute, 118, Wenham House, Bloomsbury Street, London, W.C. 1; and he will thus be placed in possession of the simple facts of the case and be enabled to judge for himself the extent to which "Pelmanism" would forward his aim or ambition.

Telephone : Museum 3156.
" " 4639.



Telegrams : " King, Euston."

H. J. KING & CO. Mess, Club, Hospital and Canteen Contractors

*Fishmongers, Poulterers, Game Dealers
and Ice Merchants,*

**OPPOSITE EUSTON STATION
LONDON, N.W. 1.** ESTABLISHED
1837

N.B.—Fish and Game Dispatched to France on Official Permit.

**And at 133 JERMYN STREET
ST. JAMES', LONDON, S.W. 1**

Estd. 1779. Telephone : Gerrard 1566

— WHOLESALE —
**LEADENHALL MARKET &
BILLINGSGATE, LONDON**

CONTENTS—continued from page 1.

9. A HUNDRED YEARS AGO: THE MAHRATTA AND PINDARI WAR. By COLONEL R. G. BURTON, INDIAN ARMY	800
10. AN EXCELLENT AUXILIARY: THE MOTOR TRANSPORT VOLUNTEERS ...	812
11. CORFU—A MEMORY. By MAJOR MORRIS BENT	816
12. FROM THE ORDER BOOK OF FERDINAND OF BRUNSWICK. EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. IN THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION ...	818
13. THE WAR: ITS NAVAL SIDE	825
14. THE WAR: ITS MILITARY SIDE	849
15. CORRESPONDENCE: THE UNITED STATES' NATIONAL ANTHEM	898
16. PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY	898
17. NOTICES OF BOOKS	900

IMPORTANT NOTICE TO ADVERTISERS.

"The R.U.S.I. Journal" is now published Quarterly, and will in future appear on the 15th day of February, May, August and November of each year.

C. GILBERT-WOOD.

BURMA SAUCE

A perfect Relish with a rare and delicate flavour, quite distinct from all others. If you want a new and delightful sensation in sauces—

— GIVE IT A TRIAL. —

WHITE, COTTELL & Co., Malt Vinegar and Sauce
Makers,
LONDON, S.E. 5.



**Send Your
Camera
along to us.
We pay Cash!**

Your Camera
can be made into
War Loan!!!

SEND SANDS-HUNTER'S your spare apparatus. Turn it into WAR LOAN! You have lenses, cameras. You do not want just now. Turn them out, send them here, *we will buy them for CASH.* Think, Sir! YOU have a camera or lens you cannot use—have it packed and sent here, right away. **Make it WAR LOAN!**

HIGHEST PRICES IN THE TRADE.—We are buying for our next Big List. Others want what you don't use. We make Cash offer, and return, carriage paid, if unaccepted. **TO PACK CAMERA:** Take it to nearest friendly tradesman; let him pack it safely in small box; send post or rail to Sands-Hunter's. This turns your Camera into instant WAR LOAN. Act to-day!

Sands-Hunter & Co. Ltd.
37, Bedford Street, Strand, W.C.2

OFFICERS' RAINPROOF WAR KIT



May we send you—

- 1.—A free copy of "Tips for Subs," a little book every young Officer should read?
- 2.—Details of our **£30 KIT?**
- 3.—A specimen of "Omne Tempus" Khaki—guaranteed Rainproof, without Rubber?

Samuel Brothers
UNIVERSAL OUTFITTERS LTD.

A "special Officers' Dept. at each House.
OXFORD CIRCUS
and **LUDGATE HILL, LONDON.**

**MAKES A VERY HANDSOME & USEFUL
XMAS PRESENT TO A NAVAL OFFICER.
'NAVAL WARS in the BALTIC'**

By Lieut. R. C. ANDERSON, R.N.V.R., M.A., etc.
Admiral MARQUESS of MILFORD HAVEN, G.C.B.,
etc., says:—"I have no hesitation in testifying to its very
great use." "THE DAILY MAIL" says:—
"Such a study as this certainly merits some public honour."
430 pages. Price **15/- net.**
C. GILBERT-WOOD, Norfolk House, London, W.C.2.



A. J. WHITE

74, JERMYN ST.,
LONDON, S.W.

Hat and Cap Maker,

Offers his SPECIAL FLEXOLYTE
FIELD SERVICE CAP

as being light in weight, soft
and pliable in texture as
quite the best possible cap
for foreign service, being
quite rainproof and having a
smart appearance, not a rag.

FLEXOLYTE
Reg. No. 327488

A. J. WHITE

Hat and Cap Maker,
74, JERMYN ST., LONDON, S.W.1

Hugh Rees

LTD.

MILITARY AND NAVAL
BOOKSELLERS, STATION-
ERS AND PUBLISHERS.

5, Regent Street, S.W.
AND AT CAMBERLEY, SURREY.

MILITARY & NAVAL BOOKS
OF ALL DESCRIPTIONS ARE
KEPT IN STOCK AND CAN BE
SUPPLIED WITHOUT DELAY.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

PATRON.

HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE V.

VICE-PATRON.

General H R.H. PRINCE CHRISTIAN OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN,
K.G., G.C.V.O.

PRESIDENT.

Field-Marshal H.R.H. DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

Admiral The MARQUESS OF MILFORD-HAVEN, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.M.G., A.D.C. (1906).

Colonel *Right Hon.* Sir J. H. A. MACDONALD, G.C.B., V.D. (1908).

Field-Marshal *Lord* METHUEN, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G. (1911).

Admiral of the Fleet the *Lord* WALTER KERR, G.C.B. (1912).

Field-Marshal *Sir* H. E. WOOD, D.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G. (1913).

Field-Marshal *The Right Hon.* *Lord* GRENFELL, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. (1914).

CHAIRMAN.

Lieut.-General H. D. HUTCHINSON, C.S.I.

VICE-CHAIRMAN.

Admiral *Sir* F. C. D. STURDEE, *Bart.*, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

General *Sir* E. H. H. ALLENBY, K.C.B.
Commander CARLYON BELLAIRS, R.N.
(retired), M.P.

Colonel B. T. BUCKLEY, General Staff.

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B.,
R.D., Royal Naval Reserve.

Lieut.-General *Sir* A. E. CODRINGTON,
K.C.V.O., C.B.

Colonel C. H. COLVIN, C.B., D.S.O.,
late 3rd Bn. Essex Regiment.

Major-General E. T. DICKSON.

Admiral of the Fleet *Sir* A. D. FAN-
SHAW, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Major-General *Sir* T. FRASER, K.C.B.,
C.M.G.

General A. F. GATLIFF, Royal Marines.

Lieut.-Colonel A. St. L. GLYN, Grenadier
Guards, late 10th Bn. Middlesex
Regiment.

Colonel *Sir* W. A. HILL, K.C.B., late 3rd
Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment.

Rear-Admiral A. C. LEVESON, C.B.

Brigadier-General the *Earl of* LUCAN.

Admiral W. F. S. MANN.

Captain H. W. RICHMOND, R.N.

Major-General M. H. SAWARD, Colonel
Commandant R.A.

Lieut.-General *Sir* H. C. SCLATER,
G.C.B., G. O. C. in C., Southern
Command.

Lieut.-Colonel R. SHOOLBRED, C.M.G.,
T.D., Commanding 16th Bn. London
Regt. (Queen's Westminster Rifles).

Vice-Admiral *Sir* R. G. O. TUPPER,
K.C.B., C.V.O.

Colonel C. W. TROTTER, S. Notts
Hussars.

Colonel *Sir* E. W. D. WARD, *Bart.*,
K.C.B., K.C.V.O., A.S.C. (T.F.)

General *Sir* H. H. WILSON, K.C.B.,
D.S.O.

*Secretary, Curator and Chief Executive
Officer.*

Lieut.-Colonel *Sir* ARTHUR LEBTHAM,
F.S.A., late Royal Monmouthshire
Royal Engineers and 13th Hussars.

Librarian.

Major C. H. WYLLY, late 1st Bn. South
Staffordshire Regiment.

Editor.

Colonel H. C. WYLLY, C.B., late
Sherwood Foresters.

Assistant Secretary and Curator.

A. N. A. PINHEY, Esq., late 12th Bn.
The London Regt.

Auditors.

Messrs. WILDE, FERGUSON DAVIE & MILLER, Chartered Accountants,
61½, Fore Street, E.C.2.

The undermentioned can become members by intimating their wish to the Secretary and either forwarding to him their subscription, or giving him a written authority on their bankers or agents for its payment:—Commissioned officers of the Royal Navy, Regular Army, Royal Marines, Special Reserve, Reserve of Officers, Militia, Indian and Colonial Naval and Military Forces, Yeomanry, Territorial Force, Royal Naval Reserve, Volunteer Corps, and Cadet Battalions and Corps, as published in the Official Navy and Army Lists, together with retired officers of the same whose names are retained in the Navy or Army Lists, and Naval Cadets,

and Cadets of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, on the recommendation of their commanding officers, Chairmen and members of the Territorial Force Associations, and Secretaries of the same.

Officers retired from the various Services enumerated above, whose names do not appear in the Navy or Army Lists, are eligible for election by ballot on the recommendation, on personal knowledge, of two members of the Institution.

The terms of subscription are:—

Annual. £1 1s. 0d. entrance; and £1 1s. 0d. annual, payable on the 1st January each year.

Life. £15, payable in one sum.

Life. £15 15s., payable in three instalments of Five Guineas each; the first on joining the Institution, the others on the 1st January of each of the succeeding two years.

Members joining after the 1st October in any year are not called upon for any subscription the following year.

An extra payment of Ten Shillings entitles a member in the United Kingdom to the loan of Four Volumes at a time from the Library for a period of twelve months from the date of the subscription.

When a member desires to pay his subscription through his banker or agent, he should send to the Secretary a written authority as follows:—

To (Banker or Agents)

On receipt of this order please pay to Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, or order, my subscription to that Institution (according to the terms above).

Name in full.

Rank, Ship, or Regiment.

Address to which Journals and other communications should be sent.

Officers of the Indian and Colonial Naval and Military Forces, temporarily in the United Kingdom, may become members for a period of six months on payment of Ten Shillings and Sixpence, or One Guinea for a period of twelve months; members of the United Service Institution of India, for six months on payment of Five Shillings.

The Institution contains the best professional Library in the United Kingdom; an excellent collection of Maps and Charts; Reading and Smoking Rooms provided with the leading papers, periodicals, and writing materials; an interesting Museum; and a Theatre in which lectures upon professional subjects, followed by discussion, are frequently given; and is open daily from 10 to 7 except Sundays, Christmas Day and Good Friday.

The JOURNAL contains the lectures given in the Theatre, articles on professional subjects, naval and military notes, book notices, &c. It is sent to ALL the 6,000 Members, post free. "THE R.U.S.I. JOURNAL" is published Quarterly.

The Royal United Service Institution,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

FORM OF BEQUEST.

I Bequeath to THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

the sum of £ _____ (free of duty).

or (in case of a specific legacy) my _____ (free of duty).

to be applicable for the general purposes of such Institution.

And I Declare that the receipt of the Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of such Institution, shall be a sufficient discharge for the same.

FLAG MAKERS

Enquiries receive prompt attention.
Small or large orders executed at
lowest current prices.

JOHN UNITE, LTD.,
291 & 293 EDGWARE ROAD,
LONDON, W. 2.

Telegrams: UNITENT-EDGWARE-LONDON
OILSKIN GARMENT MANUFACTURERS

TENT MAKERS

Princess Helena College EALING, W. 5.

Principal—Miss Parker.

BOARDING and DAY SCHOOL for
the Daughters of Gentlemen. Special
attention to Languages, English, Art,
Music. ————— Large Grounds.

Fees 66 Gns. to 75 Gns. a year.
Officers' Daughters 66 Gns. a year.



Drummer boy
about 1800.

P.683

Player's NAVY CUT Tobacco.

GOLD LEAF } 8^{1D.}
MEDIUM } 8² PER OZ.
TAWNY }

"WHITE LABEL" 7^{1D.}
1/2 PER OZ.

Also

PLAYER'S NAVY CUT DE LUXE
1/9 per 2 oz. Tin.

This Tobacco is also supplied at DUTY FREE
RATES for the purpose of gratuitous distribution
to wounded Soldiers and Sailors in Hospital.

Terms and particulars on application to

JOHN PLAYER & SONS, Nottingham.

Branch of the Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Great Britain and Ireland) Ltd.

STAMP BARGAINS.

7 Belgian Occupation of German E. Afr., 5c. 11, unused 3/-
11 Newfoundland 1911 Coronation, complete unused 6/6
10 British E. Africa, 1890, 1s. to 1r., unused ... 2/6
12 different British Colonial War Stamps ... 1/-

SELECTIONS SENT ON APPROVAL.

H. ROSS-SHIELLS & Co., 4, Eldon St., London, E.C.2

DECEMBER NO. 1.—READY ON 1st PROX.

"The Shipbuilder" Published Monthly.

Price 6d. net. (Postage 3d. extra).

THE recognised Official Journal of the Ship-build-
ing, Marine Engineering, and Allied Industries

SOLE LONDON DIRECTOR:

C. GILBERT-WOOD, F.R.G.S., F.R.S.A., &c.
Norfolk House, W.C.

Pay a Little More and have a

"LACRE"

The Super Commercial Motor Vehicle.

Works: LETCHWORTH, ENGLAND.

Stamp Auction Sales

of Foreign and Colonial Postage Stamps held weekly,
from SEPTEMBER to JULY. Those interested in
commencing or completing collections would find our
AUCTION CATALOGUES of great advantage.

Expert advice and valuations free.

Liberal Cash Advances made on Stamps sent for Sale.

HARMER, ROOKE & CO.,
Stamp Auctioneers (C Dept.), 69, Fleet Street, London.



Clamp Optic Bracket
with Tap.

PATENT OPTIC MEASURING TAP

For Spirit Barrels, also with adjustable brackets for Bottles, as illustration. Made to measure 4, 5 or 6 to the quartern or other sizes to order.

NO SPILLING. NO WASTE.

Accurate Measure.

Imperial sizes are Government stamped.

Patentees and Sole Makers:

GASKELL & CHAMBERS, Ltd.

(Incorporated with YATES & GREENWAYS)

**HOTEL, BAR AND CANTEN FITTERS
Dale End Works, BIRMINGHAM**


*Contractors to H.M. Admiralty, War Office,
Ministry of Munitions, Control Board, etc.*

Manufacturers of

**BEER ENGINES, TEA & COFFEE URNS,
CORK DRAWERS, TANKARDS & MEASURES.**

Catalogue on Application.

Telegrams: Gaskells, Birmingham. Telephone Central 4336 & 4337



Enameloid MATCH BOX COVERS



With Army and Navy Crests.

- ☐ These Covers can be manufactured with any Crest, Monogram, design or Advertisement in colours, or in black and white.
- ☐ They are specially suitable for Advertisements.

Write for Quotations:

**THE ENAMO COMPANY, LTD.
CAXTON WORKS, WIMBLEDON, S.W. 19.**

Specialists in Enameloid Advertising Show Cards, Tablets, &c., &c.

London Agency:—**THE BRITISH ENAMELOID AGENCY (G. Colman),**
36, Camomile Street, E.C.

The "VICTORIA" VEGETABLE PARING MACHINES (British Made Throughout).

These Machines are installed on practically every Ship of

THE UNITED STATES NAVY.


THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY. ::

THE RUSSIAN NAVY. :: ::

Why not THE BRITISH NAVY?

Saves
Time,
Labour,
Waste.

Best
and
Therefore
Cheapest.



Made
in
Several
Sizes.

Write
for
Full
Details.

Latest Naval Model "Victoria" Vegetable Parer.

**THE ONLY POTATO PEELING MACHINE AWARDED THE GOLD MEDAL
OF THE COOKERY AND FOOD ASSOCIATION and
CERTIFIED BY THE INSTITUTE OF HYGIENE.**

In Daily use at

The Admiralty, The War Office, The Ministry of Munitions, The Local Government Board, The Customs House, The Mint, Somerset House, The G.P.O., The School of Cookery, Aldershot, and in Camps, Hospitals and Barracks everywhere.

Manufactured throughout in London by—

IMPERIAL MACHINE CO. Crown Works, 22, Cricklewood
(Peelers Ltd., Proprietors), Lane, LONDON, N.W.2.

The Labour Problem Solved by the use of our Latest Type Machine

A COMPLETE
EQUIPMENT

LOW INITIAL COST

SMALL SPACE

LITTLE FIXING

INSTANTANEOUS
& CONTINUOUS

WASHES : RINSES

STERILIZES

AND DRIES

NOT ONLY


PLATES

BUT SILVER CUPS

SAUCERS : OR

ANY ARTICLE

OF TABLE USE



"THE CAFE"

THE "CAFE" Washing-Up Machine is specially designed to supply needed requirements for a popular priced Washing-Up Machine, where a full-sized machine is too large and expensive. It has met this requirement and more. The whole washing-up, rinsing, sterilizing and drying of one establishment seating 200 guests is being done daily with the "CAFE" Washing-Up Machine, operated by one Woman, and the cost of running is less than three farthings per hour.

Also the "SUPER-DREADNOUGHT" Washing-Up Machine of a much larger size and capacity.

AN ALL-BRITISH FIRM

THE WASHING-UP MACHINE Co.

34 FULHAM RD., SOUTH KENSINGTON, LONDON, S.W.3

Telephone: Kensington 5696.

Factory: 27 Goldsmith Road, Peckham, London, S.E. 15

Kapok

The
MARVELLOUS

Kapok

LINING FOR OFFICERS' COATS

FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN WEAR.

SOLD IN SMALL AND LARGE QUANTITIES.

LARGELY USED IN HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE.

Perfectly Hygienic, Light, Comfortable, Life Saving.

Write
for
Price
List.

The Army.

No Officer's Kit complete without it. Greatly in use in the Trenches, Billets and the Field, although six times lighter than cotton, warmer than wool. Contracts for Kapok are increasing daily.

Write
for
Price
List.

It is Rot - Proof.
It is Vermin-Proof
It is Impermeable.

Indispensable for
Camp Bedding
and Shipping
Upholstery.

Kapok
SPECIALLY
If once used



Perco,
TREATED
always recommended

All Literature and
full particulars

All Literature and
full particulars

—FROM—

**THE
SOLE
WORLD
AGENT.**

**SUPERIOR TO EVERYTHING
ELSE FOR COAT - LINING.**

The Navy.

In cases of emergency its Life-Saving properties are invaluable. Worn as a lining to Garments, one pound (avoirdupois) will keep an average man afloat. Also serviceable and warm.

—FROM—

**THE
SOLE
WORLD
AGENT.**

Mr. C. J. LEMAIRE,

Commerce House—72/84, OXFORD STREET, LONDON, W. 1.

Remember KAPOK for Linings.

The One Flag League

The League's Motto:—"One King, One Empire, One Flag."

The League's Objects:—To support the Allied Governments in their determination to secure victory and a real and permanent peace.

The League's Methods:—To bring home by means of Lantern Lectures, outdoor and indoor meetings, the distribution of literature, canvassing and other methods, if possible, to every man, woman and child in the Empire, the supreme need that everyone must put forth their utmost efforts if we are to secure victory and a real and permanent peace.

The League's Justification:—In a letter received from the Ministry of Food the following passage occurs: "If such measures as you propose are generally adopted he (Lord Rhondda) feels there can be no doubt of ultimate success."

Will you join the League and subscribe to the utmost of your power to enable the League to extend its work and prove the truth of Lord Rhondda's forecast? Subscriptions from One Shilling upwards.

THE ONE FLAG LEAGUE

28b, WESTMINSTER PALACE GARDENS,
Artillery Row, Victoria Street, London, S.W. 1.

GEORGE W. M. DALE
Hon. Secretary



CASH'S NAMES

WOVEN ON FINE CAMBRIC TAPE IN FAST TURKEY RED.

Can be used on woollen and knitted garments.
Supplied at a few days' notice ready for immediate use.
Prices on White, Black or Khaki Ground:
4/3 for 12 doz.; 3/- for 6 doz.; 2/- for 3 doz.

STYLE
No. 151.

BADEN-POWELL

EUSTACE MILES

STYLE
No. 10.

STYLE
No. 7.

H.D. MAXIM

Ian Maclaren

STYLE
No. 150.

Black Ground Names are useful for marking dark clothing and socks, and for attaching to tags of boots, &c.

Markers can be had with Figures only, or Figures and Initials, or Names combined, and can be done on a wider width of Tape should it be necessary.

TO BE OBTAINED OF ALL DRAPERS AND OUTFITTERS.

Woven Samples and full list of styles FREE on application to

J. & J. CASH Ltd., COVENTRY.

Please mention "The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution."

THE ADVERTISEMENT DEPARTMENT OF THIS JOURNAL IS CONDUCTED IN GILBERT-WOOD'S OFFICES, NORFOLK HOUSE, VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON, W.C. 2, WHERE ALL COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.
TELEPHONE NO. 4630 GERRARD.



Westminster

TOBACCO and CIGARETTES,

the World over, are recognised as the accurate realisation of to-day's cultured taste.

300
Westminster "Specials"

skilfully blended fine flavoured
TURKISH CIGARETTES
for

15/-

1 pound of
Westminster "Amulet"


SMOKING MIXTURE,
a tobacco of superlative quality
and rare charm for

7/6

or

Prices include
cost of packing in airtight tins and postage. Orders for smaller quantities cannot be
accepted. These reduced prices are for Cigarettes in Bond for direct shipment abroad only.

Westminster Tobacco Co. Ltd
(*Westminster House*)
London S.W.



SUGAR SUBSTITUTES

"Sugarene."

A skilful combination of
sweetening products, scientific-
ally blended. Contains no
Saccharin or other synthetic
products. In 6-cwt. Casks or
1-cwt. Drums.

Send to-day for a fair working
sample, 10/-.

Honey "GLOBE BRAND."

Everybody sells Honey, but
not everybody sells "Globe
Brand." We specialise and
understand the article. When
ordering, mention for what
purpose it is required.

In bulk or packed.

For Samples and Particulars write :

GLOBE MANUFACTURING CO.,

36, Mark Lane, LONDON, E.C.3.

Works : Nunhead, S.E.

Telephones : } City - - 8203.
 } New Cross 115.

J.R. GAUNT & SON

Established 200 Years.

LTD.

Manufacturers of

BADGES, BUTTONS,
MEDALS, SWORDS, GOLD
LACE AND EMBROIDERY,
HELMETS, CAPS, BELTS, &c.

Military, Naval, Crest, Club and all
kinds of Uniform Buttons and Badges.

Contractors to the British & Foreign Governments.
100-page Illustrated Catalogue on application.

53, CONDUIT STREET, LONDON, W.1

Telephone:—4010 Gerrard.

Warstone Parade Works, Birmingham.

ASK FOR

'SIMPLEX' BLACK & BROWN BOOT POLISHES

Of all Dealers from 1d. to 1/- per tin

If any difficulty is experienced in securing
deliveries, orders may be sent direct to:—

THE SIMPLEX POLISH CO. LTD.

ROADE - NORTHAMPTONSHIRE.

(Chairman—Thomas Henry Dey.)

BOOKLET FREE ON APPLICATION.

THE NAVY LEAGUE

A Patriotic and non-Party Organisation whose principal aims are:—

1. The Education of public opinion
throughout the Empire, so that
Command of the Sea by the
British Fleet may be regarded as the
first consideration of National and
Imperial Policy.

2. The promotion of the teaching
of the **use of Sea Power**, and
the outlines of Naval History, in all
the schools of the British Empire.

3. The **training of British
Boys for the Sea**, by means of
Naval Brigades, Brigs and training
ships, with a view of eliminating all
aliens from Britain's sea service.

4. The organisation of public
opinion in support of the creation of
an Imperial Air Service, under a
responsible Air Ministry, to ensure
Britain's **Command of the Air**.

The League appeals for additional Fellows and Members to enable it to
carry out this policy.

	£	s.	d.	
Vice-President - - - - -	5	0	0	annually.
Do. for life - - - - -	25	0	0	
Fellows (Ladies and Gentlemen) - - - - -	1	1	0	annually.
Do. do. for life - - - - -	10	10	0	
Members, with publications post free, not less than -	0	5	0	annually.
Members, with "The Quarterly" post free - - - - -	0	1	0	"

All communications to be addressed—

THE GENERAL SECRETARY,

THE NAVY LEAGUE,

13, Victoria Street, London, S.W. 1.

"My Valet" Ltd.

DRY CLEANERS & DYERS.

Army and Naval Officers on leave will find our service of
inestimable value. Whatever the soiled and stained condition
of the clothes, we can obtain a "good as new" appearance.

OUR WARTIME SERVICE IS PROMPT,
EFFECTIVE & WORTHY OF YOUR PATRONAGE

A postcard sent will ensure our messenger's call to collect uniforms or suits

9, BLOOMSBURY ST., NEW OXFORD ST., W.C.1

'Phone MUSEUM 940

Uniforms

of OFFICERS in Both Services

**Dry Cleaned
and Pressed
within 24**

hours

THE ADVERTISEMENT DEPARTMENT OF THIS JOURNAL IS CONDUCTED IN GILBERT WOOD'S
OFFICES, NORFOLK HOUSE, VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON, W.C.2, WHERE ALL
COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

TELEPHONE NO. 4580 GERRARD.

LABOUR SAVING & WASTE PREVENTING MACHINERY FOR MESSES AND CANTEENS



THE "VORTEX" Dish Washing Machine

(PATENTED.)

Washes, cleans, dries, polishes and sterilizes all kinds of chinaware and electroplate without the use of towels.

Rapid and Efficient.

Absolute Cleanliness and Hygiene.
PERFECT STERILIZATION.



*Installed in many Government establishments.
Officer Cadet Battalions, Naval and Military
Colleges, etc.*

THE "CORNHILL" Potato Peeling Machine

Saves Potatoes, Time and Money.

Waste Reduced to Vanishing Point.

Large Size Power Driven
(capacity 40 lbs.)

Small Size Power or Hand Driven
(capacity 15 lbs.)

SOLIDLY CONSTRUCTED.

Send for Illustrated Catalogue No. 83—to

THE AVAMORE ENGINEERING CO., LTD.
KINGSWAY HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2

Telegrams: "Avamolist, Westcent, London."

Telephone: Gerrard 634

THE CHURCH ARMY

MAINTAINS—

Several Hundred RECREATION HUTS, Tents and Clubs, at home and in France, Flanders, Malta, Egypt, Salonica, East Africa, Mesopotamia and India (over 60 under shell-fire on Western Front; 42 in Egypt) for Sailors and Soldiers; many more needed; Huts cost £300, Tents £150, Week's working £5 abroad, £2 at home.

NAVAL AUXILIARY HOSPITAL in Scotland; £50 names bed for 12 months.

KITCHEN CARS on Western Front.

PARCELS FOR PRISONERS and Troops in Trenches; 5s. per parcel.

VISITORS for men in **HOSPITAL**, far from own friends.

RECREATION ROOMS for Soldiers' and Sailors' Wives.

NUMEROUS OTHER BRANCHES.


YOUR AID IS EARNESTLY REQUESTED.

Cheques, &c., crossed "Barclays', a/c Church Army," payable to
PREBENDARY CARLILE, D.D., Hon. Chief Secretary,
Headquarters, Bryanston Street, Marble Arch, London. W. 2.

JEWELLERS &  SILVERSMITHS
TO H.M. THE KING

The "MILITARY" Luminous Watch.

PATENT NO.
11376/15



As Illustrated,
£4:12:6

Full Hunter,
£4:5:0

The "Military" Luminous Watch illustrated is fully luminous at night, and is contained in a one-piece solid silver screw case that makes it dust and damp-proof; it is fitted with a patent cover to protect the glass. An accurate timekeeper, this Watch is indispensable for Naval or Military Service, being of highest quality and proved reliability.

THE
GOLDSMITHS & SILVERSMITHS
COMPANY LTD. with which is incorporated
The Goldsmiths' Alliance Ltd. Estd 1781

112, Regent Street, London, W. 1.

RANGEFINDERS

AND

FIRE CONTROL



BARR AND STROUD


LIMITED

ANNIESLAND, GLASGOW.




After Bonstetten.

CAPTAIN OF MARINES,
1796.



PRIVATE OF MARINES
(Grenadier Coy.), 1790.



SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—The Council regret to announce the death of General H.R.H. Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, K.G., G.C.V.O., a Vice-Patron of the Institution.

II.—Entrance Fee Temporarily Suspended.

At the Annual General Meeting of the Institution, held on March 7th, 1916, it was unanimously resolved that for the present, and as a temporary measure, the payment of any entrance fee on joining the Institution should be dispensed with.

III.—Life Membership: Reduced Terms.

It was at the same time decided that the amount payable for Life Membership should be temporarily reduced from £15 to £10.

IV.—New Members.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of August, September, and October, viz. :—

Captain W. E. Euler, M.C., R.E.
Major R. G. Browne, Manchester Regiment.
Second Lieutenant F. A. B. Fisher, I.A.
Lieutenant J. Hackett, R.N.
Assistant Paymaster V. G. Butcher, R.N.R.
Captain A. J. Finny, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
Captain W. P. MacCallum, M.C., 20th Bn. Australian Infantry.
Sub-Lieutenant R. M. Dick, R.N.
Captain D. Mills, Hampshire Regiment.
Second-Lieutenant H. J. Ingleton, 4th (Reserve) Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers.
Captain V. C. Harvey, M.C., Royal West Surrey Regiment.
Lieutenant J. H. R. Homfray, R.N.
Second-Lieutenant J. A. Strange, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Captain A. A. Gemmell, Cameron Highlanders.
Lieutenant G. N. W. Boyes, R.N.
Major A. M. H. Forbes, D.S.O., Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Lieutenant M. H. Wells, R.F.A.
Lieutenant C. B. C. Swayne, R.N.
Lieutenant L. McCormick-Goodhart, R.N.V.R.
Lieutenant J. W. D. Powell, R.N.R.
Major E. N. Williams, D.S.O., D.C.L.I.
Lieutenant G. W. Hill, R.N.
Major A. M. Grenfell, D.S.O., Royal Bucks Hussars Yeomanry.
Captain B. S. Russell, R.N.V.R.
Lieut.-Colonel R. W. de C. Rennick, I.A.

V.—Library Subscription Reduced.

The Council have pleasure in announcing that for the present, and as a temporary measure, it is decided to reduce the subscription to the Lending Library from 10s. per annum to 5s. per annum. The Library is rich in works of reference, military and naval, historical, scientific, etc. A subscriber can take out as many as four volumes at one time.

VI.—The R.U.S.I. Journal.

PAYMENT FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

Naval and military officers, whether members of the Institution or not, are invited to send papers, maps, experiences, narratives, etc., which may appear to be of general interest, for the consideration of the Editor, with a view to publication in the quarterly JOURNAL of the Institution. The Council have allocated funds for the purpose of providing payment for the same.

VII.—Distribution of the Journal—Members' Addresses.

Owing to the War, members' addresses have become so uncertain, and are so constantly changing, that punctual distribution of the JOURNAL is quite impracticable, and many members must fail to receive their copies. A large number of copies of the last numbers have been returned to the Institution, through the Post Office, "Addressee not found." It is notified, therefore, that any member who does not receive a copy of the present issue can be supplied by applying to the Secretary and giving an address.

VIII.—The Museum.

The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was :—

£70 16 6 in August.
£43 14 6 in September.
£33 15 0 in October.

ADDITIONS.

- (3436) Model of the German Cruiser "Scharnhorst," which was taken by the East African Expeditionary Force at Dar-es-Salaam in 1916, where it formed part of an exhibition of German warship models about to be held there. The model has been presented to Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., by the General Commanding and the East African Force. On its arrival it was found to have been immersed in the water and portions of shell fish were found inside the case.

On December 8th, 1914, the German Squadron, commanded by Admiral Von Spee, was encountered off the Falkland Islands by a British Force under Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee and virtually annihilated, only one vessel, S.M.S. "Dresden," escaping.

The German ships were sighted at 8 a.m., when the British Squadron was completing with coal, and turned away on being fired at by H.M.S. "Canopus" over the land.

The Squadron weighed and the signal for "General Chase" was made at 10.20 a.m. on clearing the harbour; the action developed into three encounters, with the following results:—

4.17 p.m. "Scharnhorst" sunk by H.M. Ships "Invincible" and "Inflexible."

6.0 p.m. "Gneisenau" sunk by H.M. Ships "Invincible," "Inflexible" and "Carnarvon."

7.27 p.m. "Nurnberg" sunk by H.M. Ships "Glasgow" and "Cornwall."

9.0 p.m. "Leipzig" sunk by H.M.S. "Kent."

The "Scharnhorst" was an armoured cruiser, with a displacement of 11,600 tons, length 550 ft., beam 71 ft., mean draught 25 ft.; armament—eight 8.2 in., six 6 in., and twenty 24-pdr. guns, four machine-guns, and four submerged torpedo tubes (18 in.)—Loaned by Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Vice-Chairman of the Council, Royal United Service Institution.

- (6876) A French Dress Sword, of about the time 1760, and probably used by a page of honour. The hilt is richly gilded and the blade finely chiselled.—Given by Captain A. Foster.
- (6877) Rifleman's Cap Badge of the 14th (Service) Bn. (Young Citizens) Royal Irish Rifles.—Given by Captain H. G. Parkyn.
- (6878) Four Base Metal Tokens for the sums of 10s., 2s. 6d., 1s., and 6d., for issue to the officer prisoners of war in the United Kingdom.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6879) Flag of Chinese Pirate Flagship. In October, 1849, Captain Hay, of H.M.S. "Columbine," was ordered to proceed from Hong Kong to destroy the fleet of the Chinese pirate, "Shap'n'gtzai," who was causing great depredations on the Chinese coast. H.M.S. "Fury," and the H.E.I. Company's steamer "Phlegethon" were

put under his orders, and on October 8th the little command left Hong Kong. On the 19th of that month the pirates' fleet, consisting of some twenty-seven junks, was discovered preparing to attack Haiphong. At about 4.30 p.m. on October 20th, Hay, who was in the "Phlegethon," led in, followed by the "Fury," which had the "Columbine" in tow. The pirate flagship very soon blew up, and by nightfall all the twenty-seven junks were entirely destroyed; but "Shap'n'gtzai" managed to escape.—Given by Mrs. Farran.

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

November 1st, 1917.

THE JOURNAL
OF THE
Royal United Service Institution.

VOL. LXII.

NOVEMBER, 1917.

No. 448.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

MILITARY CHARACTER.¹

By VICE-ADMIRAL WM. S. SIMS, U.S. Navy.

IN assigning me the task of delivering a lecture upon military character before the Civilian Naval Volunteers, the Navy Department directed that the lecture be informal and non-technical in character, and enlivened, where practicable, by ample illustration and anecdote.

The requirement that it be informal and non-technical is not difficult of fulfilment, but I am afraid it is a subject that does not lend itself to enlivening anecdote. Character is a moral attribute, and consequently an analysis of its elements, with the inevitable enumeration of our own deficiencies, must necessarily partake somewhat of the nature of one of those uncomfortable sermons which expose our many moral weaknesses—and if any of you have been to church recently and have heard one of those sermons, you know just about how enlivening they are.

In reality such sermons are unavoidably depressing, and so necessarily is a lecture upon character, either civil or military. The parson reminds us that we have left undone those things that we ought to have done, etc., and the lecturer on character presents such a formidable array of essential virtues that not even the most self-satisfied among us can claim to possess and practice all of them.

¹A lecture delivered to the Civilian Naval Volunteers, September, 1916, as deleted November 29th, 1916.

For example, to mention at random a few of the qualities that the various authoritative writers on the subject specify as essential to the successful training and leading of men in war, we have:—

Ardour, bravery, zeal, endurance, courage, fortitude, attainment, experience, knowledge, self-restraint, decision, combativeness, energy, caution, initiative, compliance, loyalty, fidelity, industry, studiousness, will, activity, self-confidence, responsibility, patience, resolution, imperturbability, cheerfulness, imagination, memory, circumspection, boldness, enterprise, foresight, discernment, perseverance, tact, good manners, system, thoroughness, etc.; and, finally, we find the official expression of the military ideal in our service in the first of the Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States:—"The commanders of all fleets, squadrons, naval stations, and vessels belonging to the Navy are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honour, patriotism, and subordination."

From this you will see that the moral qualifications necessary for a good military character are much the same as those found in what we usually call a strong character in civil life.

Needless to say, a discussion of each one of the qualities enumerated, and their bearing upon the character required for successful leadership, would require a volume. Many volumes have been devoted to this subject. Almost all of the writers have confined their studies to the traits of character found in great leaders, but the literature concerning the character of the great body of subordinates is very scant. I will confine my remarks principally to the latter, because the character of the great body of officers and men is of more importance to us than is the character of that rarely attained ideal—a great leader of men.

During the summer of 1913, a conference upon this subject was held at the Naval War College. This conference was based upon the following question:—

Discuss the qualities of military character, the means of their development, and the method of their employment.

Discuss the relation of loyalty, initiative, and the spirit of co-operation to naval efficiency.

Explain in detail your view of, and suggest methods for, improving the present military character of our service.

In reply to this question, six papers were submitted by members of the conference. Three of them are included in a mimeograph volume issued by the college. They are by Colonel Henry C. Davis, U.S.A., Commander R. R. Belknap, U.S.N., and Commander Frank H. Schofield, U.S.N. I wish that you could all read these very able and interesting discussions. Unfortunately they are much too long for quotation or for much of their contents to be included in such a brief paper as this necessarily must be.

In addition to the above, the volume referred to contains extracts from 100 short papers submitted by officers of the Atlantic Fleet—by ensigns, lieutenants, lieutenant-commanders, and commanders—who

took an elementary course at the college. These were submitted in compliance with the following order:—

Each officer will submit to the President of the War College on Wednesday of the second week of the course a brief thesis on "Loyalty, Initiative, and Decision of Character," written from the standpoint of his own experience.

To any one who is studying this subject, these papers are of singular interest as showing the degree to which our service is beginning to grasp these essentials. In commenting upon them, the college stated that they "are worthy of the closest attention by officers of all grades and corps."

Of course I realize that, upon an occasion of this kind, I must be brief, on pain of being as much disliked as is the parson who preaches a long moral sermon in the middle of August. I will therefore refer but briefly to the essential qualities of the great leaders, and confine my remarks, as above indicated, principally to the military character of the subordinate, to his relation to his superior, to the conduct of the superior toward the subordinate, and to the duty of the superior in training his subordinates in such manner as to inspire their loyalty, develop their initiative, and thus secure their effective co-operation.

We all know in a general way that a man upon whom is placed a great responsibility in a great war, a Joffre or a Jellicoe, should not only be a model of virtue, honour, patriotism, and subordination, but that he should have a thorough knowledge of his profession, and the self-confidence which this renders possible. Also a strong will, great decision of character, resolution, energy, loyalty to his Government, his cause, and his subordinates, willingness to accept and ability to bear responsibility, fortitude in adversity, boldness in conception, caution in execution, imperturbability in council, thoroughness in preparation, besides personal courage, physical vigour, and many other secondary though essential qualities.

Each of these have been the subject of exhaustive analysis by the masters of war, and they make very interesting and instructive reading; but these writers have told us comparatively little of how we, the subordinates, are to conduct ourselves so as to inspire the maximum effort on the part of our subordinates, to the end that we in turn may render the maximum service to our superiors, and thus promote the maximum efficiency of the whole organization. This is the feature of military training that has been least understood in the past, and is making its way so slowly in some services even at present.

It involves the two wholly essential twin qualities of loyalty and initiative, and all those qualities that are necessary to inspire and develop them, as well as all those that flow from their combination. Loyalty in itself is always indispensable, but initiative without loyalty is dangerous. It is their intelligent and trained co-operation which is the vital characteristic of modern armies.

They of course involve the most complete subordination to the will and plans of higher authority, the development of the feeling of proper responsibility, the exercise of reasoned decision; and they operate in

conjunction with the manly and moral virtues heretofore enumerated, such as zeal, courage, energy, activity, fidelity, etc.

The most desirable material for military service is a man who possesses all the qualities which are usually associated with good civil character; but the point that it is my wish particularly to accentuate is that the possession of these individual qualities will not render the man efficient in a military sense unless they are employed in such manner as to promote the efficiency of the whole organization to which he belongs.

This may best be brought out by a comparison between the methods of military control in former, though comparatively recent, times and those practised at present in the most efficient modern armies, or nations in arms.

- Briefly, the former system was rigid in requiring unquestioning obedience to explicit orders from superior authority. No initiative was allowed on the part of the subordinate. The latter was not informed of the mission or general plan of the leader. Orders were given in detail and were to be obeyed to the letter. The one idea of command of the soldiers of those days was "I order, you obey," for in their eyes unqualified and unthinking obedience was the first of military virtues. In operations of a certain magnitude this method of command frequently resulted in notable success, through the soldierly qualities of the personnel and its loyalty to the cause, its leaders, and its systems; but it broke down completely when opposed by a system that combined loyalty with the use of intelligent and trained initiative.

I am insisting upon this combination of loyalty and initiative, because I expect to show that a system of military education based upon it, applied from the leaders down to the last recruit, is the best possible school for training in military character, and in the art of war.

In order to illustrate the tremendous force of these two qualities when successfully combined, I will quote a few paragraphs from the "Science of War," by Henderson:—

"The study of war has done far more for Prussia than educating its soldiers and producing a sound system of organization. It has led to the establishment of a sound system of command; and this system proved a marvellous instrument in the hands of a great leader. It was based on the recognition of three facts: First, that any army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; second, that the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; and third, that intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience.

"If those portions of the Army unseen by the commander, and not in direct communication with him, were to await his orders before acting, not only would opportunities be allowed to pass, but other portions of the Army, at critical moments, might be left without support. It was understood, therefore, in the Prussian Armies of 1866 and 1870, that no order was to be blindly obeyed unless the superior who issued it was actually present, and therefore cognizant of the situation at the time it was received. If this was not the case, the recipient was to use his own judgment, and act as he believed his

superior would have directed him to do had he been aware how matters stood. Again, officers not in direct communication with headquarters were expected not only to watch for and utilize, on their own initiative, all opportunities of furthering the plan of campaign or battle, but, without waiting for instructions, to march to the thunder of the cannon, and render prompt assistance wherever it might be required. It was long before the system was cordially accepted, even in Germany itself; and it had been fiercely criticized.

"The first step was to make a clear distinction between 'orders' and 'instructions.' An 'order' was to be obeyed, instantly and to the letter. 'Instructions' were an expression of the commander's wishes, not to be carried out unless they were manifestly practicable. But 'Orders,' in the technical sense, were not to be issued except by an officer actually present with the body of troops concerned, and fully aware of the situation; otherwise 'instructions' only would be sent. The second step was to train all officers to arrive at correct decisions, and so to make certain, so far as possible, that subordinates, when left to themselves, would act as their superiors would wish them to do. The third step was to discourage to the utmost the spirit of rash and selfish enterprise.

"In the German Army of to-day the means employed to ensure, so far as possible, correct decisions are, first, a uniform training in handling troops. Every German officer, practically speaking, is educated in the same school and taught to adapt his action to the same principles. The school is that of the General Staff. The principles, few but comprehensive, are those laid down by the Chief of Staff; and they are disseminated through the Army by his assistants, the officers of the General Staff, whom he himself has educated. Each army corps and each division has its own Chief of the Staff, all of them replicas of their teacher; and no General, so far as possible, is appointed even to the command of a brigade unless he is thoroughly acquainted with the official principles.

"The second means is a systematic encouragement, from the first moment an officer joins his regiment, of the spirit of initiative, of independent judgment and self-reliance. Each has its definite responsibilities, and superiors are forbidden, in the most stringent terms, to entrench upon the prerogatives of their subordinates. The third means is the enforcement of the strictest discipline, and the development of camaraderie in the highest sense. Despite the latitude that is accorded him, absolute and punctual obedience to the most trifling 'order' is exacted from the German officer; while devotion to duty and self-sacrifice, exalted to the same level as personal honour, and inculcated as the loftiest sentiment by which the soldier can be inspired, are trusted to counteract the tendencies of personal ambition.

"The benefit to the State was enormous. It is true that the initiative of subordinates sometimes degenerated into reckless audacity, and critics have dilated on these rare instances with ludicrous persistence, forgetting the hundreds of others where it was exercised to the best purpose, forgetting the spirit of mutual confidence that permeated the whole Army, and forgetting, at the same time, the deplorable

results of centralization in the Armies they overthrew. It is inconceivable that any student of war, comparing the conduct of the German, the French, and the Austrian Generals, should retain even the shadow of a prejudice in favour of blind obedience and limited responsibility.

"'To what,' asks the ablest commentator on the Franco-German War, 'did the Germans owe their uninterrupted triumph? What was the cause of the constant disasters of the French? What new system did the Germans put in practice, and what are the elements of success of which the French were bereft?' The system is, so to speak, official and authoritative amongst the Germans. *It is the initiative of the subordinate leaders.* This quality, which multiplies the strength of an Army, the Germans have succeeded in bringing to something near perfection. It is owing to this quality that, in the midst of varying events, the supreme command pursued its uninterrupted career of victory, and succeeded in controlling, almost without a check, the intricate machinery of the most powerful Army that the nineteenth century produced. In executing the orders of the supreme command, the subordinate leaders not only did over and over again more than was demanded of them, but surpassed the highest expectations of their superiors, notably at Sedan. It often happened that the faults, more or less inevitable, of the higher authorities were repaired by their subordinates, who thus won for them victories which they had not always deserved. In a word, *the Germans were indebted to the subordinate leaders that not a single favourable occasion throughout the whole campaign was allowed to escape unutilized.* The French, on the other hand, never even suspected the existence of so powerful a factor; and it is for this reason that they met with disasters, even when victory, so to speak, belonged to them by every rule of war. The faults and omissions of the French subordinate leaders are to be attributed to the false conception of the rights and functions of command, to the ingrained habit of blind and inert obedience, based on a principle which allowed no exception, and acting as a law, absolute and immutable, in all degrees of the military hierarchy. To the virile energy of the Germans they could oppose nothing but impetuous courage. Compensation for the more powerful fire of the German artillery was found in the superior weapon of the French infantry. But to the intelligent, hardy, and even at times somewhat reckless, initiative of the German subordinate leaders, the French had nothing to oppose, in the grand as in the minor operations, but a deliberate inactivity, always awaiting an impulse from above. These were the real causes of the numerous reverses and the swift destruction of the valiant French Army, and therein lies the true secret of German strength. Her foes of days to come will have to reckon seriously with this force, almost elementary in its manipulation, and prepare themselves in time to meet it. No well-organized Army can afford to dispense with *the initiative of the subordinate leaders, for it is the determining factor in modern war, and up to the present it has been monopolized by Germany.*"

I would apologize for the length of this quotation were it not that nothing but authoritative testimony can eradicate erroneous infor-

mation and false ideas from the minds of those who do no professional reading. Many civilians who have read amateur press accounts of the machine-like precision of the German General Staff assume that all operations are ordered in minutest detail by higher authority and that no initiative is ever allowed the subordinate. This is a very natural assumption for those whose business does not involve the study of war; but to my utter astonishment I ran across a lieutenant-commander of nearly twenty years' service in our Navy who did not know that the fundamental principle of the German military system is reliance upon the trained initiative of subordinates, and that our Naval War College training is based upon the same principle.

Practically all armies have adopted the German method of developing the initiative of subordinates, combined with a doctrine of war.

Several years ago the Naval War College began to apply the same system to our naval training. The order form in use in the German Army was modified and adapted to naval needs. These orders are invariable in form. They consist essentially of three paragraphs. The first gives the subordinate all the available information that would be of use to him in the execution of the order. The second gives the general plan of the superior—the object he wishes to accomplish. The third gives the forces assigned for the operation. He is told what he is to accomplish, but not how he is to accomplish it. Thus he must do his own thinking and must exercise his initiative to succeed; and as all orders for all operations, even of the most ordinary kind, are issued in this form, it affords continuous training in initiative, judgment, and decision.

The ability to reach a correct decision without delay is not an inherited characteristic, as many suppose. It is a habit of mind that is the result of systematic self-training in decisions applied to all situations, both great and small, as they arise in our daily occupations. A correct decision necessarily involves a logical consideration of all available information and experience. But many men who have both this knowledge and experience are comparatively unable to decide their line of action, simply because they have not trained their minds to do so. This training is essential to the development of this faculty. It is of great importance in all walks of life, but it is wholly essential in military life.

There is this difference, however, between decisions made in civil life and those required in military life. The civilian has usually a reasonable time in which to arrive at a conclusion, whereas a military decision must often be made at once to be of any use. The enemy will not wait for you to make up your mind.

Similarly, the power to exercise prompt initiative in large affairs can be acquired only by the habitual exercise of initiative in small ones.

Both initiative and decision flow from practice in logical thinking, combined with knowledge and experience. When Napoleon was a young student, he was asked by a companion how he always managed to decide so quickly in certain matters. He replied "*En y pensant toujours*," by thinking of them always.

Do not assume that the ability to make prompt decisions is not of great importance to men engaged in any occupation, for the lack of this power is as fatal to success in civil life as it is in military life.

In this connection I am reminded of a cartoon I saw very many years ago in the French paper *Le Rire*. It depicted a man standing on the banks of the Seine looking down into the water. He was ragged, dirty, and emaciated, and his dejected appearance and attitude clearly indicated that he was seriously contemplating suicide. Under the picture was this legend: "All my misfortunes have been due to never having been able to reach a decision."

There have, of course, been isolated cases in the past where naval leaders have trained their subordinates in the exercise of initiative. The most notable case was that of Nelson. His methods and their success are perhaps better known in all navies than those of any other of the great naval commanders. His method was that of the conference. He discussed his principles, methods, and plans with all of his captains so frequently that all were thoroughly acquainted with them. These principles and plans thus became those of the captains as well as of the admiral. They were the plans of the fleet—of their organization. This fleet was a team trained to work together with perfect loyalty to the fleet and to its leader. There was consequently no possible ground for criticism, except that which was invited and fully considered in general conference. Moreover, Nelson never spoke ill of his subordinates, but frequently praised them. He was the friend and protector of his officers and others who were in trouble. When a certain captain complained that the Admiralty had sent him several useless officers, Nelson said, "Send them to my ship. I can make a good officer of any decent man." When a young midshipman of his ship got a panic on his first attempt to go aloft, Nelson sprang into the rigging after him, said how sorry he would be for a midshipman who was afraid to go aloft, and encouraged him until he was over his fright. Upon another occasion he came on deck and found the ship in "irons," that is, caught head to wind and sailing backward, but instead of abusing the officer of the deck and telling him he didn't understand his business, he asked him what he thought he would better do. The officer said that he did not know, and Nelson replied, "Neither do I," and went below.

Under such conditions it is impossible to imagine disaffection, disloyalty, or failure to do his utmost on the part of any officer who served under this wise leader. Moreover, it is easy to understand how successfully his captains could fight a battle without his personal guidance.

The completeness of his victory over the French Fleet at Aboukir was the result of dispositions due to the initiative of his captains, the dispositions they made before his flagship arrived on the field.

Though his methods and the reasons for their success are better known to all naval officers than those of any other of the great commanders, yet the astonishing thing is that they have been so seldom imitated. I have given them somewhat in detail in order to bring out the great importance of the methods, the judgment, the justice, and

the tact of a leader in training his command in loyalty and in the exercise of prompt initiative.

As these principles and methods apply to all cases where officers of any grade are placed in command of a few men, or of many men, it may be useful to give a few illustrations of the effect upon an organization of the opposite line of conduct.

The following illustrations are of course derived from exceptional cases chosen as horrible examples of the disastrous effects that may be caused by bad manners, lack of sympathy and tact, ignorance of, or disregard of, the elementary principles of governing men, and mistaken ideas of punishment. They are selected from various navies.

Upon a certain occasion when President Lincoln was being shown over a man-of-war, he observed a closed, coffin-like box secured in a vertical position close alongside the ship's galley. He asked what it was, and was told that it was a "sweat box"; that for certain offences men were shut in the box and kept there until they sweated their toenails off. He got into it and had the door closed. In a few minutes he burst forth and gave an order that this instrument of torture be abolished for ever as a means of punishment in the navy.

About sixty years ago flogging was a recognised form of punishment, and was regularly practised in the navy. A man was stripped to the waist, his arms triced above his head, and given the number of strokes with the "cat" assigned to the offence he had committed. This cat was a whip of such power that it could readily be made to cut through the skin.

Together with many of our naval regulations and customs, this was an inheritance from the British, though I do not believe we ever applied it to such a savage degree as described by Sir Charles Napier, who states that he had often seen from 600 to 1,000 lashes given; that if the victim could not stand the whole of his punishment at one time he was sent to the hospital until he had sufficiently recovered to stand the remainder. In the Russian Army of old, men were sometimes sentenced to be flogged "without mercy," that is, flogged to death.

This form of punishment was believed to be necessary for the maintenance of discipline, and its abolition by act of Congress about 1854 was resented by many officers. When the new regulation was received on a certain ship in the Pacific, the commanding officer had all hands called aft on the quarter-deck to witness punishment. A man who had been sentenced to be flogged was doubly ironed with his hands behind his back and placed in front of the bilge pump, from which a stream of water was turned on his face until he became insensible. Each time he recovered consciousness the operation was repeated until the doctor reported that further punishment might endanger his life. Then the captain made a little speech in which he informed the crew that, though flogging had been abolished, he wished it clearly understood that he intended to maintain discipline on his ship.

The above incident was related to me by an officer who is still living, also the following incidents illustrating the savage nature of the punishments considered essential at that time, even for minor offences.

An executive officer was dissatisfied with the listless manner in which a man was sweeping down the deck. The man said he was not well, whereupon the executive officer had inflicted upon him the punishment of the "spread eagle," that is, he was triced up by the wrists inside the main rigging with his arms fully extended laterally, and allowed to hang there until he begged for mercy. He was then cut down and ordered to sweep the deck properly. He declared that he could no longer hold the broom, and was about to be triced up again, when, upon the suggestion of the captain, who had witnessed the occurrence, he was examined by the surgeon, who reported that both of his collar bones were broken.

Upon the same ship, a common form of punishment, then considered quite mild, was to lash a man's thumbs together behind his back, pass the lashing over a hammock hook and trice him up until his toes were just clear of the deck. My informant stated that this form of admonition never failed to bring the most refractory to terms within a very short time.

It seems to have been the general opinion in those days that the only forms of punishment that were effective were those that inflicted physical pain. Any man who was slow in obeying orders ran the risk of a blow from a rope end or a belaying pin in the hands of the nearest boatswain's mate. When hammocks were piped up, or all hands called on deck to make or furl sail, it was a common practice to station at the foot of each ladder a husky boatswain's mate, armed with the dreaded cat, and charged with the duty of slashing the last man on the part of his anatomy that was the last to disappear up the ladder. This was not considered as a punishment but simply as a reminder of the captain's desire to have a "smart ship."

To a certain extent this harsh treatment of enlisted men in the Navy was a reflection of similar methods in the merchant services of all nations, from which at that time many of our men were recruited. An admirable officer who came into the navy during the Civil War, after considerable service on American merchantmen, stated that when he first shipped as an apprentice on a deep-water ship, he was systematically persecuted and terrorized by the officers, particularly the bucko first mate. When he had been on board but a few days, the mate ordered him to replace a broken ratline in the main rigging, and when he replied he didn't know how, he had to fly for his life, as he thought, so savagely did the bucko chase him forward, roaring threats to kill him if he didn't find out damn quick and get up into the rigging and remain there until he finished. A sailor showed him how to turn in a splice and explained how to seize it on, and he set to work. Presently the captain came on deck, and, noting what a poor job he was making of it, ordered him down. He attempted to explain that the mate would murder him if he came down. Whereupon the captain seized a belaying pin, and exclaiming, "I'll show you who your Jesus is on board this ship," let fly and brought him down like a ripe apple. Through such instructions he obtained his knowledge of practical seamanship and sea manners.

You are doubtless familiar with the sea classic "Two Years Before the Mast," and similar accounts of life on board ship in the days of hemp and oak. Discipline was maintained through fear and physical force, and many sailors accepted their treatment without particular resentment, as all in the day's work.

When a classmate of mine was a young lad he was taken for a trip on a Lake Michigan schooner. One day he saw the captain step up behind the man at the wheel, glance over his shoulder at the compass, step back and knock him senseless, and take the wheel himself. When the man recovered consciousness, he got up and took the wheel again, and the captain walked away about other business. No word was spoken. The man understood that he was punished for being off his course.

Many officers conscientiously believed that it was their duty to keep a vigilant lookout for all violations of their numerous regulations, the majority of which concerned the minutiae of appearances and ceremonious forms rather than military efficiency. An amusing yarn is told of a captain possessed of this obsession who used to come on deck each morning, find all the fault he could, then go down to breakfast and easy digestion in the happy frame of mind that is the reward of duty well performed. One morning he could find not the slightest fault, as the entire crew and all the officers concerned, having determined to satisfy him for once, had left nothing whatever undone. All brasswork shone like gold, all sails were trimmed to a nicety, all gear coiled down, the decks as clean as a Dutch kitchen, and even the last grain of sand blown out of the seams of the deck. The "Old Man" got "madder and madder" as he paced the quarter-deck searching for a flaw and found none. Finally, he hailed the lookout in the topsail yard, and in reply to a prompt "Sir?" shouted, "I'm a lookin' at ye, dad gast ye!" and went below in a towering rage.

There still exist officers of this last type, though the necessity of achieving military efficiency, even at the expense of yacht-like appearance, is rapidly passing them into the discard.

There were not a few cases of vessels that were "shipshape from truck to keel," scrubbed, painted, and polished to perfection, but with gun crews untrained and gun gear "frozen." Such ships have been known to dump their target practice ammunition overboard to avoid having the paintwork tarnished by powder gases. This has occurred in various navies. I was present at a target practice where all but one round of the ammunition from a twelve inch turret was fired by the turret officer sticking his head out of a hatch in the roof of the turret and sighting over a ring bolt on the forward end. The smoke of the first shot had clouded the telescope sights, so that the pointers could not see the target, but the captain insisted that the guns be fired all the same. Of course no hits were made, but the object of getting the ship back into port on schedule time was attained.

As an example of treatment not calculated to inspire a very high degree of loyalty, the following was related by a foreign officer. A lieutenant reported for duty on a certain ship. The captain's greeting was: "Why did you come to this ship? I didn't ask for you. I don't

want you. What are your habits, anyway?" The officer very unwisely replied: "I usually get up at 3 a.m., shave and report for duty," whereupon the captain ordered that he do so every morning thereafter.

The following occurred in our service. Three midshipmen reported for duty on a seagoing ship, after having, of course, spent all their money. The executive officer stood them on a seam on the quarter-deck and informed the captain. The latter, after looking them over carefully, pointed to one and said: "I'll keep that one, put the other two ashore." This was accordingly done. A distinguished admiral, who was one of the three middies concerned, related this yarn during a call on a wardroom mess of which I was a member. We asked him if he was the midshipman selected, and he replied that he was not.

Shortly after I reported on my first ship, I learned that if I made out an official application for leave, and the captain approved it, I would be free to do as I pleased until my leave expired. So, having prepared the document in due form, I requested the marine orderly at the cabin door to hand it to the captain. This orderly was an old man who had had extensive experience with the temperamental idiosyncrasies of commanding officers. He glanced at the paper and at once handed it back to me with the following wise admonition: "If you'd be a takin' of my advice, now, Mr. Sims, you'd hand this here request in after the old man's had his lunch: he's in a h—l of a humour this mornin'." I followed this advice and my leave was granted, and since that time I have seldom if ever made any request of a superior officer until after he has had his lunch. I have related this incident to you gentlemen because I believe that a systematic avoidance of contact with the empty stomach will be found as advantageous in civil as in military life.

It would appear that in former times there was too often excessive severity in the exercise of authority, little or no attempt to control bad tempers, not much respect for higher authority, and excessive solicitude for personal dignity. The following are illustrations:—

A captain was assigned to relieve another in command of a ship. The crew and officers were mustered on the quarter-deck for the usual ceremony on such occasions. After the orders were read and the new captain had assumed command, he sent for the regulation book, tore all the inside out of it and threw it overboard, placed the cover over his shoulders, and, announcing that thereafter he would be the regulations, gave the order to "pipe down" and marched into the cabin. I have heard an admiral protest that there should be no regulations that applied to an officer of his grade.

Here is a yarn which, though a very ancient "chestnut" in the Navy, nevertheless will serve to illustrate, by contrast with present ideas, the great change which has taken place in the importance which officers attach to the ceremonious consideration shown their persons and positions.

One Sunday morning a pompous admiral in command of a navy yard was a trifle late at chapel. The chaplain was "just caught," that is, a young man whose conception of the relative importance of officiating divine in full regalia and his commanding officer was still so defective that he began the service before the arrival of the admiral,

who, entering just in time to hear the announcement that "The Lord is in His holy temple, let all the earth keep silence before Him," promptly replied: "Sir, I would have you understand that the Lord is not in His holy temple until I have taken my seat." The admiral dozed comfortably through the remainder of the service until the chaplain announced that communion service would be held in the chapel on the following Sunday, "by order of the bishop of the diocese." The words "by order" brought the admiral bolt upright in his chair to demand: "By whose order did you say, sir?" The chaplain with grave dignity replied, "By the order of the bishop of the diocese." "Well, sir," replied the admiral, "Let me inform you that I'm the bishop of this diocese, and there'll be no communion service here next Sunday."

Though incidents such as the above refer chiefly to the manners and methods that pertained before the humane ideas of our times rendered them impossible, it is nevertheless true that there still exist in all military services some officers whose methods of discipline are based upon equally mistaken ideas, and are productive of equally deplorable results.

For example, there are those who conscientiously practise such precepts as the following:—

Never fail to punish all faults, including those of omission, if you want to have an efficient ship.

Always put at least two officers under suspension to insure a general order being carried out properly.

An executive officer should not be on speaking terms with any of the watch officers.

Never consult a subordinate. Give him an order and insist that he carry it out in detail as directed. He is not paid to think.

Nothing "brings a man to time" so quickly as solitary confinement in the brig on bread and water.

Such indiscriminating severity invariably leads to trouble, and when combined with disrespectful or contemptuous treatment sometimes causes such complete disaffection and resentment as to result in very serious failures of discipline. A single officer of the character indicated may cause this deplorable condition. I have in mind a successful and happy ship of the old Navy which, shortly after the reporting of a new executive officer, who treated the crew with great severity and positive injustice, became mutinous to such a degree that gun gear was thrown overboard, gear was cut, etc. Also a vessel where similar conditions resulted in a combination among the gun pointers not to hit the target. One pointer who in his enthusiasm forgot the agreement and made a good score was taken on the fore-castle and soundly beaten by the crew. Cases have been known where it was not safe for certain officers to go forward at night, and where attempts have been made to kill the master-at-arms or other petty officers.

In contrast with such cases is the happy and successful ship—for the happy ship is almost invariably successful. Both officers and

men brag about "their ship." They will not allow her to be beaten in anything if they can help it. Every man loyally does his best to help along, and is encouraged to exercise his initiative in so doing. Such a ship is a practical school in the development of the two primary essentials of military character, that is, loyalty and initiative.

Let me disclaim again any idea of implying that these cases are typical. They are wholly exceptional at the present time, though they were all too prevalent within the period of service of men still living. Nevertheless men of the type described above, and their mistaken methods of discipline, still exist, though in a somewhat more civilized form.

I refer to these cases because it seems to me that an understanding of the evil consequences of mistaken methods and defective character gives a much more impressive idea of the value of the opposite qualities than any academic analysis could possibly give.

It seems almost incredible that there should be men of marked intellectual capacity, extensive professional knowledge and experience, energy and professional enthusiasm, who have been a detriment to the Service in every position they have occupied. They are the so-called "impossible" men who have left throughout their careers a trail of discontent and insubordination, all because of their ignorance of, or neglect of, one or many of the essential attributes of military character.

I knew one such officer who was a polished gentleman in all respects, except that he failed to treat his enlisted subordinates with respect. His habitual manner to them was calmly sarcastic and mildly contemptuous, and sometimes quite insulting, and in consequence he failed utterly to inspire their loyalty to the organization.

A very distinguished officer said after reaching the retired list: "The mistake of my career was that I did not treat young officers with respect, and subsequently they were the means of defeating my dearest ambitions."

The services of this officer, in spite of this defect, and by reason of his great ability, energy, and professional attainment, and devotion to the Service, were nevertheless of great value.

Both qualities and defects of course exist in varying degrees. These sometimes counterbalance each other, and sometimes the value of certain qualities makes up for the absence of others.

Some officers of ordinary capacity and attainments have always been successful because of their ability to inspire the complete and enthusiastic loyalty of all serving with them, and thus command their best endeavours; but no matter what other qualities an officer may possess, such success can never be achieved if he fails in justice, consideration, sympathy, and tact in his relations with his subordinates.

Such men are invaluable in the training of the personnel of a military organization in cheerful obedience, loyalty, and initiative; and when these qualities are combined in a man of naturally strong character and intellectual capacity he has the very foundation stones upon which to build the military character.

The pity of it is that so many men of great potential power should not only have ruined their own careers, but have actually inflicted

continuous injury upon the Service, through neglecting to make an estimate of the situation as regards their characters and through neglecting to use their brains to determine the qualities and line of conduct essential to success in handling their men, and thus failing to reach a decision which their force of character would have enabled them to adhere to.

Such a reasoned process applied to the most important attribute of an officer, namely, his military character, would have saved many from partial or complete failure through the unreasoned, though conscientious, conviction that it was actually their duty to maintain an inflexible rigidity of manner toward their subordinates, to avoid any display of personal sympathy, to rule them exclusively by the fear of indiscriminating severity in the application of maximum punishments, and such like obsessions.

It would appear that such officers go through their whole career actually guided by a snap judgment, or a phrase, borrowed from some older officer, such as the precepts quoted above. Though they have plenty of brains and mean well, their mistake is that they never have subjected themselves and their official conduct to any logical analysis. Moreover, they are usually entirely self-satisfied, and frequently boastful of their unreasoned methods of discipline; and they usually explain their lack of success by inveighing against the quality of the personnel committed to their charge.

All this to accentuate the conclusion of the War College Conference that: "We believe it is the duty of every officer to study his own character that he may improve it, and to study the characters of his associates that he may act more efficiently in his relation with them."

This, then, is the lesson for all members of our military Services. Let us consider seriously this matter of military character, especially our own. Let us not allow anybody to persuade us that it is a "high brow" subject, for though military writers confine their analysis almost exclusively to the question of the great leaders, the principles apply equally to all individuals of an organization from the newest recruit up.

Above all things, let us not regard loyalty as a personal matter. It is due to our organization and our country under all circumstances and under all possible conditions. No faults on the part of superiors can excuse any failure in loyalty upon our part. This is easy to say, but sometimes very difficult to live up to. As it is of the utmost importance, let me illustrate it by an example.

Suppose that, upon the outbreak of war, you gentlemen enlist in the Navy, and are assigned to what is termed a "happy ship," where you are treated with courtesy, consideration, and helpfulness. Your officers and petty officers assist and encourage you in learning your duties and the ways of the Navy. You find loyalty and obedience not only easy but an actual pleasure. You begin to think you are a disciplined man, until one day you are accosted by a boatswain's mate who has a voice like a bull, a scowl like a thunder cloud and a jaw like the corner of a box. He asks with a sneer why in the hell you did such a blankety-blank thing as so and so.

You begin to explain that you thought. . . . When he interrupts to inform you that of all the blank-blank idiots you are the limit, that you have no business to think, etc., but must get busy and do so and so, and be damn quick about it.

You are naturally shocked and indignant, and feel a strong resentment against the treatment of such a beast (there are a few of them left). You feel that it is impossible to be loyal to him. But the point is that your loyalty is not due to him alone, or to any other person, but to your organization, your ship, your "team." Disagreeable though he may be, he represents, as far as concerns you at the time, the commander-in-chief, the President of the United States.

Once you have grasped this, it will be clear to you what your attitude and conduct should be; but could you bear such insulting treatment without open resentment? Could you obey such an order with a cheerful, "Aye, aye," and without even showing by your expression that you resent it?

If you could do so, and by reason of that, and similar experiences, you should acquire an attitude toward your subordinates that would inspire them with loyalty to the team, as well as to yourself, you would become a very useful servant of Uncle Sam, and you would be pointed in the right direction to accomplish as much as your natural ability would permit.

Of course no such affront to personal dignity should ever be inflicted upon any subordinate; but do not imagine for a moment that submission involves any loss of personal dignity and self-respect. Quite the contrary, for not only can you congratulate yourself that you have won a victory in self-control; that you have sustained the rights and functions of command; but that you have received an impressive illustration of the evil influence of abuse of authority, of injustice, of disrespect, or even of bad manners toward a subordinate.

Not infrequently the extent of this evil influence is under-estimated. It is hardly possible to exaggerate it. It is always dangerous if not checked in time. I have in mind the case of a large body of men under one command, but divided into, say, ten groups, each under its own officers. In one group the serious offences committed within a short period were twenty times as great as in the other time. The cause was found to be the manner and methods of a leading petty officer that were similar to those of the boatswain's mate described above, though less in degree. The defect was corrected and the trouble disappeared. If it had been allowed to continue, it might have spread through imitation, and might possibly have turned the organization into a "mad house" of the kind heretofore described.

A petty officer of this kind is a greater menace to discipline and loyalty than many "bad" men, and his conduct should therefore be corrected, or the man at once disgraced or dismissed. In the case of an officer the evil influence is of course much greater.

The point is that all those who exercise authority should remember that, in their daily contact with their subordinates, every order, as well as the manner, bearing, and attitude of mind with which it is given, has its influence in promoting or retarding the mission of the

whole organization, that is, its maximum efficiency in preparation for war.

The responsibility rests of course with him who is in chief command. He has the power to eliminate all detrimental subordinates, and if through kindness of heart or personal consideration he fails to do so, he must take the consequences. He is also responsible for the amount of initiative and loyalty displayed by his subordinates, it being one of his most important duties to see that they are trained in these invaluable qualities.

The methods of this training are therefore all important. They must be provided for in the organization, which should be such as to insure that responsibility is passed down the line, each subordinate being assigned the full share that properly belongs to his rank or station; and all should be brought thoroughly to understand what are the influences, whether of method or of conduct, which tend to promote loyalty or to discourage it.

In a military organization "good enough" is no good. War is a vitally important game of one great team against another, and if your team is not adequately trained it will suffer defeat. In civil life the law holds you blameless if you can prove that you have exercised reasonable diligence in carrying out a contract; but by military law a court-martial will hold you to account unless you have done your "utmost."

This utmost cannot be achieved unless there is loyalty throughout the organization. It is the one wholly indispensable quality. All officers desire it from their subordinates, and wish to accord it to their superiors, but unfortunately, through failure to study the important subject of military character, and particularly through failure to estimate the influence of their own characters, methods, bearing, and conduct, upon their subordinates, they often conscientiously pursue a mistaken course.

Let me, therefore, in conclusion, briefly enumerate a few of the most important things that should always be done, and a few of those that should always be avoided, in the effort to promote loyalty and initiative in those for whose training we are responsible.

1. Always let your general mission be understood: The American is willing to co-operate when his intelligence is enlisted.
2. Invite suggestions, and consider them carefully.
3. Hold conferences for this purpose. I have known valuable improvements in seamanship, gunnery, radio, etc., to result from such suggestions from junior officers and enlisted men. Moreover, consulting subordinates greatly increases their self-respect, and tends strongly to promote initiative and inspire the "team spirit," which is another name for loyalty.
4. Make use of competitions where practicable. It promotes interest in even the most strenuous drills.
5. Explain the necessity for constant drill.

This imperative necessity is so very generally misunderstood by new men, and all too frequently even by old officers, that it is worthy

of special explanation. Usually the recruit does not understand why he is subjected to daily drills after he has thoroughly learned his duties. For example, most of the operations of loading and firing a modern gun are very simple. The beginner learns his own duties in a few lessons, and learns in a few days those of the other members of the crew. He therefore very naturally questions the wisdom of expending considerable perspiration each day in performing these arduous duties over and over again, and, not understanding, becomes dissatisfied. This is a natural result of the intelligence of our men. They are accustomed to understand what they are doing and why they are doing it; and experience has shown that when they do understand this matter they will drill enthusiastically, but that when they don't, their dissatisfaction is acute. This condition of mind is a prolific cause of trouble that frequently leads to desertion. It is therefore essential that officers understand and explain that the object of drill is not simply to learn how to perform the various necessary operations, but to repeat them so often and so continuously that these operations will eventually be performed subconsciously, that is, without really thinking about them; or, as we sometimes say, by the marrow of the backbone instead of by the brain. The following incidents will illustrate this:—

An Indian camp follower out West knifed one of our soldiers in a quarrel, seized a rifle, and fled. An officer and two old soldiers pursued him. The latter had taken magazine sporting rifles instead of their regulation pieces. Both parties took cover and opened fire. Each time a soldier fired he brought his rifle to the prescribed position of "load," carried his hand to his waist line to get another cartridge, and, finding none there, remembered that he had a different rifle, swung the lever of the magazine and fired again, only to repeat the regular drill operations after each shot. These men were trained to the subconscious degree. That is, in using their regular weapons they could be depended upon to perform all the necessary operations almost automatically, no matter what the excitement of battle.

The operation of balancing a bicycle is another subconscious process, as is also that of putting on the brake. After riding for many years a bicycle having a brake lever on the handle bars, I found that it was two or three years after adopting the hub brake before I entirely ceased, when surprised at a street corner, reaching for the lever that was no longer there. The subconscious process, or "habit," of using the old brake was so strong that it was hard to get rid of, and as this necessarily delayed putting on the hub brake, it was thus a real danger. Let no one therefore assume that because he is expert in handling a certain type of automobile, he will not be in danger, for a while at least, when he buys a new model that has a different kind of control gear. I am sure that many serious accidents have been caused by failure to recognize this dangerous persistence of the impulse in question, and I am inclined to believe that the danger is even greater in the case of the experienced drivers who do not understand this matter, and are therefore over-confident, than in the case of the cautious beginner with his first machine. The manufacturer who makes a radical change in the control gear

of a new model thereby accepts a certain responsibility. We attempt to standardize the control gear of our naval guns so that a pointer transferred from one ship to another will not have to be trained over again.

Two old Erie canal boatmen, Jim and Mike, took a night off and went to a Bowery theatre. When the highly bedizened heroine appeared on the stage Jim said: "I believe that's Sal who used to be on the barge 'Pricklyheat' with us." Mike scouted the idea, but Jim offered to back his judgment with a bet and assume the burden of proof. This being accepted, he waited until the lady was engaged in the most impassioned scene of the melodrama, when he sang out sharply: "Low bridge!" and Sal went flat on her stomach, thus illustrating again the almost irresistible force of the subconscious impulse.

6. Be sure you know thoroughly the subject of all your instructions. Knowledge of your job always commands respect from those associated with you.

Two young officers who were sitting in the deck house on the old receiving ship "Colorado," noticed that every time the quartermaster, a man old enough to be their grandfather, came in, he laid his cap on the deck. They told him he need not even take his cap off, that the deck house was the same as out of doors. He replied: "You young gentlemen knows so much more as what I do that I just feels like takin' off me hat."

7. Encourage your men to come to you for information on any subject, and take pains to look it up and supply it. Help them in anything they want to study.
8. Train your men in initiative by "putting it up to them" on all proper occasions, and explain why you do it.
9. When you have inspired loyalty in all of your men, more than half your troubles will be over, for thereafter initiative will develop rapidly if you give it intelligent direction and adequate opportunity. Thus you will have developed a team in which the men will speak of the officers of their division or ship as "we," instead of "they."

A competent clerk who had just been dismissed asked his "boss" if he would please tell him in what respect he had been unsatisfactory. The boss replied: "In loyalty, in habitually referring to the administration of this company as 'they' instead of 'we.'"

10. Maintain discipline with the minimum reference to higher authority. If you succeed in establishing the relations indicated by the above, you will hardly ever need to appeal to higher authority.
11. Always be considerate of inexperience. When admonition will correct a small fault, it is almost always a mistake to inflict punishment.
12. Be absolutely just in all your dealings with your men. Hardly anything tends more strongly towards loyalty. All kinds of men respond to the "square deal."

13. Avoid harshness in manner or in methods. Let admonition or punishment be inflicted in sorrow, not in anger. Always give the man the benefit of any reasonable doubt.
14. Never destroy or decrease a man's self-respect by humiliating him before others. If his self-respect is destroyed his usefulness will be seriously diminished. A man who is "called down" in the presence of others can hardly help resenting it. Frequent "sanding down" of your men is an all too common mistake, and a very detrimental one.
15. Do not let the state of your liver influence your attitude toward your men.
16. Do not inflict severe reprimands for minor faults. Consider each case on its merits. Often an explanation of the result of faults is the most effective means of correcting them. Take pains to explain to the men what the effect would be upon the whole organization if faults were not corrected.
17. Remember that the purpose of all forms of punishment is correction—a correction of the offending individual and a warning to others similarly situated. Never let the spirit of revenge have any influence upon your decision in disciplinary matters.
18. Before you take any action, or adopt any line of conduct, that concerns one of your men (or all of your men), consider carefully its effect upon the man's loyalty, upon the development of his character, and its effect upon the discipline of the organization, whether a company, a division, a regiment, or a ship.
19. Remember that every single one of your official acts exerts a certain influence one way or the other.
20. Avoid, as you would the plague, hostile criticism of authority, or even facetious or thoughtless criticism that has no hostile intent. Our naval gunnery instructions state that "destructive criticism that is born in officers' messes will soon spread through the ship and completely kill the ship spirit."

Lord Jarvis said: "Discipline begins in the wardroom. I dread not the seamen, it is the indiscreet conversation of the officers and their presumptuous discussions of the orders they receive that produce all our ills."

Each individual contributes to or detracts from the sum total of Service character.

Napoleon declared that the importance of moral qualities is to physical as three is to one.

Admiral Knight in his address upon the occasion of the graduation exercise of a class of officers last June said that "our people as a whole do not realize that preparedness is primarily a matter of character; that the preparedness of a nation begins deep down in the individual soul of the individual citizen—that it is essentially a consecration of self to a cause."

To a certain extent this is also true of the Navy. Heretofore little attention has been given to this very important subject. I do

not recall that, until quite recently, I had ever known it even to be referred to officially, either during the term of instruction at the Naval Academy or in the Service since that time. While this may be an extenuating circumstance, it should be recognized that it is no excuse for those of us who have violated many of the essential precepts without realizing the gravity of our offence; for it was our business as military men to understand the effect of our acts and conduct. But now that attention has been directed to this matter by the Naval War College, we may be sure that the essentials of military character will hereafter be officially recognized as an important element of an officer's education.



THE MARINES IN THE GREAT NAVAL MUTINIES, 1797-1802.

By COLONEL C. FIELD, R.M.L.I. (Retd.).

THE general tradition in the Corps of Royal Marines is to the effect that their ancestors remained absolutely loyal throughout the whole of the great mutinies that cast a deep shadow over the brilliancy of our naval prestige at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th.

It is, however, to be feared that this tradition is not entirely correct, though it may be considered to be true of the corps in general, the exceptions being merely sufficient to prove the rule.

With regard to the mutiny at Spithead in the spring of 1797 a recent naval historian¹ goes so far as to say:—"It was absolutely unanimous, the Marines joining eagerly with the sailors." But we may be excused if we prefer to accept the testimony of Captain Pelham Brenton, a naval officer who was present at the mutiny at the Nore, which took place later in the year, and who wrote a history of the Navy, in which he says:—"The Corps of Marines maintained its good character to the last, and, *had they been supported*, would have infallibly quelled the mutiny in the North Sea Fleet."

We cannot suppose this officer to have been unacquainted with the details of the previous outbreaks at Spithead, and had the Marines, as alleged by the first writer quoted, made common cause with the seamen, he could hardly have spoken so decidedly as to the temper and loyalty of the corps.

What it could and did do to maintain order when properly and resolutely utilized and backed up by the naval authorities was fully demonstrated by Lord St. Vincent in the Mediterranean Fleet in 1798, and there is little doubt that similar action would have reduced the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore to a mere flash in the pan.

Mutiny had been sporadic in the Navy² since the days of James I. The Stuart Governments do not seem to have had the faintest idea

¹ James Hannay—"A Short History of the Royal Navy." Vol. II.

² Mutinies were not, however, confined to the Naval Service. They were by no means unknown in the Army, at any rate during the 18th century. In 1763 nearly the whole garrison of Quebec, consisting of the 15th, 27th, and 2nd Battalion 60th, mutinied because a stoppage of 4d. per diem for rations was instituted. Then there was the famous mutiny of the Athol Highlanders (77th) at Portsmouth in 1783. This was occasioned by the regiment being ordered to India. The 68th and 81st were also implicated. Recruits awaiting draft for Indian service seem generally to have been quartered—or rather confined—in the Savoy and constantly mutinied. The Western Fencibles mutinied at Edinburgh in 1779, and in 1803 there was a serious mutiny at Gibraltar in the course of which twenty-five men were killed and three executed.

of attempting to treat the seamen of the nation with anything but the extremity of meanness and injustice. The primary cause of nearly all the mutinies that took place in their time—and indeed later—was the badness and insufficiency of the provisions issued on board ship and the withholding of some or all of the very meagre pay which had become due to the ships' companies.

Charles II.—that "Merry Monarch" who "never said a foolish thing and never did a wise one"—recognized this, but evidently thought that there was no possibility of setting it right. Says Pepys in his Diary:—"18th March 1668.—To Whitehall where we and my Lord Brouncker attended the Council to discourse about the fitness of entering men presently¹ for the manning of the Fleete, before one ship is in a condition to receive them. Sir W. Coventry did argue against it. I was wholly silent because I saw the King, upon the earnestness of the Prince, was willing to it, crying very civilly, 'If ever you intend to man the Fleete without being cheated by the Captains and Pursers, you may go to bed and resolve never to have it manned.'"

His Majesty might well have gone higher than these officers, for in those days the very highest personages were "on the make," and if any money passed through their hands some of it stuck to their fingers. So the seamen came off very badly and mutinies were by no means rare—except under the Commonwealth, which very early recognized that it paid to treat its fighting men well and fairly.

During the reign of Charles I. the crew of the "Swiftsure" mutinied and came ashore in a body with the full intention of deserting. Their Captain—Pennington—a notable sea-officer of his day—went after them and succeeded in inducing them to return on board, but he has left it on record that "their cases are so lamentable that they are not much to be blamed." Not long afterwards the crew of the "Lion" at Portsmouth also landed under the same circumstances, with the intention of marching to London, because "their wives and children were starving and they perishing on board." About this time, too, the crews of the "Vanguard" and "Reformation" also mutinied, being "in want of food, clothing, firing, and lodging—by being forced to lie on the cold decks."

The ship's company of the "Assurance" deserted in a body, and the sailors in Plymouth were stealing the soldiers' arms to sell for bread, there being no money forthcoming to pay their wages.

There were several other mutinies at this period, all attributable to a like lack of common humanity on the part of the Government, but in no case does there seem to have been any violence offered to their officers, which, considering Charles II.'s dictum, is very much to their credit.

During the Commonwealth, when the men were much better treated, there were but two cases of mutiny of any importance: one in 1650, on board the "Hart," when, the captain and officers being ashore, twenty-six out of her crew of sixty-eight made themselves

¹ *Viz.*, "at once."

masters of the ship, either with the intention of taking her over to Charles in Holland, of turning pirates, or because they were drunk. Very probably the latter cause had the most to do with it, as the mutineers soon fell out amongst themselves and so allowed the ship to be recaptured by the rest of their shipmates. The other cause referred to, which took place in 1653, was, perhaps, hardly a mutiny, but would be better described as a riotous assembly of seamen in London which was occasioned by the non-payment of prize-money that had become due, and which necessitated the employment of military force to disperse it.

At the Restoration all the old abuses were revived, and so wretched became the lot of our seamen that discontent was always rife, reaching such a pitch that some even forgot their patriotism and joined our enemies, the Dutch. "Many English sailors," says Pepys, recounting the destruction of the British shipping at Sheerness and Chatham in 1667, "were heard on board the Dutch ships, crying, 'We did heretofore fight for tickets—now we fight for dollars.'" The tickets referred to were the paper promissory notes issued in lieu of hard cash and which could only be turned into money at a ruinous rate of exchange—if at all.

Later on, in the time of William III., things were not so very much better, for we find that in 1693 the House of Commons "granted four hundred thousand pounds by way of advance, to appease the clamours of the seamen, who were become mutinous and desperate for want of pay; upwards of one million being due to them for wages."

During the earlier part of the 18th century there were not a few mutinous outbreaks, but space forbids their enumeration. Two only may be glanced at, on account of the peculiar circumstances which attended them. The first is, perhaps, one of the most extraordinary on record, the ringleaders being two commissioned officers, the first lieutenant of the ship and her lieutenant of marines, who, inducing a portion of the ship's company to join them, took possession of H.M.S. "Chesterfield," then stationed on the West Coast of Africa, at a time when the captain and most of the other officers were on shore.

These unworthy members of the Navy and of the corps paid the full penalty of their crime, both being shot at Portsmouth a year later. It is impossible to assign a motive for their conduct, unless it may be ascribed to drink and the hot climate combined.

The other mutiny to which reference has been made occurred on board H.M.S. "Namur" just ten years later. Seventy of her men broke out of the ship in Portsmouth Harbour and marched to London

¹ "Clarendon's History of England," 1803. In this connection it is interesting to note that a Navy Office Letter of October 27th, 1666, prays the Commissioners of the Ordnance to order that "twelve well-fixed firelocks, with a supply of powder and bullet," be delivered to Wm. Griffin, housekeeper of the Navy Office, "for the defence of the said Office," the Commissioners of the Navy being of opinion that "the present great refractoriness and tumultuousness of the seamen" make it needful that the Navy Office "should be provided with arms for its defence and securitie against any outrage in case of a mutiny."—Hist. MS. Com., 15th Report—Appendix.

to lay their complaint before the Admiralty. Fifteen of them, who seem to have behaved rather like Suffragettes in attempting to force their way to an audience, were put in irons and carried back on board. Tried by court-martial on board the "Newark," they were all sentenced to be hanged, but at the last moment a reprieve arrived for fourteen of them, lots being thrown to select the fifteenth, who was forthwith hanged at the yard-arm.

Curiously enough their grievance was not at all of the usual nature. The only cause of their irregular procedure is said to have been "the dislike they had to quit the 'Namur,' on board which ship Admiral Boscawen, when he . . . hoisted his flag was to bring the crew of his former ship with him."¹

Coming to the latter half of the century we find the spirit of discontent among the seamen to have gained strength, for in March, 1783, there was a mutiny of such extent at Spithead that it can only be compared with the great outbreaks of 1797.

Some of the ships' companies, notably those of the "Ganges," "Janus," and "Proselyte," threatened to run their ships on shore and destroy them unless their wages were instantly paid and themselves discharged. Personal threats were addressed to the commander-in-chief and the commissioner, and matters became so serious that a Cabinet Council was held which decided on sending Admiral Lord Howe down to enquire into the complaints of the mutineers, to see what could be done in the matter, and to report whether any redress was due to the seamen, who, it appears, were principally influenced in their mutinous conduct by their ships being ordered off again on service after a long commission in the West Indies. His lordship seems to have been rather a *persona grata* with the seamen, and, going from ship to ship, was received with great respect by the mutineers, even in the "Portland" and "Janus," which had been the scenes of some of the worst outbreaks.

The captain of the latter had been ashore at the time of the mutiny, and after the officers had done all they could to induce the men to return to their duty, but in vain, they asked them to hoist out a boat to bring him off. They refused, saying that "they might take the long-boat and man her with Marines, but not a seaman would get into her." Probably this was done, for the captain contrived to get off to his ship.

Lord Howe, having promised that the "Janus" and other ships should be paid off, the men returned to their duty—having gained their point. But, some delay occurring, the crew of the "Janus," at any rate, broke out again, and in the confusion which supervened the ship caught fire in the sail-room and was with difficulty saved from destruction. Lord Howe then wrote that if the men were so impatient for their discharge they must be content with bills or notes instead of money, which had not yet arrived from London. Upon this the mutineers once more returned to their duty, and the mutiny came to an end.

¹ "Annual Register," 1758.

It is on record that "in all the mutinous and disorderly proceedings" at Portsmouth, none of the Marines joined in that disgraceful affair; on the contrary they conducted themselves in so becoming a manner (when both Navy and Army shook off all discipline) that they were employed in keeping the peace and guarding the town, for which their officers were particularly thanked by Lord George Lennox, who commanded. The Commanding Officer, having acquainted the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty with this, received instructions to assure his men that their Lordships highly approved their conduct.¹

Nor was this the first time that their steadiness caused them to be selected for police work, for in *Lloyd's Evening Post*, January 7th, 1763, we find:—"Portsmouth.—Robbing increases here every night; on which account, two additional guards are to be mounted by the Marines, one on the Common, the other at the Point."

We come now to the famous mutiny at Spithead in April, 1797.² There is little doubt that the root of the whole matter can be traced to the same, or similar, causes which were responsible for the outbreaks in the days of the Stuart Kings and their immediate successors. It is not in the least likely that the men were at this period "cheated by their captains," though possibly the pursers were still, to a certain extent, indulging in their old practices of peculation; but "although very much underpaid, if the market value for a seaman was to be measured by the wages paid in the merchant service, there were limitations and regulations which deprived them even of the lower pay which was due to them."³ But the comprehensive nature of the outbreak was probably due to the presence of men in the Fleet such as Parker, the ringleader in the Nore mutiny, who had imbibed the revolutionary and socialistic doctrines which had been slowly finding their poisonous way into this country,⁴ to the machinations of the United Irishmen, many of whom were doubtless on board not only as seamen, but even in the ranks of the Marines, for this rebel organization was proved to have been at the bottom of the abortive attempt at mutiny at the Plymouth Division in this same year.

The first indication of the disaffection took the form of a series of anonymous letters setting forth the grievances of the seamen and Marines,⁵ which were addressed to Lord Howe⁶ and to the flag officers

¹ Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," 1804.

² There had been one or two mutinous outbreaks not so long before. One took place on board H.M.S. "Culloden" in 1794, and it is recorded in *The Times* (December 13th, 1794) that "During the time the ship was in this mutinous state, the crew flogged several Marines because they would not join them."

³ Hannay's "Short History of the Royal Navy," Vol. II.

⁴ "77th Company, W. Barton, Corporal, is promoted to Sergeant for his honourable and soldier-like conduct in delivering into the hands of the Commanding Officer a printed handbill tending to alienate the affections of His Majesty's soldiers."—Divisional Orders, Chatham, May 21st, 1797.

⁵ "It is to be observed that as the Marines were forcibly included in the declaration of the seamen, no imputation can lie on them on this account."—Brenton: "Hist. Royal Navy." (Note.)

⁶ "Whom they styled the 'Seaman's Friend,' knowing that he affected that character, but naval officers of that day thought that he did so invidiously to them."—"Recollections of a Sea Life," *United Service Journal*, 1832.

and captains of the Fleet. Partly, it is said, because they were all in the same handwriting and so probably attributable to the same individual, and did not really represent, it was considered, the general feeling throughout the Fleet, the authorities paid no attention whatever to these epistles. This was in February, and the Channel Fleet, from which these complaints were supposed to have come, sailed on a short cruise on March 3rd, the ships' companies evidently expecting to find that their respectfully worded petitions would have brought forth some fruit in the way of concessions by the time they returned.

But day succeeded day and week followed upon week without any indication that their representations had even been received.

Then came the crisis. On April 15th (Easter Sunday), Lord Bridport, who was in command of the Channel Fleet, made the signal to prepare for sailing. Instead of seeing, as he expected, the answering pennants fluttering aloft from the ships under his command, he was scandalized to hear loud cheering from every one of them, the "Queen Charlotte," a notoriously ill-disciplined ship, leading off. This demonstration was immediately followed up by a declaration on the part of the seamen that until their demands were complied with by the Admiralty, nothing would induce them to weigh anchor, "unless the enemy's fleet should put to sea."

Although, according to Brenton, something of the kind had been more or less expected by the authorities, no measures whatever had been taken to deal with such a contingency, and the mutineers had it all their own way.

This is the more strange, as the Admiral had only reported two days previously that "disagreeable combinations were forming, particularly on board the "Queen Charlotte," while on the day following Sir Peter Parker, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, had received and reported still further information as to the possibility of an outbreak, information which received further confirmation from a Marine of the "Royal Sovereign," who told his captain that if the men's petitions were not answered two guns would be fired from the "Royal George" as a signal for a general mutiny.¹ As it was, all that the captains and officers seem to have been able to do was vainly to remonstrate with their men in the attempt to bring them to a sense of their duty.

The next day the mutineers demanded a boat from each ship; two men from each were appointed to represent the whole, and the Admiral's cabin on board the "Queen Charlotte" was selected as being the most proper place for their deliberations.

On the 17th every seaman in the Fleet had been sworn to support the cause in which he had embarked. The next procedure of the

¹ "The extraordinary part of the business is the secrecy with which it was conducted; not an officer in the whole Channel Fleet appears to have had a suspicion of anything of the kind having been in agitation, and yet when the mutiny broke out at Spithead, there had evidently been much concert and communication among the several ships."—Letter from Lord Spencer to Lord St. Vincent, May 4th, 1797.

mutineers was to reeve ropes *in terrorem* at the fore yard-arms, not so much, it is probable, to intimidate their officers as to preserve discipline among themselves.

How much or how little were the Marines of the Fleet concerned in all this? From what occurred later on board the "London" it seems likely that no captain dared order his Marine Detachment to fire on the mutineers without an order from the Admiralty. Nicholas, in his "History of the Royal Marine Forces," says that "The late Sir Richard Williams, who was serving on board the 'Robust' as Captain of Marines, applied to the captain of the ship for authority to act, assuring him of the good disposition of the men under his command, and pledging himself by their efforts to save the ship. But Captain Thornborough shrank from committing the Marines to a possible conflict with the sailors, and recommended a little delay. In a few minutes the Marine officer returned: it was not too late but not another moment could be spared: the humane feelings of the commander impelled him still to temporize; and when Captain Williams returned, it was to say that his men must now save themselves, and the ship was lost."

Similar considerations might, and probably did, prevail in most of the ships of the Fleet. In any case the whole conspiracy had evidently been so well arranged and thought out by the conspirators that the actual outbreak was so sudden and simultaneous that the Marines had no time to get to their arms. As for their having joined in the plot, it is probable that there were few who did so in the first place, but after the mutiny had actually put the seamen in possession of the Fleet, there is very little that they could have effected, unarmed, and opposed to a strong, well-organized and triumphant body of mutineers.

On this point we cannot do better than to quote Gillespie, our earliest Marine historian, who wrote only three or four years after the event.¹ He says:—"The steady faithfulness of all those Marine soldiers who had served during the American War, and had survived the heavy reduction at its close, was uniformly conspicuous. At the outset of these lamentable events, an unshaken resolve to stand or fall with their officers inspired every breast; which, *had it been accepted*, might have led to the sacrifice of those brave men who would have been opposed to uneven numbers, in the seamen and many of their fellows, whom public emergency had embarked, untrained even to the common duties of their profession, and unhabituated to that strict obedience which is the essence of every military virtue. Unconscious of that dignity which belongs to his character, the raw recruit readily gives in to any scheme urged by the designing; of which there were too many, drawn from the dregs of society, amongst those provincial conscripts who had previously been levied at the

¹ Brenton, who was then a lieutenant on board the "Agamemnon," says that "the Captain, when urged to avail himself of the assistance of the Marines, refused to do so, because some of the men would be shot, and he could not endure seeing them lying suffering on the deck; but with a little patience there would be unanimity again!"

most enormous bounties to man the Fleet."¹ Many of these were foreigners.²

After some interchange of correspondence the Admiralty decided to comply with the greater part of the demands presented by the mutineers. On Saturday, April 22nd, an Order in Council was passed granting a free pardon to the delegates for the part they had played in the outbreak and ensuring the following advantages to the men of the Navy. An addition of 5s. 6d. per week to the pay of petty officers and seamen, bringing the wages of able seamen up to one shilling per diem, clear of all deductions, an addition of 4s. 6d. and 3s. 6d. per month to the wages of ordinary seamen and landsmen respectively. Also that none of the allowances made to the Marines on shore should be stopped upon embarkation, and that all ratings should receive the full allowance of provisions without deductions for leakage and waste.

In the correspondence between the delegates and the Admiralty occurred the following passage:—"And as a further proof of our moderation, and that we are actuated by a true spirit of benevolence to our brethren the Marines, who are not noticed in your Lordships' answer, we humbly propose that their pay be augmented, while serving on board, in the same proportion as ordinary seamen."

It is quite on the cards that this was a tactical move on the part of the delegates to discredit the Marines with the authorities in order that they should not attempt to make use of them to suppress the mutineers. Lady Spenser, writing to the Rt. Honourable W. Windham (April 20th, 1797), says of this incident:—"They (the men) at first agreed to be satisfied with Lord Spenser's concessions, and then got off again by insisting on including the Marines—a most artful subterfuge—making this hitherto useful body of men a party in their demands they ensure *their* concurrence in all of them."³

The concessions made by the Admiralty were accepted by the delegates and by the crews of the various ships, who signified their appreciation of them by cheering in the same way that they had done when the mutiny broke out.

All now seemed to have ended satisfactorily, discipline was renewed and every ship was once more under the command and control of its officers.

Unfortunately a delay in the Parliamentary sanction of their demands caused a suspicion to spread among the men that some jugglery was going on which would render the Admiralty concessions entirely nugatory, so that when on May 7th, in consequence of the arrival of the news that a powerful French Fleet was leaving Brest, Admiral Bridport again made the signal for the Fleet to weigh anchor from St. Helens, the seamen once more refused obedience.

The delegates again came to the fore and announced their intention of assembling on board the "London," the flagship of Vice-

¹ Gillespie (Lt. Alexander): "An Historical Review of the Royal Marine Corps to 1803." Birmingham, 1803.

² *Vide* Note II.

³ "The Windham Papers," edited by the Earl of Rosebery, Vol. II., page 48.

Admiral Colpoys, which with two or three other ships was lying at Spithead.

Upon receipt of this information the "London's" Marines were at once got under arms.

Whether the delegates who pulled up from St. Helens actually got on board seems doubtful, but it would seem that they came alongside and were informed by Admiral Colpoys that if they attempted to hold a convention on board his ship he would order the Marines to fire on them. But the delegates belonging to the "London" were on board, and very possibly other delegates from the ships lying with her at Spithead, and there was certainly a good deal of trouble and insubordination on board. According to one account the Admiral ordered the Marines to cover the delegates with their muskets while he again warned them, but it is not quite clear whether the delegates referred to were those on board or in the boats alongside.

However this may have been, there was certainly some sort of a scuffle on board, and a delegate fired a pistol at Lieutenant Simms, who commanded the Marines, and wounded him. Mr. Bover, the 1st Lieutenant, then ordered the Marines to fire. Some, at any rate, seem to have obeyed the order and some officers also fired, killing two delegates and three other seamen.

But it was too late. The mutineers had loaded the foremost guns and trained them on the poop, threatening to blow the whole stern out of the ship, and the officers and Marines with it, unless an immediate surrender was made.¹ They were only restrained from hanging Lieutenant Bover at the yard-arm by the personal assurance of the Admiral that both he and himself in ordering the Marines to fire had acted under the orders of the Admiralty.² The officers and Marines were now disarmed and made prisoners.

On board the other ships riotous scenes also took place, and a large number of their officers were put on shore.

On May 11th Lord Howe arrived at Portsmouth to inquire into and, if possible, settle the dispute, bringing with him a proclamation of pardon for all who should at once return to their duty. Matters were satisfactorily settled by the 15th, and the day following the Fleet sailed in search of the enemy.

Meanwhile a similar outbreak had taken place on board the Fleet at Sheerness, commencing on the 12th, with three cheers given on board the "Sandwich," the guardship at the Nore.

This was replied to by the other ships, which were instantly taken possession of by their crews.

The comparative moderation displayed by the mutineers at Portsmouth was not followed by the mutineers at the Nore, who accompanied

¹ This account is mainly taken from Brenton, and is supported by that of Lieut. Gillespie, R.M., who wrote in 1803:—"The partial support of the party of Marines on board the 'London,' given to Admiral Colpoys and his officers, at a time when they were surrounded by thousands of disaffected comrades, afforded a faint display of what would have been their general energies had such been called forth. They were overpowered by numbers after a contest in which Lieut. (now Captain) Simms was severely wounded."

² *Vide* Note III.

their outbreak with a good deal of violence and outrage, several obnoxious officers being half drowned by them.¹

Lieutenant d'Esterre of the Marines, on account of his activity against the mutineers, was sentenced by their ringleaders to be hanged, and though they eventually shrank from the commission of such a cold-blooded murder, they went so far as to actually place the noose round his neck.

On this occasion, too, the bloody flag was hoisted, either because it was the old nautical signal of defiance,² or possibly in its modern signification of communism.

Parker,³ the principal ringleader and probable instigator, always flew this flag when he pulled from ship to ship.

One of the first proceedings of the mutineers was to send four delegates to confer with the Spithead rebels, but three of them returned with a message that their action had been postponed on account of news that the French were at sea. The fourth, who was an unwilling mutineer, disappeared.

Eventually, on the 29th, several of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty went down to Sheerness and interviewed Parker and the other delegates,⁴ whose demands were so preposterous and manner so insolent that no compromise could be effected, and they returned to town. The fact was that the success of the mutiny at Spithead had emboldened Parker and those of his kidney to see how far they could go.

Two days previous to this meeting there had been yet another mutiny on board the Fleet under the command of Admiral Duncan, which was lying off Yarmouth.

Following the precedent of the other mutineers the crew of the flagship "Venerable" mounted the rigging and commenced operations by giving three cheers. But Major Trollope of the Marines, with his detachment, at once took charge of the deck, and, accompanied by the officers of the ship, arrested six men who were suspected to be ringleaders, placed them in irons, and completely cowed the rest of the mutineers. Captain David Wilson, the officer commanding the Marines of the "Agamemnon," was not able to save her in like manner, but when the mutineers demanded of him the keys of the arms chest, threw them overboard, telling the delegates that if they wanted them they had better go after them.

Only the "Adamant" obeyed Duncan's signal to sail to blockade the Texel, the remainder of his Fleet made off to join the rebels at the Nore.

Emboldened by this accession of strength the mutineers at Sheerness now made up their minds to enforce their demands by blockading the Thames. They do not, however, seem to have actually put this idea into practice, and as time went on they began to fall out among themselves. Some crews desired to return to their duty, while others were for continuing the struggle with the Government.

¹ *Vide* Note IV.

² *Vide* Note V.

³ *Vide* Note VI.

⁴ *Vide* Note VII.

Conflicts between the opposing parties now began to take place on board those ships in which opinion was divided. The "Repulse," trying to part company with her mutinous consorts, ran ashore, and in this position was subjected to a furious fire from the "Monmouth," and was also fired upon by the "Dictator," "Grampus," and "Ranger." The "Ardent" followed the example of the "Repulse" and succeeded in getting away, firing into the "Monmouth" as she passed her, and one after the other the rebel ships began to submit themselves to the authorities.

"On board the 'Iris,'" says one account, "the ship's company divided itself into two parties and prepared for a serious conflict. The royalists took possession of the fore, and the mutineers of the after part of the frigate; thus situated, they turned the great guns on each other and began a most terrible fight, in which, however, the mutineers were worsted."¹

By June 14th, even the "Sandwich" was wavering, the officers were released, and the seamen expressed a wish that the red flag of rebellion should be hauled down and the ship given back to her officers. Parker, and one or two others, tried to prevent this by saying that she would be at once fired into by three ships lying astern of her if the colours were touched, but Lieutenants Mott and Flatt, seeing the way the wind lay, said they would risk that, hauled down the rebel flag, seized Parker and confined him in a cabin with a couple of sentries over him. He was shortly afterwards tried and executed.

Although few details of the action of the Marines on board the mutinous ships at the Nore have come down to us, there is sufficient evidence to show that in spite of the command of the ships being taken from their officers, they gallantly stood by them, and in many cases were the means of saving their lives.

Among the documents at the Chatham Headquarters is a letter from the Commandant requesting the disembarkation of Sergeant Keen, of H.M.S. "Argonaut," at the Nore for the reason that "the Committee of Delegates on board H.M.S. 'Sandwich' having determined, if possible, to get him on board that ship, the behaviour of the sergeant during the time of the mutiny was such as to gain him the approbation of Captain Moss and every officer of that ship." There are records, too, of numerous promotions made for "good and soldier-like conduct during the mutiny at the Nore."

And in a letter of February, 1798, a "Committee of Merchants, appointed for counteracting the late mutiny at the Nore," gave £300 to be distributed amongst "the fifty-four non-commissioned officers of this (Chatham) Division who particularly exerted themselves upon that occasion."

An incident on board H.M.S. "Leopard" is worthy of mention. She was one of the first ships to be retaken by her officers, Lieutenant Robert Hayes, commanding her Marines, being severely wounded in the operation. Charles Cubitt, a private Marine, after being stabbed in the stomach and desperately wounded by a sailor named Sullivan,

¹ "History of the Mutiny at Spithead and the Nore," W. J. Neale, 1842.

pursued him with a loaded musket at his ear, on which the mutineer fell on his knees and begged for mercy. "The Marine magnanimously turned away his piece, and said, 'Dennis, I have no wish to take away your life, but I will make you help to work the ship,' which he did." When, later, Cubitt gave his evidence at the court-martial on Sullivan for mutiny, the prisoner exclaimed in court, "Charles Cubitt, every word you have said, my dear boy, is true, though I may be hanged for it to-morrow."¹

Besides the great mutinies at the Nore and at Spithead there were not a few more isolated cases in single ships. On board the frigate "Beaulieu," in the Downs, for instance, a mutiny seems to have been nipped in the bud by the Marines. Their officer reports to headquarters on June 27th:—"I am happy to say that the whole of the party on board joined with the officers and distinguished themselves with resolution and courage, and that it was owing to their timeous assistance the mutiny was quelled and the officers' lives saved from the mutineers' revenge."

Then there was the terrible affair on board the "Hermione" in the West Indies, when the mutineers, who, according to one account,² were mostly Frenchmen, massacred nearly the whole of the officers and handed the ship over to the Spaniards at La Guyara.

At Plymouth a very serious mutiny was within an ace of breaking out, but was discovered and frustrated. This seems to have had nothing at all to do with grievances, real or imaginary, but to have been a deliberate attempt at sedition and rebellion brought about by the disloyal association known as "The United Irishmen."

It came out that their object was to fire the magazines at the barracks and at Keyham Point, release the French prisoners, "and to do everything in their power to overthrow the established Government of the country and to murder every person who might attempt the least opposition to their design."³

The ringleaders were three or four Irishmen who had enlisted into the Marines, probably with a view of spreading disaffection in their ranks; but it is said that the 58th Regiment and the crews of two ships then in an insubordinate state were also implicated.

A Marine named Lee, who was found to belong to the United Irishmen and who was an attorney by profession, seems to have been the head conspirator, and all who joined him used to meet on the Long-Room Hill at Stonehouse to be sworn in as partakers in the plot.

The story goes that one Sunday in June a drummer, who happened to be sitting under a furze-bush on the hill, overheard some of these proceedings, and as soon as the conspirators had departed, went into barracks and reported what had passed to a non-commissioned officer, with the result that steps were taken to keep a watch upon certain men, and before long a sergeant⁴ became possessed of such important

¹ "Britannic Magazine," 1797.

² "Annual Register."

³ "Britannic Magazine."

⁴ Probably Sergeant Andrew Gilborn.

evidence that he felt it his duty to make an immediate report to the Commandant—Colonel Bowater.

It was in the afternoon and the officers were at dinner, so that when he arrived at the mess and asked to see the Commandant, that officer was by no means pleased and at first refused to see him. However, there was no time for ceremony, and the sergeant sent in word again, that if the Colonel would not come out, he must insist on going in to see him. This brought the Commandant out from his dinner to be greeted with the sergeant's report, which was to the effect that the mutineers had planned to seize the barracks almost at once.

Colonel Bowater instantly returned to the mess room, ordered all the officers to go at once to their quarters, load their pistols, and be ready in five minutes time, when he would have the "Assembly" sounded.

The men fell in and were ordered to ground their arms, after which the battalion was ordered to march some paces forward. The gates were locked, and the N.C.O.'s, with the assistance of the bandsmen, collected the arms and locked them up in the guard room.

Notice of the plot, which it was now known was not confined to the Marines, was sent to the garrison, and, thanks to this timely intelligence, the conspiracy was quashed.

The four Marines who had been the ringleaders, Lee, Branham, Coffee, and McGinnis—all Irishmen—were tried by court-martial and sentenced to death, with the exception of McGinnis, who was sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes and to be transported to Botany Bay.¹

For their services in connection with suppressing mutiny, no less than three sergeants of Marines were rewarded with commissions as 2nd lieutenants.² Sergeant O'Neale, for "detecting the late conspiracy of the United Irishmen belonging to H.M.S. 'Cæsar,' and for being very active in bringing forward evidence on the Marines who mutinied at Plymouth"; Sergeant Andrew Gilborn, "for his conduct in discovering the latter mutiny, and whose activity afterwards enabled you (Colonel Bowater) to bring the charges home to the individuals, who have suffered for it"; and Sergeant John Sweet, for his "services on board H.M.S. 'Pompée' in connection with the late mutiny."

The wave of disaffection reached the Mediterranean Fleet, but here all attempts at mutiny proved abortive, thanks to the foresight and prompt action taken by Lord St. Vincent, who at once took every possible step to enable the Marines to deal with an outbreak.

To quote from this distinguished officer's memoirs: ³ "Immediately it was clear to him that if ever a trial of strength should be actually attempted, the officers' reliance would be upon that trusty loyalty of the Marines, which never yet has failed, but always has been most ardent when most needed. Bringing them, therefore, forward upon

¹ *Vide* Note VIII.

² O'Neale, after promotion, distinguished himself in quelling a mutiny of black troops in the West Indies. *Vide* Appendix.

³ "Memoirs of Lord St. Vincent," J. S. Tucker, 1844.

all occasions, berthing them apart, separating them as much as possible from the seamen, clothing them with all the consequence he could, Lord St. Vincent placed the Marines of his Fleet in that conspicuous importance, in which from thenceforward they have ever since been holden."¹

As soon as the news of the mutinies in England reached St. Vincent he made a move. "I assembled," his Lordship wrote to Captain Duckworth, "all the captains of Marines on board the 'Ville de Paris' under pretext of informing them about uniformity of dress, in exercise, and in economy; but really to give them some sense about keeping a watchful eye, not only upon their own men, but upon the seamen. I directed that a subaltern should visit them at their meals, exhorted them to keep up the pride and spirit of their detachments; to prevent *conversation being carried on in Irish*, and to call the roll at least twice a day."²

Taken in connection with the mutinies in England, and especially with the abortive plot at Plymouth, this remark about *conversation in the Irish language* is very interesting, as it seems to prove both that there must have been a large percentage of Irishmen in the Fleet, and also that at that time there was an impression abroad that these outbreaks were not by any means to be entirely attributed to the seamen's dissatisfaction with their pay, provisions, or prize money, but that they had been, to a considerable extent, engineered by persons such as the members of the "United Irishmen," or of the "Corresponding Societies,"³ whose object was rather to attack the British nation and its Government, than to improve the seamen's position.

St. Vincent lost no time in issuing the following orders, which were to be observed whenever his ships were at anchor or moored:—

"1.—Guard to be paraded on the poop every morning at half-past eight o'clock, with all the form and order practised in the best regulated parades; and, after going through a short exercise, to descend to the quarter-deck at nine o'clock precisely, where all the accustomed formalities are to be gone through, with respect and decorum due to the occasion (although no Colours are allowed), and where there is a band, 'God save the King' is to be played, while the guard is under presented arms, and all persons present are required to stand with their hats off, till the guard shoulders. After the Commanding Officer of the detachment has received his orders from the Captain, or Commanding Sea-Officer on the quarter-deck, the arms are to be lodged, and the guard held in constant readiness for occasional service.

"2.—No non-commissioned officer, Marine, or soldier told off for guard, shall be called upon to perform any of the ordinary duties of the ship. The seamen are fully competent.

"3.—Gives a scale of guards for each rate of man-of-war.

"4.—A sergeant or corporal of the guard to patrol the ship every half-hour with two privates.

¹ Vide Note IX.

² The date of this order may be somewhat later.

³ Vide Note X.

"5.—The guard to continue for three days, and the relief to be exempt from duty the day before they mount, to clean their arms, clothes, and accoutrements."¹

Other orders issued with respect to the Marines were that whenever any punishment was to be inflicted on board a ship, an officer's guard was to be in attendance with loaded arms and fixed bayonets, "in the manner it has been practised on board the 'Ville de Paris'"; and that when at anchor, "the whole party of Marines in the respective ships of the Fleet are to be kept constantly at drill or parade, under the directions of the commanding officers of Marines, and not to be diverted therefrom by any of the ordinary duties of the ship."¹

By these and similar arrangements for keeping up the *esprit de corps* of the Marines, and by a system of almost isolating his ships one from another so that communication between the ringleaders among the disaffected seamen was so difficult as almost to be impossible, Lord St. Vincent established himself in a position in which he felt strong enough to deal in the most drastic manner with any attempts to defy authority.

One or two examples will suffice to show his methods. The crew of the "Romulus" broke out but were compelled to return to their duty by her captain, who, however, promised them that the ship should return to England on a certain date. On this becoming known to St. Vincent he allowed the ship to sail for England on the day promised, but the day previous he drafted every man out of her and manned her with another crew. The crew of the "Marlborough," which had been among the disaffected ships at Spithead, and on board of which an open mutiny had been quelled at Berehaven, were considered by her captain to be in such a state of discontent that he feared they would not allow a seaman who had been convicted of a capital offence to be hanged on board that ship. St. Vincent told him that if he could not command his ship he would at once supersede him by an officer who could, and issued an order that the man in question should be executed the very next morning, "and by the crew of the 'Marlborough' alone, no part of the boats' crews from the other ships, as had been used on similar occasions, to assist in the punishment."¹

To overawe the "Marlboroughs," all the launches of the Fleet, armed with carronades, were stationed in readiness to fire into their ship—and St. Vincent had his way. The culprit was hanged—and by his own shipmates.

The Admiral's determined measures inspired such a wholesome dread in the seamen of the Fleet that when a boat from the "London," which had been conspicuous in the Spithead mutiny, was alongside the flagship, and one of her men addressing a bluejacket he saw looking out of a port, asked, "I say, there, what have you fellows been doing out here, while we have been fighting for your beef and pork?" The seaman replied very quietly, "If you'll take my advice, you'll just

¹ "Memoirs of Lord St. Vincent."

say nothing at all about all that out here; for by G—d if Old Jarvie hears you he'll have you dingle-dangle at the yard-arm at eight o'clock to-morrow morning."¹

It goes without saying that wise and successful as were Lord St. Vincent's decrees for dealing with disaffection, the militarism of those which dealt with the Marines and their parades did not meet with universal approbation among those naval commanders who, in those sailorizing days, looked askance at pipeclay and parade.

The following letter from St. Vincent to the Admiralty sufficiently indicates this:—

“ ‘Ville de Paris,’ July 6th, 1798.²

“ Sir,—

“ The United Irishmen serving in this Fleet having, with their usual acuteness, ascertained the drift of the orders I have lately given touching the employment of the Marines when the ships are at anchor, and endeavoured to counteract them by persuading the Marines that there ought to be no distinction made, and some of the captains having shown a repugnance on receiving the order, likely to be productive of remissness in the execution, I directed Lieut.-Colonel Flight to superintend the business, and to correct any errors he might observe, and a newly arrived captain, from whom I little expected such conduct, having threatened him in the performance of this important duty, I have found it absolutely necessary to appoint him Inspector of Marines in the Fleet I have the honour to command.”

The daily quarter-deck parade, at which, in the “ Ville de Paris,” St. Vincent always made a point of appearing in full-dress uniform, does not seem to have been at all popular, and indeed was sometimes made a subject of ridicule. A really amusing parody of the Biblical story of Darius and the setting up of the golden image was composed by a lieutenant of the “ Thalia,” and fell into St. Vincent's hands. Contrary perhaps to expectation, he took it in very good part.³

Although mutiny was defeated as soon as a sign of it appeared in the Fleet off Cadiz, a pernicious leaven of it remained for a considerable time afterwards.⁴ St. Vincent writes to the Admiralty from the “ Ville de Paris,” off Ushant, in June, 1800, that “ the mutinous disposition of the seamen in Lord Bridport's Squadron was never even smothered. I could relate,” he continues, “ such atrocious proceedings in some of the ships as would make your hair stand on end.” According to Brenton a not infrequent toast at the secret meetings of the mutineers at this time was “ A dark night, a sharp knife, and a bloody blanket.”⁵

It was at about this period that St. Vincent, in pursuance of his policy of placing his whole reliance on the Marines, gave orders that

¹ “ Memoirs of Lord St. Vincent.”

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* A full text is given of the parody.

⁴ *Vide* Note XI.

⁵ “ Naval History,” Brenton, Vol. II., page 286.

they should be berthed close aft to the gun-room netting "without any seamen mixed with them." From this it would appear that the placing of the Marines' messes right aft, which was an axiom in the Navy to a very recent date, began at this time and that they were berthed elsewhere prior to 1800.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the corps, under the able direction of Lord St. Vincent, saved the Navy from even worse outbreaks of sedition than the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore. His Lordship fully recognized this, and was by no means ungrateful for the important service they had rendered to the Navy and to the country. As soon as he returned to England he strongly recommended the King to make the Marines a "Royal" corps, and almost on the last day of his life replied to an observation of his secretary as to "What a firm friend His Lordship had ever been to the Marines," by saying, "No, Sir, in obtaining for them the distinction of 'Royal,' I but inefficiently did my duty. *I never knew an appeal made to them for honour, courage, or loyalty that they did not more than realize my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England, they will be found the country's sheet anchor.*"¹

When in 1804 he was at the Admiralty and had to select some officers of the Marines for staff appointments he especially picked out those "who had distinguished themselves in quelling mutinies during the late war. . . . in preference to every other candidate."

Despite St. Vincent's firm hand the spirit of mutiny was but "scotched and not killed," for in March, 1801, the crew of the "Danae," a 20-gun ship, rose, captured the ship, and ran her into Camaret Bay, where they handed her over to the French corvette "La Columbe,"² while later in the same year, it is recorded that the same fate befel the bomb-vessel "Thunder," whose crew mutinied and surrendered her to the Spaniards at Bilbao.³ The "Castor," about the same time, was preserved to the Navy by her Marine detachment, who were ordered under arms⁴ at the first sign of mutiny and drove the disaffected seamen down to the lower deck where their ringleaders were secured. The service they had rendered was specially alluded to in the proceedings of the court-martial which ensued, and Sir John Duckworth, the Commander-in-Chief on the station, at once issued the following memorandum:—

" 'Southampton,' Fort Royal Bay,

"December 26th, 1801.

"Whereas the members of the court-martial on the mutineers of His Majesty's ship 'Castor' have felt called upon, in justice to the exemplary and meritorious conduct of Lieutenant J. S. Smith, of the Marines and the party under his command, to express their high sense of such spirited behaviour:—

¹ "Memoirs of Lord St. Vincent."

² Brenton's "Naval History."

³ "Brittannic Magazine."

⁴ *Vide* Note XII.

"It is my directions that these sentiments of the Court be read on board His Majesty's ships under my command, to testify how fully I concur with the Court in the commendation so deservedly bestowed."

The steadfast loyalty of the Marines, which must have received much strength and encouragement from the attitude in respect to them taken up by Lord St. Vincent, put an end to a serious mutiny which broke out on board the squadron in Bantry Bay on December 1st, 1801.

The "Temeraire" was the ship on board which the worst disturbances occurred, and it came out during the court-martial which was eventually held on the ringleaders, that the mutineers were so exasperated by the way in which the Marines steadily refused to give way to them, that a great number of them swore to murder them whilst asleep in their hammocks.

The Marines, on their part, did everything in their power to demonstrate their loyalty. The detachments of two of the ships at Bantry Bay wrote the following letters to their Commanding Officers:—

" 'Princess Royal,' Berehaven,

" December 12th, 1801.

" Sir,—

"We, the non-commissioned officers and privates, serving as Marines of a detachment under your command on board this ship, have heard with pleasure of the gallant conduct of our brother soldiers on board His Majesty's ship 'Temeraire'; and therefore beg leave to express, alike with them, our determination to oppose, with all our might and power, all unlawful combinations, and our readiness to obey our officers night or day."

(Signed by the whole party.)

"To Lieut.-Colonel Tench."

" 'Resolution,' Bantry Bay,

" December 15th, 1801.

" Sir,—

"I hope you will pardon the liberty we take in addressing you, but as we understand that some ships' companies have disobeyed the lawful commands of their superior officers, and knowing as we do the dreadful consequences that formerly attended same practices, for our parts we abhor the idea; and we hope you will inform Captain Gardner, likewise the Admiral, that it is our firm resolution to support and maintain our officers in everything which they may think proper, and which is best calculated to promote the interests of our King and Country.

"I have the honour to subscribe myself, and on behalf of the detachment of Marines, your most obedient servant,

" WILLIAM HEANS,

" Sergeant.

" Captain Forshall, Marine Forces."

The Lords of the Admiralty expressed their great appreciation of these letters and of the spirit which prompted them, and in compliance with their orders in a letter signifying this to Sir William Cornwallis, the Commander-in-Chief, the following memorandum was issued by Vice-Admiral Mitchell who was in command of the squadron:—

“Spithead, December 20th, 1801.

“It is my directions to the Captains of His Majesty’s ships ‘Windsor Castle,’ ‘Princess Royal,’ ‘Malta,’ ‘Glory,’ ‘Resolution,’ and ‘Vengeance,’ under my orders, to communicate to the Marines serving on board the above letter from the Commander-in-Chief; and I feel equally happy that their good conduct has merited such a mark of approbation from him, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.”

During 1802 the Marines twice saved the situation in cases of mutiny. The first took place on board the 84-gun ship “Gibraltar” when she was on passage from Gibraltar to Malta in October. The mutineers contrived to get possession of the ship, and were about to take her away from the rest of the squadron, but the outbreak “was soon quelled by the officers, assisted by the able, steady, and determined conduct of the Marines,”¹ who received the following commendation from Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, who was in command of the squadron:—

“‘Kent,’ Oristangi Bay,

“November 4th, 1802.

“Whereas it appears in the minutes of the late court-martial on the mutineers of the ‘Gibraltar’ that the detachment of Marines, serving on board that ship, bore no part in the disgraceful proceedings of October 6th last, but, much to the credit of their officers and themselves, maintained the character of the loyal and respectable corps to which they belong, by a steady adherence to their duty; the Rear-Admiral takes this public method of expressing his appreciation of their good and soldier-like conduct, and requests Captain Johnstone² to accept his thanks.

“To the respective Captains, etc.”

In much the same strain ran the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies when, a few months later, the Marines of the “Excellent,” 74, put down a dangerous outbreak on the part of her seamen. “He was highly sensible,” he said, “of the active exertions of the officers of H.M.S. ‘Excellent’ in quelling the late mutiny on board her, and also of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private Marines belonging to the said ship; who, by their firmness in resisting the attempt to seduce them from their duty, and in opposing men in actual mutiny, have increased, if possible, the high character the corps has so justly acquired; and he begs to assure *the whole of them* they have his best thanks, and he will not

¹ Letter from Lady Bickerton.

² The officer commanding the Marines of the “Gibraltar.”

fail to represent their meritorious conduct to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty."

The following account of a mutiny, by Captain Basil Hall, R.N., is well worth quoting in conclusion. The date and ship are not indicated, but as the Marines are addressed as "Royal," it must have taken place at some time later than 1802.

"In a well-known instance of mutiny on board a frigate," he says, "the operation of these principles (loyalty and fidelity in the Marines) was shown in a most striking manner. The Captain was one of that class of officers, now happily extinct, whose chief authority consisted in severity. To such an extent was this pushed, that his ship's company, it appears, were at length roused to actual revolt, and proceeded in a tumultuous, but apparently resolute body to the quarter-deck. It is extremely curious to remark that the same stern system of discipline which had driven the seamen into revolt, had likewise been applied to the Marines without weakening their paramount sense of duty under any circumstances. Such, at all events, was the force of habit and discipline, that when the Captain ordered them to fall in, they formed instantly, as a matter of course, across the deck. At his further orders they loaded their muskets with ball and screwed on their bayonets.

"Had the corps now proved traitors, all must have been lost; but the Captain, who, with all his faults of temper and system, was yet a great and gallant and clear-headed officer, calculated with good reason upon a different result. Turning first to the mutineers, he called out:—

"'I'll attend to you directly!'

"And then, addressing the soldiers, he said, with a tone of such perfect confidence of manner, and so slightly interrogative as to furnish its own answer:—

"'You'll stand by your King and Country?'

"The Marines thus appealed to said nothing, but grasped their fire-arms with an air of fixed resolution. It was exactly one of those occasions when silence gives the most impressive of all comments; and the Captain, assured that if he were now only true to himself the soldiers would be true to their duty, exclaimed:—

"'Then, Royal and loyal Marines, we don't care a damn for the bluejackets!'

"And, stepping forward, he seized the two principal ringleaders by the throat, one with each hand, and, calling out in a voice of thunder to the rest instantly to move off the quarter-deck, he consigned the astonished and deserted culprits to the master-at-arms, by whom they were speedily and quietly placed in double irons—and the whole mutiny was at an end."¹

¹ "Fragments of Voyages and Travels," 1832, by Captain Basil Hall, R.N. *Vide*, also, Note XIII.

NOTE I.—*Mutiny on Board H.M.S. "Chesterfield," 1748.*—"On October 10th, 1748, Captain Dudley being then ashore at Cape Coast Castle, sent off his barge to Mr. Couchman (the 1st Lieutenant), ordering him to send the cutter ashore, with the boatswain of the ship, to see the tents struck on shore, and to bring everything belonging to the ship on board that night.

"But Couchman directly ordered the barge to be hoisted in, and the boatswain to turn all hands to the quarter-deck, where Mr. Couchman, coming from his cabin with a drawn sword, said, 'Here I am, G—d d—mn me, I will stand by you while I have a drop of blood in my body!'

"He was accompanied by John Morgan, the Lieutenant of Marines, Thomas Knight, the carpenter, his mate, John Place (a principal actor), and about thirty seamen with cutlasses. They then gave three huzzas and threw their hats overboard, d—mnning old hats, they would soon get new.

"Mr. Couchman then sent for the boatswain to know if he would stand by him and go with him. He replied, 'No,' and said, 'For God's sake, Sir, be ruled by reason and consider what you are about.'

"Mr. Couchman then threatened to put him in irons if he did not join with him; but the boatswain boldly told him he never would in such piratical designs. He was then ordered into custody and two centinels put over him.

"Mr. Couchman then sent for Mr. Gilham, the mate of the ship, and made the same speech to him, who desired to know where he was bound and upon what account? He replied, 'To take, burn, and sink, and settle a colony in the East Indies.'

"There were five or six more put in custody with the boatswain in the same place, but were confined only five or six hours: for in the middle of the night after their confinement, Mr. Couchman sent for them into the great cabin, and desired them to sit down and drink punch, and then dismissed them.

"The next day the boatswain was invited to dinner with the new commander, who began to rail against Captain Dudley, and asked him and one of the mates what they thought of the affair. The boatswain replied he thought it *rank piracy*. On which Couchman said, 'What I have done, I cannot now go from; I was forced to it by the ship's company.'

"The boatswain told him that would be no sanction for running away with the King's ship. The carpenter and lieutenant then proposed their signing a paper, to which the boatswain replied he never would, and would sooner suffer death. The mate said the same.

"When the boatswain came out of the great cabin, he went to the gunner's cabin, who was then sick and unable to come out of it, but was of great use by his prudent advice and assistance; for after the boatswain had told him that Couchman's party had taken possession of all the arms, he said he could furnish him with twenty pistols. By this time Mr. Fraser and Mr. Gilham, mates of the ship, and Yeoman, the coxswain of the barge, were come to them, when the boatswain communicated his design of recovering the ship that very night. To this they all agreed with the greatest resolution.

"It began then to be very dark, and about ten o'clock at night, when the boatswain went to sound the ship's company, and on the fore-castle there were about thirty men. He then, in a prudent manner, disclosed the secret, and soon convinced them both of the facility and necessity of putting his scheme immediately in practice.

"Accordingly the first step was to get up all the bilboes and irons on the fore-castle. He then sent for the twenty pistols, which were all loaded. He next ordered three men upon the grand magazine, and two to that abaft, and the remainder, who had no pistols, to stand by the bilboes, and secure as many prisoners as he should send.

"This disposition being made, he went directly down on the deck, where he divided his small company into two parties; and, one going down the main and the other the fore hatchway, they soon secured eleven or twelve of the ringleaders, and sent them up to the fore-castle without the least noise.

"The two parties then joined and went directly to the great cabin, where they secured Couchman and the Lieutenant of Marines, with the carpenter, whom they confined in different parts of the ship.

"The mutineers were tried by court-martial at Portsmouth on June 26th, 1749, Sir Edward Hawke, K.B., being president, and the following were sentenced to death:—

"Mr. Couchman, 1st Lieutenant	Shot on board the "Chesterfield"
John Morgan, Lieut. of Marines	at Portsmouth, July 14th.
"Thomas Knight, Carpenter	} Hanged.
John Place, Carpenter's Mate	
John Read, Quartermaster	
Thomas Scott, Seaman	
Thomas Ferryman, Steward	

"Six more were sentenced to be hanged, but were pardoned by His Majesty."

The above extract from Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs" clearly proves that the 1st Lieutenant of the ship was the prime mover in this remarkable mutiny, though "the Lieutenant of Marines," as Morgan is called, was hardly less culpable.

Yet we find the author, or compiler, of "Saunders' Annals of Portsmouth" going out of his way to libel the Marine Corps by asserting that both officers were Marines!

What part the Marine Detachment played does not appear. At any rate the result of the trial goes far to exonerate them from any participation in the mutiny.

For, from the "Gentleman's Magazine" for July, 1749—from which Beatson apparently took his account *verbatim*—we learn, in addition, that among other members of the ship's company four Marines were tried and *acquitted*. Their names were Mathias Kitchen, Benjamin Bettis, Benjamin Attwood, and William Burgess. We are also informed that both officers died "behaving decently."

NOTE II.—*Foreigners as Marines*.—During the constant warfare in which we were engaged at the beginning of the last century, men became so scarce that the authorities were glad to get anyone they could for all branches of the Service. It must be remembered that the whole population of the United Kingdom was only 9,000,000 in 1800, while our naval and military services employed quite as many men as was the case a hundred years later, when the population of our islands was nearly five times greater.

The Marines formed no exception in this respect. Here are a few extracts from official letters and orders bearing on this subject:—

"January 29th, 1781.—I am to acquaint you that Major Jackman has sent from Deal, to serve in the Marine Corps, forty-one prisoners belonging to the neutral Powers who were lately taken in the Dutch vessels."

"March 26th, 1782.—There are five or six prisoners in the 'Security,' prison ship, that are willing to enlist with us; they are Swiss and Prussians, and were taken at Gibraltar."

"October 17th, 1795.—Notification was sent to the Admiral, Sheerness, that the Adjutant would visit him 'relative to the most effectual mode to induce the Dutch prisoners to enlist into His Majesty's Marine Service.'" 112 were enlisted.

"July 1st, 1804.—The 'Naval Chronicle' states that at Plymouth 'Orders came down to-day to enlist in the Royal Marine Corps here any Swiss soldiers or sailors who may have been pressed into the French Service, or detained as French prisoners on board the prison ships here. Several Swiss, on the news being sent on board, cheerfully entered; they were fine young men, and execrated their unnatural fraternization with the Great Nation.'"

"October 12th, 1809.—One hundred and sixteen foreigners were enlisted into the Marines, receiving a bounty of £3 17s. 6d. each."

In 1770 a special order had been issued by the Admiralty that no foreigner was to "do centinel in the Dockyard for the future."

James, in his "Naval History," in relating the attack on Fort Piscadero, in the Island of Curaçoa, in 1803, says:—"Nearly one-half, or thirty out of the sixty-seven of the 'Hercules' Marines were Poles, part of the prisoners taken at St. Domingo, and who, most inconsiderately, had been allowed to enter. On the 24th these volunteers very naturally evinced so clear an intention of going over to the enemy, that they were obliged to be sent on board their ship with haste."

Later on, in 1812, we were even enlisting negroes as Marines, for it is said that the third of the three battalions of Marines which, about this time, served first on the coast of Spain and afterwards in America, "was composed almost entirely of men of colour, refugee slaves from the States; they were known as the 'Colonial Marines,' and did good service. On receiving their discharges at the end of the war they were rewarded with small grants of land in the Island of Trinidad."

NOTE III.—*What took place on board H.M.S. "London."*—A due regard for impartiality renders it necessary to insert here the account which Captain Griffith (afterwards Admiral Griffith Colpoys)—who commanded the "London" at the time of the mutiny—gives of the affair. But it must be borne in mind that the letter in which we find it was written thirty years after the event, and was, moreover, specially written to prove that various statements made by Captain Brenton in his "Naval History" about Admiral Colpoys—Griffith's uncle, whose name he afterwards assumed—were incorrect.

Neither are they borne out by the "Annual Register" of 1797, nor by an historian writing in 1803—or rather publishing his work in that year. Their accounts are quoted below. Captain Griffith's version as written to the Editor of "Ralfe's Naval Biography of Great Britain," published in 1828, says:—

"Now will it be believed that at the time alluded to the 'London' was at Spithead and the Fleet and the delegates at St. Helens? Consequently no threat was ever used by the Admiral of firing on the delegates, they not being present; the Marines never levelled their pieces at them, nor did they fire, by Mr. Bover's orders, or those of any other person. *In short no delegate was shot*; the five men who fell were shot by the officers of the 'London,' acting under orders to resist their forcing of the hatchways, which had been barricaded against them; all contest in fact had ceased between the officers and crew of the 'London'; and the Marines, at the solicitation of the mutineers, had thrown down their arms and joined them before the delegates arrived on board. . . . The crew were encouraged by the near approach of the delegates, and the accession of the Marines, all of whom had laid down their arms, except two foreigners, who, to their honour be it remembered, refused, though certain destruction threatened when they should be found in their hands, to part with them. In compassion to these gallant and faithful men the officers, to save their lives, took them out of their hands on the quarter-deck."

It may be admitted that a letter from Admiral Colpoys to the Admiralty, dated May 8th, 1797, corroborates to a great extent the assertion that the Marines threw down their arms after a little time, possibly because the Admiral's action in placing them, as he says, "dispersed about different parts of the quarter-deck, poop, forecastle, and main-deck," split up the detachment, and the small isolated parties felt they had no chance of resistance under these circumstances.

On the other hand, the "Annual Register" for 1797 says:—"May 7th.—The delegates re-assembled and sent a deputation to the 'London,' Admiral Colpoys's ship at Portsmouth, whom the Admiral refused to admit on board, and enforced his authority by ordering the Marines to fire into the boat." Lyttleton's "History of England," published 1803, uses the same words.

Brenton's account is accepted by Neale in his "History of the Mutiny at Spithead and the Nore" (1842), though he professes anything but admiration for him either as a writer or an officer.

Schomberg, in his "Naval Chronology" (1802), states that five mutineers were "killed by the Marines." Clowes' "The Royal Navy" accepts this figure but does not say that the Marines killed them.

Conrad Gill, in his book, "The Naval Mutinies of 1797" (Manchester University Press, 1913), perhaps the best and most detailed work on the subject yet published, takes Captain Griffith's account as the groundwork on which he builds up his relation of the happenings on board H.M.S. "London," but does not appear to be entirely satisfied with it. For instance, he proves that his statement that "no delegate was shot" is incorrect, for he points out that "it is certain that one of the wounded seamen was a delegate, for John Fleming was appointed the next day in this man's place."

In the writer's opinion Captain Griffith's letter is an extremely *ex parte* affair written for a special purpose. He wished to exonerate his uncle and, incidentally, himself from any share of the blame for not having succeeded in preventing the mutiny, and what better excuse could he make than by making the worst he could of the conduct of the Marines? They formed a very convenient scapegoat, and at the distance of time from the mutiny at which he wrote, his statements would be hard to refute. It is observable that he does not mention the wounding of Lieutenant Simms, of the Marines, though there can be no possible doubt about that, since not only is it referred to by most historians of the mutiny, but it is on record that he was granted a special pension of £50 a year (afterwards increased to £70) for the wound he received upon this occasion.

NOTE IV.—*Ducking of Officers*.—"They tie the unfortunate victim's feet together and their hands together and put their bed at their back, making it fast round them, at the same time adding an 18-lb. bar-shot to bring them down. They afterwards make them fast to a tackle suspended from the yard-arm; and, hoisting them nearly up to the block, all at once let go, and drop them souse into the sea, where they remain a minute, and then are again hoisted and let down alternately, till there are scarce any signs of life remaining.

"After this they hoist them up by the heels, for the purpose of getting the water out of their stomachs, and usually put them into their hammocks."—From "Annual Register," 1797.

NOTE V.—*The Bloody Flag*.—This Communistic and Red Republican emblem was used in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries on going into action as denoting "Defiance and No Quarter." Nieuhoff, in his "Travels to Brazil" (1640), in relating a fight with a Turkish pirate, says that, on getting ready for action, "We put up the bloody flag," and later that the Turks "made towards us with orange-coloured flags, which . . . they soon changed for bloody flags." Again, in an old work, we find:—"I heard three huzzas, and then they all came on deck and hoisted *Jolly Roger* (for so they call their black ensign, in the middle of which is a large white skeleton with a dart in one hand striking a bleeding heart, and in the other an hour glass). When they fight under *Jolly Roger* they give quarter, which they do not when they fight under the red or bloody flag."¹

Possibly this custom was derived from the French, who long before employed special flags of red taffeta—sometimes sprinkled with gold, which, according to a document of 1292, "signified certain death and mortal strife to all sailors everywhere" from remote antiquity. In the ancient Grecian Navies, according to Diodorus Siculus, the signal to engage was given by hanging out a red garment or banner on the Admiral's galley. The progress of the battle was directed by raising, lowering, or inclining this signal to the right or left.

NOTE VI.—*Parker the Mutineer*.—"Parker, so much distinguished as the leader of the most daring mutiny and rebellion that is to be found in the annals of the British Navy, was born at Exeter. He was some time on board the 'Mediator' as a midshipman, and afterwards went to the East Indies as mate of an Indiaman. He has been systematically extravagant, having spent a very large sum of money; and has in consequence been at different times an inmate of Newgate and the King's Bench for several months together. The last prison he visited was that of Perth, from which he was liberated by the high bounty a short time before he appeared in his present station on board the 'Sandwich.'"—From "The Britannic Magazine," 1797.

NOTE VII.—*Insolence of the Delegates*.—"In the course of the conversation Lord Spencer asked them, rather peevishly, 'What do you want?' To this Parker replied, 'You are a man of sense, and you know what is due to us; you know what we want.' The insolence of Parker was intolerable. When Lord Spencer intimated that he must refer their demands to ministers in London, Parker replied, 'Aye, go and consult the ringleaders of your gang,' and, as the delegates were retiring, Parker, in answer to some very just admonitions from Lord Spencer, said, 'You may all be ——.'"—From Lyttleton's "History of England," 1803.

¹ "Free Lances of the Sea" in the "Nautical Magazine," November, 1908. The "old work" is not specified.

NOTE VIII.—*Execution of the Marine Mutineers at Plymouth.*—"July 6th.—This morning, at ten o'clock, McGinnis was conducted to the Hoe by a party of Marines, and was immediately tied to the halberts, where he received 500 lashes, being one half of the number he was sentenced to receive. He was then put into a sedan, taken off the Hoe, and escorted back to the barracks. About half after one o'clock, Lee, Coffy, and Branhan were brought from their cells, and conducted through the sally-port gate which leads to the Hoe; before each of them was carried a black coffin; as soon as they reached the place of execution they joined in prayers with the ministers who attended them until half-past two o'clock, when each of them had the cap drawn over his eyes, and knelt down on his coffin; and the commanding officer instantly, on all being ready, directed the execution of the fatal sentence. Coffy and Branhan fell at the first fire; but it did not appear that one shot out of the sixteen fired struck Lee, as he remained on his knees on the coffin until a Marine discharged his musket through the front of his head; he then fell, and, another musket being fired through the side of his head, he expired.

"Lee, Coffy, and Branhan were all Irishmen, and neither exceeded the age of thirty years."—From "The Britannic Magazine," 1797.

NOTE IX.—*Lord St. Vincent and the Marines.*—Lord St. Vincent carried his advocacy of the Marines to somewhat extraordinary lengths, as will be seen from the following note from a series of suggestions as to the establishment of the Royal Navy which he made on June 30th, 1797, in a letter addressed to Lord Spencer:—

"*Marines.*—A very considerable corps should be kept up, and I hope to see the day when there is not another foot-soldier in the Kingdom, in Ireland, or the Colonies, except the King's Guard and Artillery. The Colonels of regiments might be provided for during their lives by annuities equal to their present pay and emoluments."

This is an extraordinary proposal, since the writer must have known that unless a Marine has a proportionate service afloat he ceases to have those special attributes which give him his particular value and efficiency. The converse, of course, is also true. He will lose efficiency in other directions if he does not have a proportionate amount of shore service also.

But it would appear from later letters that St. Vincent belonged to the extreme section of what is now called "The Blue Water School," and did not want to have anything approaching an Army at all; either composed of Marines or of anyone else. He only proposed an addition of 10,000 Marines to the existing establishment to undertake the whole work of the Army, which he considered to be at that time "monstrous."¹

He was evidently imbued with the old 17th century ideas about the danger to the country of a standing Army, and wrote, "The rapid approach of military despotism haunts me by night and by day," and again, "A standing Army is here equally dangerous to the liberties of the people and the stability of the Throne."² He thought it ought never to be again employed on the Continent, and that "The futile employment ycleped 'Staff' should be totally done away with, and all the frippery of the Army sent to the devil."

NOTE X.—*The "United Irishmen" and the "Corresponding Societies."*—The "United Irishmen" was an association which conceived the idea of establishing an independent republic in Ireland. The Society was formed by Wolfe Tone, a barrister, in 1791. It arranged for a French invasion of Ireland in December, 1796, and worked in all possible ways against the British Government. Tone, who was tried and convicted of treason, November 14th, 1798, committed suicide in prison.

The "Corresponding Society" was formed in 1791 with the professed object of reform in the parliamentary representation of the people, but it really cherished designs of a very dangerous character. There was a similar society, established in 1794, called the "Society for Constitutional Information."

¹ Letter to his secretary, Benjamin Tucker, July 17th, 1818.

² To the same, 1815 or 1816.

The "Corresponding Society" was of a particularly seditious nature, for, like some of our latter day "pro-enemy" societies, it denounced the war with France and corresponded extensively with the leading French Republicans, and with four other similar associations forwarded a sympathetic address to the French National Convention on September 27th, 1792.

A Secret Committee of the House of Commons sat in January, 1799, to go into the question of all these treasonable societies, and, as regards the naval mutinies, it reported as follows:—

"The mutiny which took place in the Fleet, if considered in all its circumstances, will be traced to an intimate connection with the principles and practices described by your Committee, and furnished the most alarming proof of the efficacy of those plans of secrecy and concert, so often referred to, and of the facility with which they are applied for inflaming and heightening discontent (from whatever cause it proceeds), and for converting what might otherwise produce only a hasty and inconsiderate breach of subordination and discipline into the most settled and systematic treason and rebellion. These principles and this concert could alone have produced the wide extent of the mutiny, and the uniformity of its operation in so many and distant quarters. The persons principally engaged in it, even in its early stages, were many of them 'United Irishmen.' The mutineers were bound by secret oaths to the perpetration of the greatest crimes. An attempt was made to give to the ships in mutiny the name of 'The Floating Republic,' and this attempt was countenanced both by papers published in France, and by a paper here called the *Courier*, which has, on many occasions, appeared almost equally devoted to the French cause. In some instances a disposition was manifested to direct the efforts of the mutineers to the object of compelling the Government of this country to conclude a peace with the foreign enemy; and they at length even meditated betraying the ships of His Majesty into the hands of that enemy. . . . It appears that oaths have been tendered to the crew 'to be United Irishmen, equal to their brethren in Ireland, and to have nothing to do with the King or his Government,' and that they have acted in the professed expectation of assistance from France . . . and that it has been part of their plan to murder their officers, to seize on the ship and carry her to France or Ireland. On another occasion the oath has been as follows:— 'I swear to be true to the Free and United Irish, who are now fighting our cause against tyrants and oppressors, and to defend their rights to the last drop of my blood, and to keep all secret: and I do agree to carry the ship into Brest the next time the ship looks out ahead at sea, and to kill every officer and man that shall hinder us, except the Master: and to hoist a green ensign with a harp in it, and afterwards to kill and destroy the Protestants. . . .'

"The mutineers in another ship were proved to be connected with 'Corresponding Societies' at Nottingham. The oath which they attempted to administer was, 'To carry the ship into an enemy's port, French, Dutch, or Irish'; and they meant, in the event of being brought into action with an enemy's ship, to shoot their own officers on the quarter-deck."—*Vide* "Annual Register," 1799.

NOTE XI.—*Mutiny at the Cape of Good Hope, 1798.*—There was a mutinous outbreak among the ships which were at anchor off Cape Town, which was quelled by the action of the military authorities on shore. What part the Marines played does not appear.

The following account is taken from the "Annual Register," February 27th, 1798:—

"A very dangerous mutiny lately broke out on board the Fleet at the Cape, but was quelled by the spirited exertions of General Dundas, the Admiral, and Lord Macartney, assisted by the military. All the batteries were manned, and upwards of a hundred pieces of cannon were loaded and pointed at the Admiral's ship; the furnaces were heated, and red-hot balls were ready to pour into and sink the 'Tremendous,' which was at anchor before the Amsterdam batteries, in case the mutineers should refuse to deliver up the delegates, with the ring-leaders, and return to obedience. A proclamation was issued at 7 a.m., and only two hours allowed for the mutineers to consider whether they would return to their duty or not. When they found that it was positively determined to sink the ship, in case of a refusal, the signal of submission was hoisted ten minutes

before nine by the 'Tremendous,' as well as all the other ships, and the delegates were given up. Several of them have since made their exit at the yard-arm, and everything was quiet."

NOTE XII.—*Spirit shown by a Marine of H.M.S. "Castor."*—"The heroic feelings of a private Marine, who was confined to his hammock at the outbreak of this commotion, would have done honour to any age of the world. Though depressed with fever, still he arose, put on his accoutrements, took his musket and his post in the ranks. On being questioned why he was there, he nobly replied to his officer: 'Sir, this is not a time to be sick.' This action obtained for him subsequent promotion."—From "An Historical Review of the Royal Marine Corps," by Lieutenant Alexander Gillespie, R.M., 1803.

NOTE XIII.—*Loyalty of the Marines.*—In the "Life of Lord Exmouth" the loyalty of the Marines is especially referred to in the case of the mutiny on board H.M.S. "Impetueux." "The Marines," says the author, "who had previously withstood every attempt of the conspirators to seduce them from their duty, now displayed that unwavering loyalty and prompt obedience, for which, in the most trying circumstances, this valuable force has always been distinguished."



FRENCH WAR LITERATURE.

By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON.

A CHARACTERISTIC of French literature during the war has been the veritable deluge of personal impressions and narratives by combatants, literally filling booksellers' windows since the beginning of the year 1915. The victory of the Marne seemed, indeed, to give an impetus to literary output of all kinds connected with the war. A catalogue published in August, 1916, gave a list of over 800 books of all descriptions referring to the great struggle, which had appeared at that date; and in his preface the compiler remarked that, so varied and in such quantity were the works appearing, he had been obliged to renounce the idea of making a complete enumeration of them.

Since then French war literature has not ceased to accumulate.

The tendencies shown in the works that are not mere diaries are peculiar to the present French régime. The Church question is much more acute than it is in England, and the antagonism between France *noire* and France *rouge*, never long dormant, influences thought even in war time. Then, again, the political truce has not been so closely observed by all ranks as it has been in England.¹

In 1914, just before the outbreak of hostilities, the country was almost equally divided, as evidenced by the elections, into two main political camps, which we may call Conservative (although chiefly Republican) and Progressive (including the Socialists).

The war had the effect of greatly reinforcing Conservative opinion in Parliament; but there remained an active progressive opposition of over 150 members, always on the alert to check reactionary tendencies; and, aided at times by candidates for portfolios, it has frequently divided the Chamber and caused the fall of three ministries. As, however, the *Union Sacrée* is strictly observed in the composition of the Government, although the Socialists have at last withdrawn their co-operation, it has been thought necessary in the circumstances to make the political censorship all the more severe, against which, only a short time ago, M. Anatole France raised his voice in eloquent complaint. The restriction, he declared, was conspicuous by its absence in all the other Entente countries.

Suppressed in the newspapers, political opinions, seeking expression elsewhere, have in a varying degree affected the tendency of notable books, where, indeed, one would never have expected to meet with them.

The drawback to social and political controversy in these eventful days is that it tends to attract, or deflect, some of the spiritual forces

¹ Both the Pacifist and the new *Morning Post* parties—the extreme left and extreme right of our Parliament—are mere groups and negligible in voting strength.

of a country from the prosecution of the war, at a time when they should be all united in aiding (if only by keeping quiet) the armies of democracy, which are still engaged in desperate conflict with the most formidable enemy that has ever opposed freedom since Valmy.

A critic of *The Times*, reviewing on June 8th "Vie des Martyrs," by G. Duhamel (Paris: Mercure de France), drew attention to a profound change in French literature which he and other sympathetic observers had noticed: "The echoes of a grim and terrible perturbation of the human consciousness perturb them too. . . ." And then they turn, with a disappointment that will not be resigned, to the literature of England.

"Shall there not be in England, too," the reviewer asks, "that bravery of the spirit without which the bravery of the body will pass with the body into forgetfulness? The strange and splendid honesty of soul which seemed once to be the prerogative of Russia alone is descending upon France also."

Hum! Not a few people will demur, I venture to think, with regard to these sentiments. However good Russian honesty of soul may be in the abstract, it is particularly inconvenient in the concrete at the present time, and if France were to follow suit there would soon be an end to the war and a German peace. It may be doubted, therefore, *pace The Times* critic, whether whole-hearted patriotism and common sense are not more valuable features in war literature than socialistic philosophy, until victory be secure. But "Vie des Martyrs" is not at all in the same category in this respect as "Le Feu." It tells with realistic force how the wounded suffer. The author, who is a doctor on war service, may be pardoned if he seems to think that those who take no active part in it fail, too complacently, to realize its horrors.

The vote of the French Chamber of Deputies, at the beginning of June of this year, on the ministerial declaration defining the objects of the war, probably indicated, more or less faithfully, the tendency of the country with regard to the question at issue. Nine to one in favour of continuing energetically the war until the Germans evacuate French territory, including Alsace and Lorraine.

This patriotic attitude is reflected in the literature of the war, and the Stockholm Party, Socialistic minorities, as they are called (although now equal in numbers to the official majority of the Socialist Party), would have been at first totally unrepresented in literature had not M. Romain Rolland published a collection of articles which he had contributed to the *Journal de Genève*, under the title of "Au Dessus de la Mêlée" (Paris: Paul Ollendorff).

M. Rolland, the author of "Jean Christophe" (the Academy's Prix de Littérature, 1913),¹ appears to have voluntarily exiled himself, on the outbreak of war, in order to be able to write as it pleased him, without any interference from the Censor, and "Au Dessus de la Mêlée" is a work both interesting and irritating. The essays had a wide circulation in the *Journal de Genève*, which is sold in France,

¹And also the Prix Nobel.

but the book itself has had but a moderate sale. What is so trying in much of it is the almost total disregard of concrete political facts. Like all the pacifist tribe, M. Rolland allows inconvenient truth to remain undisturbed at the bottom of its well, and pages of rhetoric are written on false premises. What he writes is highly moral, but it takes no count of the political situation and the defenceless state of France after 1870. Another brilliant writer, whose latest book, "Le Feu," is referred to later, shows the same tendency.

"It is shameful," M. Rolland writes, "to see the élite of each country fan the passions of the people, which are the cause of the monstrous policy of antagonism of races, an idea scientifically absurd, as no nation is now of pure race."

"The representatives of the Prince of Peace are seen urging on their faithful to wage war."

M. Barbusse, in "Le Feu," appears to endorse this judgment.

But what are the facts? Was France safe from aggression in the early nineties, when she made the Russian alliance, which, as regards France, was the direct cause of this war? On this point these eloquent writers are silent. What they say may be good in theory, but applied to actual conditions on the outbreak of war it is misleading, because it obscures the truth.

The truth concerning the origin of this war everyone knows. Yet it is extraordinary how often, it would seem, it is forgotten, or General Pétain, the French Generalissimo, would not have thought it advisable himself to make an important addition to war literature, in the shape of a long article, published in the *Bulletin des Armées* on June 27th last, for the benefit of all French soldiers, entitled "Pourquoi nous nous battons?"

Free from all rhetoric, and admirably clear, General Pétain's article traces the cause of the war from the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia down to the totally indefensible German declaration of war against Russia, which shut out the last chance of maintaining peace, till then not impossible. When this happened, "France, bound by her word, could not withdraw her support from Russia; but our country, which for years had made so many sacrifices for peace, hoped still against all hope that the terrible conflict might be averted. Germany then again precipitated it."

"Bound by her word," General Pétain says. How was it that the peace-loving Republic was thus pledged?

Five-and-twenty years ago, in the early nineties, France was isolated in Europe.

With a stationary population of under forty millions, she had opposite her, on her Eastern frontier, the victorious Power that had crushed her twenty years before, strong, warlike, and avowedly aggressive, with a population increasing towards seventy millions. The situation of France was considered precarious. Germans talked openly of wiping her out of existence, like Carthage, and no help could be expected from Great Britain, with whom relations were the reverse of cordial.

At this moment, when threatened with a fresh invasion, which might mean her total destruction, an opportunity offered to make a defensive alliance with Russia, whose interest it was to strengthen her position against Teutonic designs in the Near East. To the great majority of Frenchmen this alliance seemed at the time to be national salvation, and its ratification was greeted with enthusiasm throughout France and in the French colonies.

But although this treaty brought to France security at the time, and peace for twenty-five years after signature, it carried with it an obligation that, however peaceful and peace-loving France might become, she was bound, in honour, to make war if Germany, or presumably any other Great Power, attacked Russia.

According to M. Rolland (and, as will be seen later, M. Barbusse also), even in these circumstances, and although other nations, and principally Germany, should make enormous preparations for war, France ought to have disbanded her Army and renounced all war-like ideas and practices, for if this is not what M. Rolland means, his essay is devoid of sense. If all priests and other ministers of religion, financiers, and chiefs of industry ought to have preached peace at any price, what chance would the Army have had in France? Extremists in Parliament did their best to ruin it as it was, and the shortage in armament has only comparatively recently been made good.

MM. Rolland and Barbusse both wrote before the Russian Revolution, which no one foresaw, at least out of Russia, and the impossibility, as it seemed, of any great change in Russian policy for many a long year doubtless influenced their ideas.

"Aujourd'hui, le militarisme s'appelle Allemagne." "Oui, mais demain comment s'appellera-t-il?"—"Le Feu."

"Les trois grands coupables, les trois aigles rapaces, sont les trois empereurs."—"Au Dessus de la Mêlée."

These thoughts were more or less common to all when Russia was an autocracy and a great aggressive empire; but now, surely, for every sane thinker, Germany alone is Militarism.

While noticing a similarity of ideas between M. Barbusse and M. Rolland, it is only fair to mention that while the latter, whatever his age, was vegetating in a neutral country, M. Barbusse was actually experiencing the hardships and horrors of war as a private soldier in the front line. He contributes now occasionally to *Le Pays*, a new halfpenny daily paper,¹ which made its first appearance on June 1st, 1917, and succeeded before the month was out in creating quite an excitement, not only in the Press, but in Parliament.

When other halfpenny papers had to be content with an issue of four reduced pages on three days in the week, and a single sheet on the other four, *Le Pays* appeared daily as a full four-page newspaper, as big as the *Figaro* in peace time, until the 4th July, when it complained that the reactionary papers, *Le Gaulois* (monarchist) and the *Figaro* were allowed to appear with four pages on five days in the

¹ All the French newspapers have now raised their price. The halfpenny papers are now a penny.

week, while "the republican organ," *Le Pays*, was only authorized to have four pages on three days. The real reason, of course, being that the *Gaulois* and the *Figaro* are the only penny morning papers published in Paris.

Le Pays, with so much space to spare, dealt very fully with art, music, and letters, as well as with politics, and its war comments were excellent. But its tendency was distinctly Socialist, but not *minoritaire*, in the present writer's opinion, although he does not profess to have read every number.

Certainly M. Barbusse's article, not reviewing, but, in a sense, depreciating M. Milhaud's book, "*La Société des Nations*" (which follows President Wilson's idea), was very freely censored, although from the context the censored paragraphs could have been no worse, from any point of view, than what had already appeared in "*Le Feu*."

They were censored, presumably, on the ground that they transgressed the political truce. Perhaps because of their coming towards the end of a long and very realistic book on trench warfare, similar paragraphs were passed over in "*Le Feu*." Yet a book may be read even more than a newspaper. In the article M. Barbusse expressed his want of faith in the utility of a League of Peace until not only Germany, but all other nations, including France, should have radically changed the character of their Governments: they must not only be democratic, but socialist.

"Now, when we speak of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, it is not really the people, but their governors and directors." ". . . the Asquiths and the Wilsons." "International progress and social progress cannot advance one without the other. That is why we have at heart and before our eyes, passionately, obstinately, a constant object: to propagate the republican idea throughout the world; to aid and hasten this propagation; to open the eyes of the multitude . . ." At this point the censor intervened.

Although there was nothing pacifist in this article, in an immediate sense, it was ultra-socialist, *à la* Keir Hardie. Other articles had appeared which drew forth protests from the Society of Fathers and Mothers who have lost sons in the war, and in the Senate from M. de Lamarselle, the Catholic orator; but it was M. Gustave Hervé, of *La Victoire* (formerly *La Guerre Sociale*), the converted anti-militarist, who formally accused *Le Pays* of pacifism, and even declared that it had been started at vast expense, possibly by M. Joseph Caillaux,¹ as part of the propaganda of a German peace. Readers will at once understand what a commotion this charge raised in Paris.

But enough of *Le Pays*, which indignantly repudiated the charge of pacifism. It has been referred to at some length in connection with the author of "*Le Feu*," which remarkable book may, perhaps, be appropriately considered forthwith, although somewhat out of its place if we are to call it a novel.

¹ An ex-Prime Minister who has recently admitted subsidizing the notorious *Bonnet Rouge*. *Le Pays* now advocates his claims to a seat in any truly National Government.

But it is really not a novel at all, in the ordinary acceptance of the word, although it is so described on the cover. On the title page it is the "Journal of a Squad," which it remains until quite towards the end—probably in great measure the journal of the actual squad in which M. Barbusse served—when, in a conversation with his few remaining comrades, under the most awful circumstances, he gives vent in the first person to some exceedingly debatable sentiments of a most depressing nature, natural, perhaps, in the depressing circumstances, but which would certainly be censored in a newspaper article. A literary critic of *The Times*, who reviewed this book, laments the fact that the more recent French literature of the war is so different from its English counterparts. The spiritual attitude is so different, and, in his opinion, so superior.

"Le Feu" was the Prix Goncourt, 1916,¹ and *The Times* reviewer feared that if such a prize and such a work had existed in England, the award would not have been the same, "the tendency might have told against it."

It is, indeed, not unlikely, for two fallacies are prominent throughout the latter part of this dramatically realistic book: the first being that the working man has suffered proportionately in a far greater degree than the rest of society, and the second—more regrettably misleading still—that the classes of society throughout the civilized world, other than the working class, foster war, and are responsible for the present horrible system of nations in arms.

"Ah, vous avez raison, pauvres ouvriers innombrables des batailles, vous qui aurez fait toute la grande guerre Contre vous et votre grand intérêt général il n'y a pas que les monstrueux intéressés, financiers, grands et petits faiseurs d'affaires, cuirassés dans leurs banques ou leur maisons qui vivent de la guerre. . . ."

"Il y a ceux qui admirent l'échange étincelant des coups. . . . Ceux qui s'enivrent avec la musique militaire. . . . Ceux qui s'enfoncent dans le passé et qui n'ont que le mot d'autrefois à la bouche. . . ."

"Il y a avec eux tous les prêtres, qui cherchent à vous exciter et à vous endormir, pour que rien ne change. . . . Il y a des avocats, économistes historiens, qui vous embrouillent de phrases théoriques. . . . Et même lorsqu'ils disent qu'ils ne veulent pas la guerre, ces gens là font tout pour la perpétuer. . . . Ce sont vos ennemis autant que le sont aujourd'hui ces soldats allemands, qui gisent ici entre vous, et qui ne sont que de pauvres dupes odieusement trompées et abruties. Ce sont vos ennemis quel que soit l'endroit où ils sont nés et la façon dont se prononce leur nom et la langue dans laquelle ils mentent. Regardez-les dans le ciel et sur la terre. Regardez-les partout! Reconnaissez-les une bonne fois, et souvenez-vous à jamais!"

The above quotations are from pages 372-5 of "Le Feu," Prix Goncourt, 1916. Comment would seem to be superfluous, except that such sentiments openly expressed and widely circulated would seem

¹ Recently translated, August, 1917; but the present writer has not had an opportunity of seeing it.

calculated to encourage a state of feeling, which it is common knowledge (General Pétain's article, for instance, recognized it) has given the French Government some anxiety, rather than to comfort and stimulate the rank and file of the French armies in their arduous struggle for national security and a durable peace.

There is not a family, or hardly a family, among the middle and higher classes in France and Great Britain that is not in mourning, and if the peasant's unexercised brain unfits him, as a rule, for the direction of operations, a large percentage of the other classes have shared the hardships and dangers of the trenches with him uncomplainingly.

As to their wanting war, the state of unpreparedness in Great Britain and America, and even in France, when liable to sudden invasion, proves at once the absurdity of the contention. Moreover, with regard to the origin of the all-devouring system of "the nation in arms," which it should never be forgotten is the prime cause of the great loss of life, the length, and universal ruin of the present war, so far from the higher classes of society—the nobility and clergy in particular—having originated this dreadful system, inevitable as it may have been, it was the proletariat of the French Revolution, after they had driven out, or guillotined, not only all monarchists, but all who were suspected of the least sympathy with them, and had abolished the Christian religion, who first decreed and enforced universal military service.

The Germans do not often originate; they perfect. Conscription was made so perfect by Germany that all other nations, even Great Britain and the United States of America, for the first time in their history, have been obliged to conform, or be enslaved.

Really, with all Central Europe organized to give in men and *matériel* its utmost yield of military power, for the avowed purpose of dominating other countries, there must be some flaw in the brain-mechanism of men of literary or oratorical ability, who try to impute, or even suggest, blame for the war on their own freely elected Governments, whose real and glaring fault was most obviously unpreparedness.

Nevertheless, there is much in "Le Feu" to be admired. The greater part of the book is free from these direct thrusts, and has many virtues. The best side of the squad is shown. If there were men in it in whose natures the bad predominated, M. Barbusse does not dwell there. The men of the people he describes so well are those with whom the reader can sympathize. We join our sympathy with his involuntarily, when, after a conversation with his neighbour, a rag and bone man—wholesale, the latter explains with pride—in a wet barn (during a period of rest) at night, before composing himself for sleep, he half raises himself and contemplates, as on a field of battle, the sleeping forms of his comrades.

"I look once again on these creatures buried in the depths of inertia and forgetfulness, on the brink of which some seem still (from their murmurs) to cling with their pitiable occupations, their instincts of children, and their ignorance of slaves. The heaviness of sleep gains on my senses. But I recall what they have done and what they

yet shall do; and before the profound vision of poor human darkness that fills this cavern, I dream of I know not what great light."

Others dream, too, and would more than dream; but first, let us beat Germany.

Nevertheless, a fine piece of poetic prose, Chapter XX., which is entitled "Le Feu," and describes a reconnaissance and the assault of a position, is in parts magnificently written.

Doubtless M. Barbusse is a good comrade, as the following letter from a soldier-priest (mitrailleur) testifies. It was published in *Le Pays*, under the signature Abbé X, the editor suppressing the name in the interest of the writer:—

"My Dear Barbusse,—

"I have just read with emotion the two articles which have appeared in *La Croix* on your work ("Le Feu").

"You will, no doubt, remember our little discussions in the dug-out under the road from N—, and you will understand the reservations the Abbé X—who has nothing to do with the soldier X—is obliged to make 'in petto' in reading, in enjoying your work.

"These divergencies in ideas are not so numerous as those exposed in *La Croix*. . . . You have painted the war as we have seen it, as we have experienced it, with an exactitude that does you honour, and if certain conclusions leave the door open to discussion, they do not merit such harsh conclusions.

"I venture to give you this mark of sympathy and to remind you of our friendship.

"ABBÉ X (mitrailleur)."

The ever eloquent and polished academician, M. Maurice Donnay, in a little book, "Premières Impressions et Après" (Crès & Cie), takes a more hopeful and a more liberal view—for there is no real Liberalism in Marxist Socialism, made in Germany—than M. Barbusse of what is possible after the war. There would be something attractive about the *International* if its aim was only peace, but in democratic countries revolutionaries would too often replace the antagonism of race by that of class, and revive tyranny in the name of liberty.

M. Donnay, in his excellent essay, "Après," in which, among other liberal ideas, he advocates votes for French women, on the ground that men are fighting that the abominable maxim, "might is right," shall not triumph on the earth, M. Donnay writes: "The best in every civilized country would willingly create a society of nations, where unjust, brutal aggression might be punished, where the desire for domination and hegemony might be crushed in the bud. For this thousands of apostles are wanted. . . .

"If you ask those citizen soldiers who have fought on the Marne, the Yser, the Meuse, and at Charleroi and Verdun—if you say to them: 'It will begin again in five years, in ten years, in fifty years,' all these brave fellows, heroes, *poilus*, reply: 'It is not for that that we have fought.'

"Let us hope that in the new days it will be the wondrous rôle of the new France to be at the head of the crusade for peace between nations.

"Having found herself again the warrior-nation France should be the apostle-nation, and to be powerful for good she has but to be the opposite of everything German. Germany hates the whole world, and has made of hate a national institution. France should love. German pride is immense. France should cultivate moderation, but with honour and dignity."

Henri Heine wrote: "The Germans are more vindictive in their hate than the Latin peoples, for the reason that they are more idealist in their hate. They hate from the bottom of their souls and for a long time."

"If the French cannot hate for long," M. Donnay says, "let them at least have memory. It is impossible to love Prussians: it would be no good. Let there be monuments against forgetfulness."

As with M. Barbusse and M. Rolland, M. Donnay wrote all this, and much more, before the Russian Revolution. That event, like a mighty shock of earthquake, has reverberated throughout the world and shaken political institutions, that seemed to be fairly firm, to their foundations. What was thought impossible of realization in our time is now regarded with hopefulness.

As Mr. Lloyd George has said: "It would be easier to make friends with a democratic Germany."

M. Pierre Lasserre, in "Le Germanisme" (Champion, Paris), traces the downward course of German philosophy from Kant and his categorical imperative to the superman. (P. 25.)

When "awakened by the reasoning of Hume from his dogmatic slumber," as he said himself, Kant wrote his "Critique of Pure Reason"; he feared that if man was left without any relation with the Absolute and the Eternal, his morality would suffer. He therefore invented the Absolute in man himself. Our conscience prescribes to us duty: the idea of duty is God.

"One must be German," M. Lasserre writes, "to give to the human idea of duty this visage, less divine than monstrous. One must be German to alter, with so much subtlety, the true nature of things, *et pour répandre dans une notion comme celle du devoir l'eau troublée où l'on pensait pêcher Dieu.*"

From this theory—*facile decensus Averni*—it was easy to arrive at that of Schleiermacher, who, in his "Discourses on Religion" (1831), taught that true religion can only be understood and felt by Germans. "It is especially unattainable to the English on account of their cupidity, and to the French by reason of their frivolity and immorality."

"From such a proposition to that of presenting Germany herself as the object of religion," M. Lasserre asks, "what is the distance?"

May not this idea of Duty as God account, in some measure, for the extraordinary docility of the German people towards their rulers?

M. Pierre Loti (Captain Viaud of the French Navy, retired), who has been doing military duty in the war zone with the rank of

Major, has recently published "*Quelques aspects du vertige mondial*" (Flammarion, 26, Rue Racine), a collection of essays, of which "Vertige" originally appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and is an interesting meditation on war in general and the universal struggle for existence.

A tempest of ugliness and crime, in M. Loti's opinion, rages on the earth as the result of man's mechanical triumphs; and the hypothetical conclusions of science would make of him a hopeless pessimist, were it not that, in the very fact that man is now able, by his reason and intelligence, to detect and establish errors in the first attempts at creation, he sees hope. For whence has come this intelligence? Surely from elsewhere, farther and higher. . . . To assume that the author of solar systems (generated in the most stupendous and terrific of conflagrations), the very imperfect primeval creation (which has taken hundreds of thousands of years to improve, as if the author was in need of constant experiments), and of all the horrors of the animal and insect world¹ is the same power that implants in man such sentiments as abnegation, sacrifice, love, and charity, is an assumption too improbable.

"Our humanity, so incompletely devised by its creator—or, at least, of its supposed creator, who is perhaps only responsible for its animal form—after having vegetated indefinitely in caves, knew an apogee almost sudden in its marvellous spirit of faith, to which we owe the temples of Egypt, the catacombs of Rome, and our own cathedrals with their penumbras, all impregnated with confiding prayers. Now, instead of lofty basilicas, built by inspired artists, we have the flame of explosives and the nightmare of the great steel birds, which, above our heads, threaten us with death."

A tempest of ugliness and crime is raging on the earth, and there would be no hope for humanity, M. Loti thinks, if it were not for the mysterious immaterial force which gives nobility to the mind of man; and he elaborates a recent verdict of science to justify this view.

A new discovery of the laboratory, it appears, has proved that matter is not really divisible *ad infinitum*. There is a limit which Nature Creatrice cannot cross, and below which all her power, which was thought sovereign and innumerable, is at fault. "Then, if we take, for example, those half-beings, only just appreciable in the microscope, the communion of which, in the words of science, suffices to ensure the continuity of races, and in particular of the human race . . . , it has been shown that they are not divisible, and it is impossible that atoms so small could contain, materially, as they appear to do in some cases, in addition to the germs of heredity, all those attributes of character, intelligence, genius, and tender pity which are visible not infrequently in human beings.

¹ M. Loti quotes the case of the insect which, before dying, injects an anæsthetic into another bug, exactly in the centre of its nerve system, which causes it to fall into a lethargic sleep. It then lays its eggs on the body of this insect, so that its young, on being born, should find a prey still fresh, still alive, although inert.

To produce such transcendent qualities, these atoms, M. Loti believes, must have been traversed by a ray, which necessarily could have neither weight nor size—in other words, by an immaterial ray—and directly the immaterial begins to make itself felt in our reasoning, every hope becomes possible.

The rest of the book is in a lighter vein, and includes an address, delivered on the stage of the Comédie Française in June, 1916, in aid of naval charities, on which occasion certain sailors from the front, decorated with the Croix de Guerre, took part in the manifestation.

In the peroration of his discourse, the author of "*Pêcheurs d'Islande*" exhorted them as representatives to hold fast to the sound and superb tradition of the French Navy: respect and confidence, on which rests its immemorial discipline, and to remain what they are and what were their ancestors, in the fulness of the admirable sense of the word—sailors.

The imperious necessities of the war have not prevented writers of fiction from finding the requisite leisure for the production of some notable novels of the ordinary type, with plots more or less intricate requiring to be unravelled, of which "*L'Adjudant Benoit*" and "*Lazarine*," respectively, by the academicians, Marcel Prévost and Paul Bourget, are perhaps of the most permanent interest. "*L'Adjudant Benoit*" has already an English translation. It is considered one of M. Prévost's best works, and professes to have been founded on fact—on the confessions of a wounded non-commissioned officer during his treatment in a hospital at Versailles. In the French Army the regimental appointment of *adjudant-major* corresponds to the British "adjudant." The battalion "adjudant" is a N.C.O.

The hero of this story commits two crimes. He fails grievously in his duty by failing to hand over to military justice a German spy, who is in his power, and he seduces the daughter of the man he has just killed with his own hands. But there are extenuating circumstances in his case, which allow of the expiation, in the mind of the reader, of these offences by further gallant and devoted service. Very dramatic is the episode of the discovery of the spy, totally unsuspected until the moment of his appearance.

Benoit suspects the little Alsatian domestic, physically unfit for enrolment, who is called *le Manchot*, although Gertrude says he is *trop bête*. Determined to prove him traitor, he lays wait for him in the woods, sees two Germans arrive at the meeting place, and the spy approaching is not the *Manchot*—he is Gertrude's father. . . .

M. Prévost, whose fame as a novelist is due, in no small measure, to his masterly analysis of female character, describes the death of Gertrude (killed by a shell in the first skirmish) with surprising skill. The scene of the novel is laid in Lorraine.

"*Lazarine*" (Plon, Editeur, Paris) goes somewhat near to belonging to that category of books, greatly to be dreaded, the novel with a purpose; in French, *le roman à thèse*. It is similar in this respect to "*Les Autels Morts*" (Colmann-Levy), by Madame Reynes-Monlaur (with a preface by the Dominican monk R. P. Mainage), which was, however, very favourably reviewed in the *Journal des*

Débats. Both appeal in the *dénouement* more to the faithful of the Church of Rome than to either Protestant or Freethinker. In M. Paul Bourget's novel it is the Freethinker who is converted, and before the war as many as 75 per cent. of the French people were said to be Freethinkers, at least to the extent of non-conformance to Catholic practice. In "*Les Autels Morts*" it is the Protestant heroine.

In "*Lazarine*" the problem set before us by a master-hand is of more general interest. It might have been solved, perhaps, another way, but not more naturally, or with greater probability, than in the actual story. There is unspoken but ardent love between an innocent girl, a devout Catholic, and a freethinking divorcé. How are these two to be brought together? This problem is still further complicated by murder.

When the beautiful, high-souled girl learns from the divorced wife, with many slanderous lies, the awkward truth, she not unnaturally concludes that the *glorieux blessé*, Robert Graffeteau, does not really love her. She is thus disillusioned, and the bar between their union matters not. But the whole of the problem has not yet been told. Graffeteau, before leaving again for the front, proves his love for Lazarine by shooting dead his vicious, opium-smoking and divorced wife.

To an earthly union greater still is now the bar between the devout Catholic and the divorced Agnostic; but in this desperate deed (thought by the police to be suicide) the latter has shown unmistakably his true feelings, and Lazarine accepts his love in her own way—in her "*adieu, mon fiancé*"—as he leaves her for ever.

Now is M. Bourget's opportunity, as a devout Catholic himself, to solve the apparently unsolvable by the conversion of the Freethinker. In the words of the excellent critic of the "*Débats*," "only one way was left to Robert Graffeteau and the author to get themselves out of an otherwise inextricable situation. The virgin charm of Lazarine had provoked in Graffeteau love. Love shall bring him to God: he returns to the front and is killed; but before going into action he has confessed and receives the sacrament. Parted on earth, they shall be united in Heaven."

The appearance of these two novels is perhaps a sign of the times.¹

The inquisition in the Latin countries did its work only too well. It left the people no choice between the most autocratic form of Christianity and any other form. Religious toleration came too late. There are Protestants in France, but they are few and far between, and French Protestantism makes no converts. The mass of the people, before the war, were either freethinking or Catholic, and the governing class had become more and more hostile to the Church.

Since the war began, the national system of government, in which Catholics as well as Socialists were until quite lately represented, and the stress and anguish of the times—hardly a family out of mourning—and the gallantry and heroism displayed by the French priests and monks (the latter returning from exile to fight for France) in the

¹ A third novel on this subject has appeared, by the late Teodor de Wyzewa, "*Le Cahier Rouge*": the study of a conversion through music.

performance of their duties as military chaplains, stretcher-bearers, soldiers, non-commissioned and commissioned officers—all these things have tended, and very possibly are still tending, to bring back many to the Roman Catholic fold who had strayed from it. For doubtless a considerable proportion of the 75 per cent., who before the war had ceased to go to confession, were more neutral than hostile to the claims of religion.

Several books have been published bearing either directly or indirectly on the Church question, such as "*La Troisième France*" and "*L'Heroïsme en Soutane*" (Tallandier), by M. Guy de Tera mond.

The author of "*La Troisième France*," M. Giraud, has strong clerical bias, but, nevertheless, states his views fairly and moderately. His book was reviewed in *The Times*, and described as "sanely tempered." It was suggested by a work published in 1905 by a Swiss professor: "*Les Deux Frances*": the clerical and anti-clerical France: France *Noir* and France *Rouge*, as to which M. Giraud quotes a passage from Renan.¹

"*Les Sentiments de Critias*" (Emile Paul) will have none of this sentimentality, whether it is the lyricism of M. Romain Rolland, or of the defenders and glorifiers of the sons of the Church. Critias can be very bitter to both. Of the latter he writes: "In the midst of this hell of tears and sufferings, certain people can only see one side: that the war serves the ideas which they hope will triumph; and as it develops the religion of the sword and the ascendancy of the priest, scarcely without disguise they bless it. Even so, as during the plague of Florence, perched on top of their cars on heaps of corpses, whose remains enriched them, people paraded the city crying '*Vive la peste*.'"

Strange to say, this captious criticism first appeared in the *Figaro*, whose editor is of the Academy, and whose politics are at least conservative. Doubtless the fact that the author does not confine his attacks to one party commended itself to the broad-minded directors, and also more especially that he was sound on the important question of Alsace and Lorraine, with regard to which M. Brenda (the author) quotes Fustel de Coulangé's reply to Theodor Mommsen in 1871:

"*Strasbourg n'est pas à nous, il est avec nous. . . .*"

"France has only one motive for wishing to keep Alsace: it is that Alsace has shown most valiantly that she wishes to remain French. That is why we approve the war against Prussia. Bretons and Bourguignons, Parisians and Marseillais, we fight against you on the subject of Alsace. But do not make any mistake, we do not fight to constrain her. We are fighting to prevent you from constraining her."

This is still the one question that would appear to unite, if not all Frenchmen, the great majority of Frenchmen, of every shade of opinion, in their determination to continue the war.

¹ One reads in the old Hebrew legends that Rebecca, feeling the two infants struggling within her, consulted the Lord. "Two nations in thy womb," was the reply. In the womb of our country, as in that of Rebecca, two peoples fight, of which one would stifle the other.

Débats. Both appeal in the *dénouement* more to the faithful of the Church of Rome than to either Protestant or Freethinker. In M. Paul Bourget's novel it is the Freethinker who is converted, and before the war as many as 75 per cent. of the French people were said to be Freethinkers, at least to the extent of non-conformance to Catholic practice. In "Les Autels Morts" it is the Protestant heroine.

In "Lazarine" the problem set before us by a master-hand is of more general interest. It might have been solved, perhaps, another way, but not more naturally, or with greater probability, than in the actual story. There is unspoken but ardent love between an innocent girl, a devout Catholic, and a freethinking divorcé. How are these two to be brought together? This problem is still further complicated by murder.

When the beautiful, high-souled girl learns from the divorced wife, with many slanderous lies, the awkward truth, she not unnaturally concludes that the *glorieux blessé*, Robert Graffeteau, does not really love her. She is thus disillusioned, and the bar between their union matters not. But the whole of the problem has not yet been told. Graffeteau, before leaving again for the front, proves his love for Lazarine by shooting dead his vicious, opium-smoking and divorced wife.

To an earthly union greater still is now the bar between the devout Catholic and the divorced Agnostic; but in this desperate deed (thought by the police to be suicide) the latter has shown unmistakably his true feelings, and Lazarine accepts his love in her own way—in her "*adieu, mon fiancé*"—as he leaves her for ever.

Now is M. Bourget's opportunity, as a devout Catholic himself, to solve the apparently unsolvable by the conversion of the Freethinker. In the words of the excellent critic of the "*Débats*," "only one way was left to Robert Graffeteau and the author to get themselves out of an otherwise inextricable situation. The virgin charm of Lazarine had provoked in Graffeteau love. Love shall bring him to God: he returns to the front and is killed; but before going into action he has confessed and receives the sacrament. Parted on earth, they shall be united in Heaven."

The appearance of these two novels is perhaps a sign of the times.¹

The inquisition in the Latin countries did its work only too well. It left the people no choice between the most autocratic form of Christianity and any other form. Religious toleration came too late. There are Protestants in France, but they are few and far between, and French Protestantism makes no converts. The mass of the people, before the war, were either freethinking or Catholic, and the governing class had become more and more hostile to the Church.

Since the war began, the national system of government, in which Catholics as well as Socialists were until quite lately represented, and the stress and anguish of the times—hardly a family out of mourning—and the gallantry and heroism displayed by the French priests and monks (the latter returning from exile to fight for France) in the

¹ A third novel on this subject has appeared, by the late Teodor de Wyzewa, "*Le Cahier Rouge*": the study of a conversion through music.

performance of their duties as military chaplains, stretcher-bearers, soldiers, non-commissioned and commissioned officers—all these things have tended, and very possibly are still tending, to bring back many to the Roman Catholic fold who had strayed from it. For doubtless a considerable proportion of the 75 per cent., who before the war had ceased to go to confession, were more neutral than hostile to the claims of religion.

Several books have been published bearing either directly or indirectly on the Church question, such as "*La Troisième France*" and "*L'Heroïsme en Soutane*" (Tallandier), by M. Guy de Teramond.

The author of "*La Troisième France*," M. Giraud, has strong clerical bias, but, nevertheless, states his views fairly and moderately. His book was reviewed in *The Times*, and described as "sanely tempered." It was suggested by a work published in 1905 by a Swiss professor: "*Les Deux Frances*": the clerical and anti-clerical France: *France Noir* and *France Rouge*, as to which M. Giraud quotes a passage from Renan.¹

"*Les Sentiments de Critias*" (Emile Paul) will have none of this sentimentality, whether it is the lyricism of M. Romain Rolland, or of the defenders and glorifiers of the sons of the Church. Critias can be very bitter to both. Of the latter he writes: "In the midst of this hell of tears and sufferings, certain people can only see one side: that the war serves the ideas which they hope will triumph; and as it develops the religion of the sword and the ascendance of the priest, scarcely without disguise they bless it. Even so, as during the plague of Florence, perched on top of their cars on heaps of corpses, whose remains enriched them, people paraded the city crying '*Vive la peste*.'"

Strange to say, this captious criticism first appeared in the *Figaro*, whose editor is of the Academy, and whose politics are at least conservative. Doubtless the fact that the author does not confine his attacks to one party commended itself to the broad-minded directors, and also more especially that he was sound on the important question of Alsace and Lorraine, with regard to which M. Brenda (the author) quotes Fustel de Coulangé's reply to Theodor Mommsen in 1871:

"*Strasbourg n'est pas à nous, il est avec nous. . . .*"

"France has only one motive for wishing to keep Alsace: it is that Alsace has shown most valiantly that she wishes to remain French. That is why we approve the war against Prussia. Bretons and Bourguignons, Parisians and Marseillais, we fight against you on the subject of Alsace. But do not make any mistake, we do not fight to constrain her. We are fighting to prevent you from constraining her."

This is still the one question that would appear to unite, if not all Frenchmen, the great majority of Frenchmen, of every shade of opinion, in their determination to continue the war.

¹ One reads in the old Hebrew legends that Rebecca, feeling the two infants struggling within her, consulted the Lord. "Two nations in thy womb," was the reply. In the womb of our country, as in that of Rebecca, two peoples fight, of which one would stifle the other.

One of the most successful novels on the war, perhaps *the* most successful commercially, is the Prix Goncourt of 1915, "Gaspard" (Fayard & Cie.), by M. René Benjamin.

The story is admirable and life-like, both as regards the young, self-reliant Parisian street hawker turned soldier, and with respect to the description of the mobilization, concentration, and entrance into action of a French infantry regiment, followed by life in a hospital, the regimental dépôt, and (a glimpse of) the trenches.

Very realistic is the account of the first entry into action of Gaspard's company: "The sound of the cannon seemed quite close: earth and heaven trembled. At the exit of a wood the men found themselves face to face with a long line of 75 mm. guns ready for action. They were not firing, only waiting for the order. Gaspard said: 'This time, it is the battle.' Captain Ruche, who was consulting his map, replied quite quietly: 'Yes, it is here.'

"Advancing some hundreds of metres, so as not to interfere with the guns, the company halted at last behind a group of wheat stacks, and the Captain, with the aid of two of his men, mounted to the top of an unfinished stack, where he laid out his map, focussed his field-glasses, and from this post of observation drew up his command, piled arms, and ordered the soup to be prepared. 'Look sharp,' he said, 'if you want to get something to eat before fighting.' The company cook was cracking jokes around the marmite, when suddenly 'the air was torn by a sound which several generations will retain all their lives, as it were, in the ear.' A shell fell, resounded, flashed, burst, and literally smashed *le petit cuistot*. In the place where a moment before he had been joyously watching over the marmite, nothing was to be seen but a few tatters of flesh. . . .

"Captain Puche fell in the company, dressed it, put it through some exercises with the rifle, then calmly remarked: 'The fire is not violent, there is nothing to be astonished at, for we are at war. We are going to do a kilometre under it. By fours and by sections *en avant*.'"

As before remarked, the most striking characteristic of French war literature is undoubtedly the extraordinary number of records of personal experiences and impressions published by combatants.

With us, accounts of the war have been written chiefly by Press correspondents, or impersonally, as "The Retreat from Mons," by Major Corbett-Smith; but in France diaries and impressions have simply poured into the booksellers' shops during the last three years. The fact that the war is going on in their own country, in defence of their freedom, and for the existence of their nation, arouses quite possibly a deeper interest among the mass of the French people, in the details of individual experiences at the front, as well as inspiring the combatants to record them more freely, than with us; or possibly the French are the more ready writers. There is obviously a demand for this class of literature, or there would hardly be such a continuous supply. Naturally it varies in quality. M. Jean des Vignes-Rouges, the founder of the trench journal *L'Avenir*, in "L'Âme des Chefs" criticizes some of it as follows:—"The *poilu*," he says, "exaggerates his good humour in order to reassure his friends and relations, and

literature, following its usual process, accentuates still more this attitude." Necessarily these narratives have a certain resemblance to each other, which would risk to become monotonous were it not that the record of actual experiences and dangers in a war, the greatest in history, which still occupies so much of our thoughts, has always this interest—that they are living documents, often, alas! the work of authors who will write no more.

Of the books of this description that have come my way, "Les Coups de Canon," by Charles Nordmann, with a preface by General Nivelle, is one of the best, for the author, besides being an astronomer and mathematician, is a keen soldier and an accomplished writer. His book, which originally appeared by instalments, at long intervals, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, under the title "Impressions d'un Combattant," combines anecdote with technical information of great interest regarding the employment of modern artillery in the field. General Nivelle's remarks are also of very special if somewhat melancholy interest. They tend to confirm the impression produced by the speech of the French War Minister, M. Painlevé, in the debate on the French offensive of April of this year: that the late Generalissimo was at the head of the ultra-optimistic school of strategists, who believed that Napoleonic manœuvres were still possible on the Western Front, given the requisite energy and determination.

It was this optimism in the French plan—Laon and Rethel to be occupied, a twenty-mile advance in three days—that made their spring offensive appear a failure, whereas, with less ambitious views more consonant to the actual situation, it would have been regarded both more correctly and more hopefully as at least a great tactical success, which gave the French, among other gains and 30,000 prisoners, the Chemin des Dames and the Craonne Plateau.

General Nivelle's preface begins:—

"My Dear Nordmann,—

"I accept with pleasure the honour you have done one who was your old colonel at the beginning of the war, in dedicating to him your volume, 'Les Coups de Canons.' The day you arrived at my headquarters I associated you with my researches in the location of enemy batteries by sound. The next day you brought me the formula which served as the base of solution of the problem. Your method has, since then, been subjected to numerous variants, but it remains the base of all that has been done in this order of ideas."

But the passage in this letter which discloses the writer's optimism is as follows:—

"The war of trenches is, however, only one of the numerous forms of war, and a form that cannot continue indefinitely, for it does not lead to a decision. You may be sure that the essential principles of Napoleonic war have lost nothing of their value. One of these days they will reassert their rights. It

is because we failed to understand them—while it was just the opposite with our enemies—that we were beaten in 1870.

"To seek, in a form of war like the present, which procedure would dispense with all reflection and determination, the solution . . . is not worthy of our magnificent army."

These remarks, sound enough in the abstract, nevertheless seem to imply a belief in the possibility of a strategical penetration of the enemy's front, for which the situation was not yet ripe.¹

M. Nordmann tells an amusing story of an unfortunate African tirailleur killed on the Western Front. When his identity disc was sought for, it was found that he was wearing seven vests and four under garments, which, it appears, he had from time to time received from French societies for the supply of warm clothes to soldiers. He had carried all this property on him, hoping evidently that one day he would be able to proudly distribute it in his native village.

The superiority of the French to the German artillery is attributed by this author chiefly to two reasons: the preparation of the fuse previous to inserting it in the shell is done mechanically instead of by hand, and the hydromenetic brake, which is much better than the German. On the other hand, the telephones for artillery work, or, rather, the telephone system, was better on the German side. The French despised it before the war. "But there is not a battery to-day," M. Nordmann tells us, "that is not telephonically connected with its post of observation, group, regimental commander, and, whenever possible, the infantry in front of it."

M. Nordmann discourses very informingly on all the technical work of modern artillery in the field, and on initial velocity in connection with the rate at which sound travels. He also describes the way in which guns and gun detachments can be concealed in a flat country. "I know a battery," he writes, "which for five and a half months had the same position in an open field, guns and carriages simply covered with grey-coloured coverings, and it remained undiscovered by the daily enemy aerial reconnaissances.

"This result was obtained as follows: As soon as the observer stationed in front signalled a hostile aeroplane, the semaphore signal was hoisted, consisting of two cask rings assembled orthogonally and drawn up to the top of a pole by means of a pulley. At this signal the gunners, no matter what they might happen to be doing—for the captain was very particular on this point—rushed like rabbits into their holes. All went to earth except the avion observer, who, by means of a small telephone, directed the fire of the anti-aircraft gun, in a wood near. This observer was dressed in an immense blouse with a covering over his face with two little holes for eyes. He looked like a trunk of a tree rather than a brilliant artillery officer."

¹ "C'en doit être fini des plans ambitieux et téméraires, dont les apparences grandioses dissimulent mal le vide et l'impréparation. C'en doit être fini des conceptions prétendues à la Napoléon, obstinément inspirées d'une école que la réalité a démentie."—Speech of M. Painlevé, the French War Minister, in the debate on the April offensive.

Besides these precautions, a false battery, made of wood and half concealed, was arranged in another place for the enemy to fire at.

But, excellent as is M. Nordmann's book as a whole, professional soldiers will not be able to pass without question the theory—common, apparently, to many improvised soldiers—that a few weeks in the trenches are enough to teach a man the whole art of war and make him the equal of the professionally trained officer. In minor tactics this may be true; in fact, the temporary officer may easily become even superior to the regular in this most essential branch of the art; but minor tactics can only be regarded as the whole art of warfare in the case of persons who have no desire or likelihood of rising above the subaltern ranks. The war in France, for the first six weeks, was totally unlike the present war of trenches, and in other parts of the world operations have had to be conducted totally differently also. Even in France at the present time a knowledge of strategy and higher tactics is required of the higher commanders which no amount of trench warfare can supply. Napoleon's formula for the making of a great General, "Read and re-read the campaigns of the great Captains of history," is as true now as in any other period, and this to be of any good requires long and profound study. It cannot be done in an armchair, and a good knowledge of military administration and topography is an essential preliminary.

Yet M. Nordmann writes: "The phenomenon, 'battle,' like all other natural phenomena, is open to scientific criticism. It is to the same degree as a chemical reaction, or a malady, subject to the laws of observation and logic. The least apprentice perhaps, he who has, if only for a few weeks, taken an active part in the war. . . . *he who has eyes to see and ears to hear, and common sense to draw conclusions, knows the art of war better than if he had only followed, even for twenty years, the theoretic and systematic instruction of all the military academies of the world.* You, my comrades, from the peaceful chrysalis of commerce, manufacture, agriculture, and the laboratory, have burst forth, metamorphosed suddenly, into stern and eager warriors."

The italics are my own, and if the meaning of this passage is that a few months at the trenches are sufficient to qualify a man for the highest military appointments without further study, history does not support the idea, which was dealt with in a most able, interesting, and conclusive manner by Major R. H. Beadon, A.S.C., in the May number of this JOURNAL.

"Theory," wrote Clausewitz (who had twenty years of practical experience in the Napoleonic Wars), "has not less importance because it cannot be established on mathematical bases. Thanks to it, each may now find, without being obliged to make preliminary researches, stated, classified, and clearly explained, all the elements of the science"; and Napoleon, who, were he alive to-day, would be the first to make use of modern inventions, laid down that "courage and natural talent cannot make head against courage and talent, aided by all the recorded experience of the past: *tous les souvenirs et toutes les comparaisons.*"

Doubtless it was partly to combat this mistaken idea, that all the military art can be learnt in the trenches, that General Nivelle, in his preface, referred so pointedly to other forms of warfare.

The danger that not infrequently attends the observation of artillery fire—now so important with the almost universal system of indirect laying—is illustrated in Lieutenant Robert Deville's excellent little book, "*Virton La Marne*," which describes the experiences of a regiment of field artillery from the beginning of the war up to and including the pursuit after the Battle of the Marne until the author was wounded for the second time.

On the second day of the great battle he was detailed for the post of observer in the church clock-tower at the village of Blesmes. A staff officer of the division and the colonel of the infantry regiment, whose men occupied the ground in front of the village, accompanied him in order to point out the positions of the French troops. While this was being done, the Divisional General also paid a visit to the clock-tower.

Soon after his departure, a salvo of the enemy's 105's burst in front of the tower, followed by another which burst just behind it. The colonel and staff officer thereupon descended the ladder, leaving the observer alone in his post of honour, which was the only point above the numerous poplars (so common in every French landscape) from which the enemy's artillery fire could be traced back to the positions of the guns. No telephone seems to have been available, and the officer's observations, which included the details of a hostile infantry attack, were communicated to the French batteries by written messages carried by a cyclist orderly. Suddenly, a terrific noise half stunned him, while a vivid light half blinded him; and with the sensation of being buried in falling stones and wood, and stifled with yellow dust, he found himself at the bottom of the tower with his frightened orderly standing over him, and the blood pouring from a wound in his neck.

He had had the satisfaction, however, before he was brought down, of locating the hostile 105 battery.

The well-known firm of French publishers, Messrs. Hachette & Cie., of the Boulevard St. Germain, has brought out a whole series of this class of war literature under the general heading of "*Memoires et Récits de Guerre*."

Looking through one of these, "*La Bataille dans la Forêt (Argonne, 1915): Impressions d'un Témoin*," it was recalled to memory how great was the relative success of the French Champagne offensive, in September, 1915, in comparison with recent events. It was on quite a narrow front of less than fifteen miles, but resulted in the capture of 25,000 men and 150 guns in three days. Had it not been for a change in the weather on the very morning of the attack, the writer of these "impressions" believes that Joffre and Pétain would have broken through the German front.

In a note-book found on a German artilleryman was written: "provided that the sky does not clear, so as to allow of the French airmen spotting us. Fog, fog, come to our help." Fog on this

occasion, as in many more recent experiences, proved an invaluable auxiliary to the enemy.

M. Henri Robert, Batonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats, or, in other words, the leader of the Paris Bar, is not only an eminent barrister, he is a celebrity. Whoever he defends appears to go free, almost as a matter of course. Not always acquitted, but, if imprisonment is awarded, generally it is *avec sursis*, an extraordinary French custom which means that, although perhaps given five years, for example, the fortunate prisoner does not do a day of it. He simply walks home as if nothing had happened. If M. Henri Robert does not persuade the jury to acquit, he at least obtains for his client *sursis*, which amounts apparently to much the same thing as acquittal. Consequently, when the Committee of the Society *L'Effort de la France et de ses Alliés* announced that M. Henri Robert would give an address at the Sorbonne on *L'Effort de Paris*, it is not surprising to find among the audience the most distinguished names, representing Parliament, the Army, the Church, and the Municipality.

The President of the Conseil Municipal of Paris, who presided, in introducing the lecturer, said there was no need; "his name is synonymous with eloquence, loyalty, and generosity."

The eloquent speech of the Municipal President, M. Mithouard, and the most interesting and detailed address in which M. Henri Robert (who had remained at his post when the Government went to Bordeaux) describes what has been done in Paris, since the war began, towards the defence of the country, in amelioration of suffering and distress, and in cheering and aiding the French Army in its long and arduous task—all this valuable information, eloquently imparted, has been published in pamphlet form, under the title of *L'Effort de Paris*, par M. Henri Robert (Blond & Gay, Paris). The work of the Comité de Sécurité (which governed Paris from September 2nd to December 21st, 1914), the Conseil Général, the Municipality, the Institute (in which has been established a hospital), the Chamber of Commerce and Le Secours National, are all described; and the unexpected steadiness and endurance of the Parisians is held up to honour by the following quotation from the *Frankfort Gazette*: "That which (in Paris) has disappeared is simply the air of frivolity, under which was hidden solid virtues." "Paris," M. Henri Robert declares, "is the brain, the heart, the soul of France."

An article on French war literature would be very incomplete without reference to the patriotic work of M. Maurice Barrès, deputy, author, academician, and President of the League of Patriots.¹ In politics M. Barrès is the Nationalist Deputy for the Paris Arrondissement, which includes the Place Vendôme and the Rue de la Paix, and his party appears to consist of himself alone; but he allies himself with the Right and is an active opponent of the anti-clerical majority. He began his journalistic career many years ago as an editor of General Boulanger's organ, *La Cocarde*, and for some time past,

¹ Founded by the late M. Paul Deroulède. The corresponding anti-clerical league is the League of the Rights of Men.

dating from before the war, he has been connected with the *Echo de Paris*, which, although not the organ of the Church party, is distinctly clerical in tendency.

Almost from the commencement of hostilities, upon the death of the eminent and much regretted Count Albert de Mun, M. Barrès, in the leader columns of the above-mentioned newspaper, has eloquently supported the Union Sacrée, and has promoted and even originated many useful ideas and projects for vigorously prosecuting the war, and for the encouragement of the French soldiers. The Croix de Guerre was his idea, as well as the re-education of the permanently maimed.

He has published several volumes during the war. "Les traits éternels de la France" is the development of a lecture delivered before the British Academy in London, in 1916, when he visited Oxford and was the guest of the British Government during his stay in England.

"Les diverses familles spirituelles de la France," a great deal of which originally appeared in the *Echo de Paris*, relates many touching and heroic episodes of the war in which Frenchmen of conflicting opinions and creeds have shown equal abnegation and self-sacrifice:—

"I offer my life in order to dissipate the misunderstanding that exists between the priest and France." (The Abbé Liégeois, Corporal, 28th Chasseurs Alpains, killed.)

"I offer my life for future generations." (Georges Groli, Protestant, killed near Souchez.)

"I am filled with gratitude towards the country of my adoption. Nothing can be too much to repay her goodness to me." (Sous-lieutenant Robert Herz, German Jew, killed at Marcheville.)

"I start bravely, hoping that our devotion, and perhaps our sacrifice, will be of help to our children. May they enjoy the peace of which we dream." (René Gepin, Freethinker, killed.)

"I start in half an hour. To live without justice is not worth the pain." (Albert Thierry, Socialist, killed at Aix-Noulette.)

These extracts from soldiers' letters show the fine spirit animating, as a rule, the French Army; and the following incidents illustrate the liberating effect on the mind of common dangers and common sacrifice:—

"At a burial *en masse* of unidentified bodies, priest, pasteur, and rabbi together blessed the unknown dead."

"The freethinker and freemason Captain P., and the priest, Captain M., were good comrades, and when the priest was killed, his friend the Freethinker not only ordered a Mass for the repose of his soul, but he attended it himself. Invited by the curé to speak, he

mounted the altar steps and glorified the soldier-priest. All this he did, not because he believed it to be of any real importance, but because he knew his friend, who thought otherwise, would have done the same for him."

Another literary personality that cannot be passed over is the venerable Madame Juliette Adam, the friend of George Sand, and later on of the young Gambetta, whom she formed and moulded, the discoverer of Pierre Loti, and for twenty years the editor of the *Nouvelle Revue*. Her contributions to the literature of the war have taken the form of two passionate denunciations of Bismarck and the present Kaiser, entitled, "L'Heure vengeresse des crimes bismarckiens" and "Guillaume II." The latter volume is simply a reprint of selected articles from "La Nouvelle Revue" of 1890 to 1899; but so infallible have the predictions contained in these pages been proved by the events of the last three years, that all France can do no other than admit to-day—tardily and too late, but as an act of moral recompense—that she was indeed a prophetess, *une voyante*.

"Voilà ton ennemi fait ceci," she wrote, referring to German preparations of all kinds, material and educational, for the inevitable struggle, "*si tu ne veux pas être écrasé par lui, tu en feras autant. C'est une question de vie, ou de mort.*"

A good deal of verse has appeared. The leading French poets, Hugues Delorme, Edmond Rostand, the Countess Mathieu de Noailles, Jean Aicard, have written much in the magazines, and the latter and Paul Fort have published volumes, as also has M. Paul Claudel, the Catholic poet, inspired, all of them, by the heroism of the French soldier and the barbarism of the enemy.

Of a lighter kind, similar to what appears in *Punch*, a little book of selected poems, ballads, and revues of a very special interest, made its appearance this year with some clever drawings on the cover, published by *La Renaissance du Livre*, 78, Boulevard St. Michel. Captain Gaston Vidal,¹ of the Chasseurs Alpins, himself the joint author of two excellent contributions—a revue and a sketch—explains in the preface that the contents of this volume were composed and written down under difficulties. "It was in the sticky and often evil-smelling mud of the trenches, the dark saps, or in the camps of repose, sometimes during the anxious minutes preceding an attack, on their knees, on a stone, or on the corner of a table, lighted à la diable, that these lines were scribbled."

The following is an extract from a citizen-soldier's appreciation of the methods of the present Generalissimo, General Pétain. All who know Paris are acquainted with the establishments of that veritable prince of grocers, Felix Potin, whose employees are in peace time dressed in white:—

¹Appointed chief editor of *Le Pays* on September 26th, 1917, on being retired on account of wounds: this may mean some change in the tendencies of this newspaper.

L'EMPLOYÉ DE CHEZ PÉTAÏN.

i.

Afin d'gagner ma vie,
 Au bon temps de la Paix,
 Dans un 'grande épïc 'rie,
 Jadis je travaillais.
 Un plaisir légitime
 Vient d'inonder mon cœur,
 D'puis qu'un presque homonyme,
 Devint mon directeur.

Refrain.

J'ai de quoi m'occuper,
 Le soir et le matin.
 Car je suit employé,
 Employé chez Pétaïn.

ii.

Un "disciplin" sévère,
 Règne dans la maison,
 Mais on n'cherch 'pas à faire,
 Des modèl's de bon ton.
 Elle est bien envolée,
 La blous' blanch' du temps d'Paix;
 Nous rentrons des branchées,
 Crottés comm' des barbets.

(Refrain.)

iii.

Je me sens plein de zèle,
 Pour ce patron censé;
 Auprès d'la clientèle,
 Je suis très empressé.
 Si Fritz, à la nuit noire,
 Vient chercher mes produits,
 Alors je vous prie d'croire,
 Qu'il est viv'ment servi!

Dernier Refrain.

Le patron nous baptise,
 Ses enfants, cré matin,
 Je suit fier quoiqu 'on dise,
 D'être un enfant d'Pétaïn.

ADJUTANT P. COURCEL.

Here is a translation of a sonnet in honour of General de Castelnau, the hero of the Grand-Couronné of Nancy, who has lost three sons in the course of this war.

The first to fall was the youngest,¹ at the Battle of the Seille, in Lorraine, August 20th, 1914. It is taken from "Les poètes de la Guerre" (Berger-Levrault, Paris). The incident is historical. General de Castelnau commanded the troops engaged in this battle—the Second Army:—

A GENERAL.

Among his staff he paces up and down,
Dictating rapidly his orders clear,
When from the fighting line he sees appear
A man, whose visage wears an anxious frown,
Who, questioned, stammers in an undertone:
"Sir, Lieutenant. . . ." "Speak up, man, do not fear!"
"Just now a ball. . . ." "My son? Enough, I hear. . . ."
The General bows his head, the truth is known.
He pales, but firm as marble stands his frame,
Although, in the mind's eye, he sees again
His child a boy, then gallant soldier, then
A mother weeping. But he must not shame
Himself before the men he should sustain;
Proudly he speaks: "Continue, gentlemen."

The recipient of the Grand Prix de Littérature of the French Academy for 1917 is the poet, Francis Jammes, ardent convert to the Church of Rome, who recently in *La Croix*, wrote: "*Si je rêve parfois de devenir un tyran c'est afin de—semblable à Chi-Hoang-Ti, empereur de Chine, mettre les lettrés qui troublent l'ordre dans un unique sac, sur un seul bûcher, dont la flamme gigantesque s'alimenterait à leurs livres mêmes, entassés autour.*"

As to which a writer in *Le Temps* remarks that M. Francis Jammes lived at least *la matinée d'un faune* (which may perhaps be translated: "sowed wild oats freely") before passing over in the afternoon of his life to the Inquisition. If what he proposes were done by another absolute fanatic, is he so sure that he himself would escape punishment?

This award by the Academy is perhaps a set-off against having so recently as 1913 advertised that misguided *iconoclast* M. Romain Rolland, who on the outbreak of war made his home in Geneva; and for clandestinely attempting to communicate with whom, Mr. E. D. Morel is now undergoing six months' imprisonment.

The numerous translations into English of French war literature, which have already appeared, testify to its extraordinary interest and value.

¹ Xavier de Castelnau, Lieut., 4th Battalion Chasseurs à pied, of the 11th Division, XXth Corps d'armée.

"EMDEN."

*A paraphrase of the account published by Kapitän-leutnant
Hellmuth von Mücke.*

(Translated by A. C. HEARN.)

THE account starts on the afternoon of August 2nd,—the "Emden" being then in the Yellow Sea.

An important message had just been received by wireless, and the crew of 300, in response to the whistle of the boatswain's mate, assembled on the afterdeck and listened attentively to the words of Captain von Müller.

"I have just received the following wireless message from Tsingtau:—

"His Majesty the Kaiser ordered combined mobilization of Navy and Army on August 1st. In consequence of the violation of German territory by Russian troops the Empire is in a state of war with Russia and France."

Captain von Müller then proceeded to address his men to the following effect:—

"For years we have been taught to expect this event. Without any previous declaration of war the hostile hordes have broken into Germany.

"The German sword has remained in its scabbard for forty-four years, notwithstanding the fact that in this period we have had more than one opportunity of drawing it victoriously. Germany, however, has never sought conquest by violence. In peaceful competition she has won a place of honour among the nations, through labour and diligence, through commercial and industrial enterprise, through her science and her intellectual eminence, through honesty and fair dealing. So stands the German kingdom, envied by those who were unable to emulate her. . . . It is our task to show that the German people, sound to the very core, can now endure the proof. . . . To be or not to be, that is the question for us. . . . We will show ourselves worthy of our forefathers, even against a world in arms."

At the conclusion of his address, the captain announced that he intended to make a diversion in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok, where, as he understood, the naval forces of France and Russia were assembled. Should the "Emden" encounter them, he placed entire reliance on his crew; but the main task was to destroy commerce.

The order was then given to clear for action.

At this stage of the account the author takes the opportunity of moralizing in the following strain:—

So the year-long cry for revenge has been heard, and the iron dice must again be tossed. But now it is no mere question of Alsace-Lorraine. Much more! To-day it is Russia and France; but behind them stands another Power, the foe of all; the Power which for centuries has pitted one nation against another, always seeking its own profit—England. Without conscience, without honour, without truth, this is her war, and sooner or later she will enter the arena. . . . He recalls, in evidence against her, the judgment of her own children. Carlyle inveighs against her hypocrisy with the old familiar dyspeptic gusto. Lord Derby (once Premier) condemns her intolerance of sea-rivalry, and the *Saturday Review* of 1897 expounds in the manner of Machiavelli. And now, he concludes, "the last free land is called upon to face the unbridled egoism and ambition of England."

He embarks on these musings as the order is given to "clear ship for action," and is only aroused from them as the various stations announce "guns clear," "torpedo tubes clear," "main and auxiliary engines clear," "pumps, steering gear, signals and wireless all clear."¹

With decks cleared for action and lights out the "Emden" proceeded through the Straits of Tsushima at fifteen knots on a black and moonless night. The brilliant phosphorescence of the water and the regular wash of the waves created long glowing passages of light about the ship, and submarines were frequently reported from the look-out in consequence.

Early on the morning of August 3rd, a steamer was sighted about fifteen miles from the Japanese coast. A blank shot, followed by two shells, brought her to, though she made desperate efforts to escape into the adjacent neutral waters. She proved to be the Russian volunteer steamer "Rjesan," employed in peace time in carrying passengers between Shanghai and Vladivostock, but destined for service in war as an auxiliary cruiser, for which she was well suited, being fast and only recently off the stocks at Schichau.

It being decided to take this prize to Tsingtau, the "Emden" proceeded south at fifteen knots, the "Rjesan" following in her wake with a small prize crew on board. The master protested strenuously against his capture, but naturally without avail. In the hope of meeting with more booty, the "Emden" steered on a circuitous route, but saw nothing until passing the southern end of Corea, when smoke columns were announced by the look-out. These were conjectured to represent the French squadron, consisting of the armoured cruisers "Montcalm" and "Dupleix," and certain destroyers. The upper works of a small steamer were also seen nearer at hand. With fitting discretion the "Emden" made a wide detour and left the neighbourhood *sans cérémonie*.

¹ Lieutenant von Mücke was obviously too good a seaman to have spent so important a period of his duties in such irrelevant reveries, and it must therefore be concluded that they are rather the later contribution of some benevolent professor, who had undertaken, *more teutonico*, the revision of the diary from a cultural and propagandist standpoint, and had his subject "learned and conned by rote."

Without further event of note the ship at last arrived at Tsingtau, taking in on voyage a wireless message, issued on the authority of Reuter, to the effect that the " Emden " had been sunk !

An examination of the " Rjesan " at Tsingtau showed her suitability for naval service, her speed being seventeen knots. She was therefore armed and manned and commissioned as the auxiliary cruiser " Cormoran."

Tsingtau was found fully occupied with the activities of war. Mine defences were being completed. Shore batteries were completely manned. Behind the mole, many merchant steamers were being equipped as auxiliary cruisers and transports for service with the squadron. Captain von Müller here received orders from Count von Spee, the Commander-in-Chief, to join up at an appointed rendezvous to the south. The " Scharnhorst," " Gneisenau," and " Nürnberg " were then in Southern waters, steering north.

II.

Two days after her arrival, the " Emden " put out from Tsingtau, followed by the tender " Markomannia " and a large number of German ships destined for the squadron. The band played " Die Wacht am Rhein," and the cheers of their compatriots followed the crews on their course.

As they passed between the mine-fields the sun rose over Tsingtau, gilding the long lines of houses and the signal tower, lending a fresher green to the newly afforested hill-side, and bathing the church-tower and its cross in rosy light. A vision of peace, for the safety of which they felt no misgivings, having no prescience of things to come.

On the journey south news was received of England's declaration of war. No surprise was felt, except, perhaps, that England should have departed from her usual practice of getting others to pull her chestnuts out of the fire.¹

Some days later the news of the ultimatum was also received. No matter !

At this stage Lieutenant von Mücke takes occasion to deny a rumour, subsequently read by him in an English paper, to the effect that the " Emden's " exit from Tsingtau was only made possible by hoisting a British ensign and cheering a Japanese blockading squadron, in the neighbourhood of which they were supposed to have passed. This, he conjectures, may justify the conclusion that a British and Japanese squadron was *en route* to Tsingtau before the declaration of war. In any case it is hardly to be imagined that, had such a chance presented itself, the " Emden " would have soiled herself by flying the English flag, or let slip so fine an opportunity of saluting the enemy from the torpedo tube !

On August 12th the " Emden " reached the island which had been designated by the Commander-in-Chief as the rendezvous, and

¹ It will, of course, be appreciated that remarks of this nature are merely transcripts from the account of Lieutenant von Mücke, and represent the German view.

took up a berth near the flagship amidst the cheers of the squadron. All three ships were busy coaling from colliers, and in their neighbourhood lay a large number of auxiliary vessels.

Captain von Müller immediately proceeded to report, and to suggest to Count von Spee that he should be given orders to proceed to the Indian Ocean. The Admiral promised to consider the suggestion. On the following day the squadron left the harbour in line ahead, followed by the auxiliaries, and took an easterly course.

At midday the flagship signalled "'Emden' to proceed independently; we wish you luck," followed by the order "'Markomannia' to accompany 'Emden.'" Thereupon both ships stood out of the line, and in a short time lost sight of the squadron.

Owing to the destruction of the German wireless station at Jap by the British, they were still in doubt whether Japan had actually declared war.

On August 20th the German steamer "Princess Alice" was encountered, relieved of some reserve ratings, and ordered to proceed to Manila. Soon after the gunboat "Geier" was met. On account of her defective signalling apparatus she was still in ignorance of the British and Japanese declarations. The ships remained together for a short time, exchanging news, after which the "Geier" proceeded to the east, in order to follow the squadron, and the "Emden" resumed her southerly course.

To the uncertainty regarding the precise position of the relations with Japan a Japanese steamer was much indebted, as she was allowed to proceed without challenge.

By now the "Emden" was approaching frequented waters, and it was feared that her lack of resemblance to any British ships might lead to an easy recognition of her identity, and to early news of her presence and course in southerly waters being received by the enemy.

All English warships in Chinese waters had either two or four funnels; the "Emden" had three. To remedy this a fourth was hastily improvised by nailing a strip of canvas about five feet wide to a spar, and setting up this contrivance forward of the three funnels. Seen from the beam, the arrangement answered well, but from ahead it was not convincing; a start was therefore made on the morrow with an improved design, oval in section, constructed of lattice work and sail cloth. The "Markomannia" took up a position on the beam of the "Emden" in order to advise as to the exact siting of the new funnel, which was so placed as to give the "Emden" a resemblance to the British cruiser "Yarmouth." The lifting wire was specially marked in order that the dummy funnel might be hoisted into position at short notice whenever desired, either by day or night.

By the end of the first week in September the ship entered the Bay of Bengal. During five days they were aware, through her powerful wireless, of the presence in the neighbourhood of a British warship, which was conjectured to be the "Minotaur." The messages gradually grew weaker, and finally ceased altogether. Nothing, however, was actually seen.

III.

Business began on the night of September 10th. A steamer was sighted ahead, and the "Emden," with lights out, steamed up to within 100 yards of her. "Stop. Do not use your wireless. We are sending a boat on board." To punctuate the order a blank shot was fired. The steamer stopped, a prize crew was sent on board, and shortly afterwards a signal was received, to the dismay of everybody, that the ship was the Greek steamer "Pontoporros." A neutral! To let her go was to publish to the whole Indian Ocean the news of what was afoot. Great was the relief when it was discovered that the ship carried a cargo of Indian coal consigned to a British port. She was promptly appropriated as a collier transport, and the squadron became three strong.

Von Mücke was particularly anxious to obtain a supply of soap, of which he had run very short! The "Pontoporros," though well provided with "the dirtiest coal one can imagine," was but indifferently well equipped. It was decided to capture a ship better found in the toilet department! Fortune smiled, and on the morning of the 11th inst. a British steamer, bound from Calcutta to France, *via* Colombo, and equipped for service as a troop transport, was encountered and held up. Numerous horse stalls and gun limbers were on board; also a fine race horse, which was regretfully shot. Within half an hour the transport was at the bottom, and the "Emden" was the richer by a supply of soap sufficient for a year's consumption on a generous scale.

The crew of the transport was transferred to the "Pontoporros" in her rôle as "scavenger" (*Lumpensammler*). This rôle was always assigned to a captured ship, either in ballast and therefore of little value, or filled with neutral cargo, the sinking of which would prove expensive. "For neutral cargo must be replaced at the close of the war." The scavenger was retained in company until her complement of passengers was complete, when she was sent to the nearest port.

Business flourished. Whenever a steamer appeared, it was stopped and a prize crew of one officer and ten men proceeded on board. They prepared the ship for sinking and provided for the safe transfer of the personnel to the scavenger. More often than not, whilst this work was proceeding, another ship would be sighted. The procedure was repeated, and yet again repeated, so that on some occasions five or six victims were assembled together in one spot; one making for the bottom, its funnels just disappearing, the next with decks awash, a third gradually filling, and listing gently; the remainder in preparation for a similar fate. Meanwhile crews and passengers made their bewildered *début* on board the scavenger.

In this manner the "Emden" cruised between Colombo and Calcutta, accompanied by the "Markomannia," "Pontoporros," and "Kabinga." The latter was a British steamer with an American cargo, and had taken over the duties of "scavenger" from the "Pontoporros." She was ultimately sent in to Calcutta with the passengers, numbering nearly 400. As they parted company, the crew and passengers gave

the " Emden " three hearty cheers, an experience which was repeated on every similar occasion.

Towards the passengers—who, almost without exception, behaved very well—the officers of the " Emden " were studiously polite. On one occasion a passenger begged that his motor cycle might be spared from the common destruction. It was accordingly hoisted out of the hold, and consigned, with its delighted owner, to the " scavenger."

"The English were always very grateful to us for invariably giving them plenty of time to save their belongings. This they frankly confessed in their newspapers. I am not going too far in saying that, at the end of 1914, the ' Emden ' was the most popular ship in the East Indies. Generally speaking, the English do not understand the meaning of war. It is not with them a conflict of the people, as with us; for the most part they stand indifferently aside, praising alike the efforts of friend or foe from what is merely a sporting standpoint."

When in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, the Italian steamer " Loredano " was stopped and overhauled. Her cargo being beyond suspicion, she was allowed to proceed, and was later observed salving bales of tea floating up from the wreckage of a British steamer newly sunk. On the next day she was " guilty " of the unneutral act of warning all ships by wireless of the presence of the " Emden."

The scarcity of ships now put an end to the profitable exertions of the " Emden " in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and a course was therefore set for Rangoon. On the way a Norwegian ship was taken and appointed " scavenger," but the waters of Rangoon yielded no prizes. After a week of fruitless endeavour, the captain decided to visit Madras to test the oil tanks. On the evening of the 18th the " Emden " appeared off Madras Harbour.

"Only on the preceding day had the gladsome news been officially announced in Madras that the ' Emden ' was disposed of. To celebrate the event a festive gathering had assembled at the Club. Unfortunately, since we did not know of this at the time, we were unable to prevent our shells falling into the soup; otherwise we should naturally have postponed our bombardment until the following day. One should not unnecessarily irritate one's opponent. As far as possible all sacred institutions should be spared; and Englishmen are especially sensitive as regards their dinner."

Lights were burning brightly when the " Emden " stood in to a range of 3,000 yards; no difficulty was therefore experienced in navigation nor in picking out the white, red-banded oil tanks, which stood out prominently in the glare. A few shells were fired, and the tanks were seen to be in flames. The shore batteries replied, but the " Emden " had no knowledge of where their shells went. Her task being accomplished, she stood to the northward with all port lights showing, and starboard lights extinguished. After a short run in this direction all lights were extinguished, and the vessel swung round to the south.

On the next day, a hundred miles distant from Madras, the column of smoke from the burning tanks could still be seen.

On the evening of September 26th, whilst cruising off Colombo, a British ship, laden with sugar, was rendered clearly visible by the harbour searchlights. An attempt to escape was unsuccessful, and within a few minutes she was cleared of her crew and scuttled.

The master and engineer were placed for a short time in a cell on board the "Emden" for having disregarded the order to stop.

"Meanwhile, the question of coal was becoming serious. Our faithful 'Markomannia' had run short, and we only had the 'Pontoporros,' loaded with Indian coal, to fall back upon. . . . However, the British Admiralty, in the most disinterested manner, found a solution to the problem by providing us within a few days with a 7,000-ton collier laden with best Welsh coal for Hong Kong."

By now, the presence of the "Emden" in southern waters had become so widely known that traffic had stopped, and business was no longer brisk. The Captain therefore considered the time opportune to find some means of effecting a refit, more particularly as the hull was very foul and in urgent need of attention; so the ship proceeded to the south.

IV.

It was fully realized by all her crew that the "Emden" was marked down for destruction, and that, sooner or later, the day of reckoning was bound to come. Sixteen warships were on the track, flying the British, Japanese, French, and Russian ensigns. All of them were of superior metal to the "Emden," and, even should she succeed in waging successful battle with the least of them, the inevitable loss of men and damage to the ship would put a definite term to her activities, seeing that she could find no means of completing her complement, or of effecting large repairs.

In the meantime, however, her task was to do as much harm as possible until destruction marked her down.

At no stage was news received of the position of any of her opponents, though their wireless frequently betrayed their presence. Not knowing in which direction to look for the enemy ship, the "Emden" held steadily on her course throughout. There was no safety in speed, as she was tied down to twelve knots, the speed of her colliers. It was possible, not only to tell approximately the distance of enemy ships by the power of their wireless, but also to differentiate between their nationalities.

Life on board proceeded in much the same manner as in peace time, but with less comfort, as all woodwork, curtains, and other inflammable material had been dispensed with, and officers slept with their clothes on, ready for instant action. The behaviour of the crew was admirable, and for the Captain they all had an unbounded respect and admiration. The pleasantest hours were spent over newspapers found in their prizes; true, the news mostly came from English papers, but it was possible to obtain some idea of the actual state of affairs despite all the falsehoods and misrepresentations! Nor did they allow themselves to be disturbed by the news of colossal German

losses, for it was found, on reckoning them together, that they considerably exceeded the total population of Germany! Over the endless rumours of disasters to the German forces with which the Indian papers were crowded, the officers merely made merry; armies annihilated, universal defection, famine, revolution, an epidemic of suicide amongst the generals and similar news were the order of the day. The Crown Prince had fallen, the Kaiser had fallen, Bavaria had broken adrift from the Empire! No news was kept from the crew, nor did they ever entertain any serious belief in any of the stories of disaster culled from the Indian papers. The seal had been set finally to their credulity on that day in the China Seas, far off in early August, when Reuter announced to them: "'Emden' sunk by 'Askold.'—Official."

The crew received with the greatest delight the news of the battle of Santa Maria (Coronel) where, for the first time for one hundred years an English squadron more than met its match in an annihilating conflict. They realized that the ultimate fate of the German squadron, like that of the "Emden" itself, was a foregone conclusion; but they rejoiced all the more in feeling that it had at least succeeded in securing Germany's first fleet victory at sea, and the first naval defeat of England for one hundred years.

Whilst the crew were kept busy in attending to the welfare of the ship and her machinery, they lived none the less a pleasant and healthy life. Shower baths were rigged up on deck, and three times a day the men were allowed to use them as long as they wished. In the period between the "Emden's" departure from Tsingtau and the final battle off Keeling Island, the sick berth had not a single case requiring attention. In the evening the men gathered together and sang old folk songs, or topical and modern verse, often of their own composing. At the end all joined heartily together in "Die Wacht am Rhein."

The division of the booty was always an occasion of festivity. Something of value, more frequently in the edible line, was generally secured from the prizes.

In an allotted position on the afterdeck were stretched piles of dainties. Innumerable sausages, chocolates and sweets, cigarettes, flasks of claret and bottles of "three star" blocked the gangways. Pigs, ducks, fowls, *et hoc genus omne*, grunted, quacked, and cackled from their temporary quarters.

All these good things were shared amongst the crew, and helped to grace many a banquet. Whenever a prize was visited the boarding officer carried with him a list of "desirables" from the point of view of the ship's upkeep, from lathes to lubricating oil. The boarding party had their own ideas regarding desiderata, although such things did not appear on the official list. How they pitied the situation of their pursuers, sixteen strong, condemned to hard sea fare and knowing nothing, except perhaps in dreams, of the many good things which fell to the lot of the "Emden"!

In good time the Bay of Bengal was left behind and the anchor dropped in the harbour of Diego Garcia, a small British island in

the south of the Indian Ocean. Hardly was this done before the British flag was hoisted on shore, and an old man, an Englishman, came off in a boat laden with fish, eggs, and vegetables. He welcomed them with enthusiasm. Not for twenty-five years had a German warship appeared in the harbour. Of the state of war he knew nothing, nor was he enlightened. The state of the ship caused him some amazement, but he was told that the "Emden" was making a tour of the world, and that such a condition of affairs was therefore only to be expected.

Whilst in harbour everything possible was done to put the ship in good order. She was partly careened by filling alternately the port and starboard compartments with water, and composition was applied to the exposed portions of the bottom. Naturally it was not possible to make a thorough job of it. During the brief intervals of leisure, the crew passed an idyllic time angling for fish, with which the waters abounded, of all colours and all shapes. Bright green water snakes disported themselves on the surface of the water, and great sting rays, rolling slowly up from the depths, were shot but not retrieved.

The brief idyll in harbour soon came to an end, and the "Emden" resumed activities, this time in the neighbourhood of Minikoi, where numerous prizes fell to her lot. Particularly pleased were all with another present from the British Admiralty of a 7,000-ton collier laden with excellent coal.

As the neighbourhood of Minikoi soon ceased to be remunerative, the "Emden" proceeded north, and soon fell in with a British steamer. Others followed.

The capture of vessels by night was a troublesome and somewhat "jumpy" business. There was no certainty that the supposed merchant vessel was not really a warship, or under warship escort, but no mischance of this nature was actually experienced.

"We were pleased to note that Dutch ships always behaved with more propriety than the 'Loredano.'" We have never picked up wireless from any Dutch ship which had been overhauled by us. On the other hand, we knew that the Dutch, in order to maintain a rigid neutrality, had forbidden ships fitted with wireless to communicate any war news. We intercepted one signal in which a British ship asked a Dutch ship for information, and received the reply: 'We are not permitted to use our wireless to communicate war news.'"

The repeated appearance of the "Emden" in unexpected positions led the English papers to conjecture that several German ships were at work, all bearing the name of the "Emden"; and in course of time she became known, not as the "Emden," but as the "Flying Dutchman."

V.

As merchant ships grew scarce, the Captain began to consider other objectives. Apart from Colombo and Singapore, it was thought that hostile warships must be using another base for coaling and provisioning, and Penang was considered a likely harbour. It was

gathered from the newspapers that this port was not infrequently visited by the "Montcalm" and "Dupleix." The Captain decided to attack these or other ships in the harbour.

By midnight of October 27th-28th, the "Emden" arrived off Penang. On account of navigational difficulties, it was impracticable to make a night attack.

"As weariness is most pronounced in the very early morning, a surprise attack has then the best chance of success."

Just before sunrise, the "Emden," with lights out and her dummy funnel in position, slipped past a few wondering fishing boats, and made for the channel.

Immediately before the entrance a brilliant white light was seen. It vanished promptly, and was conjectured to be an electric light on board a patrol or picket boat on guard. No vessel was actually seen.

It was at first not possible, amongst the crowd of merchant shipping in the inner roads, to detect a warship. On approaching nearer, however, the Russian cruiser "Schemtschuk" was clearly identified. There was no evidence of any personnel on deck. At barely more than 200 yards distance the "Emden" launched a torpedo from the starboard tube, followed by a broadside directed against the forepart of the "Schemtschuk," where were the men's sleeping quarters. The torpedo struck the after part of the ship, which immediately after began to settle slowly by the stern. Great commotion was now visible on her decks, and many officers sprang overboard dutifully followed by a number of the crew. Thereupon the "Emden" slowly passed the hostile cruiser at 400 yards distance, raking her with quick-firers, until she was wrapped in flames and smoke. None of the crew were seen escaping from the forepart of the "Schemtschuk."

In the meantime gunfire appeared to be directed on the "Emden" from three sides, although the position of the batteries was not known. Shells were seen to strike the merchant shipping. The "Schemtschuk" also brought some guns into action, and, as it was most necessary that the "Emden" should not be crippled, orders were given, as she again slowly steamed past her opponent, to launch a second torpedo. With a terrific explosion, followed by dense clouds of smoke and steam and by flying debris from the bridge and elsewhere, the ship broke amidships, and within some ten or fifteen seconds, as the air cleared, the masthead truck was alone visible above the surface of the water.

The drowning survivors were left to the attention of fishing boats, which hurried to their rescue.

In the meantime, the cannonade had ceased from all sides, but suddenly a glimpse was caught, in the inner harbour, of the French gunboat "D'Iberville," half surrounded by merchant vessels. As the order was given to turn to port, in order to pass the wreck of the "Schemtschuk" with a view to ramming the gunboat, the lookout reported a destroyer approaching the harbour. As it would never have done to have been caught in the narrows with no power to manoeuvre, the "Emden" was steered for the outer harbour, and fire opened at 4,500 yards. The strange vessel immediately turned to starboard, and it was then seen that she was a moderately sized British

transport. The error had arisen owing to the effects of light refraction in the early morning. The "Emden" ceased fire, and was turning to resume her attack on the "D'Iberville," when a second vessel was reported to be in sight. This proved to be an ordinary steamship, and the Captain decided to capture her before returning to the "D'Iberville," which could not, in any case, eventually escape him. Hardly, however, had the boarding cutter reached the prize than she had to be recalled, as the lookout reported a warship making for the harbour.

Owing to the bewildering effects of the mirage, which was then particularly pronounced, it was some time before the newcomer could be clearly descried. Neither the "Emden" nor the stranger were flying a flag, but at somewhat over 6,000 yards the latter hoisted the tricolour and was identified as a French torpedo boat destroyer. Although the sounds of the recent action could not have escaped her, she appeared to entertain no visible suspicion, and kept on her course, passing within 4,000 yards of the "Emden," at which point the latter, turning easily to port, fired a first salvo against her opponent. The destroyer turned sharply to port, and endeavoured to escape at full speed. Too late! Five shells from the third broadside struck her aft, whereupon a violent explosion, apparently from the magazine, was immediately followed by great clouds of smoke and steam, temporarily blotting her out from view. Notwithstanding this evil plight, she made a good fight of it, opening fire from the bow and launching two torpedoes. The "Emden," however, was out of range of the latter, which came to the surface about 1,000 yards to starboard. The fire of the destroyer was soon suppressed by the hail of shells from the "Emden," and mast, funnels, cowls, and upper works soon disappeared overboard. A few moments later she sank. She was the French destroyer "Mousquet."

The "Emden" now launched two cutters to pick up the survivors, and it was noticed with astonishment that they endeavoured to swim away from their would-be rescuers, although the land was too far distant to offer any hope of safety. Thirty-three ratings and a wounded officer were eventually recovered. Hardly was this accomplished, when another French destroyer was observed steaming from the harbour. It was deemed unwise to engage in another action, in full daylight, with the possibility of superior British or French forces arriving on the scene. The "Emden" therefore steamed to the west at high speed, followed by the destroyer, which it was hoped might be lured sufficiently far out to permit of her being engaged in comparative safety. However, she finally disappeared in a rain squall and was seen no more.

Special quarters were rigged up for the prisoners, and two ratings, who spoke French fluently, were told off as attendants on the sound and wounded men. On questioning the prisoners, it was ascertained that they had endeavoured to escape since, as they said, "Our papers have reported that the Germans massacre all their prisoners, and so we preferred drowning. Not only did the newspapers say this, but the officers as well."

When we asked them how it was that they had passed by the " Emden " in the night, they replied that they had seen her, but, on account of her four funnels, they had taken her to be the " Yarmouth." There is little doubt that the white light seen by the " Emden " when off the harbour entrance was that of the " Mousquet."

Three of the wounded died in the course of a few hours, and were buried, wrapped in the tricolour, with full naval honours.

After a few days, an opportunity offered for transfer of the prisoners to a ship laden with neutral cargo, which was directed to proceed to Sabang. Two of the petty officers begged to be allowed to express their thanks to the Captain and First Lieutenant for the treatment accorded to them, and promised to put an end to the rumours regarding the German treatment of prisoners. The wounded officer also expressed his gratitude for the chivalrous treatment accorded to him and his men, and begged that he might be given a cap ribbon to keep in memory of his captors. It was subsequently learnt from the newspapers that the unfortunate officer ultimately died in the hospital at Sabang.

The English newspapers published a great deal of nonsense about the fight at Penang. They reported that the " Emden " evaded recognition in entering the harbour by flying the English flag. Also that she entered the harbour by the southern entrance and left by the northern. As she entered the harbour by night, a flag was useless, but, in any case, she did not fly the English flag, nor was it possible to enter the harbour by the southern channel owing to shoal water.

VI.

One question of extreme importance was the provision of coal. The cargo of the " Markomannia " was exhausted soon after arrival in the Indian Ocean. The first bit of good fortune was the capture of the " Pontoporros," whose cargo was promptly drawn upon. Coal from this source, however, betrayed the position of the ship by a mighty volume of black smoke. The boilers became filthy and their efficiency suffered. A fine rain of ash and unburnt smalls fell continuously on the deck, and the filthy coal dust found its way through every port and aperture. Naturally, all yearned for a better coal, and there was more joy over the capture of a collier with Welsh coal than if a cargo of gold had been taken.

As it was necessary, for fighting efficiency, to maintain the bunkers fairly full, coaling was a frequent operation. The tropical heat made this a most laborious job, and the unhappy stokers, who were required to trim coal in the bunkers, often found the work unendurable.

In default of a coaling base, the work had to be done at sea, and, as there is a very perceptible swell in the Indian Ocean, the motion of the two ships rendered the operation somewhat dangerous. The ship's fenders, which were made of rope or plaited cane, proved too small for coaling at sea, and were in any case soon worn out. Fortunately, 150 hammocks had been taken in at Tsingtau, primarily with a view to using them as leak stoppers (collision mats).

These now came in very useful, as they were used for covering large balks of timber, from 12 to 20 feet long, which were then suspended from the ship's side. True, with every coaling they were a good deal knocked about, but it was not a difficult matter to render them shipshape again.

A novel kind of fender was also improvised from the pneumatic tyres used for automobiles (a large stock of which had been taken from a prize), which were hung in rows from the bulwarks.

Coaling at sea (which was always carried out from the starboard side) was naturally a very slow, and, at times, a dangerous business in view of the heavy rolling of the two ships in the swell. After the coal sacks had been hoisted well clear by the collier's derrick, a favourable moment had to be chosen, as the ships rolled together, for the hoist to be swung inboard on to the decks of the "Emden." It was obviously necessary on these occasions for the coaling party to keep strictly on the alert.

A good deal of miscellaneous damage was caused by the violent dumping of the coal hoists on the ship's deck, and by the constant bumping of the two vessels in the swell. The protruding gun sponsons (*schwalbennester*) fore and aft suffered particularly from the latter cause.

The coal sacks also constantly fouled the guard chains, and it was not long before there was not a single undamaged guard stanchion on the starboard side of the ship.

The linoleum deck also suffered, and was soon worn out; as the plain steel deck then became very slippery, it was necessary to chisel small furrows to give a foothold. In the end sufficient sailcloth and tar were obtained from a prize to permit of the deck being re-covered.

To supplement the bunkers, large quantities of coal were stacked on the decks both fore and aft, and amidships near the engine room skylights. Stained with oil, and smothered with coal dust and soot, none would have recognized the "Emden" for the vessel which once, on account of her spotless appearance, had been known as the "Swan of the East."

The enemy, since they measured all things from the standard of their own seamanship, considered it impossible that coaling should, as a general practice, be carried out at sea, and consequently sought the "Emden" vainly in sheltered bays and roadsteads where it was conjectured that the ship might run in to coal. Great was the astonishment of the English master of the prize collier "Buresk," when, with a fairly heavy swell on, he received the order: "Prepare to coal." Although he had first considered it impossible, he confessed after actual experience that German seamanship was equal to the difficulty. In unfavourable weather, the "Emden" took in about forty tons per hour, but there were occasions, when the weather was more propitious, when an average of seventy tons was attained. Whoever has coaled at sea in similar conditions will confess this to be a fine performance.

Coaling took place alternately from the two prize colliers "Buresk" and "Exford." These vessels were newly built in England, but there was a constant danger of them suffering irrepar-

able damage during coaling operations, as they were very lightly and badly constructed.

The time spent in coaling ship was always one of special anxiety to officers and men. At any moment, with the "Emden" in a state of utter unpreparedness, the smoke of an enemy ship on the horizon might be reported by the lookout. The men therefore worked with feverish haste, watch competing with watch. Life was no easy matter to them, but they never thought things could be otherwise than they were. On one occasion, when the crew were utterly worn out with ten hours' strenuous coaling, and had just taken to their hammocks, a possible prize was allowed to escape, in order not to disturb their rest. When they heard of it the next day there was a general grumble.

VII.

As it was pretty certain, after the Penang exploit, that sailings would be stopped in the Bay of Bengal, and that enemy ships would redouble their activity in those waters, the Captain decided to try his fortune off Sunda Strait. The "Emden," therefore, first picked up the "Buresk" at an appointed rendezvous, and proceeded at eleven knots—the maximum speed of the latter—until the Dutch islands lying to the west of Sumatra were sighted. It was first decided to operate in the channel between these islands and Sumatra, this being thought a likely position for merchant ships, and also for English and Japanese destroyers.

The ship coaled, in extraordinarily calm weather, about eight miles from the coast of the Island of Simalu. Soon after completion a motor-driven fishing boat came alongside, and the Dutch Commandant of the island came on board. His ostensible mission was to enquire whether the "Emden" was coaling in territorial waters, and to ask that the ship might move further out if such were the case. After reassurance on this point, he reported the Portuguese declaration of war, which caused much amusement.

For some time afterwards the "Emden" cruised off Sunda Strait, but sighted nothing. It appeared that traffic must have been stopped in these usually much frequented waters.

Apart from what might reasonably be conjectured, all such information as could be obtained from newspapers and the crews of prizes tended to show that the "Emden" was being sought by a growing number of enemy ships, notwithstanding the fact that so many of them were on the trail of the German armoured cruisers in the Pacific Ocean. A good deal of casual information was obtained from Indian and Chinese ratings amongst the crews of captured ships.

"One Indian related a strange affair to us. He said that there had been two English cruisers, each with two masts and funnels, based on Colombo. One was always at sea on patrol, until relieved by the other, which, in the meantime, remained in the harbour. One day, one of the cruisers returned minus a mast and funnel, and otherwise much damaged by gunfire, and also with many wounded on board. The other cruiser did not again appear. Was that, by any chance, one of the occasions on which the 'Emden' was destroyed?"

A somewhat similar story was told by a Chinaman in connection with two damaged Japanese cruisers which put in to Hong Kong.

As no more ships appeared off the Sunda Strait, the Captain decided to destroy the wireless and cable station at Keeling Island, and so cut off Australia from her last direct connection with England. As the other direct cables had already been damaged by von Spee's squadron, Australia would then only be able to communicate by means of the neutral Dutch cable *via* the East Indies. It was thought that there would probably be a small garrison of about 100 men on Keeling, sufficient to oppose a landing, and a bombardment of the station would give ineffective results, as there would probably be a reserve of the necessary apparatus available to make good damage, and the cable would, in any case, suffer no harm. Apart from this, the "Emden's" ammunition was too precious to expend on such a bombardment.

It was therefore decided to land, and to make the landing party as strong as possible, notwithstanding the fact that the ship's complement had already been weakened by the drafts sent on board the "Pontoporros," "Buresk," "Exford," and "Markomannia."

Late on the evening of November 8th, the "Emden," with the tender "Buresk," was fifty miles west of Keeling. The collier "Exford" had been sent to a special rendezvous, as there might well happen to be English cruisers anchored off the island. In that event, although the "Buresk" might be captured, the "Emden," if she could avoid engaging, would still have one collier to fall back upon.

In the night the "Buresk" received orders to remain fifty miles westward of Keeling, and not approach the anchorage unless ordered to do so by wireless. It was Captain von Müller's intention, if all proceeded smoothly, to coal in Keeling Harbour after the cable station had been destroyed.

At sunrise on November 9th the "Emden" made the entrance to Port Refuge, passed the difficult passage through the reef, and dropped anchor inside. The landing party, consisting of fifty men, armed with four machine-guns, twenty-nine rifles, and twenty-four revolvers, shoved off from the ship at 6.30 a.m., under the command of Lieutenant von Mücke, and landed without resistance.

"Within two hours, the landing party, having finished their work, were just preparing to put off again, when a message was heliographed from the 'Emden': 'Hurry up the work.' Shortly after a blast came from the siren, which signified danger. The landing party then saw her hurriedly raise anchor and steam out of the harbour. They made an attempt to reach the ship by crossing the reef diagonally, but without success. Shortly afterwards the 'Emden' hoisted her ensign, and opened fire upon an opponent invisible to the landing party. His presence, however, was evident through the high columns of water raised by shells falling close by the 'Emden.'"

"Without being able to raise a hand to help, the landing party on Keeling could only watch, with gnashing teeth, the beginning of the unequal combat.

"The 'Emden's' opponent was the British-Australian cruiser 'Sydney.' As she was one and a half times larger, five years younger, belted with armour plate (which the 'Emden' did not have), provided with an armament equal in numbers on the broadside, but with a calibre exceeding by half that of the 'Emden,' and of even higher speed, the result of the action was hardly in doubt. The inevitable hour of fate had arrived.

"Soon both ships engaged in a running fight at 4,000 to 5,000 yards' range, and exchanged their iron greetings in full broadsides. At first it appeared as though the enemy was suffering considerably, as she was struck forward by the very first salvoes of the 'Emden.' The English gunnery was not particularly good, and it was some time before the 'Emden' received any significant damage. Then, however, a well-directed salvo struck her aft, and the effect of the heavy shells on the unarmoured ship was extraordinary. A violent fire broke out beneath the poop, the flames of which rose 60 to 80 feet high for fifteen minutes afterwards. The clouds of steam mixing with the smoke showed that the starboard steam-pipes must have suffered. Notwithstanding this, the 'Emden' turned energetically on her opponent, the helm being put hard over and an attempt made to close on the 'Sydney.'

"A hail of shells poured incessantly from the guns forward, and the hostile cruiser then turned to starboard, and increased her distance. As a number of hits were observed, it was hoped by the watchers on shore that the 'Sydney' had been vitally damaged, but this was apparently not the case. At high speed she at first increased the distance between her and the 'Emden,' but soon afterwards slightly closed in again. It was obviously her intention to maintain the action at such a range as to diminish the possibility of receiving any considerable punishment from the lighter guns of the 'Emden,' whilst retaining the advantage of her heavier batteries.

"In the meantime, the 'Emden' had received yet more considerable damage. Whilst she was turning a shell destroyed the foremost funnel, which lay like a mighty block diagonally across the foredeck. Almost simultaneously, the foremast was shot overboard. When I saw that, I knew that at least one of my comrades—the observation officer in the fore control platform—had ceased to live.

"The fire on board was still raging, although there were indications that it was gradually being got under. The flames were followed by volumes of smoke, probably caused by the efforts to extinguish the conflagration. In a running fight, and exchanging a violent fire, both ships then disappeared below the horizon.

"An old schooner, named the 'Ayesha,' was lying in Keeling Harbour at the time, and the landing party began to prepare this craft for sea, with a view to leaving in her in the event of the non-return of the 'Emden.' In the course of the day, the fighting 'Emden' came a number of times near the horizon, though not near enough to be recognizable. At intervals, however, the heavy black

clouds of smoke from the Indian or Australian coal in the 'Sydney' were plainly to be seen.

"In the dusk of the evening both ships again approached, still firing continuously. Shortly before sunset our last view of the action showed the 'Emden,' almost below the horizon, steaming slowly east. Nothing but the mainmast and the last surviving funnel remained to indicate the course and speed of the ship. . . . The 'Sydney' was closer in, and her masts, funnel, bridge, and upper works were all discernible. Though both ships were still engaged, the fire of the 'Emden' was weak and irregular. Either a number of her guns were out of action, or the supply of ammunition, much of which had been expended at Madras and Penang, was giving out.

"At sunset the 'Sydney' broke off the engagement and proceeded in a north-westerly direction. The 'Emden' continued on an easterly course.

"Gradually the range became too great, and the guns were silent.

"The sun sank, and darkness came. Like a shroud the night fell over both ships."

The landing party thereupon left Keeling in the "Ayesha" in order to search for the "Emden," but nothing more of her was seen.

The first news of her fate was not received until Padang was reached three weeks later.

In such manner did the little "Emden" battle with a wholly superior opponent for ten long hours until night closed the combat. None but seamen can appreciate the significance of her inferiority in speed, armour, and weight of broadside. On land it is possible for a comparatively weak force, by using every advantage of position, wire entanglements, and machine-guns to hold up a much more powerful opponent, and even, in certain circumstances, to baulk him of his aim. But at sea it is far otherwise. Given an equality of complement, the issue is decided by the heavier armament and armour protection, and by the higher speed. When these factors are taken into account, it will be recognized that the "Emden" did marvels.

"The tale is told. The 'Emden' is no more. The reefs of North Keeling are become her grave. But so long as the monsoon rustles in the high-crowned palms of that world-remote island, singing her threnody in concert with the Indian Ocean's sounding wash of surf, so long will the story be sung and told of 'The Flying Dutchman,' the little German ship which, in the world war of 1914, in the mighty conflict for the freedom of the seas, was for months the terror of her enemies."

THE RED COAT IN THE ARMIES OF EUROPE.

By LIEUTENANT-GENERAL F. A. TYRRELL.

THE author who writes under the *nom de plume* of "Snipster" in his interesting paper on military uniform in the August number of this JOURNAL, observes that "The Irish Brigade in the service of France, almost alone amidst our allies or foes, patriotically preferred our blend of splendid scarlet."

The Irish Brigade was, however, by no means singular in this respect among our allies or foes. Red was the colour of the uniforms of the Danish and Hanoverian Armies as well as of the British, whose red coats the Irish soldiers of King James II. continued to wear under a foreign flag. And there were few armies on the Continent in which red uniforms were not worn by some body of troops.

Splendid scarlet lent itself especially to the pomp and parade of military display; a man who was born blind described scarlet as resembling the sound of a trumpet, and Dean Swift, in one of his ribald rhymings, relates how a bridegroom was "in martial scarlet drest." Byron says:

"Ribands, rank, lace, medals, embroidery, scarlet,
Are things immortal to immortal man."

Bishop Newton, in his learned work on the Prophecies, finds the explanation of the breast-plates of jacinth and fire and brimstone worn by the horsemen in the book of Revelations, Chapter ix., verse 17, in the dress of the Turkish Sipahis, who, he says, "in particular, wear martial apparel of red and yellow." Officers of the Janissaries wore scarlet robes, though their men wore blue or green. In the "Narrative of Evliya Effendi," he states that Da'ud Pasha, striving to gain the suffrages of the Janissaries, promises them that for the future, "instead of the blue cloth of Salonika, they shall wear fine scarlet cloth." But scarlet, as well as all material of brilliant dye, was costly, and it was probably owing to this fact that so many of the standing Armies on the Continent were clothed in white uniforms.

The French, the Austrian, the Saxon, and the Neapolitan Armies were all dressed in white uniform generally, but brighter colours were affected by *corps d'élite*. Uniform dress in the French Royal Army was first made the subject of regulation by Louis XIV., in 1658, when he ordained that in future all regiments of cavalry should wear blue, all dragoons green, and all infantry white. The English billmen and pikemen wore white, and the latter continued to wear their white coats during the reign of Charles II. and only exchanged them for the red coats of the musketeers when the bayonet replaced the pike as the infantry weapon. The red coat seems to have been

generally worn in the New Model Army; Cromwell's Ironsides were dubbed "lobsters" from their red coats and steel armour. Soldiers of fortune favoured scarlet, and Kings clothed their personal guards in the showy colour to add to the splendour of their Courts. The famous Imperial General Wallenstein was escorted by a troop of fifty scarlet-clad Lifeguards. Red was much worn by Swiss mercenary regiments; those in the permanent hire of the Kings of France and Naples always wore red uniforms. Before the time of the French Revolution there was in France a regiment of Swiss Guards of four battalions and fourteen Swiss regiments of the line of two battalions each, all dressed in red uniforms faced with various colours. The Guards, of course, wore facings of royal blue; the regiments from the Canton of Berne had facings of black velvet. In Naples there was a regiment of Swiss Guards and four of the line, all of two battalions, wearing red uniforms. The Swiss in the service of Naples continued to wear red until their final recall to Switzerland in 1850; and old veterans may still be met with in that country who boast of having worn the red coat.

The Irish and Swiss regiments were not the only troops that wore red uniforms in the French Army. Among the earliest formations of that army were ten companies of Gendarmerie (heavy cavalry), which were territorial troops, like our Yeomanry, and were distinguished by provincial titles as Gensdarmes de Berry, etc. They were recruited from the squires and yeomen of their province and officered from its most noble families, and for centuries formed the *élite* of the French cavalry. The standard of one of their companies was captured by the British at Blenheim. Their uniform was a scarlet coat, buff waistcoat, and leather breeches and jack-boots, and they wore the universal three-cocked hat (*chapeau tricorne*).

The corps was suppressed and the companies disbanded in the reforms of Count St. Germain shortly before the Revolution.

The Maison du Roi, or Household Brigade, of the Kings of France was reorganized by Louis XIV. in two divisions, as Guards of the Inner and Outer Courts. The first of these bodies comprised the four companies of the Garde-du-Corps and three companies of Palace Halberdiers, the Cent Suisses, the Gardes de la Prevôté, and the Gardes de la Porte. All these were clad in the royal livery of blue faced with scarlet, but the Guard of the Outer Court had four of its five companies clothed in scarlet, and was commonly called the Maison Rouge. Its five companies were the Gendarmes de la Garde, the Chevaux-Légers de la Garde, two companies of Mousquetaires du Roi, and the company of Grenadiers à Cheval. The latter was dressed in royal blue with red facings and silver lace to match the uniform of the Garde-du-Corps, to which it was attached for service as a grenadier company when the King took the field. But the first four companies all wore red. The Gendarmes had scarlet coats faced with black velvet and black velvet waistcoats, and wore black cockades in their hats. Their lace was gold. The Chevaux-Légers had the same uniform, but their waistcoats were buff, their cockades white, and their lace was mixed gold and silver.

The two companies of Mousquetaires du Roi were called the Mousquetaires Gris and the Mousquetaires Noirs from the colour of their horses. Their dress was scarlet throughout; coat, waistcoat, and breeches of the same colour; the Black Musketeers had also scarlet stockings, but the Grey Musketeers wore white hose. Over all they wore sleeveless blue surcoats studded with gold or silver fleur-de-lys, and with crosses, encircled by rays, embroidered on the breast and back.

Their equipment was as old-fashioned as their dress; they were trained to fight both on foot and on horseback, and each company had a standard for use when mounted, and a colour for foot parades. The device on the flags of the Grey Musketeers was a bombshell bursting over a town, with the motto, "*Quo ruat Lethum*"; that of the Black Musketeers was a sheaf of thunderbolts with the motto, "*Atterius Jovis altera tela*." The lace and buttons of the First Company were gold, of the Second, silver.

Dumas' famous three musketeers belonged to the First, originally the King's Company: the Second Company were the Cardinal's musketeers of his romance, who, after the death of their patron, Mazarin, were taken into the royal service.

Count St. Germain disbanded all the companies on the ground of the excessive expense of their maintenance and equipment, out of all proportion to their military value; and soon afterwards the Revolution caused a temporary eclipse of the scarlet coat in France: the loyal Swiss Guards were massacred, and the Swiss regiments of the line were all recalled by their cantons to their native mountain land.

The Irish regiments were broken up and their battalions distributed among the new blue-clad demi-brigades of the Republican Army, the only exception being one of the battalions of Dillon's, which, being quartered at the time in the West Indies, succeeded in preserving its red uniform by passing over into the British service.

The Hanoverian troops had always worn red uniforms, even before their Elector became the King of Great Britain. When a Quadruple Alliance was formed by the Empire of Germany with Russia, Poland, and Venice against the Turk, after the defeat of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa under the walls of Vienna, the Republic of St. Mark hired a division of Hanoverian troops from their elector to serve in the Venetian expedition to the Levant. They were disembarked in the Morea, and under their gallant General, Count Konigsmarck, bore the brunt of all the fighting which resulted in the expulsion of the Turks from the peninsula. The country abounded in herds of buffaloes; and the antipathy of these animals to the red colour of their uniforms caused continual trouble to the Hanoverians in their foraging expeditions. In the same force were serving the Knights of Malta, wearing scarlet surcoats, charged with the eight-pointed white cross, over their mediæval panoply.

After Napoleon had taken possession of Hanover the Electoral Army was perforce taken into the French service, but its soldiers continued to wear their red uniform; and in the wars of the Spanish Peninsula they suffered in consequence, being on more than one

occasion fired upon by their French comrades, who mistook them for British soldiers. In the collection of pictures of the regiments of King George II.'s Army, now preserved in the Royal Library at Windsor Castle, the only way in which the Hanoverians can be distinguished from the British soldiers is by their moustaches. The Hanoverians were not the only troops in the new Imperial Army of France who wore red uniforms; Napoleon had four regiments of Swiss, of four battalions each, aggregating 16,000 bayonets. They all wore red coats, scarlet (*rouge-écarlate*) for the officers, madder red (*rouge-garance*) for the rank and file. One of these regiments, the First, recruited from the French-speaking cantons, was so unlucky as to cross bayonets at the battle of Maida with the Swiss regiment of Wattenwyl, or de Watteville, in the British service, recruited from Berne, in German-speaking Switzerland. The French battalion was overthrown, and its commandant mortally wounded and made prisoner.

The news of this affair caused great distress in Switzerland; and in future contracts for the hiring out of troops the authorities of the cantons inserted a clause stipulating that Swiss troops should not be employed against others of the same nationality. The three Swiss regiments of de Roll, de Watteville, and de Meuron, in the British service, wore the same uniform as their British comrades; the last-named regiment had worn blue in the Dutch service, but when it changed its allegiance it also changed its uniform.

Napoleon tried to raise an Irish brigade, but for lack of recruits it never got beyond one battalion; its uniform was green. His Imperial Army had twelve Hussar regiments, each of which had a different colour for its regimentals; one wore scarlet, and another crimson. In most of these Hussar regiments the dolman or pelisse was of different colour to the jacket and pantaloons. In the regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval of the Old Guard, the jacket was green with orange braid, like Hussars, and the pelisse or slung jacket was scarlet, trimmed with white fur for the officers, black fur for the troopers. This was Napoleon's favourite corps, and it is in the green undress uniform of its Colonel that he is most commonly represented in pictures.

There was also a regiment of Red Lancers in the Imperial Guard dressed in scarlet from head to foot, lance-cap, jacket, and overalls.

The facings, plastron, and double stripes on the overalls were dark blue. This regiment was raised and equipped by Napoleon's brother, Louis, King of Holland, for his own bodyguard; but when he was dethroned by his despotic brother, the Emperor incorporated it in his own guard, and it fought at Waterloo.

After that disastrous day all the formations of the once invincible *Grande Armée* were scattered to the four winds.

Louis XVIII. made an attempt to revive the formations of the *Maison du Roi* and the *Maison Rouge*, but times had changed and men had changed with them, and the attempt was a failure. However, he procured a regiment of Swiss Guards, and four double-battalion regiments of Swiss foot from the cantons. The Guards wore scarlet coats with royal blue facings: the line regiments had red coats with

facings of blue or of black velvet. All these mercenary troops were returned to Switzerland after the fall of the Bourbon dynasty in 1830, and the only red-coat regiment left in France was the "*lanciers rouges*," which probably owed its existence to the memory of its predecessor in the Imperial Guard. It continued to be distinguished by its brilliant uniform until the catastrophe of Sedan, and when the French Army was reorganized after the disasters of 1870 on a strictly utilitarian basis, the lance found no place in the ranks of its cavalry and fancy uniforms were not favoured.

The Emperor Louis Napoleon formed an Imperial Guard on the model of that of his famous uncle, and dressed its corps in the uniform of their predecessors as far as the changes of military fashions permitted. Thus the new Regiment of Guides (so called from the original title of the Chasseurs à Cheval of the old guard) wore the large busby and green jacket with orange braid of the old regiment, but had wide red booted-overalls instead of the tight leather pantaloons and Hessian boots of Napoleon's horsemen. Even the old custom of dressing the musicians in a contrasting uniform to that of the corps was preserved, and the trumpeters of the Guides wore red jackets and green overalls. But all the splendid uniforms disappeared with the fall of the Second Empire, and the only troops who now wear the red are the regiments of Algerian Spahis. They have red jackets and vests trimmed and ornamented with black braid after the Moorish fashion, and they wear scarlet cloaks.

In the German Army the regiments of Hussars are all dressed in various colours like those of Napoleon's army, and the Prussian regiment of the Ziethen Hussars still wears its old red uniform. The late Prince Frederick Charles was called the Red Prince from his habitually wearing the uniform of this famous corps. Formerly the Saxon Lifeguards wore scarlet, but they now wear the Prussian blue. The Emperor of Austria has two companies of bodyguards dressed in scarlet. The Trabanten Guards have plumed helmets and scarlet tunics with bars of gold braid across the front and down to the hem of the skirt. The Hungarian company has scarlet tunics with gold braid and Leopardskin dolmans. The King of Bulgaria also has for his bodyguard a squadron of scarlet-clad Hussars.

In Rumania the regiments of regular cavalry (*Rossiori*) wear red uniforms; the reserve cavalry regiments (*Kalarashi*) are dressed in dark blue.

In Russia the Cossacks of the Don used to wear red uniforms; in the Imperial Guard the Tartar and Circassian squadrons wore an Oriental dress of a red colour, and the regiment of Cossacks of the Guard wore long-skirted red coats. The Hussars of the Guard also had a showy scarlet uniform. The officers of the Chevalier Guards, whose parade uniform was white, wore a scarlet coatee as evening dress at Court balls and entertainments. But the splendid uniforms of the Czar's household troops will probably not survive the dissolution of the monarchy.

The Grand Dukes of Savoy, afterwards Kings of Sardinia, had a bodyguard of Swiss halberdiers clothed in scarlet. Napoleon, on

his conquest of Piedmont and occupation of Turin, converted this company into a body of military police, and after serving in that capacity for some years it was disbanded. The King of Sardinia did not restore it on his return to his throne and country in 1814, but its memory is preserved by a hall in the palace at Turin which still goes by the name of the Salle des Suisses.

His Holiness the Pope's *Guardia Nobile*, a squadron of Lifeguards which has done dismounted duty in the Vatican precincts since 1870, is dressed much like our own Lifeguards in scarlet tunics, with white leather breeches and jack-boots. The miniature army of the Holy See adheres punctiliously to old military traditions, and the trumpeters of the Noble Guard wear blue tunics with red facings, and a white horse-tail flows from the crest of their silver helmets instead of the black one which adorns the head-piece of the officers and troopers.

The thin red line will no more be seen on the field of battle: the soldier's splendid scarlet has now been exchanged for the Quaker's drab or the friar's grey. The disappearance of all the pomp and splendour of military parade and martial finery, which allured the quick ardour of youth to the field, will prove a potent factor in stimulating the desire for peace and the aversion to settling international differences by the arbitrament of arms, which is a sentiment continually increasing in force in the civilized world of to-day.



GERMAN WAR WRITERS ON THE "U"-BOAT WARFARE.

By THOMAS F. A. SMITH.

A STRIKING feature of German propaganda literature is the astute manner in which English literature—ancient and modern—has been exploited in blackening England's fair fame. Anything and everything which Englishmen have written derogatory to their own country has been unearthed for home and neutral consumption by German propagandists. Defoe's "True-born Englishman" and Bernard Shaw's superficial generalities, with a host of other things, have all supplied the German "David" with pebbles to hurl at the British "Goliath." It all reminds one of the schoolboy's tag concerning the effect of "sticks and stones" compared with the hurt caused by "calling names."

Another domain for exploitation has been the bitter caricatures which Frenchmen and Englishmen have drawn to represent each other during the last two centuries. In short, practically everything nasty which either one of the Entente Powers has ever said, written, or drawn to attack any of the others has been pressed into the service.

Some two centuries ago a Dutchman wrote a book on "The English Tyrant." That has been reproduced in its original form and scattered broadcast throughout Holland—and America too, if the British Fleet had not been where it was. Another instance is a book by a Belgian—Eugen Detmolder—called "Albion's Death Struggle." The book is a scurrilous attack on this country written during the Boer War, which, as the German translator says, "gives it an added piquancy now that England poses as Belgium's 'protector.'"

The same method has been applied to every phase of the war, but especially when Germany had reason to put some particular odium from herself on to her opponents. Ruthless submarine warfare has found several apologists of this type. Writers endeavour to justify Germany's latest methods by discovering supposed, invented, or real wrongs committed by England during her long history. But none of them appears to remember that Germany's commercial birth and extraordinary maritime development are unthinkable if the British Fleet had not put the high seas in order before their advent.

Admiral Carl Hollweg's book, "Our Right to 'U'-Boat Warfare,"¹ was completed in the middle of January, 1917. Internal evidence—the large number of quotations from British naval writers, newspapers, etc., down to the date of publication—stamps the work "semi-official."

¹ Contreadmiral Carl Hollweg: "Unser Recht auf den U-Bootskrieg." Berlin, 1917.

It is hardly conceivable that one author could have collected so much material from enemy sources without the aid of Berlin's propaganda centre. The date of publication, too, makes it probable that the work was intended to anticipate opposition at home, and disgust in neutral countries, at the submarine policy opened on February 1st.

Looked at from this point of view, Admiral Hollweg's book gains in interest. Its fundamental note is that England has committed so many violations of right, law, and justice that Germany has a complete indulgence to use any weapons or methods she pleases.

Admiral Hollweg opens his argument with these words:—"These considerations are intended to strengthen the feeling of right within us—indeed, the feeling that it is our duty—to make use of any and all weapons we possess with the utmost ruthlessness."

The lengthy quotations, supported by the author's own sophistry, cited to justify submarine ruthlessness, may be summarized in a sentence. The "U"-boat is a new weapon, unforeseen by any existing naval laws, and therefore it is not bound to render obedience to them. "We may say," he writes, "without departing a hairbreadth from the truth, that no naval laws exist to-day either for the belligerents or neutrals. Accordingly each Power is free to act as its vital interests demand and do anything which it possesses the might to perform."

The book contains a great deal on the "blockade" of Germany, written in a strain which betrays where the shoe pinches, and occasionally the Admiral quotes the Scriptures to support his argument. "The illegal blockade goes on. England has cut off Germany and the neighbouring neutrals from every branch of commerce which does not suit her. Her naval power swings the whip of hunger over all Europe to compel enemies and neutrals alike to submit to her will. Even St. John, in the Book of Revelations, Chapter XIII., verses 16 and 17, spoke prophetically of this unbearable naval tyranny."

Germany's counter-stroke to parry the thrust against "Prussian militarism" has been an endeavour to raise a hue and cry against "England's navalism." Of course, the numerous propaganda works on this question ignore the fact that British naval power has, on the whole, been employed in a disinterested manner, bringing benefits to a large number of nations besides the British. It would be a vain search to seek instances showing that Prussian militarism had played a similar emancipating rôle in history to that of the British Fleet. Yet it is to be feared that Germany has not been entirely unsuccessful in influencing some neutrals at least. The passages already quoted show that Hollweg is appealing to neutrals, and the succeeding one further illustrates the point. "It is our honest conviction that to-day we are fighting with the neutrals for their future rights on the sea. And therein lies the great significance of the 'U'-boat warfare in the present struggle, that it serves as the pioneer of a future freedom of the seas; that it will destroy the obsolete, harmful theory of the 'invincibility of sea power' which has hung like a sword of Damocles over the heads of the weaker sea powers; and that it will tear the whip of hunger from the hands of English naval despotism for all eternity."

The writer, however, neglects to paint a picture of a future freedom of the seas under "U"-boat despotism. Like many other writers, Admiral Hollweg doubts the possibility of forcing England to sue for peace by starvation caused by submarine warfare. They dispute even that that is the aim in view, but rather that it is the destruction of the maritime fleet till an irreducible minimum is reached.

It is argued that Britain must have a certain amount of tonnage—known in British governmental and shipping circles—necessary for her existence after the war. Assuming it to be ten million tons, or thereabouts, the German claims that a time must come at the present rate of destruction when Britain will have been reduced to that minimum. As a consequence she will then immediately ask for peace terms. No German writer appears to believe that the amount of tonnage built per month can equal the amount sunk, hence the circles interested in shipping and commerce will compel the Government to make peace before their future is annihilated.

German soldiers and sailors have both written many books relating their personal experiences in the war.

Among the "U"-boat tales Count Forstner's narrative, "As 'U'-boat Commander against England," is one of the least egoistic. In an early chapter a passage occurs which throws a little light on the Hun conspiracy to enthrall the world. Writing of his training for submarine service a few years before the war, he says:—"It was wise on our part in pre-war days not to boast of our progress in 'U'-boat construction, like our enemies did of their every little development. We knew then that our time was coming! Hence in the war on land and on sea we have been able to employ new, almost unknown, weapons against our enemies, and have succeeded in giving them many painfully unpleasant surprises." He also confirms the fact that the German Fleet was mobilized about the middle of July, 1914. The German Chancellor, however, while thumping the President's table in the Reichstag on August 4th of the same year, said that "not a single man had been mobilized before August 1st."

The Count's story of his first victim runs:—"The sun was laughing down on us as we lay off the Meuse lightship after having examined a ship, which had proved to our satisfaction that she really was a neutral. Just then a steamer which was steering in our direction betrayed the fact that she was English by suddenly changing her course. Before we had time to hoist the 'stop' signal, she was in full flight. After urging our engines to their utmost we signalled, 'Stop at once or I fire!' But this had not the slightest effect.

"We saw with feelings of satisfaction that the distance between us was gradually lessening, but the Englishman still hoped to get away, and ever-thickening clouds of smoke issued from the steamer's funnel. Several warning shots were sent across her bows and ignored, so the next was placed right in the ship's body. This had the desired effect, for three short whistles notified the enemy's intention to reverse his engines. The next order was, 'Leave ship at once!' and this being obeyed without demur, the next shot struck the burning vessel on the waterline.

"The crew, about twenty-five in number, accepted our offer to tow them to the lightship, but before long we fell in with a Dutch ship which took them on board. Then we watched the blazing wreck till it disappeared beneath the waves—one ship the fewer of England's maritime marine to plough the furrows of the world's oceans."

Some of the writers give glimpses of life on board a "U"-boat. When submerged for a number of hours on end the men suffer severely from nausea, loss of appetite, and sea-sickness. Smoking below deck is forbidden, and the atmosphere becomes appalling in spite of limited supplies of compressed air. In foggy weather look-out is kept not only on deck, but a good part of the crew must stand at the listening stations below to listen for the throb of engines or the burr of propellers. The listening stations are mechanical devices to catch the waves of sound which, as is well-known, are more rapidly transmitted by water than by air. There are descriptions of "U"-boat traps, and Captain Koenig in his book, "The Voyage of the Deutschland" to America and back, tells a thrilling story of how his commercial submarine got stuck at the bottom of the North Sea while evading a British destroyer. "I was just going to give the order to start the oil engines when I caught sight of an enemy destroyer. With a single bound I was inside the tower, and closed the hatch. 'Alarm!' 'Submerge!' 'Flood the tanks!' 'Sink her sixty feet!' were the commands, shouted in quick succession, but carrying them out was quite another matter. The sea was stormy, and according to all experience, to submerge under such conditions was sheer madness. But down we had to go, for the destroyer might already have seen us.

"The air hissed in all the tones of the scale as it rushed from the tanks. I was standing with pressed lips watching the raging sea and waiting for the first signs that we were going under, but ever and again the waves brought the boat to the surface. We had not a second to lose, so I gave her more deep rudder, and shouted:—'Both engines at full power!' The vessel trembled, made a couple of vicious plunges, and then cut downwards through the dark waters, the twilight disappeared from the tower ports, and the manometre showed in quick succession six, eighteen, thirty feet of depth. Suddenly there was a violent shock, and we, together with everything which was not nailed down, were all mixed up on the lower deck.

"What had happened? Why was the boat at such a remarkable angle? And why did the engines rush round at intervals as if possessed? Before we could find answers to these and other questions, the chief engineer clambered to his feet and put the indicator to 'stop.' The boat was swinging at an angle of 36°, showing that the bows were wedged in the bottom of the North Sea, while the stern was submerged one minute, and the next above water. It was during these intervals above water that the engines had rushed round so madly, and if the chief engineer had not had the presence of mind to stop them running, the whirling propellers would inevitably have attracted the destroyer. In any case we were in a most delicate situation, for the enemy might sight the exposed stern at any moment and begin putting shells into us.

"Some minutes of horrible tension followed, but we found consolation in the fact that the boat was apparently undamaged. By flooding the tanks we approached a little nearer to a horizontal position. Then we trimmed the ballast till the bows were freed, and after a little while longer the 'Deutschland' was again under control."

Count Forstner, as well as other "U"-boat writers, mention again and again that they had no easy task in sinking unarmed British steamers. The following is the Count's description of his meeting with the steamer "Vosges":—"On the following morning we were to the north of the Scilly Isles. The sea was running high when a large steamer came in sight, evidently making for Cardiff. On turning in her direction she at once made off. As no flag was flying and our inquiry about her nationality remained unanswered, it was clear that we had an Englishman before us. Several warning shots failed to bring her to, so the next shell crashed into her near the bridge. The only answer was the appearance of the English flag, signifying that she refused to surrender.

"On later voyages we had the same experience, the flag was only hoisted after a hit had been scored. All honour to the personal gallantry of these English captains!

"Steaming in circles the enemy tried several times in vain to ram our boat, but we manœuvred at a respectful distance. Our gunners had no easy task, for the waves dashed right over our boat, and they were often standing up to their necks in the icy waters. Sometimes they were washed overboard and only saved from drowning by the ropes which bound them to the guns. Still the wild chase went on till a shot brought down the British flag, but another was immediately hoisted. A similar fate overtook it, but yet a third time it appeared—this time upside down, no doubt due to the hurry. That flag must have gone down flying, for later we were compelled to leave our quarry in a sinking condition.

"Altogether the chase lasted over four hours without our having been able to inflict a mortal wound, although several gaping holes decorated the vessel's sides, and fire had broken out once or twice. The crew, however, had succeeded in extinguishing the flames. Often the waves would break over the cannon's mouth just as it was being fired, and the shell would go hissing through a mountain of water.

"Now it was high time for us to leave the field, for destroyers were sighted coming up at full steam. Moreover, the brave resistance of the captain and his crew had made a great impression on us. So we left the 'Vosges' to her fate, changed our course, and went in search of other prey."

Count Forstner laments that warning shots were consistently ignored by English vessels, and chronicles with a sense of outrage, that even insignificant trawlers tried to ram his boat. He relates how the captain of the "Ottillie," a steam trawler, in St. George's Channel, yelled to the mate who was parleying with the pirate, 'Ram the beggar!' A lucky turn of the rudder, however, saved the "U"-boat from a well-deserved fate. Forstner appears to possess a sense of humour. While cruising in the North Sea they fell in with a neutral

fishing boat, whose captain bemoaned having caught no fish, and apparently mistook the submarine for an English boat. "Our aged fisherman," writes Forstner, "seems to have been very short-sighted, for he mistook our flag for the British, and begged permission to be allowed to try his luck in the neighbouring Scotch waters. I gladly wrote him a permit, and he disappeared towards the Scotch coast. I should have liked to see the face of the English officer, who, no doubt, caught him later on, fishing in Scotch territorial waters with a German permit!"

"We played a concertina 1,500 yards from the enemy," says a German sailor in a letter published in a Munich paper, "but he did not hear it, and neither could we, so great was the noise of the motors. We could not hear what was being played, but we saw the tune, as it were, through the player's movements, his face and fingers, and his feet, as they beat time. And we shouted the words of the song with all the strength of our lungs; but yet we did not hear the song. Every sound was drowned by the noise of the engines.

"What do I know about the voyage to the coast of Scotland? Almost nothing! There is no comfort in such a nutshell, for the fore-castle is not a ball-room. The air we breathe is not mountain air, but petroleum, petroleum, and again petroleum.

"The voyage lasted ten days, right along the English coast; now above, now below water. Six hours' work followed by six hours' sleep through ten whole days. There are no commands, for one hears nothing but noise. We are like deaf and dumb men, who hear with their eyes and speak with hands and feet. Hence a gentle kick means, 'Hi! the mate wants you.' There's a devil of a lot of work for the few men, especially when the boat is under water.

"So things went on for days on end, and then came a sensation. One after the other we were allowed a peep through the periscope. It was the sight of my life. There lay an English squadron, like a herd of peaceful lambs, as free from care as if there were no such things as German wolves in armoured clothing. For two hours we remained on outpost duty, and it would have been easy enough to fetch down one of the cruisers to keep us company. But we might not; we were only a patrol. What must our captain have felt—so near to the enemy and yet obliged to leave the torpedo in its tube?"

Probably the man who has attained the greatest popularity in the Fatherland during the war was Captain Otto Weddigen, of "U-9." While in command of "U-9" he sank the "Hawke," "Aboukir," "Cressy," and "Hogue." Some months later he and his crew lost their lives in "U-29." All Germany mourned his death, and quite a number of biographies and poems have been written in his memory. One of the crew has described the sinking of three of the above ships. "We left Heligoland," he writes, "early in the morning of Sunday, September 20th. Two days later, off the coast of Holland, we saw smoke in the distance. After submerging, we steered towards it, and on coming nearer, saw three English armoured cruisers. Without being seen we let the first pass us, and fired a torpedo into the second. There was a loud explosion, and the ship sank in fifteen minutes.

The first cruiser returned to give help, and so we were able to send a torpedo into her, too; she disappeared in three or four minutes.

"Meanwhile the third cruiser came up to render aid, and received our third torpedo. But she would not sink, and so a second was fired, whereupon she turned turtle and vanished. Two Dutch fishing-boats in the vicinity set about the work of rescue, but we steered away, remaining, of course, under water. After a quarter of an hour we came to the surface and made for home. At 11 o'clock we sighted English destroyers chasing us, so we again submerged. On again coming to the surface the enemy had disappeared; a few hours later we were welcomed by German torpedo-boats."

During a recent visit to Switzerland, the present writer discussed the "U"-boat war with various Germans and Swiss. Many of them asserted that German submarines had often been employed to drop spies on the coast of Great Britain, and fetch them off again at a given time and place. They were unable or unwilling to offer any confirmation of the story, but the theory seems to be within the bounds of practicability.



A HUNDRED YEARS AGO: THE MAHRATTA AND PINDARI WAR.

By COLONEL R. G. BURTON, Indian Army.

IN the autumn of 1817 all India was turned into a vast camp. The greatest English armies ever seen in that country were assembled and set in motion. In order to trace the causes which led up to the Mahratta and Pindari War of 1817-18, it is necessary to revert to the events of the early years of the 19th century. The Governor-Generalship of the Marquis Wellesley, from 1798 to 1805, had been characterized by a policy of strenuous activity, both military and political. French influence had been entirely destroyed. Mysore had been conquered and Tipu Sultan killed, the Hindu dynasty being restored at Seringapatam under English tutelage. The Mahratta powers of Sindhia and the Nagpur Raja had been defeated in 1803 by armies under Lake, in Hindustan, and Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington), in the Deccan; Holkar was driven into the Punjab and brought to terms in 1805; and Baji Rao, the Peshwa, was established as head of the Mahratta Empire at Poona.

But the Directors of the East India Company took alarm at the magnitude of the operations and designs of the Marquis Wellesley, and the fatuous policy which followed on the vigorous measures of that great statesman was in itself sufficient to eliminate the results that had been attained at the cost of so much bloodshed.

In 1817 Baji Rao was still in power at Poona, where he had been established in 1803 under the terms of the treaty of Bassein. He was the nominal head of the Mahratta princes who, although independent of one another, were ready to combine under his leadership against a common enemy. These princes owned nominal allegiance to the descendant of the great Sivaji, who, deprived of all power, had his seat at Satara.

Of the other Mahratta Chiefs, Mulhar Rao Holkar was a boy of eleven years of age, and the regency of his State of Indur was in the hands of Tulsi Bai, a lady, like so many of her race, of bold and masculine character, formerly the mistress of the deceased Jeswant Rao Holkar.

Appa Sahib was Raja of Nagpur. In alliance with Mahdoji Sindhia of Gwalior was Amir Khan, who had risen to power and founded a strong military state in Malwa.

The English conquests had not been altogether beneficial in their effects. The break-up of the military power of Mysore and other States had let loose a horde of military adventurers on the country. These people, finding no further employment in the honourable

profession of arms, became Pindaris, or freebooters. Every horseman discharged from the service of a regular government, or wanting employment or subsistence, joined one of the *durras*, or divisions, of the Pindaris, so that no vagabond who had a horse or sword at his command was at a loss for occupation. Thus the Pindaris were continually receiving an accession of associates from the most desperate and profligate of mankind.

Already, in 1804, General Wellesley had written:—"I think that we run a great risk from the freebooter system. It is not known to the Governor-General, and you can have no idea of the extent to which it has gone, and it increases daily. No inhabitant can or will remain to cultivate unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village." During the next ten years these freebooters increased to a still more alarming extent, until their depredations became so unlimited that a great army had to be assembled for their destruction. The Pindaris fluctuated in numbers, frequently amounting to as many as 30,000 men. They had their strongholds in the mountains and jungles on the banks of the Narbada River. They were armed with spears and matchlocks; they operated in parties, or *durras*, of from one to three thousand; and their sole object was plunder, in pursuit of which, being all mounted, they sometimes covered as much as fifty miles in a day. Wherever they marched villages were seen in flames, with the houseless and often wounded inhabitants flying in every direction. Every variety of torture was resorted to in order to extract information from the unhappy victims as to the place of concealment of their treasures. Red-hot irons were applied to the soles of their feet; a bag filled with hot ashes was tied over the mouth and nostrils of the victim, who was then beaten on the back to make him inhale the ingredients; or oil was thrown on the clothes which were then set on fire. Neither age nor sex was spared; the hands of children would be cut off to obtain their bracelets. Women frequently accompanied their male associates on these excursions, and exceeded them in rapacity and cruelty. Many of the Native States encouraged the Pindaris and shared their booty.

In 1817 the Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, assembled two large armies which, advancing from the north and south, were to close in upon and crush the Pindaris, whilst the various divisions were at the same time so disposed as to keep a watch on the Mahratta powers, which were themselves predatory in spirit and viewed with dismay, and were prepared to oppose with force the establishment of effective power in the land where they had so long been accustomed to pursue with impunity their lawless mode of life. For the destruction of the Pindaris it was determined to close in from every side upon their headquarters on the Narbada River. Two armies were organized, the Grand Army being assembled at Cawnpore in September in four divisions under the personal direction of the Governor-General; and the Army of the Deccan in five divisions under General Sir Thomas Hislop. There were in addition a Reserve Division in the South and a Guzerat Division in the West of India.

The operations about to be undertaken were to occupy an extensive region embracing every diversity of physical feature and characterized by considerable varieties of climate. This area stretched across India from the River Jumna on the north to the Krishna and Tungabhadra on the south. It was crossed by ranges of rugged mountains abounding with wild beasts, and clad with dense forests whose solitudes were seldom disturbed by the presence of man, and culminating in tall peaks, crowned by massive forts hoary with age and bristling with guns. There were rich alluvial plains, dotted with villages and large populous cities, and watered by mighty rivers whose streams poured in turbid floods in the rainy season but shrank to silver threads in the height of summer. Within the limits of this theatre of war were many Native States and some English territories. It was inhabited by peoples of many races and many tongues. Pathans, Mahrattas, and Rajputs represented the civilization of the orient; aboriginal Bhils and Gonds shared with savage beasts the fastnesses of forest and mountain. Not only the hostility of man but the forces of Nature had to be encountered and overcome. Difficult passes over the mountains, worn by rushing torrents and dark with jungle, had to be traversed by great armies with all their baggage. After heavy rainfall even the watercourses that had previously been empty were rendered temporarily impassable, and the rivers took days to shrink to their normal proportions, whilst the soil in many parts of the country became so soft as to render the progress of an army a most difficult operation. Death lurked in many shapes. Cholera followed in the track of the troops and fever claimed numerous victims. Even the wild beasts which infested the country took their toll of the advancing armies. The maintenance and movement of great armies over a wide theatre of operations called for careful organization and masterly strategy on the part of the commanders. The opposition of the enemy both in the open field and in their mountain strongholds demanded skill and valour on the part of the troops.

The Marquis of Hastings arrived at Cawnpore on September 13th, 1817, in order to direct the preparations for the campaign, and the negotiations with the Native Powers, from the most convenient position. The Grand Army was composed entirely of native troops, with the exception of the 8th and 24th Light Dragoons, the Horse Artillery, and 14th, 67th, and 87th Foot. The Army of the Deccan was mainly composed of troops of the Madras native army, but included also Horse Artillery, the 17th and 22nd Light Dragoons, the Royal Scots, 65th Foot, and the Madras European Regiment.

During October and early November the divisions of the two armies were disposed as follows:—

Of the Grand Army:—

First Division marched to the Sind.

Second Division marched to the Chambal.

Third Division was disposed north of the eastern Narbada.

A detached force under Brigadier Hardyman was placed on the extreme left astride of the Narbada.

The Reserve Division had its headquarters at Rewari to control Amir Khan.

By the distribution of the forces on the Sind and Chambal Rivers Sindhia was enclosed and cut off from his allies, and was obliged to conclude a treaty ceding the forts of Hindia and Asirgarh to the English, and to supply a contingent of troops for employment against the Pindaris.

In the meantime the Army of the Deccan had been advancing. Although encumbered by all its baggage and some 200,000 camp followers, the army marched rapidly through the dense jungles on and beyond the Tapti River, and by the middle of November was disposed as follows:—

The First and Third Divisions were concentrated at Harda, and disposed to hold the fords of the Narbada.

The Second Division, with headquarters at Malkapur, watched the Berar Ghauts.

The Fourth Division marched to Khandesh, filling the space between Poona and Berar.

The Fifth Division was at Hoshangabad.

A Reserve Division was posted between the Bhima and Krishna Rivers. In addition, a chain of defensive posts was established from the western point of the English frontier on the Tungabhadra, and along that river to its junction with the Krishna. From there the chain extended along the latter river to Chintapili, and along the Eastern Ghauts to the Chilka Lake.

Meanwhile the Peshwa had engaged in secret negotiations with the other Mahratta powers and the Pindaris, while at the same time raising troops in his own territory. This hostility culminated early in November in a demand for the withdrawal of the English troops at Poona, following on which the Mahrattas advanced to attack the Residency on November 5th. The Resident, Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, barely escaped with his life, and joined the forces at the cantonment of Kirki. These forces consisted of the Bombay European Regiment, a detachment of the 65th Foot, and some native artillery and infantry, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Burr. This officer, in view of the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, whose cavalry covered the plain as far as the eye could reach, wished to act on the defensive; but Elphinstone had ridden beside Wellesley at Assaye, and had learnt the advantage of always acting on the offensive against the Mahrattas. On leaving the Residency he sent a messenger on to warn Colonel Burr of the enemy's approach, at the same time directing him to attack the Peshwa's army. The English line accordingly moved to meet the advancing enemy, the European Regiment on the right and the 7th Bombay Infantry on the left. The Mahratta horse were advancing over the plain in countless numbers, levelling the hedges and standing corn as they passed, while the earth shook with the thunder of their hoofs.

A large body of Arab and other infantry attacked the English left, but were repulsed by the fire of the 7th Native Infantry, who were following up their success when they were charged and thrown

into some confusion by 3,000 horse under Gokhale, who in their turn were driven off by two companies of the European Regiment who came to the assistance of the native troops. The repulse of the Mahratta Horse, together with some effective artillery fire, finished the action, and the Mahrattas withdrew to Poona, having suffered a loss of some 500 men. The English loss amounted to 19 killed and 67 wounded. The numbers engaged on the enemy's side were 18,000 horse, 8,000 foot, and 14 guns. The English force numbered 2,800, of whom 800 were Europeans.

Meanwhile the Fourth Division of the Army of the Deccan, under Brigadier Smith, had been advancing to the relief of the Kirki force, and on November 13th took up a position covering Yerowda ford between the Kirki Bridge (known as Holkar's Bridge) and a small hill on the left bank of the Muta-Mula River. The enemy were encamped on the opposite bank of the river. After some desultory skirmishing, an action took place on the 16th; the Mahrattas were driven back with considerable loss, and next day they fled, leaving their camp standing and a number of guns in the city.

From Poona Baji Rao fled at first in the direction of Satara, but eventually made his way to Nasik, on the Godavery. He was pursued by Brigadier Smith who, it is interesting to note, formed one of the Bombay native corps into mounted infantry, thus managing to keep at hand with the cavalry a body of infantry in the event of overtaking the enemy. The departure of Brigadier Smith, who marched from Poona on December 21st, left that place with a very reduced garrison, and Baji Rao was thus tempted to try his fortune once more in that direction. His approach caused some alarm at Poona, and the detachment at Sirur was called in to reinforce the garrison. This detachment consisted of a battalion of Bombay infantry¹ under Captain Staunton, two guns with 24 artillerymen under Lieutenant Chisholm, and 250 Reformed Horse² under Lieutenant Swanston.³ The detachment reached the high ground overlooking the village of Koregaon on the Bhima River at one o'clock on January 1st, 1818, twenty-seven miles from Sirur and some sixteen from Poona, and saw in front of them a scene that might well appal the stoutest heart. In the valley below lay the whole of the Peshwa's army—20,000 horse and 8,000 foot—encamped on the right bank of the river above the village. Captain Staunton at once occupied the village, which stood on the Poona road, but the enemy, seeing his approach, had already forestalled him by seizing a portion of the buildings, while they quickly surrounded the whole place. The Peshwa himself ascended a neighbouring height to watch the destruction of the little detachment, which he expected would fall an easy prey. The village of Koregaon was composed of terraced buildings, and included a small choultry and a mud fort, the latter occupied by the Peshwa's Arabs.

¹ Now the 102nd Grenadiers.

² Now the 34th Poona Horse.

³ Lieutenant Swanston's grandson was killed in France in 1914 when in command of the Poona Horse. He used to wear his grandfather's sword, presented to the latter in commemoration of the defence of Koregaon.

The two guns were at once placed in position, one covering the road to Sirur, the other commanding the right bank of the river. By noon the English force was cut off from the water and the gunners were exposed to continuous sniping. All day the little force was subjected to the attacks of three thousand Arabs, the bravest of the Peshwa's troops. The infantry had frequently to charge with the bayonet, whilst the 6-pounders were so disposed as to cover the gateway, and the Arabs were slain in dozens as they attempted to rush the entrance. But they continued their attacks, and most of the Europeans had been struck down round the artillery, when at length one of the guns was taken, Lieutenant Chisholm being killed and his head cut off and taken to Baji Rao.

Among the English officers was Lieutenant Pattinson, Adjutant of the Bombay Infantry Regiment, a man not only of heroic disposition but of gigantic stature, being 6 feet 7 inches in height, and of immensely powerful physique. Pattinson was lying mortally wounded, having been shot through the body, when he heard that the gun was taken. Getting up he called to the Grenadiers "once more to follow him," and, seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking right and left and bringing down five of the enemy. His example so fired the valour of the troops that the enemy were again and finally repulsed, and the gun was retaken. In this struggle Pattinson was disabled by another ball through the body. Near the gun was found the headless body of Lieutenant Chisholm, which Captain Staunton pointed out to the men, telling them "such was the way all would be served who fell dead or alive into the hands of the Mahrattas." His men all declared that they were ready to die to a man and the conflict was resumed with determined valour. In this action not only the combatant officers but the Assistant Surgeons Wingate and Wyllie led the troops to the attack again and again, and there can be no doubt that the presence and example of the English inspired the remarkable valour of the troops. All the officers were killed or wounded, and of the twenty-four English artillerymen twelve were killed and eight wounded. The native troops had 250 casualties. In the night the enemy withdrew, disheartened, from the village, having lost five or six hundred men, and next morning retreated on hearing of Brigadier Smith's approach. Captain Staunton marched back to Sirur, which he entered on January 3rd with drums beating and Colours flying. It is sad to record that the heroic Pattinson died of his wounds at Sirur, and in his last moment laboured under the impression that his corps had been defeated, which caused him great distress. A monument erected by Government on the bank of the Bhima River, inscribed with the names of those who fell in the action, commemorates this glorious defence.

While the events that have been narrated were in progress, matters had also come to a head at Nagpur, where the Raja, known also as the Bhonsla, Appa Sahib, secretly received the agents of Chithu, the celebrated Pindari chief. In November Appa Sahib received in open durbar a dress of honour sent to him by the Peshwa.

The garrison of Nagpur consisted of three troops of Bengal cavalry, two battalions of Madras native infantry, the Resident's escort of two companies of native infantry, and some European artillerymen with four guns, in all some 1,500 men, under Lieut.-Colonel Hopeton Scott. The Resident, Mr. Jenkins, perceiving the hostile attitude of the Bhonsla, saw the necessity for defensive measures, and occupied the hill of Sitabaldi on November 25th, at the same time despatching messages for assistance to the Second Division of the Army of the Deccan, which was in Berar.

The Residency lay to the west of the city of Nagpur, and separated from it by the rocky hill of Sitabaldi, running north and south. At each extremity of the hill is an eminence, connected by a narrow ridge some three hundred yards in length. The southern or larger hill was occupied by the greater part of the infantry and three 6-pounders, 300 men and one gun being on the smaller hill, and the cavalry in the enclosures of the Residency. In front and on both flanks of the position was a village of mud huts in which the enemy assembled with their guns.

On the evening of November 25th one of the picquets was fired on from the village and retired under a heavy discharge of matchlocks, which was the signal for a general attack. A heavy fire was exchanged until two o'clock in the morning, when it slackened, only to be renewed with both musketry and guns at daylight. The Arabs, who as usual with the Mahrattas furnished the attacking force, made frequent attempts to carry the smaller hill by assault, inflicting severe loss on the garrison, which had to be constantly reinforced. At length, favoured by the confusion caused by the explosion of a tumbril, they charged, sword in hand, carried the hill and turned the gun posted on it against the larger hill, where the casualties also became severe. Emboldened by this success, the enemy's horse and foot closed in on every side and prepared for a general assault.

Meanwhile the cavalry under Captain FitzGerald, posted in the Residency grounds, had been idle, although the commander had repeatedly applied for permission to charge, but had been forbidden. The Residency grounds were also attacked, guns were brought up, and bodies of horse threatened to break in. Seeing the impending destruction, FitzGerald now made a last attempt to obtain leave. Colonel Scott's reply was: "Tell him to charge at his peril!" "At my peril be it," said the gallant FitzGerald, and immediately gave the word to advance. As soon as he was clear of the enclosures, he swept down on the principal body of Mahratta Horse, drove them from two guns by which they were supported, pursued them for some distance, cut their infantry escort to pieces, and brought back the captured guns. This exploit was witnessed with enthusiasm by the infantry on the hill. At this moment an explosion of ammunition took place among the Arabs on the smaller hill; officers and men, mingling together, rushed forward, drove the Arabs headlong down the hill, spiked two of their guns, and then returned to their post. The Arabs prepared for a fresh charge, when a troop of cavalry under Cornet Smith charged round the base of the hill, took them

in flank, and dispersed them. The English now assumed the offensive, drove the enemy from the huts, and by noon the battle came to an end.

The English loss amounted to 119 killed, including five English officers, and 243, including 13 English officers, wounded. No more heroic defence is recorded in history than this gallant stand of a small force of native troops, inspired by the heroic example of their officers and their few European comrades of the artillery. A monument stands on the hill of Sitabaldi, of which the foundation stone was laid on the first anniversary of the battle to commemorate the deeds of these gallant men.

The enemy were quite disheartened by this repulse. Reinforcements arrived from all directions, and the Bhonsla came in and agreed to surrender all his artillery; but on the English advancing to take possession, the guns opened fire. The Mahratta forces were accordingly attacked on December 16th, when line was formed with a company of the Royal Scots at the head of each native regiment; the enemy's batteries were taken by assault, and his horse was dispersed and pursued for some miles by the cavalry and horse artillery. The garrison of Nagpur, consisting of 3,000 Arabs, still held out, and an attack on the city was repulsed with heavy loss; but the Arabs eventually agreed to submit on terms which were highly honourable to themselves.

A force under Brigadier Hardyman had meanwhile moved down the Narbada to the relief of the Resident at Nagpur. This force engaged the Mahrattas at Jubbulpore on December 19th, defeated them and took all their guns, the town and fort, and the stores it contained.

The Marquis of Hastings' disposition of the Grand Army had reduced Sindhia to terms early in November, and the only remaining hostile power which had not yet been dealt with was that of Holkar of Indore. Holkar's army was in camp at Mehidpur, on the Sipra River, when Sir Thomas Hislop, with the First and Third Divisions of the Army of the Deccan, arrived at Ujjain on December 12th, 1817. On the 14th the army moved in the direction of Mehidpur, arriving in the vicinity of that place on the 19th. It has already been related that Mulhar Rao Holkar was a boy of eleven years of age, the Regency being in the hands of Tulsi Bai. The advance of the English Army, and the consequent negotiations, gave rise to dissensions in the Mahratta camp, where there was a peace party and a party favourable to war. The Regent vacillated between the two factions, and was finally seized and decapitated on the river bank by those who were in favour of opposing the English by force of arms, and whose counsels consequently prevailed.

On the morning of December 21st the English Army advanced in the direction of Mehidpur, moving through hilly country, where the Pindaris hovered about the flanks and rear, driving off camels and bullocks. In those days, as in ours, our cavalry was too heavily weighted to contend with light horsemen. An eye-witness of the scene says:—"We could see the Pindaris flying like the wind, at a considerable distance off, our cavalry having no chance with these fellows,

even on an open plain. The Pindaris, unencumbered with accoutrements, heavy saddle, etc., will gallop round and round the most active of our troopers; and his very horse seems to partake of the master's cunning and dexterity, and to know exactly the moment for a quick and timely retreat."

A reconnaissance under Sir John Malcolm was pushed on to the river, where it took possession of the fort and a small village on the right bank, driving in the enemy's light cavalry where it formed on the plain between the two armies. The enemy's position across the river was now exposed to view. At a distance of about 800 yards beyond the stream, the infantry, 5,000 strong, stretched from Mehidpur to the bank of the Sipra where their right rested. Their front was covered by nearly a hundred guns in line. Beyond these a dense mass of 30,000 horse crowded the plain. The English Army numbered no more than 5,500 men, but there were some present who had fought under the great master of war at Assaye, and knew that English soldiers had no need to fear the issue of a conflict with a Mahratta host, however numerous. In front of the position were two fords by which it was determined to cross, but in the first place some cavalry, horse artillery, and light infantry were pushed forward to clear the hither bank of the river and reconnoitre the enemy's position.

Meanwhile the main body was advancing under the personal command of Sir Thomas Hislop, to whom Sir John Malcolm reported the result of the reconnaissance. It was determined to pass by the left-hand ford alone. The light brigade crossed and seized the opposite bank, while a small battery was established to cover the passage. This movement was carried out under a heavy fire. Beyond the enemy's left flank the river took a sudden turn towards their rear, continuing in that direction for a mile and a half, where there was a deep ford impassable for guns owing to the steepness of the bank. On their right a deep ravine ran into the bed of the stream, and near their centre was a ruined village which, being on an eminence in front of the main ford, was the key of the position. It was filled with hostile infantry and flanked by hostile batteries.

Following the light brigade, the cavalry and horse artillery crossed the stream, the cavalry ascending the bank to the left, the artillery forming in front of the ford. At the same time a battery was established on the right bank to keep down the cannonade which the enemy concentrated on the point of passage. The battery which had crossed the stream was quickly overwhelmed, while the infantry suffered severely not only from the enemy's fire, but from the missiles of their own rocket troop which fell short and burst among them. The main body had crossed by midday, an extraordinary counter-march being carried out during the passage to bring the right in front, which exposed the troops to considerable loss. The English troops were at once launched against the enemy's line, followed by the native regiments, and were received with a discharge of grape, chain, and round shot, which by its weight alone staggered the advancing line. But with a cheer the English soldiers charged straight on the enemy's guns, and although the artillerymen stood bravely to their pieces, they

were nearly all killed, and the guns fell into the hands of the victors. Holkar's infantry fled at the beginning of the action, and the cavalry followed suit; while the artillerymen, disgusted at the defection of their comrades, turned their guns and fired a salvo into the ranks of the fugitives.

The cavalry took up the pursuit and captured the Mahratta camp and Holkar's regalia and jewels, whilst numbers of the enemy were slain, and the surrounding country was strewn with their dead. The English loss amounted to 174 killed and 621 wounded. In some respects history repeats itself, for over 200 of the wounded died for want of proper medical treatment. A contemporary writer says:—"In the field hospitals there was scarcely a bit of dressing plaster for the wounded officers, none for the men; nor was there a single set of amputating instruments besides those belonging to individual surgeons; some of these without them; and we have the best authority for saying that, of those amputated, from the bluntness of the knives and the want of dressing plaster alone, two out of three died in hospital." The enemy's loss amounted to 3,000 men.

The battle of Mehidpur was followed by the complete submission of Holkar. But although the main forces of the Mahratta chiefs had been all reduced, there still remained a great deal to be done. The Pindari *durras* had been broken up and dispersed while the operations that have been described were in progress, but it was some time before their destruction was completed. These freebooters were given no rest, but were pursued by the Guzerat division and by the various detachments of the Grand Army until none remained but the famous Chithu with a few hundred followers. After a long pursuit all these were gradually dispersed until their unfortunate leader was left alone in the jungle of the Tapti River near Asirgarh. Here he fell a victim to a man-eating tiger, his fate being ascertained when the monster was followed to its lair and Chithu's head was discovered and recognized. It is related that the fate of the Pindari chieftain excited sympathy among the English officers, who admired the spirit and intrepidity with which he had on all occasions braved the deepest reverses of fortune.

After the battle of Mehidpur and the conclusion of the treaty with Holkar, Sir Thomas Hislop turned southwards with the First Division of the Army of the Deccan, the Second Division having proceeded to Berar, and on February 27th, 1818, approached the fort of Thalner, which should have surrendered under the terms of the treaty. Suddenly fire was opened from the fort on the head of the column, which was obliged to fall back. The fort, rising abruptly from the Tapti River, was of considerable importance, as it covered the main road over the Sendwa Ghaut. The entrance was through five successive gates, communicating by intricate traverses. A winding ramp, with steps in some places, ascended through the gate to the rampart. Negotiations for surrender were eventually discussed at the inner gate, and two officers and three grenadiers entered by the wicket, expecting to be followed by as many men as could get into the confined space, when the enemy attacked them furiously, killing them all except Colonel

Murray, who fell towards the wicket covered with wounds. The defenders then tried to close the wicket, but were prevented by a grenadier who thrust his musket into the aperture, and the wicket was then forced open and the wounded officer rescued. The attacking party now poured a fire in through the gateway, clearing it sufficiently for the head of the column to enter, and the place was carried without further difficulty. The troops poured in, the garrison were put to the sword, and the same evening the commander of the fort was hanged from a tree on the flagstaff tower.

Although the main Mahratta forces had been beaten, and the Pindari freebooters, broken alike in organization and in spirit, had been scattered to the four winds, there still remained a great deal to be done. The pursuit of the Peshwa, Baji Rao, continued. After his repulse at Koregaon, he fled towards the Carnatic, but, being disappointed in his hope of assistance from Mysore, he again turned north in the direction of Sholapur, and then bent his steps towards the Tapti in order to obtain the aid of Appa Sahib of Nagpur. An interesting cavalry combat took place on February 25th, 1818, when Brigadier-General Smith came up with the Peshwa at Ashta. At eight o'clock in the morning the Mahratta kettledrums were heard beating below a hill which covered them from view. They had struck their tents and laden up their baggage. On hearing of the approach of his pursuers, Baji Rao fled on horseback, leaving Gokhale with ten thousand horse to cover the retreat.

Between the Mahratta horse and the English cavalry was a deep nullah, difficult to cross. The English force consisted of the 22nd Dragoons in the centre, and a native cavalry regiment on either flank, with horse artillery and galloper guns on the outer flanks. In this order, advancing in regimental columns of threes at forming distance, Brigadier-General Smith approached the enemy and was forming, when Gokhale, with 2,500 horse and several standards, advanced from opposite the left, cleared the nullah, and charged obliquely across the front, delivering the fire of their matchlocks into the native cavalry, who were unprepared to receive them. Turning this flank, the enemy circled round and gained the rear, threatening the right flank and rear of the 22nd Dragoons. But the Dragoons' right was thrown back, while their left charged the Mahrattas. Gokhale, who was foremost, engaged Lieutenant Warrant, whom he wounded, but, being attacked by numbers, he fell mortally wounded, covering his head gracefully with his shawl in falling, so that his enemies should not gaze upon his countenance at the moment of dissolution. The death of their gallant chief disheartened the Mahrattas, and they fled after sustaining a loss of some 200 killed. The most important result of this action was the death of Gokhale, a brave man, justly named by his master "the Sword of the Empire," who had ridden beside Wellington at the battle of Assaye in 1803.

The flight of Baji Rao was continued until May, when he surrendered on terms to Sir John Malcolm, near Asirgarh. Meanwhile many hill forts had to be reduced in various parts of the country. Among these Asirgarh, and Malegaon in Khandeish were the principal, and

THE FIELD OF ME



View of the Ground on which was fought the Battle of Me

From an old Engraving.

REFERENCE

A.A.	Avenue of Trees leading to Mehidpur.	c
B.	Fort of Mehidpur.	d.d
C.	Ruined Village of Dooblee.	e.
D.	Ruined enclosure	11111.
E.E.	Fords of the Seepra, called Kuldoc Ghat	2.22.
a	Ravine in which the Light Brigade was posted	3.3.
b.	Ravine by which the European Brigade ascended	4.

MEHIDPUR



Mehidpur, seen from the right bank of the Seepra.

REFERENCES

- c Horse Artillery Battery.
- d Cavalry formed for Action.
- e Rocket Battery.
- 1.1.1. Front of the Enemy's position.
- 2.2.2. Enemy's Cavalry.
- 3.3. Enemy's principal Batteries.
- 4. Ravine by which parties of the Enemy's Infantry came down to annoy the British Cavalry.

in the Southern Mahratta country Belgaum and Sholapur as well as many others, some of which were defended with remarkable valour by their Arab garrisons. Desultory operations continued until the spring of 1819, when the fort of Asirgarh was captured.

This was the last war with the Mahrattas. Perhaps the most important result was the delivery of the Rajput States, regarding which the Governor-General wrote :—"They have been delivered from an oppression more systematic, more unremitting, more brutal than perhaps before trampled on humanity. Security and comfort have been established where nothing but terror and misery before existed; nor is this within a narrow sphere. It is a proud phase to use, but it is a true one, that we have bestowed blessings upon millions." Nor were those blessings forgotten when, forty years later, in time of stress during the Mutiny, the Rajput States remained true to their allegiance to their deliverers. That most sinister figure of the Great Mutiny, the Nana of Bithur, was, it is interesting to note, the adopted son and heir of the deposed Baji Rao. The history of Southern India since those days is sufficient evidence of the wisdom of the policy of the Marquis of Hastings. It is the history of a hundred years of peaceful progress. The Pindaris are forgotten even in name. The Mahrattas have settled down to peaceful agricultural pursuits. For a hundred years the villagers of Southern India, who in the early decade of the last century found security only behind their fortifications, have tilled their fields in safety.



AN EXCELLENT AUXILIARY.

THE MOTOR TRANSPORT VOLUNTEERS.¹

*(4th to 23rd Squadrons, City of London Motor Volunteer Corps.
Headquarters, 31, Walbrook, London, E.C.4.)*

AMONG the many volunteer formations that the war has brought into being in Britain, there is none that can lay better claim to useful service than the Motor Volunteer Corps. To understand the working of this branch of volunteer work, it might be better to take one example—that section which handles the stream of soldiers pouring into London in the early hours of the morning, proceeding on leave from overseas and from home units. There are no ordinary means of communication between railway stations after the underground lines close—somewhere about midnight—until five and six a.m. On Sundays the close time for the 'buses and tubes is even longer, and in the early days of the war the troops who had to cross London from one terminus to another were obliged to find their own way as best they could. Since the majority of the men have quite a considerable amount of baggage and kit, it was no small trial for them to have to tramp across London under their heavy loads.

Arriving in a great city, entirely ignorant of its pathways, weary men, perhaps trudging through driving rain, welcomed even the most questionable means of obtaining shelter and rest, and often fell prey to the dangers that lie in wait in every great city, so that in many cases they were robbed and worse, and sometimes broke their leave and were left stranded, penniless, and forlorn—very sick men.

It was a happy idea, therefore, that led to the inauguration of a Volunteer Motor Transport Corps to deal with the problem of the soldier in transit from one station in London to another. The need of the fighting men had only to come to the notice of certain patriotic business men, and a corps was formed to provide free transport for men arriving from the front on leave—this with the approval and sanction of the G.O.C. London District. The men who undertook this work were professional and business men who placed their own cars and commercial vehicles at the disposal of the corps, giving their own services as drivers and orderlies. This was the first step.

¹ It might be interesting to add that the corps was formed on February 15th, 1916, by the Hon. President, Sir John Lister Kaye, Bart., and Mr. C. R. Freemantle, Commandant. That the necessary funds are obtained by voluntary contributions from the public, and that up to the present date getting on for half a million of H.M. forces have been assisted and directed, and a quarter of a million been transported free of charge. At the present time on Sunday mornings an average of between 3,000 and 4,000 men are provided with free transport.

After ten months of looking after the needs of the men coming from overseas to Victoria Station only, the corps was requested by the G.O.C. London District to make additional provision for the men arriving at other termini. On December 4th, 1916, the additional work was taken in hand, and the men coming from the country to catch the train in the morning which takes them back to France from leave, or those breaking their journey when proceeding on furlough at home, were looked after. How well the work has been done can be seen from the figures. Since the date when the larger scheme was initiated the corps has transported over 300,000 men of H.M. forces, free of charge, at night; that is to say, on an average from 10,000 to 15,000 men per week. On one night, taken casually from the returns, a Sunday, the corps had 16 lorries and 15 cars working; they transported 1,650 men and directed 120 more, and had the stations cleared by eight-thirty in the morning.

It is instructive to spend a night with the Motor Volunteers, and he who would make a study of our soldiers and the best type of our voluntary workers, could not have a better opportunity. One sees the soldier coming from a country station arriving in London to break his journey perhaps for the north of England. He has never seen the City before, and as often as not, he is quite bewildered at the prospect of crossing London without guidance. He is greeted by a polite orderly in a smart grey uniform with green facings, who asks him where he wishes to go. Next moment he is shepherded into a waiting car or lorry, in which he finds a number of fellow-soldiers in like case with himself. If his train does not leave the other station for some hours, he is taken to the Rest House nearest his point of departure; his train is looked up for him; he is told exactly how he stands and what he has to do.

There is wisdom in the proceeding. It is found that if a soldier is left at the Rest House nearest the station at which he arrived he usually wanders off, getting impatient, and makes for the station of his departure. Then he loses his way, and probably misses his train. When he is taken to his station and is left in a Y.M.C.A. hut within a stone's throw he is not inclined to wander, but will rest or sleep and wait with all patience for the train time.

One of the most charming things which one notices about the work of the Volunteer Motor Corps is the mutual respect between the carriers and the carried. The Volunteers spare no pains in looking after the soldiers, and declare that it is a distinct pleasure to work for them. They admire the splendid patience and never-failing good humour of the soldiers, their willingness to make things easy for those looking after them, and their gratitude for the services rendered. The soldiers themselves show their gratitude in their own various and often quaint ways, and do not fail to express their appreciation of the work of the Volunteers.

But it is not alone in the way of transporting the troops that the Motor Volunteers help. A soldier may return in the early hours to a station where he has left his kit in the left-luggage office, and find the place shut up. It is the Motor Volunteer orderly that finds the

key and discovers the wanted kit, or, failing that, finds it later and sees that it goes after the man to his unit. Then, again, a man may, through his train being late, miss his connection and break his leave. The Motor Volunteer is there to vouch for the honesty of the excuse he tenders to his commanding officer, who might otherwise be inclined to think it rather thin.

Nominally the work demanded of the members of the City of London Motor Volunteer Corps (4/23rd Squadrons) is one night in six; in practice much more service is given by the members than that. It is manifestly impossible for men to carry out their day's work and do transport service every night, but the amount of service that each individual member puts in is astonishing. In this unit there are peers, driving their own cars, and drivers of commercial cars belonging to well-known firms, giving voluntary service at night after doing a full day's work. As an example of the spirit that prevails in the corps there may be cited a case of a taxi-cab driver-owner who lends his car and his services at least one night in six; which means that he does a heavy night's work after a full day earning his living. A well-known firm of match manufacturers lends one car every night, or rather a large-capacity lorry, and three on the busiest night—Saturday-Sunday.

The unit prides itself that it can place a member proficient in French and with a smattering of Flemish, perhaps, on each station, so that Belgian or French soldiers coming to this country are properly looked after. The work is not confined to soldiers exclusively. The sailors have come to know the vehicles of the Volunteer Transport, and are very quick at getting aboard the right car for the station they wish to reach.

As an example of the work the unit is sometimes called upon to do, there is the case of a number of Russian prisoners of war escaped from Germany, arriving at one of the London stations under the charge of men from Scotland Yard. They arrived in the early morning and had to be conveyed to a rest-camp just outside London. Lorries were detailed by the Commandant of the unit and the Russians were driven straight to their destination without delay.

The corps has received official recognition from the Army Council and has been granted permission to increase its personnel and strength in vehicles, especially in the direction of heavy transport, as a measure to meet a national emergency. At the present moment the strength is over two hundred cars and lorries with a personnel of about 300 men. A campaign of recruiting is in full swing with the object of increasing the number of lorries to about four times the present standard with cars and a large increase in motor-cycles and personnel.

There should be no difficulty in attaining the standard aimed at, especially if the value of the work done by the unit could be made more widely known. A taste of the work is the best incentive; one instinctively wishes to be helping when the work is seen in progress. The service carries its reward in itself. It brings one in contact with that admirable person, the British soldier, with all his lovable qualities, his faith in you, his essential decency. The Commandant of the

London unit tells the story of one Scots soldier who got stranded in London with no money. His wife was ill and he wished to get to Scotland to see her. The Commandant advanced the money and the Scot caught the early train. Next morning the amount was returned by wire, and a few nights later the Commandant's hand was wrung by the soldier, who had been waiting in the station for some hours.

The work done by the Motor Volunteer Corps is worthy of the fullest recognition. It is carried out without friction, sanely and happily, and that at a time of night when the most of us are fast asleep.

There is no parade about it. It is simply a sincere and exceedingly useful piece of work, done because the need was there, with no thought of honour and glory. But our officers and men understand.



CORFU—A MEMORY.

By MAJOR MORRIS BENT.

THE print, stained with age, is inscribed to "His Excellency" by one Francesco Claudiani, in token of his "profound respect" for the then titular head of the Ionian Islands. As a labour of love, perhaps, rather than as a work of art, it is valuable; but it seems to have a peculiar significance and interest at the present time, when the name of Corfu frequently figures, more especially as the scene of the reincarnation of our Serbian ally, and as witness of the general operations at the mouth of the Adriatic.

"*Prospetto de la città di Corfu veduta dallo scoglio di Vido,*" so runs the descriptive. We stand on what was the highly fortified shore of the little island of Vido, looking west, with a mile or so of bluest water between ourselves and the *città*—bluest and busiest, too, as appears; for the channel is thronged with all manner of craft which, with appropriate disregard of nautical principles, the artist has depicted on the wind, before the wind, becalmed or at anchor, according to his fancy; and, in the midst, with "Il Terribile" conspicuous on the paddle-box a small puffing-billy of a steamer, under trysails and jib, and a huge smoke-stack, the first of her kind, is running amok. Beyond, within its line wall, and with much attention to detail—we even spot our own first dwelling, the *casa paramittiotti*—the town can be seen, flanked by the citadel and Cape Sidaro on the one hand, and by the less imposing Fort Neuf on the other, headquarters respectively of the two British regiments whose bugles come to us across the water. How far off now they sound, and with what other eyes, could we revisit the scene, might we regard it! For the moment, however, as the date of the picture reminds us, we are back in the middle of the last century (for that matter it might be in the days of Ulysses and his friend Alcinous, so fairy-like do they look), and Sir Henry Storks is our Lord High Commissioner.

A pleasant place was the Corfu of that time. With the Albanian coast and Butrinto (old Buthrotum) for the sportsman, only some ten miles off; and, on the spot, most of the joys with which the Briton is apt to surround himself, it is small wonder that the station was regarded with favour, and that its surrender to the "rightful owners" was regretted, and not least by the local inhabitants. The island has changed hands before, and doubtless will again, for the Greeks are an adaptable folk; but of all its past masters or administrators, the Venetians are most in evidence, their winged lion (of St. Mark) confronting one upon curtain and bastion. It is this emblem, embossed against the counterscarp, that at once attracts the eye on arrival at the official, as distinct from the commercial, landing place in the "ditch," which severs the citadel from the main land. Here, in addition to the little fleet of officers' private boats, are privileged to lie a few belonging to native watermen, and from one of these, the

"Very nice Gypsy" by the same token, we step ashore. Spiro shakes his earrings, and leads the way up the long flight of the Lord High's steps to the mimosa-clad boundary of the palace gardens which skirt the parade ground. A battalion is there at drill; and the stately, convincing "March past in slow time" to a solemn strain is in progress; the band in their white, the rank and file in the brick-red tunic of the day—they wheel into line, each company a living wall, and officers take post for the advance in review order—a crowd of young Greeks sets up a shrill shout, and the rehearsal for "Queen's birthday," 1859, is over. Let us follow the returning troops into the citadel; and bending to the left at the outer guard, over the high level bridge and draw-bridge, we are presently within the picturesque fortress, and on the upward road to the signal station at its summit. Flags, red and white at the yard arm, displayed to a brisk northerly breeze, speak the approach of the Malta packet; and we recognize the little "Alhambra" rising and diving to the head sea till she rounds the cape and disappears up harbour. But it is over Vido, and further, Salvador, and the snowy height of Albania across the straits, that the enchanted eye most loves to travel, while thought flies back to the classic ages, the Odyssean shipwreck, and the reception of the "many-minded" hero by the king of luxury and Corcyra. There stands a ruined temple of Poseidon above Gastouri, which we always pleased ourselves to think commemorated the event, and, peradventure, marked its site. Here peasants dance on festal nights among the sombre olives; the sward carpeted with scented cyclamen, and the air alight with fire-flies.

The British occupation will probably chiefly endure in the legend of a prosperity engendered of money spending, and in the excellence of our roads by which, incidentally, so many lovely spots were made accessible to traffic. Among these, that leading to the one-gun battery, and that to Garuna, where Monte Dekka flings his broad shoulder shadow at evening, stand clearest—Garuna, where, in the jaded days of summer, respite and short sojournings were enjoyed (pace the fleas) at a certain wayside caravanserai opposite the holy shrine of San Spiridiano, whose pâpa, equally dirty and devout, would greet each new arrival with benediction. One wonders whether he and it are still there to bless the wayfarer. They must be very, very old, much older than the little boy of sixty years ago who has not forgotten them; but the well, his well, doubtless remains, and life has been prolonged by miracle:—

"Who drinks of me may never think to die

"Before his time, and that is bye-and-bye!"

So runs the paraphrase; for sentiment and conviction worthy of the tragic chorus. We are tempted to linger on the mountain slopes of this paradise; but other old friends await our greeting—the racecourse, Potamo, where we got the fever, Pantaleone, Paleocastrizza, and, in the city itself, the convent of the good nuns who taught us our alphabet and pinched our cheeks. . . .

"Alas! we babble; but the scenes were dear,

"And still are rounded with an atmosphere."

FROM THE ORDER BOOK OF FERDINAND OF BRUNSWICK.

(Extracted from the MS. in the Royal United Service Institution.)

DURING the latter part of the Seven Years' War a British contingent served for rather over four years under Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, and it is thought that it may be of interest at this period to give extracts from the Manuscript Order Book preserved in the Royal United Service Institution, showing the complimentary character of the remarks that Commander published after the several actions in which the British troops were engaged—first under Lord George Sackville and, after Minden, under the Marquis of Granby.

The first of these orders given below was published after Minden. The "Honour" is borne only by the British infantry regiments which took part—"The Unsurpassable Six," as Carlyle calls them; the 12th, 20th, 23rd, 25th, 37th, and 51st. The following British cavalry regiments were also present, but owing to the extraordinary behaviour of Sackville, they were condemned to inaction: the Blues, 1st and 3rd Dragoon Guards, Greys, Inniskillings, and 10th Hussars.

The following was published on August 2nd, 1759—the day after the battle: "H.S.H. orders his greatest thanks to be given the whole Army for their bravery and good behaviour yesterday, particularly to the British Infantry and the two battalions of Hanoverian Guards; to all the Cavalry of the left wing and to General Wangenheim's Corps, particularly the Regiment of Holstein, the Hessian cavalry, the Hanoverian Regiment du Corps and Hammerstein. The same to all the brigades of heavy artillery.

"H.S.H. declares publicly that, next to God, he attributes the glory of the day to the intrepidity and extraordinary good behaviour of these troops, which, he assures them, he shall retain the strongest sense of as long as he lives; and if ever upon any occasion he shall be able to serve these brave troops, or any one of them in particular, it will give him the utmost pleasure.

"H.S.H. orders his particular thanks to be likewise given to General Spörcken, the Duke of Holstein, Lt.-Generals Imhoff and Urff. H.S.H. is extremely obliged to the Count of Bückebourg for all his care and trouble in the management of the artillery which was served with great effect; likewise to the commanding officers of the several brigades of artillery, viz., Colonel Brown, Lt.-Colonel Huth, Major Hase, and the three English Captains, Phillips, Drummond, and Foy. H.S.H. thinks himself infinitely obliged to Major-Generals Waldegrave and Kingsley for the great courage and the good order in which they conducted their brigades. H.S.H. further orders it to

be declared to Lieut.-General the Marquis of Granby that he is persuaded that if he had had the good fortune to have had him at the head of the Cavalry of the right wing, his presence would have greatly contributed to make the decision of that day more complete and more brilliant. In short, H.S.H. orders that those of his suite whose behaviour he most admired be named as the Duke of Richmond, Colonel Fitzroy, Captain Ligonier, Colonel Watson, Captain Wilson, aide-de-camp to Major-General Waldegrave, Adjutants-General Estorff, Bülow, Derenthal, the Count Taube, and Malortie. H.S.H. has much reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

"H.S.H. desires and orders the Generals of the Army that upon all occasions, when orders are brought to them by his aides-de-camp, they be obeyed punctually and without delay."

The following has reference to the action at Emsdorf, where Elliott's Light Horse, now the 15th (The King's) Hussars, covered themselves with glory, capturing nine Colours, six guns, and taking prisoners 177 officers and 2,482 of other ranks. Some Hanoverian Chasseurs and Lückner's Hussars were also present, but took little part in the action. The casualties in "Elliott's" were 123 killed and wounded.

"Camp at Saxenhausen, Sunday, July 20th, 1760.

"H.S.H. orders it to be publicly attested to the Army how much he is both charmed and satisfied with the good conduct and valour of the Corps that fought on the 16th inst., under the Hereditary Prince. The praise H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince gave of them to H.S.H. the Duke were such that nothing can be said in addition to them. H.S.H. therefore gives his best thanks to these brave troops, and particularly to Elliott's Regt., which was allowed by every one present to have done wonders. H.S.H. could not enough commend the bravery, good conduct, and good countenance with which that Regiment fought. H.S.H. desires much to be able to find means to acknowledge to Major Erskine principally, who was at the head of that Regiment and led it so gallantly, as well as to the other Officers and men his real satisfaction and to have it in his power to serve them, and he desires those gentlemen to furnish him with opportunities of doing it, and he will seize them with pleasure."

The following has always been regarded as mainly a cavalry battle, and perhaps it is for this reason that when in 1909 the battle "Honour" was granted, it was given only to the cavalry regiments present. These were the Blues, King's Dragoon Guards, the Bays, 3rd Dragoon Guards, Carabiniers, 7th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royal Dragoons, Scots Greys, Inniskillings, 7th, 10th, and 11th Hussars. The following infantry regiments were present: 5th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 33rd, 37th, 50th, and 51st, while the Grenadier corps specially referred to was formed from the Grenadier companies of the 12th, 20th, 23rd, 25th, 37th, and 51st, under Major Maxwell of the 20th. Two regiments of Highlanders, Keith's and Campbell's, since disbanded, were also present.

First Order.

"Thursday, Warburg, July 31st, 1760.

"H.S.H. desires his best thanks be given to all the Troops who behaved so gallantly in the affair of this day. The British Cavalry gave striking proofs of its countenance and bravery, for which he will not fail to give them their due merit to His Majesty and has infinite thanks to give to the Corps of Grenadiers for the proofs they gave of their gallantry in the attack of the day. In a word H.S.H. wants words to express how much he is obliged as well to the Generals as other Officers."

In his report of the action to King George, Duke Ferdinand wrote: "The English artillery got up at a gallop and seconded the attack in the most spirited manner. All the troops have done well and particularly the English. . . . The loss on our side is very numerous and falls chiefly upon the brave battalions of Maxwell's Grenadiers which did wonders. Colonel Beckwith, who commanded the brigade of English Grenadiers and Scotch Highlanders, distinguished himself greatly and is badly wounded in the head. My Lord Granby with the English cavalry contributed extremely to the success of the day."

Second Order.

"Camp at Warburg, Friday, August 1st, 1760.

"H.S.H. again renews his compliments of thanks, that he gave in general terms yesterday, to the Generals, Officers, Regiments and Corps who were then engaged, and who by their valour and excellent conduct gained so compleat a victory over the enemy, and orders his thanks be publicly given to Lord Granby, under whose orders all the British Cavalry performed prodigies of valour which they could not fail doing, having His Lordship at their head, and the other General Officers of the British Cavalry, who by their example shewed the Troops they led to the charge how much they acted with an astonishing courage and presence of mind not to be equalled. H.S.H. is much obliged to them, and gives infinite thanks as well to them as to all the Officers in general, and particularly to the whole Cavalry, and principally Lieut.-Colonel Johnston of Conway's Regiment.

"The family of Lord Granby (in particular Captain Vaughan) are hereby desired to receive the same compliments of thanks, as they constantly attended Lord Granby in the different attacks of the Cavalry, and executed His Lordship's orders in the most punctual manner. The Corps of brave Grenadiers, who so much contributed to the glorious success of the day, receives by this the justest praises due to them. H.S.H. cannot enough acknowledge how much esteem and regard he has for them. He orders his best thanks to Lieut.-Colonel Beckwith and Major Maxwell, as also to the three Captains of the British Artillery, Phillips, McBean, and Stephens, who so well managed their artillery. All the Regiments under the command of H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince and General Spörken from the Generals down to the private men are particularly thanked for the good conduct and courage with which they fought yesterday. Major-General

Breitenbach, at the head of Cope's Regiment, who signalized himself so much is specially thanked, as is Colonel Huth of the Hessian Artillery, by whose care his artillery was so well managed. Major Bülow, who with the British Legion manœuvred the whole day in the face of the enemy and who did them infinite damage, H.S.H. returns him many thanks, and assures him that he shall on all occasions retain a proper acknowledgment. In fine H.S.H. gives many thanks to those who accompanied His Person, as well as to those of His Suite, particularly to the brave Captain Wintzingerode, who is very much wounded, Captain Carpenter, who greatly contributed to the taking of several of the enemy's cannon, Count Dohna, who was instrumental in making prisoners a great number of Fisher's Corps, Captain Sloper, Major of Brigade Hardenberg, and Captain Malarty, who at all times executed with alacrity and exactness the orders they received from him. H.S.H. desires that on the first occasion the Army will return thanks to the Almighty for the success of yesterday, and flatters himself that by his assistance, and the bravery shewn yesterday, he shall in the end overcome every obstacle that offers."

In the affair of the Zierenberg, in regard to which Ferdinand published two complimentary orders, besides the British infantry corps mentioned, the Greys and the Inniskillings appear to have been present. The General Griffin mentioned afterwards rose (in 1796) to the rank of Field-Marshal and became Lord Howard de Walden.

First Order.

"Camp at Bune, Sunday, September 7th, 1760.

"H.S.H. orders it to be published to the Army that H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince has again struck a fine stroke, which has cost the enemy dear, having surprised and attacked a considerable Corps of their Troops in the night of the 5th inst. in the Town of Zierenberg, by which 37 Officers and 380 men were made prisoners (and have been conducted to Warburg) with at least an equal number of killed and wounded that were left at Zierenberg. Two pieces of cannon were likewise taken. According to the account H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince has given of this action to the Duke, he cannot enough commend and express his satisfaction of the bravery and good conduct of the Troops employed on this occasion. Major-General Griffin particularly greatly distinguished himself and was wounded, as did Kingsley's, at the head of which was Lieut.-Colonel Beckwith. Likewise Maxwell's Battalion of Grenadiers, with which was Lieut.-Colonel Boyd, and the Prussian Hussars led by Major Bülow, Lord George Lennox, who was there as a Volunteer, and had his horse wounded, and Captain Courtney of Kingsley's Regiment, who commanded the advanced Guard, of all these H.S.H. the Prince has given the greatest encomiums. H.S.H. the Duke is charmed with a fresh opportunity this gives him of being able to acquaint these brave Troops in general, and everybody in particular (who have given such real proofs of their valour) of his perfect satisfaction and most cordial thanks."

Second Order.

"Camp at Bune, Tuesday, September 9th, 1760.

"H.S.H. the Duke having been informed more particularly since the day before yesterday of what passed the 5th at night at the surprise of the Town of Zierenberg, and of the fine behaviour of many of the Officers, in which they extremely signalized themselves. For instance, Major Maxwell, commanding a Battalion of British Grenadiers, who forced the Guard, and entered the Town on one side, while Captain Gray entered it at another, and made Monsieur Normand, a Brigadier-General, prisoner of war, with his troops, Captain Carlton with the half of that Regiment entered by the breach. Captain Picton of the Grenadiers, whose bravery, presence of mind, and the different arrangements he made during the dark, cannot be enough commended. Captains Perceval and St. George of Kingsleys, who distinguished themselves extremely. Captain McLane, who with a Detachment of 150 Highlanders made Monsieur de Cameray, commanding the Volontiers de Clermont, prisoner and many other Officers, and H.S.H., loving to do justice to merit, desires and orders that the fine behaviour of these brave Officers and their names be made publick to the Army, and that his particular thanks be given to them, assuring them of his friendship and perfect esteem. The Regiments to give in to Lord Granby a list of their Volunteers, specifying the time of their service."

The battle of Vellinghausen, or Kirchdenkern, to which the following order refers, commenced at 4 p.m. on the 15th and was not over until 11 a.m. on July 16th. The British cavalry regiments present were the Blues, 1st Dragoon Guards, Bays, 3rd Dragoon Guards, Carabiniers, 7th Dragoon Guards, 1st Dragoons, Greys, Inniskillings, 7th, 10th, 11th, and 15th Hussars; the infantry engaged were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Guards, the 5th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 33rd, 37th, 50th, and 51st, Maxwell's Grenadiers, Campbell's and Keith's Highlanders. These last three corps suffered very heavy losses. Of this action Ferdinand generously said he had been a mere looker-on and gave all the praise to Granby.

No "Honour" has ever been awarded for this hardly-contested battle.

"Camp at Hohenover, Tuesday, July 16th, 1761.

"The glorious victory of yesterday furnishes H.S.H. with a fresh opportunity to testify to the Troops he has the honour to command the high esteem and perfect consideration he has for them, on account of the good countenance they shewed for so long a time, notwithstanding the redoubted fire of the Artillery and Musquetry of the enemy, and afterwards for that vigorous and intrepid attack by which they overpowered and drove them from all their posts. H.S.H. hereby gives them his most sincere and perfect acknowledgments, and declares to them, that as in general he has the utmost reason to be satisfied with that conduct and bravery, which the Generals, Field Officers and others, as also the Corps of different Nations have had an opportunity to shew and who have distinguished themselves by their good will

and intrepidity, that it is a most sensible pleasure to him to make this publick declaration of it to them, and to assure them that he will not only remember it as long as he lives, and retain for them a perpetual esteem and friendship, but will not fail moreover to recommend them to their respective Sovereigns that they may be by them rewarded, as they so justly deserved.

"H.S.H. further thinks it proper that the Army should be acquainted of what passed upon our right, while our left was engaged by the enemy, viz., that allmost Marshal Soubize's whole army was manœuvred opposite the Hereditary Prince's Corps, and endeavoured to penetrate in several places, but that the Prince, by his prudent manœuvres, his own personal bravery and that of his Troops rendered the attempts ineffectual, so that they were obliged to retire with great loss, which contributed not a little to our being able upon the left to push our advantages with more certainty and success.

"With regard to the two Princes of Brunswick, Frederick and Henry, they have well supported by their behaviour yesterday that good opinion which was so justly entertained of them before, having in their first campaign and at the first action they have ever been in shewn so much presence of mind, so good a countenance, and have behaved with so much intrepidity, the Eldest at the head of his own Regiment, and both in places where there was the greatest danger, H.S.H. feels a particular pleasure in declaring through himself to the Army, and to make known to these two Princes his satisfaction and approbation.

"H.S.H. also looks upon it as an essential point from gratitude as well as friendship to make his best and most sincere acknowledgments to His Excellency Count la Lippe, for his indefatigable pains in arranging, ordering, and executing with such surprising expedition everything that was within his power towards contributing to the glorious success of the day. H.S.H. declares for himself and also in the name of the common cause to preserve the most lasting remembrance of gratitude for it. At 6 this evening the Army and all the detached Corps are to be under arms in the front of their camp to fire a *feu de joy*. The Artillery taken from the enemy will begin it, followed by the Artillery attached to each Corps, then the Field pieces of the Regiments, and lastly the small arms. The whole to be repeated in this order three times, beginning upon the right of each Corps.

"The action of yesterday is to take the name of Fellinghausen, which is to be declared to the Army. Any Corps that have taken trophies from the enemy is to report it to the Adjutant-General."

An "Honour" for Wilhelmstal is borne by only one of the British Regiments engaged—the 5th. There were also present the Blues and the 15th Hussars, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Guards, a Guards Grenadier battalion, the 8th, 11th, 12th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 33rd, 37th, 50th, and 51st, two other Grenadier battalions and Campbell's and Keith's Highlanders. Ferdinand wrote: "All the troops behaved exceedingly well, and showed great zeal and steadiness, but particularly

the battalions of Grenadiers belonging to Colonel Beckwith's brigade which distinguished themselves exceedingly."

"Camp at Wilhelmsthal, Friday, June 25th, 1762,

"British Headquarters, Weimer.

"The happy success of yesterday, under the auspices of the Almighty does so much credit to the Army under the command of the Duke, that H.S.H. finds a particular pleasure and looks on it as his duty to give publick thanks to the Army, which they so justly deserved. The Corps and Regiments who have had a particular opportunity to distinguish themselves have shown so much good will, courage and eagerness to acquit themselves in doing their duty in the bravest manner, that H.S.H. cannot testify to them his satisfaction, or sufficiently express his acknowledgments, or to the Generals and superior Officers who by their conduct and good example have so much contributed to the happy success of the day, or to the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, whom H.S.H. promises to recommend in the strongest manner to their several Sovereigns, by informing them of the honour and glory they have again acquired by the action of yesterday. The Army will return thanks to Almighty God this morning for His Assistance and Blessing on this happy day."

The following is the text of Duke Ferdinand's farewell order to the troops he had commanded during four years and four months.

"Münster, December 28th, 1762, received at 1 o'clock.

"The following Declaration of H.S.H. Duke Ferdinand to the Army having been received by General Conway, he takes the first opportunity of communicating it to the British Troops.

"H.S.H. desires the Troops may be acquainted that having after his arrival at Newhaus demanded His Majesty's permission to leave the Army, as he could be of no further use with it in the present situation, he had received His Majesty's permission for that purpose, accompanied with the most gracious declaration of his approbation and thanks for the services performed by H.S.H. during his command of the Army.

"H.S.H. declares to the Army that he shall allways preserve the most flattering remembrance of having fought successfully at the head of those brave Troops which composed it, for the publick liberty and for the honour of their own and his Country. That this remembrance will not cease but with his life, and will never fail to recall to him the obligations which he has to the Generals and other Officers, who by their valour and experience have assisted and enabled him at the same time to serve his Country, and make a suitable return for the confidence with which His Majesty has been pleased to honour him. He therefore returns them his thanks for the same, and to the Army in general for the obedience they have constantly shewn during the time he has commanded them."

THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

SOME ADMIRALTY CHANGES.

In the present issue of the JOURNAL, the narrative of the naval events of the war is continued down to the end of September, 1917. The period covered has been marked by a series of important changes at the Admiralty. On July 17th it was announced that Sir Edward Carson was to become a Member of the War Cabinet, without portfolio, and that Sir Eric Geddes would succeed him as First Lord of the Admiralty. Sir Eric had been for two months the Controller of the Navy, in accordance with the changes referred to in the last issue of the JOURNAL. On June 6th, 1917, in reply to a question in Parliament, Dr. Macnamara had made the following statement in reference to the changes in the composition of the Admiralty Board:—"The reconstituted Board of Admiralty consists of eleven members, besides the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries. It includes the Additional Civil Lord, who is for the present employed by the Government in connection with other services. The duties briefly of the various members are:—First Lord: General direction. First Sea Lord, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, and Asst. Chief of Naval Staff: War operations. Second Sea Lord: Personnel. Third Sea Lord and Controller: Matériel, the former mainly requirements, the latter production. Fourth Sea Lord: Stores and Transport. Fifth Sea Lord: Air service. Civil Lord: Works. Financial Secretary: Finance. Permanent Secretary: Admiralty business. Lord Lytton will represent the Admiralty in the House of Lords."

In a speech at Cambridge on July 28th, Sir Eric Geddes said: "You may ask, How do I view the duties of First Lord of the Admiralty? The last thing I shall do is to interfere in naval strategy. My time in France has taught me that it is better to leave the tactics and strategy to the professional soldier and sailor, and I intend to do so. But it is my duty to know what the Sea Lords are proposing to do to get through the material and resources at their disposal, to form an independent opinion as to whether they have enough or should have more, and in every possible way, as far as a civilian can, help them in their work."

On August 6th it was officially announced that Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss had been selected to be Second Sea Lord, in succession to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who would be employed on special duty; and that Mr. Alan Garrett Anderson (late Vice-Chairman of the Wheat Commission) had been appointed Controller in the vacancy created by the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord of the Admiralty. The official announcement continued:—"On the appointment of Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the opportunity will be taken to rearrange the duties of the Second Sea Lord, who will be relieved of detailed administrative work connected with the personnel of the fleet. It is also announced that Mr. R. F. Dunnell (secretary and solicitor of the North-Eastern Railway) has, with the approval of the directors of the North-Eastern Railway, accepted the appointment of Temporary and Additional Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty. It is further announced that Sir W. Graham Greene, K.C.B., has been invited by the Minister of Munitions to undertake the duties of Secretary of the Ministry. Sir Graham Greene, with the Prime Minister's approval, has accepted this invitation, and has vacated the office of Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty. An announcement as to his successor will be made later. In the meantime Sir Oswyn Murray, K.C.B., will act as Secretary."

On September 11th, 1917, the Patent for the New Board of Admiralty, published in the *London Gazette*, showed that the Board consisted of ten members, viz., Sir Eric Geddes, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, Rear-Admiral H. H. D. Tothill, Commodore Godfrey Paine, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, the Right Hon. E. G. Pretyma, and Sir Alan G. Anderson.

On September 6th Sir Oswyn Murray, it was officially announced, had been appointed Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, in succession to Sir W. Graham Greene, who had become Secretary of the Ministry of Munitions. Mr. Charles Walker, C.B., the official statement continued, had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty, in succession to Sir Oswyn Murray.

Increased rates of pay to seamen and soldiers were announced on September 30th, and published on the next day. The changes were explained in a letter addressed by the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated from 10, Downing Street, on September 29th. The principles on which the War Cabinet decided to proceed are:—Increased pay in proportion to length of service, and relief of men with dependents of the assignment hitherto charged against them. The following is a summary of the Government's decision so far as it affects the Navy:—

1.—The State to take over a portion of the allotment not exceeding 3s. 6d. in the case of allotments amounting to 5s. or more per week, and in the case of smaller allotments to dependants other than wives, such lesser sum as will leave the men chargeable with 1s. 6d. per week. In the case of boys whose pay normally does not admit of an allotment in excess of 2s. per week, the State to take over 1s. of the allotment.

2.—3d. a day extra to able seamen after three years (at present after six years), with corresponding increase in afloat allowance to marines.

3.—Messing allowance at 7d. (at present 5½d.).

4.—Hospital stoppages to be abolished except where a man is responsible for the complaint for which he is being treated.

5.—Free kit (now free kit on entry).

6.—Pension to be paid to men who have completed time for pension and are detained under Proclamation; the same to be retrospective as from the beginning of the war, minus in each case the value of the detained pay already received.

7.—Improved pension for twenty-two years' service.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his letter, further stated that "the question of pay and allowances to the junior ranks of commissioned officers requires attention. Their leading and example throughout the war, and the immense proportion of loss that has fallen upon them, give them an inestimable claim upon the regard of their country, and the confidence and admiration of their men. The measures of the Government to deal adequately with the special difficulties of their position will be announced shortly."

On July 12th the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the private allowance payable by parents on behalf of acting sub-lieutenants, midshipmen, and assistant clerks, had been waived as from July 1st for the remaining period of the war.

During the period under review, several statements were made on authority in connection with the submarine campaign. On August 16th the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, announced that the Government had come to the conclusion that with reasonable economy there was no chance of starving out the population of these islands. He said, with regard to the destruction of

tonnage, that when the unrestricted submarine campaign began in February, there was an enormous advantage to the assailant in being able to hit at any ship without having to ask any questions as to the flag she was under, or as to the cargo she carried. "The moment the Germans came to the conclusion that they would destroy every ship that appeared on the surface of the deep, then the losses increased—they leaped—so that by the month of April we lost about 560,000 tons of shipping in a single month." After contrasting the German official figures with the actual figures to show the exaggerated nature of the former, the Prime Minister said "the losses are diminishing, the building is increasing." He also remarked in connection with the measures adopted to counter the submarine campaign that the figures indicated that they were meeting with considerable success, and the measure of their success was the more conspicuous when it was borne in mind that the number of submarines was increasing.

On August 7th an interview which Sir John Jellicoe had given to a representative of the Associated Press was published. The Admiral said: "There is no reason to doubt that the Germans have at sea a far larger number of submarines than in February and March, but with the invaluable assistance which America has rendered we have prevented them from reaping the harvest which they anticipated." With regard to the means for meeting the campaign, Sir John Jellicoe pointed out that the two urgent needs of the moment were more patrol ships for hunting down submarines, and an increased output of merchant shipping to make good the losses suffered at sea.

In reference to the raids which German destroyers had been able to carry out from time to time, mainly from the coast ports of Belgium, the First Sea Lord, who had already spoken on this subject at an interview granted to the Associated Press on April 12th, was now reported to have said:—

"Despite the advantage which the Germans enjoy, no raid has resulted in the slightest military gain to Germany or loss to Great Britain. Such a policy cannot be pushed successfully unless the enemy is prepared to support his destroyers with stronger forces—in other words, to risk some portion of his High Seas Fleet—and thus the menace of our Grand Fleet operates. We deplore the loss of life among non-combatants, but after all we are engaged in a war whereon the freedom of the world depends and we cannot deflect our strategy from its main purpose. That is what the Germans hoped to effect, and they have failed. At the same time I might add that since the exploit of the 'Swift' and the 'Broke' the enemy has attempted no raid on the British coast. This leads me to say a few words as to the destroyer and submarine bases on the Belgian coast, which are in occupation of the Germans. One is Ostend and the other Zeebrugge. The Germans have applied to this length of sand-fringed coast the same principle of intensive fortification adopted higher up the North Sea and on the island of Heligoland. The coastline is studded with heavy guns which in themselves constitute infinitesimal targets at ranges over twenty thousand yards whereat any bombardment could be carried out. The enemy, moreover, has not been slow to make the fullest use of aircraft and smoke screens by way of protection. Ostend offers the best target, but it can only be attacked at rare intervals, when a favourable combination of wind and weather and sea conditions can be attained. Zeebrugge in the real sense of the word is not a naval base, but merely an exit from the inland port of Bruges, wherewith it is connected by a wide, deep-water canal. There is little to hit at Zeebrugge. Still I hope that the problem which the Belgian coast presents is not insoluble."

On the same subject Sir Joseph Maclay, the British Controller of Shipping, at the end of July, stated that "a miraculous panacea against submarines may be discovered some day. At present it has not been found, and we must confine

ourselves to applying and strictly co-ordinating the existing offensive and defensive measures at our disposal. . . . Sixty per cent. of our merchant vessels and all long-distance vessels are now armed with guns and provided with sufficient gunners to work them, but the surer remedy seems to be the intensive construction of ships, and, above all, of fast-going ships, capable of attaining a speed of 15 knots when crossing the danger zone. . . . Unless the United States faces the shipping problem and constructs 6,000,000 tons of shipping annually, the military efforts of the United States will be crippled from the start."

NORTH SEA.

DANGER ZONE EXTENDED.—In the first week of July the Admiralty published the following notice to mariners, headed, "North Sea Caution with regard to dangerous area":—"In view of the unrestricted warfare carried on by Germany at sea by means of mines and submarines, not only against the Allied Powers, but also against neutral shipping, and the fact that merchant ships are constantly sunk without regard to the ultimate safety of their crew, his Majesty's Government give notice that on and after July 4th, 1917, the area in the North Sea rendered dangerous to all shipping by operations against the enemy will be further extended as undermentioned, and it should be avoided.

"The area comprising all the waters except Netherlands and Danish territorial waters lying to the southward and eastward of a line commencing three miles from the coast of Jutland on the parallel of lat. $57^{\circ} 08'$ N., and passing through the following positions:—

- (1) Lat. $57^{\circ} 08'$ N., long. $4^{\circ} 00'$ E.
- (2) Lat. $53^{\circ} 00'$ N., long. $4^{\circ} 00'$ E.

thence along the parallel of $53^{\circ} 00'$ N., to a position three miles from the Netherlands coast, thence to the northward and eastward, following the limit of Netherlands territorial waters.

"The danger zone is extended more than a degree to the north and slightly to the west."

DESTROYER LOSSES.—On July 4th the Admiralty announced that one of His Majesty's destroyers of an old type struck a mine in the North Sea and sank. There were 18 survivors. On July 7th the Admiralty also announced that one of His Majesty's destroyers was torpedoed by an enemy submarine on the previous day in the North Sea and sank. One officer and seven men were killed.

TRAWLER AND SEAPLANES.—On July 9th, it was reported by the Commodore at Lowestoft that the British armed trawler "Iceland," Lieutenant P. Douglas, R.N.R., destroyed two enemy seaplanes, and brought four prisoners back to port.

GERMAN SHIP LOST.—About the beginning of July the German steamer "Westfalen" struck a mine or was torpedoed off the Island of Terschelling. The steamer, in company with another German steamer, the "Heinrich Schultz," left Rotterdam laden with coal for Denmark. The "Westfalen" having sunk, the "Heinrich Schultz" sought refuge at Ymuiden. Thirteen of the crew of the "Westfalen" were rescued by Dutch torpedo boats.

GERMAN SHIPS CAPTURED.—Early in the morning of July 16th, British light naval forces sighted a number of German steamers off the Dutch coast, and signalled to them to "abandon ship." The enemy ships made for the Dutch shore, and two of them, badly damaged by gunfire, reached it. Four other German ships, all over 1,000 tons, were intercepted and captured by our destroyers, and brought into harbour in this country. Their names were the "Pellworm," "Brietzig," "Marie Horn," and "Heinz Blumberg." The crews of two of them

were brought in as prisoners. In the week ending July 28th, the German vessel "Norderney" was torpedoed near the Island of Texel, but did not sink. A few days later the Dutch Naval Department announced that the attack on the German merchant ships took place within Dutch territorial waters. The Minister in London was instructed to express the confidence of the Dutch Government that the British Government would give complete satisfaction for the occurrence according to international law.

DUTCH STEAMER CAPTURED.—On July 23rd the Dutch steamer "Gelderland" was stopped by a German seaplane near the Hook of Holland. A German officer boarded the vessel, which was ordered to proceed to Zeebrugge.

INTERNEED SUBMARINES.—It was stated in July that the Dutch Government had agreed to a Commission to arbitrate on the question of the internment of German submarines now in Dutch ports.

GERMAN SHIP SUNK.—A British submarine whilst patrolling in the North Sea on July 27th captured the German steamer "Batavier II." The steamer's crew abandoned ship and a prize crew was placed on board. Owing to damage by gunfire, however, it was not possible to bring the "Batavier II." into port. She was therefore sunk.

GERMAN SHIP TORPEDOED.—On August 23rd a report from Amsterdam stated that the German steamer "Renate Leonhardt," with a cargo of coke from Ymuiden, had been torpedoed near Texel and had sunk outside Dutch territorial waters. The crew were saved.

"VANGUARD" SUNK.—On the night of July 9th the battleship "Vanguard," Captain James D. Dick, R.N., blew up whilst at anchor, as the result of an internal explosion. The official statement, issued on the 13th, showed that the ship sank immediately, and there were only three survivors among those who were on board the ship at the time of the disaster—viz., one officer and two men, of whom the officer died subsequently. There were, however, 24 officers and 71 men not on board the ship at the time, thus bringing the total numbers of survivors up to 97. The Admiralty *communiqué* also added that a full inquiry had been ordered.

"OTWAY" SUNK.—On July 22nd the British armed mercantile cruiser "Otway," Captain Philip H. Colomb, R.N., was torpedoed in northern waters and subsequently sank. Ten men were killed by the explosion. All the officers and the remainder of the ship's company were saved. The "Otway" was formerly in the service of the Orient Steam Navigation Company, Ltd.

"C.34" SUNK.—On July 22nd an official wireless *communiqué* from Berlin announced that the British submarine "C.34," Lieutenant I. S. Jefferson, R.N., had been sunk by an enemy submarine, the only survivor, a stoker, having been taken prisoner.

"ARIADNE" SUNK.—On July 30th the Admiralty reported that H.M.S. "Ariadne" had been torpedoed and sunk. All the officers and crew were saved, with the exception of thirty-eight men killed by the explosion. The "Ariadne" was a protected cruiser of 11,000 tons, and was launched in April, 1898.

NORTH SEA MINED AREA.—On July 27th there was published in the *London Gazette* a notice to mariners, as follows:—"There has been established in the North Sea a mined area comprising all the waters except Netherlands and Danish territorial waters lying southward and eastward of a line commencing three miles

from the coast of Jutland on the parallel of lat. $57^{\circ} 08'$ N., and passing through the following positions:—

- (1) Lat. $57^{\circ} 08'$ N., long. $6^{\circ} 00'$ E.
- (2) Lat. $56^{\circ} 00'$ N., long. $5^{\circ} 10'$ E.
- (3) Lat. $54^{\circ} 45\frac{1}{2}'$ N., long. $4^{\circ} 17'$ E.
- (4) Lat. $53^{\circ} 29'$ N., long. $4^{\circ} 04'$ E.
- (5) Lat. $53^{\circ} 00'$ N., long. $4^{\circ} 10'$ E.

thence along the parallel of $53^{\circ} 00'$ N., to a position three miles from the Netherlands coast, thence to the northward and eastward, following the limit of Netherlands territorial waters."

"U"-BOAT STRANDED.—On July 27th a Belgian official announcement was made to the effect that on the previous day a German submarine grounded on the French coast west of Calais. The crew, who reached the shore after having set fire to their vessel, were captured by a Belgian detachment. The mission of the "U"-boat was to sow mines.

THE "BELGIAN PRINCE" OUTRAGE.—On August 5th the Admiralty made the following announcement:—"As has already been reported unofficially in the Press the British steamer 'Belgian Prince' was torpedoed by a German submarine on July 31st. The crew abandoned the ship in two boats, and were ordered on to the upper deck of the submarine by the German commander. Under his directions the boats were then smashed with axes and the crew of the 'Belgian Prince' deprived of their lifebelts. The master was taken below and the hatch closed; the submarine submerged without warning with forty-three men standing on her deck. This was the entire crew of the 'Belgian Prince.' With the exception of three all these were drowned. The three survivors had contrived to retain their lifebelts without the knowledge of the enemy. They were picked up after having been in the water eleven hours. The details of this atrocious outrage are supported by the separate affidavits of the three survivors. The cold-blooded murder of these men equals, if it does not transcend, the worst crimes which our enemies have committed against humanity."

DESTROYER SUNK.—On August 14th the Admiralty announced that one of His Majesty's destroyers had struck a mine in the North Sea and sunk. The captain, two officers, and 43 men were saved.

HELIGOLAND BIGHT AFFAIR.—On August 16th, as stated by the Admiralty three days later, some of our light naval forces scouting in the German Bight sighted an enemy destroyer at 9.45 a.m. Fire was opened and the enemy destroyer was chased. She was seen to be repeatedly hit and on fire, but she escaped through the mist over a minefield. Enemy minesweepers were sighted shortly after the sighting of the destroyer and heavy fire opened on them. At least two of the minesweepers were seen to be very severely damaged, but, similarly with the destroyer, our ships were unable to follow them owing to the proximity of the minefields. During the engagement our vessels were attacked by a submarine, and after the action a second submarine attacked, in both cases without result. Our vessels suffered no damage whatever.

GERMAN VERSION.—The following account of the above encounter was issued from Berlin:—"On August 16th a German guard patrol in the North Sea encountered enemy cruisers and destroyers on the fringe of the English barred zone, and attacked them. The enemy, who had a large superiority, turned away under the well-placed German fire, and withdrew from the engagement with all possible haste. We suffered no losses."

OFF JUTLAND.—On August 21st a portion of the British light naval forces, whilst operating off the coast of Jutland, engaged and destroyed an enemy Zeppelin. This is the fourth Zeppelin reported to have been brought down by the Navy. On September 1st the light forces operating off the same coast destroyed four enemy mine-sweeping vessels.

SCARBOROUGH SHELLED.—On September 4th, about 6.45 p.m., a hostile submarine appeared off Scarborough, and fired thirty rounds, of which about half fell on land. Three persons were killed and five injured. The material damage was slight.

MERCHANT SEAMEN LOST.—In August it was officially stated that the number of lives reported as lost in British merchant vessels, owing to enemy action, from the beginning of the war until June 30th last, was 9,748, viz., 3,828 passengers and 5,920 officers and seamen.

MERCHANTMAN AND "U" BOAT.—In August it was announced that Sir William J. Tatem had forwarded to the Editor of *Syren and Shipping* a cheque for £500 for presentation to the captain and crew of the second unarmed merchantman which had sunk an enemy submarine. In view of the fate which overtook the late Captain Fryatt, no names or particulars of the achievement were published.

NEW GERMAN SUBMARINES.—Early in September news from Copenhagen stated that Germany was in possession of a number of submarines of a new type, 340 ft. in length, with a tonnage of 1,500. It was said that they carried forty torpedoes and a large number of shells and mines.

FRENCH MERCHANT SHIP FIGHTS.—An inquiry was made into the conditions in which encounters have taken place between French merchantmen and enemy submarines between January 1st and August 1st, 1917. It is stated that the French ships were successful in one hundred and six of these encounters. In thirty-four cases success was due to manœuvring, and in sixty-two to the use of artillery. In thirteen cases it was not the submarine which began the fight. There were even occasions when merchant vessels chased their enemy. In three cases the French vessels escaped by beaching. On June 5th the French steamship "Diane" was sunk by an enemy submarine in the English Channel.

NEW GERMAN CRUISER.—On September 15th a Berlin telegram reported that a large cruiser had been launched at Danzig that day, and named the "Graf von Spee," after the admiral who commanded the German ships in the action off Coronel, and was lost in the Falklands battle. Prince Henry of Prussia made the baptismal speech, and the widow of the late admiral, Countess von Spee, christened the vessel.

SKIPPER'S "V.C."—On August 29th, the *London Gazette* contained a number of awards for naval services, among which the Victoria Cross was conferred upon Skipper Joseph Watt, R.N.R., this being the first time the honour had been awarded to an officer of this rank. The deed of gallantry was thus described :— "For the most conspicuous gallantry when the Allied drifter line in the Straits of Otranto was attacked by Austrian light cruisers on the morning of May 15th, 1917. When hailed by an Austrian cruiser at about one hundred yards range and ordered to stop and abandon his drifter, the "Gowan Lea," Skipper Watt ordered full speed ahead and called upon the crew to give three cheers and fight to the finish. The cruiser was then engaged, but after one round had been fired, a shot from the enemy disabled the breech of the drifter's gun. The gun's crew, however, stuck to the gun, endeavouring to make it work, being under heavy fire all the time. After the cruiser had passed on Skipper Watt took the "Gowan Lea" alongside the badly-damaged drifter "Floandi," and assisted to remove the dead and wounded."

ESCAPED PRISONERS RECAPTURED.—On September 1st, while engaged in patrolling in the North Sea, some of our light forces captured a small boat containing six German prisoners who had escaped from this country.

DRIFTING MINES OFF NORWAY.—A report from Copenhagen on August 28th stated that vessels which had arrived from Bergen reported that there were hundreds of drifting mines, some being only eight miles from the shores of Norway. It was presumed these mines had been recently laid by enemy ships.

DESTROYER LOST.—On September 23rd the Admiralty announced that one of His Majesty's destroyers had been torpedoed by a German submarine in the approaches to the Channel, and had sunk. There were fifty survivors.

OSTEND ATTACKED.—On September 22nd Ostend was attacked by British vessels patrolling the Belgian coast, with satisfactory results. On the same day three enemy seaplanes on observation duty were shot down by a British air patrol.

BRITISH AIR RAIDS.—On the night of July 2nd-3rd, bombing raids were carried out on Bruges Docks and on Lichtervelde ammunition depôts by R.N.A.S. machines. On the night of July 3rd-4th R.N.A.S. machines dropped bombs on the aerodrome at Ghisteltes and Nieuwunster, the Ostend seaplane sheds, and a train at Zarren.

AIR BATTLE.—On July 11th a patrol of five R.N.A.S. machines met and engaged ten Albatross scouts and three large two-seater machines off Nieuport. Five of the enemy machines were accounted for, with the loss of one of our machines. Several tons of bombs were dropped in Belgium by the R.N.A.S. machines on the night of July 11th-12th. A fire was caused near Ostend electric power station; a heavy explosion, followed by an intense conflagration, was caused at Varssenaere railway dump, and bombs were dropped on Ghisteltes and on a train near St. Denis Westrem. Raids were made on the night of July 12th-13th by R.N.A.S. machines on the enemy's aerodromes at Aertrycke, Houttave, Nieuwunster, and Ghisteltes; on the railway junction north of Thourout Station, on Bruges Dock and canal bank dumps, and on the railway junction south of Ostend Harbour. A bombing attack was also made on the Solway Works, Zeebrugge, and root of Zeebrugge Mole. On the night of July 15th-16th several tons of bombs were dropped by the Royal Naval Air Service on the following military objectives: Solway Works, Zeebrugge; railway junctions and sidings at Ostend; railway sidings and dumps at Middelkerke; railway junction at Thourout; and motor transport convoys and railway sidings at Lichtervelde. All our machines returned safely. On the night of July 7th a raid was carried out on Ghisteltes aerodrome by R.N.A.S. machines. They were attacked by enemy formations, but bombed their objective, and returned safely.

HARWICH RAIDED.—On July 4th a squadron of some twelve to fourteen enemy aeroplanes attacked Harwich from a north-easterly direction at about 7.5 a.m. A number of bombs were dropped, but only slight material damage was caused. Fire was opened from the anti-aircraft defences, and the enemy's formation was broken up, although low-lying clouds rendered visibility very bad. The raiders were also engaged by our own aircraft from a neighbouring station. After dropping their bombs the enemy's squadron turned seaward without attempting to penetrate inland. The whole raid only occupied a few minutes. From the Admiralty it was announced that the Vice-Admiral, Dover, reported that naval aircraft from Dunkirk intercepted the hostile squadron returning from England after the attack on Harwich. An engagement ensued at a considerable distance from the Belgian coast. Two of the hostile machines were brought down in flames and a third was seen to be damaged. Several other machines were attacked with indecisive results. All our machines returned safely.

LONDON RAIDED.—On the morning of July 7th, at 9.30 a.m., about twenty German aircraft crossed the coast of England and divided, one group attacking the Isle of Thanet and the other the east coast of Essex. Bombs were also dropped in the Metropolitan area of London. The total casualties were 37 killed and 141 injured. The official report stated that the raiding squadron was chased by R.N.A.S. machines from this country, and forty miles out to sea an aerial battle was fought, by which three German machines were destroyed. Our aircraft returned safely. Five flights of British machines were sent up from Dunkirk to intercept the raiders, and four enemy aeroplanes were destroyed near Ostend. The Germans claimed that one of our machines was destroyed in the London area, and admitted that one of theirs fell into the sea and was lost.

GERMAN REPORT.—On July 22nd the German Main Headquarters reported :—“ On Saturday morning one of our aviation squadrons attacked London. Bombs were freely dropped on the docks, harbour works, and warehouses on the Thames. Fires and explosions were observed. One English aeroplane was shot down over London. Also at Margate bombs were dropped. Our aeroplanes all returned except one, which was compelled to make a descent on the sea, and could not be saved by our naval forces.”

ESSEX AND SUFFOLK.—At about 8 a.m. on the morning of July 22nd fifteen to twenty-one German aeroplanes bombed Felixstowe and Harwich. They were heavily engaged by fire from anti-aircraft guns, and on the return to Belgium were encountered by a flight of R.F.C. machines. The destruction of one raider was claimed.

BELGIAN COAST ATTACKED.—Reports from Amsterdam on July 24th stated that on the night of July 21st two British naval airmen bombed Zeebrugge and destroyed an aeroplane shed with much petrol. The same report stated that on the night of July 22nd the coast from Zeebrugge to Ostend was bombarded from the sea. A further report from Amsterdam on July 25th stated that British airmen attacked Bruges and Zeebrugge on the nights of the 23rd and 24th, on both occasions causing great damage ; also that on July 28th Ghent was bombed. An official report announced that R.N.A.S. machines on the night of July 28 carried out a raid on Bruges, Thourout, Middelkerke, and Ghisteltes, with good effect. All the machines returned safely.

BRITISH RAIDS.—During August, British naval airmen were very active against military centres in Belgium, and on the average a raid was carried out every night for the whole month. Night attacks were delivered over wide areas, and on railway stations, ammunition dumps, docks, shipping, and batteries. The towns of Thourout, Middelkerke, and the aerodrome at Ghisteltes received much attention.

ZEPPELIN AND GOTH A RAIDS ON ENGLAND.—On August 12th, about 5 p.m., twenty enemy aeroplanes were reported off Felixstowe. They reached Clacton and divided, part going south towards Margate, where bombs were dropped. The remainder crossed the coast, going as far as Chelmsford, and then to Southend. No military damage was effected. The total casualties were 32 killed and 42 injured. Air battles took place over Southend and Margate. British aircraft pursued the enemy machines out to sea, when one of the raiding squadron was destroyed and forced into the sea. During the return of the raiders over the Belgian coast a hostile seaplane was also destroyed.

FURTHER AIR RAIDS.—Two more raids were carried out on England a short time after the last. Enemy airships attacked the coast of Yorkshire on the night of August 21st. One of the raiders dropped bombs at the mouth of the Humber, and on being fired on by anti-aircraft guns made off to sea. Following this, at

about 10 a.m. on the morning of August 22nd, a squadron of hostile machines of the Gotha type attacked Ramsgate, Margate, and Dover. Bombs were dropped at each place, and the total casualties were 11 killed and 13 injured. An aerial battle took place over Dover, while three German aeroplanes were brought down near Margate. While on their way back, twenty-five raiders were encountered by a patrol of ten R.N.A.S. machines, and in the ensuing fight five Gothas were driven down completely out of control, and probably more. All our machines returned safely. The Germans stated that the raid was successful, with no mention of losses.

BRITISH RAIDS DURING SEPTEMBER.—British aerial activity on the Belgian coast during September was very great. It started on the 2nd and 3rd with raids on Bruges, Varssanaere, and Ghisteltes aerodrome. Then unfavourable weather intervened, and operations by naval aircraft were restricted. It was, however, resumed on the 11th, between which date and the 15th five raids were made on many towns, those receiving the most attention being Thourout, Ostend—where a destroyer was hit—Zeebrugge, and Bruges. There was again a break until the 20th, when five raids were made in succession, lasting until September 25th. These were conducted mainly on Thourout and Ostend. On September 25th the *Temps* stated that from the reports of captured officers the aerodrome of Ghisteltes was being disbanded, "because its personnel, which is being bombarded incessantly day and night, will not remain there any longer."

AIR RAIDS ON CHATHAM.—September started with a succession of three moon-light raids in succession. On the night of the 2nd one enemy aeroplane bombed Dover at 11 p.m. Seven bombs were dropped. One man was killed and six women and children injured. On the night of the 3rd about six enemy aeroplanes carried out a raid on the Sheerness—Chatham area. Bombs were dropped in the Isle of Thanet, Sheerness, Chatham, and near Margate. Civilian casualties were one killed and six injured. At Chatham, however, the Royal Naval Barracks was hit, and the loss of life was very great, amounting to 107 killed and 86 injured, all of these being naval ratings. The third successive night raid was made on London on the night of the 4th at about 11 p.m., when twenty enemy machines crossed the south-east coast. Bombs were dropped at several places. Some of the machines reached London, where forty bombs were dropped. The casualties were 11 killed and 62 injured.

ANOTHER LONDON RAID.—A break was then made until September 24th, when two raids were carried out, one by aeroplanes and one by Zeppelins, and another on the next night. On September 24th, in the evening, hostile machines crossed the south-east coast. The raiders came in at various places in Kent and Essex, and a few of them followed the Thames as far as London. Bombs were dropped here, and the raiders were driven off by gunfire. The casualties were 15 killed and 70 injured. The same night, between midnight and 3 a.m., enemy airships crossed the Yorkshire and Lincolnshire coasts, but did not penetrate any distance inland. They were driven off by anti-aircraft guns. Bombs were dropped at one coast town, three women being injured. The following night, September 25th, two groups of hostile machines crossed the Kent and Essex coast at various points, and a few bombs were dropped. They approached London, not more than two penetrating the defences, and these dropped bombs on the south-eastern outskirts of London at about 7.45 p.m. The casualties numbered seven killed and 25 injured. The German report was that bombs had been dropped on military buildings in the heart of London, on Dover, Southend, Chatham, and Sheerness.

OSTEND BOMBARDED.—On the morning of Saturday, September 22nd, naval works at Ostend were bombarded by ships of our Belgian Coast Patrol with

satisfactory results. Three seaplanes attempting to assist the enemy by observation were shot down by our air patrol. The German report of this bombardment said that a British monitor on September 22nd, assisted by aerial observers, bombarded Ostend. A few shells struck the Cathedral, in which early Mass was being held. Seven Belgians were killed and 24 seriously wounded. The monitor was driven off by the fire of our coastal batteries.

OFFICIAL REFUTATION.—An Admiralty *communiqué* issued on Monday night, September 24th, stated that, with reference to the above quoted German wireless message, a careful examination of the photographs taken of Ostend after the bombardment showed no signs of a hit on the Cathedral. On the other hand, the photographs indicate clearly that one floating dock has sunk and heeled over, one workshop in the dockyard has been completely demolished and seven others damaged, and that a portion of one submarine shelter is missing.

OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE SHIPPING HIT.—On September 12th a bombing raid was attempted on Bruges Dock, but owing to thick clouds the shipping alongside Zeebrugge Mole was attacked instead. A direct hit was made on a large destroyer, and several hits on seaplane sheds and Mole, causing a fire. All our machines returned safely. Again on September 15th naval aircraft carried out a bombing raid on enemy shipping between Ostend and Blankenberghe. Bombs were dropped on destroyers and trawlers or drifters. One large destroyer was hit amidships, and one, probably two, out of a group of four trawlers, was sunk.

AIR RAID ON ENGLAND PREVENTED?—The Admiralty announced that on September 27th a bombing raid was carried out on St. Denis Westrem aerodrome. Bombs were dropped on the sheds and on fifteen Gothas lined up on the aerodrome, a direct hit being observed on the latter. All our machines returned safely. This is what probably prevented a raid on England the same night, the weather being very suitable, and the moon very bright.

AMERICA IN THE WAR.

CAPTURED STEAMERS.—Early in June it was announced that President Wilson had granted to the United States Shipping Board for service eighty-seven German vessels. The remaining fourteen were in the possession of the Navy Department.

ARMED MERCHANTMEN.—On June 29th, in an address to the Southampton Chamber of Commerce, Colonel Swalm, United States Consul at Southampton, said that all merchant ships under the American flag were armed on overseas voyages. This enabled American ships to discuss matters with hostile submarines in a weighty way.

"U" BOAT ENCOUNTER.—It was reported in July that the United States steamer "Norlina," while on her way to America, fired nineteen shots at an enemy submarine, which, it was believed, was sunk. The "Norlina," built in 1909 and registered at New York, had a displacement of 4,596 tons.

SHIPBUILDING REQUISITIONED.—On August 5th it was stated that the United States Government had requisitioned all merchantmen of 2,500 tons and over then being built in American shipyards. The Washington correspondent of *The Times* on August 1st stated that the Administration had asked Congress to authorize the President to suspend the laws governing coastwise trade, and to open this hitherto American monopoly to foreign ships, so that a British vessel discharging cargo at Boston and reloading at Galveston could transport American cargo between these ports, a practice now forbidden by the coastwise laws.

TANK STEAMER SUNK.—On August 6th, off the Ile de Rè, the American tank steamer "Campana" was sunk by an enemy submarine. The "Campana" was a vessel of 3,694 tons gross, belonging to the Standard Oil Company. A French steamer on arriving on the scene was also torpedoed, but she was able to fire on the submarine, which disappeared.

NEW SHIPS RELEASED.—On August 30th, according to a despatch from the New York correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, the United States Shipping Board decided to release two commandeered vessels to their original British and French contractors, and although this action must not be taken as an indication that all British and French vessels building here will be similarly treated, it may be assumed that wherever possible other vessels now building will be turned over if such action does not seriously hamper the United States' own needs. No tonnage whatever, it is known, is to be released to foreign neutrals.

AMERICAN PLANS.—In an interview with a Press representative on July 17th, 1917, Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, said:—"Just before the war was declared between the United States and Germany, the authorized strength of the Navy was 53,500 men. Now the actual strength is 122,000 men. We have doubled the Navy in a few weeks without the slightest trouble, and you must remember that there is no draft for the Navy." Regarding new construction, the Secretary said:—"I gave an order recently for sixty new destroyers of a much improved type, and I expect to get some of them before the year is out. I shall get all of them within twelve months. I have also just ordered a large number of submarines, and am hastening construction on those already ordered. We are building scout-cruisers, battle-cruisers, Dreadnoughts, trawlers, and ships of every class that will be useful in war, and we have under construction thousands of submarine chasers, which ought to go far towards solving the problem of dealing with the 'U'-boat."

FLEET ORGANIZATION.—On July 18th a reorganization of the United States Atlantic Fleet was announced. The fleet was divided into two divisions, officially known as "forces." Battleship Force One was commanded by Vice-Admiral Albert W. Grant, who was promoted from Rear-Admiral and appointed to this post from the charge of the Submarine Service, in which he was succeeded by Captain S. S. Robinson, from the battleship "South Carolina." Battleship Force Two, comprising the latest Dreadnoughts, was under the command of Vice-Admiral De Witt Coffmann. Admiral Henry T. Mayo remained Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, and Vice-Admiral William S. Sims likewise continued in charge of the division of the fleet in European waters.

"IDAHO" LAUNCHED.—On Saturday, June 30th, 1917, the American battleship "Idaho" was launched from the yard of the New York Shipbuilding Company. The "Idaho" has a displacement of 34,000 tons, and, according to other particulars published in the American Press, she will be 600 feet long, with a breadth of 97 feet 4½ inches, and a mean draught of 30 feet. Her armament includes twelve 14-inch guns in four triple turrets, and with engines of 32,000 horse-power she will have a speed of 21 knots.

AMERICAN CONTINGENT'S VOYAGE.—Early in August the report was made public of Admiral Gleave, commanding the torpedo boat destroyer flotilla which conveyed the first American contingent to France. From the report it seemed clearly established that the Germans were advised of the approximate route of the Americans, and submarines were assigned to intercept them. The flagship was the first to be attacked, and escaped apparently through a fortuitous jamming of the rudder, which led to a changing of course and the sounding of the siren,

this leading the enemy to believe he had been discovered and to fire prematurely. The second division encountered two submarines, and the Admiral believes that one was sunk by an under-water bomb. The third division's voyage was uneventful, but two submarines fired torpedoes on the fourth division.

"U" BOAT ATTACK.—On September 11th the Navy Department announced that a report from Paris had been received that the Union Petroleum Steamship Company's "Westwego," while cruising with several other ships, was attacked by a massed force of six submarines off the coast of France on September 5th. Two steamers were attacked and sunk, and one of the submarines was destroyed.

SMOKE SCREENS.—On August 17th a Department of Commerce circular showed that a special apparatus for creating smoke screens was to be provided for the use of American merchantmen in the war zone. Smoke boxes, to be dropped overboard at the approach of the enemy, were to be issued to every ship by the Navy Department, and more elaborate stationary funnel contrivances were being made by private firms for shipowners to purchase direct.

RUSSIAN NAVAL MISSION.—On September 14th a Washington report referred to the presence there of a Naval Commission from Russia. It was stated that Vice-Admiral Koltchak, in charge of the Commission, was presented to Mr. Daniels, and it was considered probable that the Russian Admiral would also confer with Admiral Takeshita, Chief of the Japanese Naval Mission in the United States.

ADMIRAL SIMS' REPORT.—On August 5th a report to the Navy Department of Vice-Admiral Sims was placed on record at the Department. A summary issued to the newspapers showed that the high-speed, well-armed destroyers of the American forces were keeping the German submarines close to their base, preventing them operating on the American side of the Atlantic.

ATLANTIC.

NEUTRAL SHIP SUNK.—On June 22nd the Argentine steamer "Toro," while proceeding to European waters, was sunk by gunfire in the Atlantic Ocean, outside the German declared war zone. Papers showing the nationality of the vessel were given to the officer in command of the submarine before the ship was sunk by gunfire. No lives were lost.

"KLEBER" SUNK.—On June 27th the French cruiser "Kleber," from Dakar for Brest, struck a mine off Cape St. Mathieu and sank. Thirty-eight of the crew, including three officers, were missing. The vessel sank off the Pierres Noires.

AZORES SHELLED.—On July 4th a submarine bombarded the city of Ponta Delgada, Azores, at dawn, a girl being killed and other persons wounded. The forts opened fire on the submarine.

"ARMADALE" SUNK.—On June 27th the British transport "Armadale," a steamer of 6,153 tons, was torpedoed and sunk in the Atlantic. Eleven of those on board, including six soldiers, one passenger, and one officer and three men of the crew, were drowned.

SEAPLANE v. SUBMARINE.—On July 14th a seaplane belonging to the Brest station, while reconnoitring, sighted a sailing ship which was sinking, and near by a large submerged submarine. The seaplane attacked the latter with bombs, and the submarine was not seen afterwards.

"CITY OF ATHENS" MINED.—On August 10th the steamer "City of Athens," from New York, was sunk off Cape Town by an explosion. She was carrying a

full cargo and also ninety-seven passengers, seventy of whom arrived in Cape Town at midnight. Fifteen passengers and four of the crew had been drowned. The crew numbered 115, mostly Lascars. The "City of Athens" was a steel screw steamer of 5,604 gross tonnage, built in 1901 by Workman, Clark & Company at Belfast. She was owned by the City Line. A Court of Inquiry expressed the opinion that the sinking was due to striking a mine or mines. The Court considered the vessel was lost as the consequence of navigating contrary to the Admiralty's advices, the captain steering a course and taking the ship over the danger area instead of as directed by the Admiralty.

BALTIC.

GERMAN AIR RAIDS.—On July 5th nine enemy aeroplanes flew over the Island of Oesel and dropped twenty-four bombs on the batteries, airships, and buildings. The attack was driven off by the concentrated fire from the naval units and shore batteries. There was no loss or damage. Again on July 6th a squadron of German seaplanes raided the region of Tserelia in the Island of Oesel and the town of Arensburg, north of the Gulf of Riga. Nineteen bombs were dropped on the batteries, air-sheds, and other structures, and again no damage was done. On being met by gunfire from sea and land batteries the enemy machines disappeared. On July 9th a squadron of enemy seaplanes dropped about thirty bombs on Arensburg and the region of Tserelia on roadsteads, batteries, and other structures without effect.

"U"-BOATS IN GULF OF BOTHNIA.—On July 12th it was stated that the captain of the Swedish steamer "Aif" said that his ship was stopped and boarded by the crew of a German submarine near Lula, in the north-east corner of Gulf of Bothnia. This report appeared to indicate that German submarines had penetrated the Gulf of Bothnia for the first time.

GERMAN CLAIMS.—On July 11th the Chief of the German Naval Staff announced that during the few previous days German air squadrons from the North Courland coast had repeatedly dropped bombs on batteries, barracks, and harbour works near Reval and Arensburg, and on the Island of Oesel. Hits and large fires were claimed to have been observed. The report also stated that in spite of the fire from hostile batteries the German aircraft returned safely. Again on July 16th a telegram from Berlin stated that for a few days German air squadrons had carried out attacks on the harbour at Arensburg and on the Russian air station at Hapenhelm, on the Island of Oesel. It was stated that all the machines returned safely.

A DESPERATE FIGHT.—On July 19th it was reported that a few days earlier there had been a desperate fight to the finish between the Russian destroyer "Lovky" and a German submarine. The presence of the latter had been discovered by a Russian seaplane, which promptly communicated with the "Lovky" by wireless. Having arrived near the submarine, the commander of the "Lovky" decided to sink the submarine by ramming her. A short, sharp encounter followed, in which the submarine launched torpedoes at the destroyer but without effect, owing to the skilful manœuvring of the vessel. After firing its last torpedo without result the submarine opened gunfire. There was a short and ineffectual exchange of gunfire, and then the destroyer, which was now at close quarters, suddenly headed at full speed for the submarine and reached her before she had time to submerge. The Russians then threw several powerful bombs which made great holes in the upper parts of the submarine, and the entire crew of the latter was drowned.

UNREST IN THE BALTIC FLEET.—Among other indications of disloyalty in the Baltic Fleet, a report from Petrograd on July 21st stated that a destroyer had arrived there from Helsingfors that morning for the purpose of supporting the Baltic Fleet delegation. Several companies of loyal sailors, with machine-guns and an armoured car, were sent to the English quay. The destroyer did not obey the order to leave at once, but remained. She, moreover, lowered boats containing several sailors and so-called delegates who were promptly arrested. The destroyer then left, but subsequently returned.

M. KERENSKY'S ORDER.—Following on this latter incident, M. Kerensky addressed an order of the day to the Army and Navy in which he said that "The traitorous activity of a number of individuals obliged the Provisional Government to order the immediate arrest of the leaders and the deputation from the Baltic Fleet which arrived in Petrograd." In view of what had happened he ordered:—(1) The immediate dissolution of the central committee of the Baltic Fleet and the election of a new committee; (2) The issue of a notification to all detachments and ships of the Baltic Fleet that he desired them to remove at once all persons suspected of inciting to insubordination against the Provisional Government and against our offensive; and to send these individuals to Petrograd for trial; (3) The detachments from Kronstadt and the battleships "Petropavlosk," "Republic," and "Slava," the names of which had been disgraced by the actions of the counter-revolutionaries, should arrest within twenty-four hours the ringleaders and send them to Petrograd for trial. He thereupon notified the Kronstadt detachments and the crews of these ships that if this order was not carried out they would be branded as traitors to the country and the Revolution, and the most rigorous measures would be taken against them.

NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—On July 24th it was announced from Petrograd that Rear-Admiral Rasvozoff, who had just been promoted to that rank from Captain, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian naval forces in the Baltic. On the same day, at a meeting held at Helsingfors by the representatives of the whole Baltic Navy, a resolution was passed supporting the Provisional Government and proclaiming their loyalty.

ONE AGAINST SIXTEEN.—An unofficial statement issued from Malmo announced that on July 20th a fight occurred in the Baltic between a submarine and four armed trawlers escorting twelve German merchantmen which were going southwards. The noise caused by the steamers' whistles and the firing of machine-guns considerably frightened the people on shore.

GERMAN AIR ACTIVITY.—During July particular activity was noticed in air raids and scouting flights both in the Baltic and on the coast and islands in the Gulf of Riga. Little success seems to have attached to them, and on each occasion the aircraft were apparently driven off by fire from ships of the Baltic Fleet and also from land batteries.

GERMAN PATROL SHIP LOST.—On August 5th a semi-official report stated that a German patrol ship had been blown up in a Russian minefield in the Baltic. The officers and thirty men of the crew were killed. A fishing boat succeeded in rescuing four men.

GERMAN AIR RAIDS IN AUGUST.—Air activity on the part of the Germans was continued in August. Two raids of importance were reported officially. One was announced on August 8th, when some enemy aeroplanes made several flights over the coast and islands of the Gulf of Riga. No report of damage done was indicated. The other was reported on August 11th, when a squadrilla of eight German aeroplanes made a series of raids on the shores of the Gulf of Riga. Bombs were dropped without causing any loss of life or appreciable damage.

DISORGANIZATION OF BALTIC COAST DEFENCES.—On August 12th the Russian destroyer "Lieutenant Bourakoff" was sunk by a German mine, near the Aaland Islands in the Baltic. This destroyer was following a squadron of other boats, on board one of which happened to be the Russian Acting-Minister of Marine, Lieutenant Lebedeff. Two officers and twenty-two men were drowned, and the commanding officer, three other officers and nine seamen were injured. Others were rescued. From later reports it transpired that the powerful coast battery which was entrusted with the defence of the particular portion of the coast near which the destroyer sank, was in a state of profound disorganization. The survivors on landing discovered that not one of the battery detachment was to be found, and the guns were covered with sand. In view of this, it was not surprising that the various signals made by the destroyer failed to elicit any reply from the battery. M. Lebedeff reported the facts to M. Kerensky, saying that he thought it his duty to do so, and adding that so long as stronger measures were not taken against criminal propaganda giving such results, it was impossible for any officers to do their duty.

GERMAN STEAMER SUNK.—On August 12th it was reported that a Russian submarine sank a German steamship in the Gulf of Bothnia.

LOSS OF RIGA.—At the beginning of September great activity in the air prevailed, with the appearance of German ships, torpedo-boats, and submarines in the vicinity of the Courland coast, and renewed operations of enemy trawlers at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. A day or two later the prospect of a combined naval and military attack somewhere on the coast increased, and coincided with movements which culminated in the loss of Riga on September 2nd. At this time a German flotilla entered the Gulf of Riga, and the villages of Kabli, Mainashtu, Koshöui, and Pidde, on the Riga coast, were being shelled by submarines.

THREAT TO REVAL.—Appearances indicated at this date that the Russian Fleet and the sea base of Reval were in peril, and that if the port fell, the Baltic Squadron might be shut up in Kronstadt. The German Fleet was manifestly in possession of a large air service, of which full use was made in raids on the islands in the Baltic. Speculation was rife as to what further advantage would be taken of the occupation of Riga, and it was thought that a landing might be effected for the purpose of cutting the rail communication between Reval and Jacobstadt and Pskov. Had this happened, the position of the ships in the Gulf of Finland would have been seriously menaced. After considerable "liveliness," which included air raids, reconnaissances and attacks on the fringes of the Russian Fleet, it was announced on September 16th that the Germans, having partially destroyed the Russian minefields which protected it, had obtained entry to the Gulf. It was also stated that the Russian Fleet had retired to its main base in the Moonsund. The heavier German ships approached the entrance to the Gulf, but there made little progress, owing to the protection which the minefields afforded, and also the batteries at the entrance to the Gulf, as well as the light forces of the Russian Baltic Fleet.

FURTHER OUTBREAKS IN BALTIC FLEET.—On September 16th it was reported that the action of a General Assembly of Democratic Bodies in calling upon the officers of the army and navy in Finland to sign a pledge of fidelity to the Provisional Government gave rise to misunderstanding on board the warship "Petrovavlosk," with the result that four officers refused to sign and were shot by the crew. On the day after this occurred, M. Kerensky despatched to the Baltic Fleet a telegram demanding in emphatic language the immediate cessation of acts of violence, and of all the excesses which the crews were committing under

the pretext of safeguarding the Revolution, whereas in reality they were disorganizing the Navy by reducing its fighting capacity. M. Kerensky scathingly condemned the guilty parties, and added that he awaited news of the complete re-establishment of order.

RUSSIAN NAVAL OFFICERS.—On September 25th Admiral Vederevsky, the Minister of Marine, speaking at a meeting of the Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, said that the distrust of the sailors for their officers was unjustified, as the officers were an excellent body, and constituted the Fleet's last resource. The Committee later passed a resolution which would appoint a deputation of five members, for the purpose of pointing out to the sailors the dangers to the country and the Revolution created by the disorganization of the Fleet.

RUMOUR OF BRITISH SUBMARINE.—On September 21st it was announced from Sweden that an engagement had taken place east of the Island of Oesel on the previous day, between five German warships and a submarine, which was supposed to be British. The result of the fight was not known, as the Germans fled eastwards. The submarine was large, of modern type, and was armed with heavy guns.

FURTHER ACTIVITY OF GERMAN FLEET.—From September 14th to 27th the activity of the Germans increased in the Baltic. It was marked principally by aerial reconnoitring and manœuvres by submarines, which endeavoured to prevent the Russian ships from approaching the coast of Courland. In this vicinity, Russian forces foiled the enemy in his attempt to enter their territorial waters. Here also several Zeppelin attacks upon Russian military centres in the islands were made.

RUSSIAN DESTROYER MINED.—On September 26th, at 11.25 p.m., south of the Island of Oesel, the Russian destroyer "Okhotnik" was damaged and sunk by an enemy mine laid there by a submarine. In the evening of the same day, a ship's boat containing four wounded sailors and seven others was landed on the coast. Motor boats and ships were despatched in search of the remainder of the crew. The officers and fifty-five men showed great devotion to duty, and, refusing to leave the ship, sank with the vessel.

MEDITERRANEAN.

LOSSES.—On June 11th the French transport "Annam," which was being escorted through the Ionian Sea, was torpedoed and subsequently sank. No lives were lost. On June 22nd the French steamer "Himalaya" was sunk in the Mediterranean as the result of an explosion. Of those on board 176 were saved out of 204. The "Himalaya," which was owned by the Messageries Maritimes Company, was a steamer of 5,620 tons. On June 24th, in the Mediterranean, the French liner "Ville de Tunis" had picked up the survivors from a torpedoed vessel when she herself was fired on by an enemy submarine. The captain gave orders to return the fire, and the submarine gave up the attack. It was decided to confer an honour on the captain and rewards were granted to the other officers and to some men of the crew.

MINE-SWEEPER SUNK.—On July 6th the Admiralty announced that one of His Majesty's mine-sweeping vessels employed in the Mediterranean struck a mine on July 4th, and subsequently sank. Ten of the crew were missing, and assumed killed by the explosion.

RAID ON CONSTANTINOPLE.—On the night of July 9th a successful attack was carried out by the R.N.A.S. against the Turkish-German Fleet lying off Constantinople (Golden Horn). When the "Goeben," surrounded by warships—including

submarines—had been located, the attack was made from a height of 800 ft. Direct hits were obtained on the "Goeben" and the other enemy ships near her. Big explosions took place on board them, and several fires were observed. The War Office was also attacked, and a direct hit obtained. The enemy appeared to have been completely surprised, as, until the bombs had been dropped, no anti-aircraft batteries opened fire. Our force returned safely, without any casualties.

FURTHER DARDANELLES RAID.—On July 12th the Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean, reported that in the course of attacks on the enemy positions in the Gallipoli Peninsula, Royal Naval Air Service machines sank a tug lying off Chanak.

SPAIN EXCLUDES SUBMARINES.—On June 29th, following a Council of Spanish Ministers, it was announced from Madrid that the German submarine "U.C.52," which took refuge at Cadiz, had left that port early the same morning, being escorted by two Spanish destroyers outside territorial waters. It was also announced from Madrid that King Alfonso had signed the following decree:—
"1. Submarines of all belligerent nations are prohibited from navigating in waters within the jurisdiction of Spain and from entering Spanish ports. 2. All submarines mentioned in Article 1 which enter waters within the jurisdiction of Spain for any reason will be interned until the end of the war. 3. Submarines of neutral nations may penetrate Spanish waters, but must travel on the surface and fly their national flag plainly showing."

FRENCH SUBMARINE SUNK.—On June 19th the French submarine "Ariane" was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine in the Mediterranean. Part of the crew and the officers lost their lives. Nine men were saved.

"U" BOAT INTERNED.—On September 9th a German submarine, reported to be the "U.293," entered Cadiz, towed by the Spanish torpedo-boat No. 11, having run short of lubricating oil. She was immediately interned in the Carreca Arsenal. The boat was stated to be of the same type as "U.53," also interned in Spain, with a displacement of 600 tons, carrying a crew of thirty. Her commander, aged 26, had the Iron Cross. The vessel was said to be in no way damaged.

JAPANESE ATTACK ON SUBMARINE.—On July 28th an official report issued by the Japanese Naval Attaché showed that one of the Japanese naval forces in the Mediterranean, while escorting British transports on July 22nd, at 1.50 p.m., sighted an enemy submarine. Whilst one unit protected the transports from attack on one side, the other proceeded to attack the submarine, and fired on it, smashing the periscope, and, after closely pursuing, again attacked with success and undoubtedly destroyed the submarine.

SUBMARINE COAST BOMBARDMENT.—On July 15th, the Italian port of Derna, on the coast of Cyrenaica, 150 miles from the Egyptian frontier, was bombarded by an Austrian submarine.

JAPANESE FORCES.—Early in August, the Japanese Naval Attaché announced that some additional Japanese naval units had joined the Allied Forces in European waters.

TURKISH COAST BOMBARDED.—On August 8th Allied warships bombarded Turkish batteries on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Chios. They silenced one of the batteries and destroyed an enemy aerodrome.

ADMIRAL SOUCHON RECALLED.—In September, it was reported that Admiral Souchon, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Division of the Turkish Fleet, who had commanded from the beginning of the war the Turkish and German

forces in the Mediterranean, with his flag on the "Goeben," had been recalled in order to take up another appointment.

CHIOS BOMBARDED.—On August 7th official advices from Chios stated that the Turks had bombarded the island from Chosme, on the mainland, sinking four sailing vessels in the harbour and causing slight damage to the town and aviation ground.

ADRIANOPLE RAIDED.—On the night of September 2nd-3rd an attack was delivered by machines of the Royal Naval Air Service upon Adrianople. The official statement said that bombs were dropped on the railway station and bridge with good effect.

ADRIATIC.

TRIESTE REPRISAL RAID.—On Monday, July 2nd, the Austrians carried out a raid on Venice and two other towns in the vicinity. Bombs were thrown on houses, but there were no victims. Anti-aircraft gunfire bombarded the aeroplanes vigorously, and there was every reason to believe that two raiders were hit. By way of immediate reprisal, Italian seaplanes bombed the industrial quarters of Trieste.

TRIBUTE TO WORK OF BRITISH NAVY IN ADRIATIC.—In an article on July 19th the *Tribuna* gave most whole-hearted praise to the work of the British Navy and auxiliaries in the Adriatic. It stated that although British warships had been co-operating with Italian and French units since 1915, little had been heard of them. It went on to say that in the battle of December, 1915, British scouts were instrumental in causing the defeat of the Austrian Fleet. Much emphasis was laid on the perilous task of the numerous minesweepers in the Adriatic, and after relating a few very stirring stories of individual bravery, the writer concluded by hoping that when the secrecy necessitated by the war is removed, more would be learnt of even greater achievements of the British Navy in the Adriatic.

THE AUSTRIAN FLEET.—On July 31st, in an editorial, the *Tribuna* contradicted the statement made that the Austrian Fleet was only too ready to fight if the occasion presented itself. The latter remark was made by the Admiral Commanding the Austrian Navy. The writer said that he was present on May 24th, when two big British monitors, escorted by Italian craft, entered the Gulf of Trieste, silenced the land batteries, and shelled the rear Austrian left wing. The Austrian battleships did effect a sortie from Pola, but prudently withdrew on seeing the Allied units. The writer further explained why the Austrians have not the slightest intention of risking a great sea battle.

INTENSE ITALIAN AIR ACTIVITY.—At the commencement of August advantage was taken of the moonlight nights to raid Austrian naval and military works. Enormous quantities of bombs were dropped on the objectives, and the results were very satisfactory. The naval station and fortified town of Pola bore the brunt of these aerial attacks. On August 2nd a great raid was made on this town by twenty machines. The raid was timed to continue for the duration of five hours, and the machines were started one after the other at intervals of five minutes with that intention. The Austrians brought many guns to bear on the raiders, and over thirty searchlights, but without effect. On the occasion of this raid, the leader of the squadron, Captain Barucchi, released a parachute bearing an extremely powerful chemical light, which burned for some time, illuminating the whole place for the benefit of the raiders. This so amazed the Austrians that they actually stopped firing. All the Italian machines returned safely. In one of these raids on Pola it was reported that two submarines were destroyed and other shipping

set on fire. An Austrian attempt to imitate these tactics on Venice finished in disaster. At least two airmen, a colonel and a major, were brought down, and two others were captured alive and two recovered dead. As a reprisal for this futile attempt, Italian machines bombed a squadron of Austrian destroyers, of which one appears to have been hit.

ITALIAN SEAPLANE SINKS "U"-BOAT.—On August 18th an Italian seaplane sank an enemy submarine by bombs, securing direct hits.

BRITISH MONITORS AT TRIESTE.—On August 19th, co-operating with units of the Italian Royal Navy, British monitors effectively bombarded the enemy positions and communications on the Lower Isonzo. Simultaneously, Italian monitors were bombarding the enemy's dockyards south of Trieste. Attempts were made by the Austrian airmen to attack the Allied units, but this was a failure, for they suffered very heavily by the destruction of their machines. Later in the continuous bombardment, Austrian airmen could not show themselves, as the sky was thick with Italian aeroplanes.

RAIDS ON POLA.—During September, Italian airmen carried out many raids, most of these being over the important naval port and harbour of Pola. Many tons of bombs were dropped, and severe damage seems to have been effected. Hits were also made on the Austrian Fleet at anchor in the harbour. On another occasion the submarine base at the Olivi Reef in the harbour was bombarded with over three tons of high explosive bombs. Another time, an Italian hydroplane even went as far south as the Bay of Privlaca, in the Island of Lussin, and dropped over a ton of bombs on the naval dockyards and vessels anchored in the Bay, which is about forty miles from Pola. The machine returned safely, despite heavy gunfire.

DESTROYER ACTION.—On the night of September 29th, at the same time that Italian aeroplanes were carrying out an attack on Pola, enemy machines dropped bombs in the vicinity of Ferrara, causing some damage but no loss of life. A group of Italian destroyers on patrol duty, sighted a little before midnight some enemy destroyers supporting the seaplanes which had attacked Ferrara. The Italian vessels determinedly attacked the enemy, and seeing him immediately turn, pursued him, all the while shelling him until they got within range of the enemy's Parenzo batteries. Explosions were clearly observed on the enemy's vessels, which were hit many times. The Italian ships sustained no damage. Almost at the same time as this last raid another squadron of enemy machines attacked the South Adriatic coast between Monopoli and Lecce, dropping many bombs on Brindisi and Ostuni. At the latter place, which was evidently the object of attack, five persons were killed and twenty-two wounded. The attack was received with heavy anti-aircraft fire, which greatly limited the effectiveness of the enemy's attack, and succeeded in bringing down a hostile seaplane, of which the two airmen were taken prisoners.

BLACK SEA.

RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.—On July 24th the Russian official *communiqué* stated that, in conjunction with the torpedo boats "Strogi" and "Smeitlivy," acting in the Black Sea, the Russian artillery bombarded Tireboli, destroying depôts and barracks. Under cover of the artillery fire, Russian scouts were able to cross the River Karshut-Darassi and attack a strong Turkish position at the mouth of the river; after bayoneting many of the defenders they returned to their own trenches with one officer and twenty-one men as prisoners.

ANOTHER RUSSIAN COUP.—On August 27th, the Russian Army Headquarters reported another successful combined operation, as follows:—"On the Black Sea

coast, our troops, co-operating with the Fleet, made a raid on the town of Ordu (about one hundred miles west of Trebizond). The landing was met by fire from houses occupied as hospitals. The landing party destroyed many official buildings, and blew up eleven motor-boats and seven feluccas."

INDIAN OCEAN.

"MONGOLIA" MINED OFF BOMBAY.—On June 23rd, at noon, the P. and O. liner "Mongolia," carrying mails from London posted up to May 31st, sank off Bombay, as the result of having struck a mine. Out of the 450 persons on board, twenty-three lost their lives, apparently being killed by the explosion. All the rest, despite the monsoon weather prevailing at the time, were safely rescued and conveyed to Bombay.

MESOPOTAMIA.

A special supplement to the *London Gazette*, issued on September 21st, announced that the following despatch had been received from Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., late Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, covering a report by Captain Wilfrid Nunn, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N., on the operations of His Majesty's gunboats in Mesopotamia from December, 1916, to March, 1917:—

SIR,—

May 7th, 1917.

Be pleased to submit to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the enclosed report on the recent operations in Mesopotamia rendered to me by Captain Wilfrid Nunn, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N.

2. I take this opportunity of specially bringing to their lordships' notice the excellent conduct of Captain Nunn during the whole period that he has commanded the flotilla on the Tigris. Through force of circumstances this command devolved upon an officer of less standing than might have been otherwise expected, and he has shown himself under all circumstances not only to have been worthy of his responsible position, but to have carried out his duties with a zeal and dash worthy of the best traditions and to have shown a very remarkable capacity for command.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

R. E. WEMYSS, Vice-Admiral,

Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,—

H.M.S. "Mantis," March 21st, 1917.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations on the Tigris during the months of December, 1916, and January, February, and March, 1917, which led to the capture and occupation of Baghdad by our forces on March 11th, 1917.

2. Our advance on the right bank of the Tigris began on December 13th, 1916, when our troops established themselves on the Shatt al Hai.

The general situation early in January was as follows: On the left bank our forces were held up by the Turks in the extremely strong Sannaiyat position, while on the right bank we had advanced much further up the river. The Turks opposed to us were commanded by Khalil Pasha. They were well dug-in in strong positions. Very large improvements had been effected in the transport department, railways have been constructed, and a large number of river craft arrived. A number of these, and also barges, were put together at Abadan and Basra, and the facilities for repairs much increased, and wharves constructed.

3. The gunboats at the Tigris front have co-operated with the Army in many intermittent bombardments of the enemy positions, and some very good results have been obtained, besides frequently engaging enemy aircraft. We have at all times received great help from the Army, the artillery officers and staff being indefatigable in rendering the Navy every assistance. The 14th Kite Balloon Section, R.N.A.S., commanded by Commander Francis R. Wrottesley, R.N., marked for us on many occasions, besides the useful work it has done keeping look-out for the Army. Aeroplanes have also been frequently put at the disposal of the Royal Navy for spotting. While keeping some gunboats at the Tigris front, I have also always, at the request of the military authorities, stationed others at various points on the line of communication, and two have been stationed in the Euphrates, in touch with the troops at Nasiriyah.

The following of His Majesty's ships have been engaged in the operations at various times :—

H.M.S. "Tarantula," Commander Henry G. Sherbrooke.
 H.M.S. "Mantis," Commander Bernard Buxton.
 H.M.S. "Moth," Lieut.-Commander C. H. A. Cartwright.
 H.M.S. "Gnat," Lieut.-Commander E. H. B. L. Scrivener.
 H.M.S. "Butterfly," Lieut.-Commander G. A. Wilson.
 H.M.S. "Sawfly," Commander G. F. A. Mulock, D.S.O.
 H.M.S. "Snakefly," Lieutenant R. P. D. Webster.
 H.M.S. "Greenfly," Lieut.-Commander A. G. Seymour, D.S.O.
 H.M.S. "Gadfly," Commander E. K. Arbuthnot.
 H.M.S. "Grayfly," Lieutenant C. H. Heath-Caldwell, D.S.C.
 H.M.S. "Stonefly," Lieutenant M. Singleton, D.S.O.
 H.M.S. "Mayfly," Lieutenant R. H. Lilley, D.S.C.
 H.M.S. "Waterfly," Acting Commander Charles T. Gervers.
 H.M.S. "Firefly," Lieut.-Commander C. J. F. Eddis.
 H.M.S. "Flycatcher," Lieutenant Hugh Lincoln, R.N.R.
 H.M.S. "Scotstoun," Lieutenant S. E. Nicolle.

ASSAULT ON SANNAIYAT.

4. Operations proceeded in a most satisfactory manner, and early in February our forces were in possession of the right bank as far as to the westward of Kut-el-Amara, with bridges over the Hai, large numbers of prisoners having been taken, guns captured, and heavy loss inflicted on the enemy. After intense bombardment, in which the gunboats co-operated, a successful assault of the Sannaiyat position was made on February 22nd, and a footing obtained in the Sannaiyat position. During the night of the 22nd-23rd dummy attempts were made to cross the river in various places above Sannaiyat, and just before daybreak of the 23rd covering parties were rowed across the Tigris near Shumran in pontoons, a surprise landing effected, and a bridge thrown across. By evening the infantry of one division had crossed, and another followed, the enemy trying ineffectually to stem the British advance on the Shumran peninsula. Meanwhile our troops were pushing forward boldly through the Sannaiyat position. The whole Turkish position was manifestly becoming untenable, and they commenced a general retreat, which developed later into a rout.

5. I was present at the operations on board H.M.S. "Tarantula," and later on on board H.M.S. "Mantis," other of H.M. ships present being "Moth," "Butterfly," "Greenfly," "Gadfly," "Snakefly," "Waterfly," "Flycatcher," and "Scotstoun," which were also present at the front from time to time, and H.M.S. "Gnat" rejoined me on March 4th.

6. On the forenoon of February 24th I moved up river with "Tarantula," "Moth," "Mantis," "Butterfly," "Gadfly," and arrived at Kut-el-Amara at 9.30 p.m., where I landed and hoisted the Union Jack. The town was deserted and in ruins. Early on the morning of the 25th I moved on up river and communicated with our troops near Shumran. Floating mines had been seen in the river, but were easily avoided.

7. During the morning I received a message from the Army Commander asking me to co-operate in pursuing the retreating Turkish Army, and I pressed on up river. We were abreast of our leading infantry at about 9.30 a.m. and in sight of the Turkish rearguard, on which we at once opened with rapid fire, inflicting heavy casualties. This the enemy soon returned, opening an accurate fire on us with field batteries and several 5.9 howitzers from a prepared position among the sandhills in the neighbourhood of Imam Mahdi. Our troops were advancing, and some of our field artillery considerably relieved the situation by the rapidity with which they came into action. The battle continued during the day, all ships being hit by splinters of shell, but luckily no serious damage was done. Lieutenant John H. Murdock, R.N.R., of H.M.S. "Mantis," was somewhat severely wounded in the afternoon.

8. The enemy evacuated their position during the night, and we pushed on with the Army in pursuit on the morning of February 26th. It soon became evident that the Turkish Army was much demoralized, and I received a message by wireless telegraphy from General Sir F. S. Maude during the forenoon to push on and inflict as much damage as possible.

We proceeded at full speed in "Tarantula," leading "Mantis" and "Moth," His Majesty's ships "Gadfly" and "Butterfly," following at their utmost speed. My flotilla passed the small town of Bghailah at two p.m. White flags were flying over the town, and later on Commander Ernest K. Arbuthnot, of "Gadfly," hoisted the Union Jack over the town, bringing in also about 200 prisoners and some trench mortars.

9. Just above Bghailah we now began to come up to numbers of Turkish stragglers on the left bank of the Tigris, and some guns partially submerged in the river, where they had been abandoned. We opened fire on all who did not surrender. The smoke of steamers had been seen ahead, and we were soon able to distinguish several steamers, including His Majesty's ship "Firefly," which we had to abandon on December 1st, 1915, when her boiler was disabled by a shell during the retreat from Ctesiphon, and we were surrounded by the Turkish Army. We shortly afterwards got into gun range of the small shipping, and opened a heavy fire, particularly on "Firefly" and the armed enemy ship "Pioneer," who both replied. The "Firefly" made some good shooting at us with her 4-inch gun.

SIX-INCH GUNS AT 400 YARDS.

10. The Turks retreating on the left bank were becoming more numerous; they now had our cavalry division in pursuit of them on their right flank and the gunboats on their left. The enemy were firing at us from three directions, and on approaching Nahr Kellak bend I observed a large body of enemy on the left bank at the head of the loop in the river, and gave orders for all guns to be fired on them. They proved to be a strong rearguard, and opened on us with field and machine-guns and heavy rifle fire. At this close range there were casualties in all ships, which were all hit many times, but our guns must have caused immense damage to the enemy, as we were at one time firing 6-inch guns into them at about 400 to 500 yards. Besides the Turkish artillery there were a large number of enemy with rifles and machine-guns behind the bend, at a range

of about 100 yards from the ships. In the act of turning round the bend shots came from all directions, and casualties of "Moth," which came last in the line, were particularly severe. There were casualties in all three ships, "Moth," which was magnificently handled by Lieut.-Commander Charles H. A. Cartwright, who was himself wounded, had three officers wounded—all severely—out of four, and two men killed and eighteen wounded, which is about 50 per cent. of her complement. She was hit eight times by shell—one from ahead hit the fore-side of stokehold casing, burst, and pierced the port boiler, both front and back, but luckily missed the boiler tubes. The after compartment was holed below the water-line, and the upper deck and funnels of all ships riddled with bullets. The quartermaster and pilot in the conning tower of His Majesty's ship "Mantis" were killed, but the prompt action of her captain saved her from running ashore. I consider that the excellent spirit of the men and skilful handling of the ships by their captains in a difficult and unknown shallow river were most praiseworthy.

11. We thus passed the enemy rearguard, and large numbers of the retreating Turkish Army were on our starboard beam. I opened rapid fire from all guns that would bear (this included heavy and light guns, pom-poms, maxims, and rifles), and at this short range we did enormous execution, the enemy being too demoralized to reply, except in a very few cases. We were also able to shoot down some of their gun teams, which they deserted, and several guns thus fell into the hands of our forces when going over this ground.

12. The vessels ahead were now in easy range, and several small craft stopped and surrendered, including the armed tug "Sumana," which we had left at Kut during the siege, and had been captured at the fall of that place. About 5.20 p.m. the large Turkish steamer "Basra" stopped and surrendered when brought to by a shell from H.M.S. "Tarantula," which had, I was afterwards informed, killed and wounded some German machine-gunners. The "Firefly" kept up a heavy fire from her 4-inch gun, but our reply began to tell on her, and having been hit several times she ran into the bank and fell into our hands about 6.15 p.m. in the north-west part of the Zalzah reach, to westward of Umm-al-Tubul. The "Pioneer," having been badly hit by "Mantis," was in flames near her, and some barges laden with munitions in the vicinity. The Turks had endeavoured to set fire to the "Firefly's" magazine, but we were able to put it out and took possession of her at once, and I put a prize crew on board and hoisted the White Ensign. Darkness now came on, and I considered it inadvisable to go further on, as we were far ahead of our troops. I placed Lieutenant John P. Bradley, R.N.R. (of H.M.S. "Proserpine"), in temporary command of H.M.S. "Firefly," with a small crew, and we moved out of the way of the burning "Pioneer," anchored for the night, and buried our men who had been killed.

13. We remained in the vicinity the following day, and I sent the "Moth" back to Basra for repairs, and the prizes down river. The advance of our Army continued, and we reached Aziziyah on March 1st. Here the Turks had abandoned more guns and again retreated. I was joined here by His Majesty's ship "Waterfly." The pursuit was continued on March 5th, and our cavalry again engaged the enemy rearguard near Lajj, but we were unable to distinguish anything owing to a dense sandstorm.

14. We arrived at Ctesiphon on the 6th, finding the strong position there deserted, and next day arrived in gun-range of the enemy position on the north bank of the Dialah River, which joins the Tigris on the left bank about eight miles below Baghdad. In attacking this position we again came under heavy fire from the Turkish guns, to which we briskly replied. During the night of the 10th-11th the enemy evacuated the position, as some of our troops had crossed the Dialah, and others were carrying out a wide flanking movement on the right

bank to the south-west and west of Baghdad. An attempt had also been made to send two motor lighters full of troops to land them on the left bank above the Dialah on the night of March 10th. One of them, however, grounded in the shallow river in gun-range of the enemy. I sent His Majesty's ships "Tarantula" and "Snakefly" to assist, and "Tarantula" rendered valuable assistance by extricating the motor lighter from her dangerous position before daylight.

15. The Baghdad Railway was seized early on March 11th.

I proceeded up river with the gunboat flotilla, which included His Majesty's ship "Firefly," Lieut.-Commander C. J. F. Eddis in command, during the day, with minesweepers ahead, and arrived at the Citadel at Baghdad in His Majesty's ship "Mantis" at 3.40 p.m., on Sunday, March 11th. Paddle steamer No. 53, having on board Sir F. S. Maude and Staff, being in company with the flotilla.

The pursuit of the enemy was continued up river, and two iron barges captured.

16. I have much pleasure in bringing to your notice the excellent behaviour and spirit of the captains, officers, and men under my command during these operations, which were, in my opinion, worthy of the great traditions of His Majesty's Service. In conclusion, I desire to express how greatly the naval forces serving in Mesopotamia have always been indebted to the military and political services for never-failing help and assistance on all occasions.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

WILFRID NUNN,

Captain and S.N.O., Mesopotamia.

THE WAR.

ITS MILITARY SIDE.

DIARY OF OPERATIONS, JUNE 18th—30th, 1917 (concluded).

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

18TH, *British*.—At dawn, enemy attacked new positions E. of Monchy-le-Preux : some advanced posts before Infantry Hill lost : 21 prisoners. 10 enemy aircraft were brought down, 5 damaged : 2 of ours failed to return.

French.—Night 17th—18th. Reconnaissances penetrated enemy lines towards Leintrey (N.W. of Lunéville) and S.W. of Senones (N.E. of St. Dié), taking some prisoners. 18th, early, enemy trenches forming a salient in our Mont Cornillet—Mont Blond position captured on a front of 550 yards : 1 officer, 40 rank and file, taken. Marked artillery activity near Laffaux, at the Pantheon, and between Craonne-Chevreux. 2,000 shells thrown into Reims.

19TH, *British*.—Night 18th—19th. Successful raids S.E. of Le Verguier and near Bapaume—Cambrai road.

19TH.—Progress S. of Cojeul and N. of Souchez Rivers : 35 prisoners taken. 6 enemy aircraft brought down : 3 of ours missing. Weather squally.

French.—Strong counter-attack on position captured 18th broken. Attempts on small posts north of St. Quentin and near Calonne trench repulsed. Patrol actions in Parroy Forest (N. of Lunéville).

20TH, *British*.—Night 19th—20th. Posts before Infantry Hill, lost on 18th, recaptured. Heavy enemy bombardment: four counter-attacks repulsed.

20TH.—2 enemy aircraft brought down: 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 19th—20th. Enemy bombardment Ailette River—Laffaux Mill, E. of Bois de Chevreux, and N.W. of Reims. Attacks on Mont Têtu and Mont Cornillet broken.

20TH.—“Very violent” assault on half-mile front between the Ailette and Laffaux Mill delivered by a fresh division from Russia: 400 yards of front-line trench lost S. of Mont des Singes (N. of Vauxaillon), 200 yards N. of Moisy Farm (S.E. of Vauxaillon). E. of Filain, attack E. of Royère Farm repulsed. Artillery duels Hurtebise—Chevreux, and on Vacherauville and Chambrette sectors (Verdun).

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. Raids repulsed on Bapaume—Cambrai road, E. of Laventie, and near Lombartzyde (S. of Ostend).

Enemy artillery active N. and S. of the Scarpe.

French.—Trench lost S. of Mont des Singes recovered: 50 prisoners taken. Before evening, further progress E. of Vauxaillon: enemy only retaining a salient 400 yards N.E. of Moisy Farm. 3 p.m., N.E. of Mont Cornillet, advance “in particularly brilliant circumstances”: assault repulsed on position gained on 18th: enemy pursued to his trenches: 300 yards of ground won on 700 yards frontage. Artillery duels near Vauxaillon, Hurtebise—Craonne.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. Successful raids S.E. of Quèant, and near Neuve Chapelle and Armentières. Repulsed raids E. of Epéhy, and near Guillemont Farm.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. Enemy attack on 400-yards front on crest and E. of Mont Teton repulsed “after a lively engagement.” Artillery duels E. of Vauxaillon, and S. of Filain to N. of Braye-en-Laonnois. 22nd, at dawn, enemy attacked on one and a quarter-mile front from W. of Royère Farm to the Epine de Chevreux: penetrated a salient in the centre: driven off elsewhere.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. Prisoners taken N. of Gavrelle and near Warneton. Raids repulsed N.E. of Ypres, and S. of Armentières. Portuguese wiped out a patrol. Artillery active near Croisilles and Messines.

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. Violent bombardment. Renewed attack from E. of Chevreux spur to N. of Froidmont Farm broken. Attempts E. of Chevreux, E. of Cavaliers de Courcy (N.W. of Reims), and in Chambrette sector (Verdun) failed. 23rd, artillery activity near Filain, Craonne, and Chevreux. 1,200 shells fell in Reims.

24TH, *British*.—Raids repulsed S.E. of Gavrelle and Armentières. Enemy artillery active near Havrincourt Wood, N. of the Scarpe, and by Messines. 3 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Artillery duels near Hurtebise and Craonne. S. of Juvincourt (E. of Craonne) threatened offensive stopped. Most of salient still held by enemy N. of Moisy Farm recaptured. Attack repulsed N.E. of Mont Cornillet. Successful raid near Auberive.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. Successful raids near Epéhy, Bullecourt, Roex, Loos, Hooze, and Vermelles. 25th, progress on both banks of the Souchez. 6 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. 5 of ours missing.

French.—Night 24th—25th. Raids repulsed near Chevreux, in the Woeuvre, and near St. Mihiel. 25th, artillery activity N. of Laffaux Mill, near Cerny, Craonne, and Chevreux. 1,200 shells thrown into Reims. In the evening, attacked strongly organized crest N.W. of Hurtebise: first line captured “in a few moments”; counter-attacks repulsed. 10 officers, 340 rank and file, 9 machine-

guns, 300 sets of equipment, quantities of material, and 1 dressing station, taken. [The position included the "Dragon's Cave," 100 yards wide, 300 yards deep.]

Belgian.—Heavy bombardment.

26TH, *British.*—Night 25th—26th. Successful raids W. of La Bassée, and N.W. of Fontaine les Croisilles: 2 counter-attacks repulsed: 27 prisoners. 26th, progress towards Lens. Enemy positions astride the Souchez now occupied on 2-mile front for depth of 1,000 yards. 2 aircraft brought down: 3 damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 25th—26th. Raids repulsed N.W. of Hurtebise, in the Argonne, and near Tahure (Champagne). 26th, artillery activity near Laffaux Mill and Reims.

27TH, *British.*—Night 26th—27th. Successful raid W. of Oppy. 27th, threatened attack on Fontaine les Croisilles smashed. Successful raid S. of Roeux. 6 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged. None of ours missing.

French.—Raid west of Mont Cornillet broken. Successful raid near Maisons de Champagne. Artillery activity from Hurtebise to Craonne, S. of Moronvilliers, and in Avocourt sector.

28TH, *British.*—Night 27th—28th. Bombardment near Fontaine les Croisilles. Raids repulsed S. of the Cojeul, and E. of Vermelles. 28th, progress on 2-mile front S. of the Souchez to outskirts of Avion (S. of Lens). 5 aircraft brought down: 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 27th—28th. Artillery activity near Hurtebise Monument and Mont Cornillet. Raid repulsed on Wattweiler salient (N.E. of Thann). Patrol encounters before Flirey and Bezonvaux (Verdun). 28th, strong patrol repulsed on slopes of Mont Roches, N. of Jouy. Reims bombarded: 8 shells on Cathedral.

29TH, *British.*—Night 28th—29th. Captured forward position on 2,000-yards front S. and W. of Oppy. Entered Avion. 247 prisoners, 12 machine-guns taken. Repulsed raid N. of Cherisy. 29th, successful raids N.E. of Croisilles, and near Armentières.

French.—Night 28th—29th. Violent bombardment. Two attacks on Cerny repulsed: S.E. of Corbeny, several attacks broken. Intense fire on Avocourt Wood and Hill 304. 6.30 p.m., powerful attack on one and a quarter-mile front W. of Hill 304 "disorganized," after gaining a footing in some front-line trenches. 3.45 a.m., second attack E. of Hill 304 completely repulsed. 29th, heavy bombardments. Near Cerny, during further attacks, front-line elements penetrated.

30TH, *British.*—Night 29th—30th. Raid repulsed N.W. of Gouzeaucourt. 30th, captured some trenches S. of Loos. Repulsed raid S.E. of Gouzeaucourt. 6 aircraft brought down: 1 of ours missing. Heavy rain.

Summary.—As result of recent operations, 4-mile advance to depth of over 1 mile: capture of series of strongly organized defensive systems on both banks of the Souchez, covering Lens. During June, 8,686 prisoners taken, including 175 officers: 67 guns (2 heavy), 102 trench mortars, 345 machine-guns, much material.

French.—Night 29th—30th. Two attacks with liquid fire on La Bovelleville (Chemin des Dames), gained footing in a flattened-out salient. Artillery violent Avocourt—Mort Homme. Part of trenches temporarily lost W. of Hill 304 on previous night recaptured. Attack on one and a quarter-mile front W. of Mort Homme penetrated whole of first line: thrown back except on W. slope: 80 prisoners taken. Raid repulsed W. of Navarin Farm (Champagne). 30th, N. of St. Quentin, raid repulsed near Gricourt. Artillery duel Avocourt—Mort Homme. Enemy efforts to advance W. of Mort Homme frustrated: 3 officers, 17 other ranks, taken. Between 21st—30th, 19 aircraft brought down: 14 damaged.

Belgian.—Artillery activity near Dixmude, Steenstraat, and Het Sas. Raids repulsed near Rykenhoeck, and Ferryman's House.

ITALIAN FRONT.

18TH.—Advanced post lost on S. slopes of Monte Rombon (Upper Isonzo). Attack repulsed on Hill 219 (N.E. of Jamiano). Artillery activity on Carso Plateau and Carnia sector.

19TH.—Formidable positions, including summit of Hill 2,105, stormed in Monte Ortigara area: 74 officers, 862 other prisoners, considerable material taken. Progress between Agnello Pass and Monte Mosciagh. Aerial activity.

20TH.—During night 19th—20th, in the Val Costiana (Ampozzano sector), exploded powerful mine under a spur of the Piccolo Lagazoi (7 miles N.W. of Cortina d'Ampezzo): blew up garrison: stormed Hill 2,668 on the Piccolo Lagazoi. Attacks repulsed on Monte Vodice, and S.W. of Jamiano. S. of Versic batteries silenced: line carried forward.

21ST.—Desultory artillery, normal patrol, activity. On the Sette Comuni sector, since 10th, 16 officers, 650 other ranks, 7 machine-guns taken.

22ND.—Artillery duel on new position on Monte Ortigara. Reconnaissance repulsed at Tonali Pass (N. of Adamello massif).

23RD.—Night 22nd—23rd. "Big detachment" repulsed at Belaghi (E. of Laghi). 23rd, attack on Monte Sess Satt beaten off. Artillery activity on Asiago Plateau.

24TH.—Patrol fighting.

25TH.—Night 24th—25th. Progress S. of Versic. 25th, heavy fighting on Monte Ortigara. Aerial activity.

26TH.—Fighting on Monte Ortigara slackened: 47 prisoners taken. Patrol actions on Monte Zebio.

27TH.—Night 26th—27th.—Attack repulsed on new position in Agnello Pass. 27th, artillery activity in Dolomites, near Monte Croce, and Monte Faiti.

28TH.—Artillery activity.

29TH.—Night 28th—29th. Advanced posts W. end of Agnello Pass abandoned. Attack repulsed on the Col Bricon (Dolomites). 29th, aerial activity S. of Versic.

30TH.—Artillery activity on Asiago Plateau, and in the Upper But (Carnia). Advanced trench S. of Vertoiba (near Gorizia) lost and regained. Attack repulsed on advanced post S. of Versic.

RUSSIAN FRONT.

19TH.—"Fusillades and aerial operations."

22ND.—Near Krevo (S.E. of Vilna) "fusillade more intense."

Patrols engaged at Pozhog (on River Stokhod), at Grabkowce, and near Presowce (N. of Brzezany).

23RD.—Increased activity Lemberg—Tarnapol Railway to the Dneister.

26TH.—"Lively fighting" S.W. of Lutsk, and from the Strypa to the Dneister. Raids repulsed near Zolotchew and Brzezany.

28TH.—S. of the Pripet, artillery duels near Zloczow (on Lemberg—Tarnapol Railway), and Brzezany.

29TH—30TH.—"Intense artillery battle," Zloczow—Brzezany.

BALKAN FRONT.

18TH.—On E. bank of Struma, British patrols cleared villages of Homondos, Yenekeui, Cuculuk, Cavdar Mah, Elisan, and Haznatar, of enemy. Our air-

craft bombed Porna and Tunda stations (E. of Seres), depôts at Savjak (5 miles E. of Demirhissar), and St. Vrac (13 miles N.N.E. of Petritch). Reconnaissances repulsed near Liumnica, and between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida. Near Monastir, "lively" artillery duel. In Thessaly, French troops occupied Pharka Pass in Othrys mountains.

20TH.—British airmen bombed depôts at Bogdanci (between Lake Doiran and the Vardar), and Vetrina (on the Struma).

22ND.—Patrol fighting on British and Serb sectors. Artillery active near the Vardar and the Tchernia bend.

23RD.—Patrol fighting near Doiran. Threatened attack broken near Lake Prespa.

25TH.—Artillery activity on both sides of the Vardar, and in the Tchernia bend. Successful British raid on Brest (E. of Lake Doiran). Raid repulsed in the Tchernia bend.

26TH.—Raid repulsed between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida.

28TH.—Artillery activity on right bank of Vardar, and near Crvena Stena. Attack repulsed in Moglina region. Fires and explosions caused by British airmen at Sovjak, and Bogdanci.

30TH.—Patrol fighting near Nonte (between Mozlina Mountains and Liumnica).

CAUCASIAN FRONT.

19TH.—Kurds beaten off S. of Erzinjan.

21ST.—Captured post on N. of Jamur Ridge (N. of Erzinjan, W. of Kelkid). Captured Serdesht Hill (Persia).

22ND.—Advanced 2 miles N. of Rayat (Turco-Persian border). W. of Sinna, position captured W. of Askhan summit.

26TH.—Occupied Nania and Muliashoh. Enemy driven towards Bistan Mountains. Progress towards Penjvin.

27TH.—Captured Serdesht town. E. of Bistan retired to N. bank of Ab-i-Shirvan River. N.W. of Sinna, occupied part of Garraan height.

28TH.—Seized summit of Gurraan Height.

MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

19TH.—"Quiet." Hot season.

22ND.—Airmen bombed river steamers.

26TH.—Airmen bombed camp at Tekrit (on the Tigris, 30 miles above Samarra).

28TH.—Attack repulsed on convoy near Bakuba (33 miles from Baghdad, on caravan route to Persia *via* Khanikin).

EGYPTIAN FRONT.

29TH.—"General situation remains unchanged."

EAST AFRICA.

30TH.—Report on operations during the month. Advance from Kilwa (a port 20 miles N. of Kilwa Kissivani) against enemy positions S. of Ngami River (S. and S.S.W. from Kilwa Kissivani); from Kimamba Hill (on shore of Beaver Hafen) to Makagaga (12 miles inland). Enemy retired to line Lanyu—Mnindi—Utigiri, on roads to Lake Nyassa and Portuguese frontier. Patrol

fighting W. and S.W. of Lindi (half-way between Lake Nyassa and Central Railway). "Half-hearted" attack repulsed at Likuju (49 miles E.N.E. of Songea, 60 miles N. of Portuguese border): enemy fled to Liwale. Towards Ikoma (E. of Lake Victoria Nyanza, 50 miles S. of British East Africa frontier), Belgian troops from the Congo in pursuit. Advance from Fort Johnston (at S. end of Lake Nyassa), drove enemy to Mwembe (65 miles N.E. of British border). Portuguese contingents at Mlanje (S.E. of Lake Nyassa) and on the coast S. of Rovuma River.

DIARY, JULY 1st—31st, 1917.

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night June 30th—July 1st. Captured trenches on half-mile front S.W. and W. of Lens: 17 prisoners. Successful raid N.E. of Epéhy.

French.—Night June 30th—July 1st. On Chemin des Dames, enemy attempts to advance "stopped": violent bombardment E. of Reims: attacks repulsed E. of La Pompelle, N. and N.E. of Prunay. On left bank of Meuse, artillery duel Avocourt Wood—Hill 304—Mort Homme: attack broken on Avocourt Redoubt: an advanced post N. of Mort Homme flattened out and mutually abandoned. 1st, on Chemin des Dames, bombardment of "redoubled intensity" Cerny—Ailles: enemy attacked E. of Cerny on 500-yards front Ailles—Passy road: gained a line of levelled trenches previously evacuated: driven out. On left bank of Meuse, lively bombardment Hill 304—Mort Homme.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. Successful raid E. of Hargicourt. Repulsed raid E. of Loos. 2nd, after hard fighting, advanced posts slightly driven back W. of Lens.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. South of St. Quentin, repulsed raid near Gauchy. Artillery activity Cerny—Ailles. In the Woeuvre, dispersed reconnaissance near Flirey. 2nd, artillery activity N. of St. Quentin, W. and E. of Cerny, and on California Plateau.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. Successful raids near Havrincourt and Nieuport. Attack repulsed S. of the Cojeul. 3rd, artillery duel near Ypres. Raid repulsed S.E. of Laventie. 4 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. On Chemin des Dames, 6.30 p.m., violent attack on new positions astride Paissy—Ailles road: fighting lasted all night: positions held. On left bank of Meuse, 2.30 a.m., attack on 500-yards front S.E. of Avocourt Wood smashed. 3rd, artillery activity N. of St. Quentin, near Hill 304, and Monts Cornillet and Teton. Patrol action E. of Coucy le Château (N. of Soissons).

Belgian.—Artillery activity Woesten—Lizerne—Steenstraat. Attempts to cross canal near Het Sas broken.

4TH, *British*.—Two minor raids repulsed. Artillery activity N. of the Scarpe, near Messines and Ypres. 3 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. "Violent and repeated attacks with large effectives on 11 miles front" N. of Jouy—E. of California Plateau: especially on Froimont Farm, W. and S.E. of Cerny, N. of the Ailles post, the Casemates, and California Plateau. Completely defeated. Near Cerny, and on California Plateau, assaulting waves "almost annihilated." E. of Cerny a salient lost. Attacks on small posts in Sapigneul and Vauquois sectors failed. Artillery duel near Hill 304. 4th, bombardment on the Panthéon, Royère Farm, Hurtebise, and Vauclerc Plateau. Three attacks with liquid fire on Hill 304 repulsed.

5TH, *British*.—Night 4th—5th. Successful raids near Wieltje (North of Ypres), and Nieuport. Line advanced 600 yards S.W. of Hollebeke.

French.—Artillery activity N. of the Aisne, near Hurtebise, and N. part of Bois de Beaumarais : near Mont Cornillet : and Hill 304. 400 shells on Reims.

6TH, *British*.—Night of 5th—6th. Successful raid near Bullecourt. 6th, artillery activity on both sides of the Scarpe, near Messines, and Nieuport.

French.—Night 5th—6th. Artillery duels between the Miette and the Aisne : near the Casque, and Mont Teton. Attempts repulsed W. of Mont Cornillet, and S.E. of Tahure. Patrol action near Louvemont (right bank of Meuse). 6th, artillery activity in Vauxaillon, Laffaux, La Royère, and Braye-en-Laonnois sectors. Two small salients captured on Mont Haut and E. of Mont Cornillet : 4 counter-attacks repulsed. " Artillery struggle very keen " near Mort Homme and Hill 304.

7TH, *British*.—Progress E. of Wytschaete. Raids repulsed near Acheville (S.E. of Lens), and E. of Loos.

French.—Night 6th—7th. Artillery activity La Royère—Panthéon, and in Champagne. Raid repulsed near Main Massiges, S. of Moronvillers. 84 aircraft bombed dépôts, etc., at Trèves, Ludwigshafen, Essen (Krupp works), and Coblenz : Hirson station (N. of Laons), Thionville station (N. of Metz), railway W. of Phalsburg : and many points in enemy lines.

7TH.—Artillery activity Cerny—Ailles, near Mort Homme, Hill 304, S. of Moronvillers, near Rhone—Rhine Canal, and Carspach Wood.

8TH, *British*.—Night 7th—8th. Successful raids S.E. of Hargicourt, and N. of Ypres.

French.—Night 7th—8th. Bombardment N. of Laffaux Mill—Froidmont Farm, and near Sapigneul. At dawn, violent attacks repulsed N. and E. of Laffaux Mill, and W. of the Panthéon. Between Bovette and Froidmont Farm, attack on 2-miles front driven off after several hours' fighting. Reconnaissance repulsed near Sapigneul. Progress E. of Cerny. Captured 1 strongly organized salient W. of Mort Homme : 2 S.W. of Hill 304 : counter-attacks repulsed. 8th, artillery activity " very keen " Froidmont Farm—the Panthéon.

Belgian.—Intense artillery activity near Dixmude, Woesten, Lizerne, Steenstraet, and Pyegaele. Patrols repulsed near Ferryman's House, Het Sas, and N. of Steenstraet.

9TH, *British*.—Night 8th—9th. Raids repulsed S. of Hargicourt (1 officer, 35 other ranks, taken), and S.E. of Loos. Enemy entered advanced post W. of Warneton. 9th, artillery activity near Bullecourt, Ypres, and Nieuport.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Artillery activity S. of Filain. Strong attack repulsed on the Panthéon. Recaptured trenches lost night 7th—8th on 1,600-yards front between Les Bouvettes and Chevreigny Ridge. Raid repulsed near St. Hilaire—St. Souplet road (Champagne). Two attacks repulsed on new salient W. of Mort Homme. 9th, artillery activity S. of Filain, and near Hill 304.

10TH, *British*.—Night 9th—10th. Progress E. of Oosttaverne. Successful raids S. of Ypres—Comines Canal, and near Nieuport. Raids repulsed S.E. of Havrincourt, and E. of Monchy-le-Preux. 10th, towards evening, intense artillery activity on coast.

French.—Night 9th—10th. Attempts repulsed N. of Laffaux Mill, and S.E. of Aisnes. 9.50 p.m., powerful attack between Hurtebise Monument and the Dragon " scattered in severely battered condition." Raids repulsed S.E. of Corbeny, near Courcy, Auberive, and Carrières Wood. 10th, attempt repulsed on Froidmont Farm. " Considerable " artillery activity in Moronvillers, and Mort Homme—Hill 304 sectors.

Belgian.—Night 9th—10th. Attempt repulsed S. of St. George (E. of Nieuport). 10th, " lively fighting " Nieuport—S. of Dixmude.

11TH, *British*.—Night 10th—11th. Trenches near the Dunes levelled, and position isolated by the destruction of bridges. 7.45 p.m., enemy penetrated to right bank of the Yser on a front of 1,600 yards to a depth of 600 yards from the sea. Simultaneous attack on Lombartzyde broken. 11th, on 800-yards front, enemy attacked advanced posts E. of Monchy-le-Preux: "some of them pressed back very slightly." Attempt driven off N.W. of Lens. Weather bad.

French.—Night 10th—11th. Artillery activity N. of Jouy, and near Hill 304. Raids repulsed near Sapigneul and in Champagne. In the Woeuvre, attack smashed near Flirey. 11th, "fairly violent" bombardment on the Panthéon, Moronvillers, and Hill 304 sectors.

12TH, *British*.—Night 11th—12th. Raid repulsed S. of Lombartzyde. 12th, raid repulsed W. of Quéant. Aerial encounters. 6 machines brought down: 6 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 11th—12th. Attacks repulsed S. of Juvincourt (near Laffaux Mill): on both banks of the Meuse, near Hill 304, and on Hardaumont work. 12th, "relative quiet." 100 shells dropped on Reims.

13TH, *British*.—Night 12th—13th. Successful raids S. of Hulluch, and S.E. of Ypres. Raids repulsed S.E. of Gavrelle, near Ypres—Comines Canal, and E. of Nieuport. 13th, raid repulsed W. of Quéant. Aerial activity. 15 craft brought down: 10 damaged. 9 of ours missing.

French.—Night 12th—13th. Bombardment "particularly severe" near St. Quentin, the Panthéon, and on both banks of the Meuse. 13th, artillery activity. 1,600 shells on Reims.

14TH, *British*.—Night 13th—14th. Attack repulsed S. of Lombartzyde. Raids driven off E. of Hargicourt, W. of Warneton, E. of Oostaverne, and N. of Ypres. Patrol scrap N.W. of Cherisy. Four stations, rest-camps, bombed. 14th, 5 aircraft brought down: 10 damaged. 7 of ours missing.

French.—Night 13th—14th. Artillery activity near St. Quentin, Craonne, and Courcy. Successful raid N.W. of Navarin Farm (Champagne). Great artillery activity near Hill 304: attempt repulsed S.W. of Avocourt Wood. In the Woeuvre, "somewhat violent" bombardment Limy—Ramaneauville "stopped": attempt N. of Faye-en-Haye smashed. Bombs on Nancy. 14th, attack repulsed S. of Courcy: small post lost. Guns "very lively" near Hill 304: "extremely violent" near Mont Haut, the Casque, and Mont Teton. 2,000 shells on Reims.

15TH, *British*.—Night 14th—15th. Successful raids near Bullecourt, Gavrelle, and S. of Armentières. Patrols engaged S. of Havrincourt. 15th, artillery activity near Armentières, Wytshaete, and Nieuport. 3 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged. 5 of ours missing.

Belgian.—Night 14th—15th. Artillery activity near Ramscappelle, Pervyse, and N. of Boesinghe.

French.—Night 14th—15th. Powerful attack with flame projectors on a salient W. of Cerny: after all-night fight, enemy thrown out of supporting trenches into which he had penetrated: 500 yards of first-line elements lost. Lively bombardment on Craonne sector. 7.30 p.m., N. of Mont Haut, captured "network of powerfully organized trenches" on a front of 800 yards to depth of 300 yards: all counter-attacks failed: supporting masses caught by artillery fire. 9 officers, 360 other ranks, taken. On left bank of the Meuse, "very lively" cannonade Hill 304—Mort Homme: W. of Mort Homme, attack repulsed. On right bank, attempts on E. end of Carrières Wood smashed. 15th, artillery activity W. of Cerny, and near Craonne. Successful raids W. of Butte des Mesnil, and near Bolande (Argonne).

16TH, *British*.—Night 15th—16th. Raids repulsed N.W. of Fontaine les Croisilles, and near Armentières. Successful raid near Oppy. 16th, successful raid E. of Vermelles. Progress N.E. of Messines.

French.—Night 15th—16th. Attempts repulsed S.E. of St. Quentin, W. of Allemant, and S. of Corbeny. Progress S. of Ailles. Near Mont Haut and the Teton, "large enemy forces" assailed position gained on night 14th—15th: first two waves of assault mown down: third reached lines, annihilated. Attack "completely defeated." 16th, artillery activity N. of Braye-en-Laonnois, Hurtebise, N.W. of Reims, and on left bank of the Meuse. 1,600 shells dropped on Reims.

17TH, *British.*—Night 16th—17th. Progress N.W. of Warneton. Near Nieuport, "a large enemy party" pursued to their trenches and bombed. 17th, early, progress E. of Monchy-le-Preux. Thick clouds and strong winds. 6 aircraft brought down: 3 damaged. None of ours missing.

French.—Night 16th—17th. Artillery activity on Chemin des Dames. A "serious effort" on the Teton "had to return in disorder": all positions maintained. W. of Hill 304, "lively artillery": some ground lost on June 28th—29th recaptured. Raids repulsed in the Argonne, near Douaumont (Verdun), and Regneville (Woeuvre). 17th, renewed assault on the Teton made a slight gain. Violent artillery duel continued near Mont Haut. 6.45 p.m., trenches lost June 29th near Hill 304 recaptured "in a few minutes": 1st and 2nd enemy lines astride Esnes—Malancourt road stormed on 2,750 yards front to a depth of over 1,000 yards: counter-attacks shattered: 8 officers, 425 other ranks, taken unwounded. Line advanced from S.E. corner of Avocourt Wood, through Camart Wood, to W. slopes of Hill 304.

18TH, *British.*—Night 17th—18th. Progress E. of Monchy-le-Preux. Successful raids N.E. of Oosttaverne, and near Boesinghe. 18th, successful raid near Fresnoy. 7 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 17th—18th. Violent bombardment W. and E. of Cerny. Surprise attack repulsed N. of Vienne le Chateau. Counter-attacks shattered on new positions Avocourt Wood—W. of Hill 304. Attempt near Calonne trench foiled. 18th, artillery activity Cerny—Hurtebise—Craonne. Attack repulsed W. of Cerny sugar factory. Artillery activity W. of Hill 304. Patrol action Parroy Wood.

19TH, *British.*—Night 18th—19th. Advanced posts E. of Monchy-le-Preux lost on 16th re-established. Raids broken N.W. of Cherisy, repulsed E. of Oosttaverne. Successful raids N. and E. of Ypres. Artillery duel near Lombartzyde. 19th, attack S. of Lombartzyde repulsed.

French.—Night 18th—19th. Violent bombardment from the Somme to the Aisne, Vauclerc—Craonne, and on left bank of the Meuse. 9 p.m., E. of Gauchy (S. of St. Quentin), on hill of Moulin des Tous Vents, enemy gained footing in first-line trench: driven out of greater part at dawn. Counter-attack on new position at Avocourt Wood smashed. Attempts on the Panthéon, S.E. of Sapigneul, and near Douaumont broken. Successful raid near Badonvillers (S.E. of Nancy and Lunéville). 19th, artillery activity Somme—Aisne. 1 p.m., fresh attack on Moulin des Tous Vents repulsed. Afternoon, enemy attack N.E. of Craonne—Hurtebise: 5th Guard Division thrown in: repulsed on flanks, reached some first-line elements in centre. Bombardment S. of Corbeny—Cerny: infantry massing dispersed. 18th—19th, over 1,000 shells on Reims.

20TH, *British.*—Night 19th—20th. Successful raids opposite Gavrelle, and N. of Ypres. Artillery activity N.W. of St. Quentin and S.W. of Lens. 20th, raid repulsed N.E. of Hardicourt (N.W. of St. Quentin).

French.—Night 19th—20th. 8.30 p.m., enemy launched "general assault by large forces" Craonne—Vauclerc: repulsed on "entire crest of plateau": gained "precarious hold" of 650 yards of demolished first-line elements on N. edge. Surprise attack repulsed between Navarin Farm and St. Hilaire—St. Souplet road. Artillery duel near Hill 304. 20th, artillery duel S.E. of St. Quentin. Recaptured some elements lost night 18th—19th on Moulin des Tous Vents. "Fairly lively"

artillery duel N. of the Aisne, S. of Moronvillers massif, and on both banks of the Meuse.

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. Successful raids on Greenland Hill (N. of Roeux), S.W. of La Bassée, and S. of Armentières. Raids repulsed N. of Havrincourt, and S. of Armentières. 21st, artillery activity near Lombartzyde. 4 aerodromes, 1 railway junction, bombed. Evening, 3 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 20th—21st. "Particularly disturbed" on the Aisne sector. Heavy bombardment. N. of Braye-en-Laonnois, attempt repulsed. S. of Cerny, enemy twice penetrated first-line elements on 275 yards front: ejected. W. of Cerny, attempt failed. S. of Ailles, 2 attacks broken. In Champagne, artillery activity. On Meuse Heights, raid repulsed near Bois des Chevaliers. 21st, artillery duel Cerny—Craonne. Troops massing N. of California Plateau dispersed.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. Successful patrol actions N.W. of St. Quentin and S.E. of Lens. Progress S.E. of Monchy-le-Preux. Artillery activity near Lens, Armentières, and coast. 22nd, raid repulsed E. of Verguier (N.W. of St. Quentin). Thick haze till evening: then, 2 aircraft, 1 observation balloon, brought down: 4 aircraft damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. Artillery activity S. of the Oise. Attempt repulsed at St. Firmin Cemetery (W. suburb of La Fère). Heavy bombardment Hurtebise—Craonne. Daybreak, strong attack with fresh troops: between Hurtebise—the Casemates, broken: further E. on Casemates—California Plateau, "brilliantly repulsed." Artillery "brisk" near Avocourt, Bezonvaux, and St. Mihiel. Attack repulsed N. of Bezonvaux. Two attempts "proved futile" on the Meuse Heights near Bois Bouchet and Bois des Chevaliers. E. of Seppois (Alsace) attempted surprise smashed. 22nd, fighting all day. Bombardment of "extraordinary intensity." Casemate and California Plateau "incessantly attacked with powerful effectives": thrown back from the Casemates: after repeated defeats, footing gained in first-line elements on the California Plateau.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. Successful raids S. of Avion (S. of Lens: position penetrated on 600 yards front to depth of 300 yards: 50 prisoners taken), S. of Havrincourt, near Bullecourt, and Hollebeke. Raids repulsed E. of Loos and near Lombartzyde. 23rd, successful raid on a farm E. of Oostaverne. Raid repulsed N.W. of Cherisy. Aerial activity. 9 aircraft, 1 observation balloon, brought down: 4 aircraft damaged. 9 of ours missing.

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. Between Craonne—the Casemates, enemy penetrated first line: driven out of greater portion by counter-attack. On California Plateau, all attempts against supply trenches repulsed. 23rd, progress E. of Cerny. "Very violent" bombardment Hurtebise—Craonne. 850 shells on Reims. Attack N.W. of Mont Cornillet "completely repulsed after a heavy fight." 100 shells N. of Nancy. In reprisal, bombarded works at Chateau Salins.

24TH, *British*. Night 23rd—24th. Successful raids W. of Havrincourt, E. of Vermelles, and S. of Hollebeke. Raids repulsed E. of Laventie, and E. of Givenchy. 24th, raids repulsed E. and N.E. of Ypres: 2 officers, 114 other ranks, taken. Fewer aircraft met. 3 brought down: 3 damaged. None missing.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. Two attacks N. of Braye-en-Laonnois repulsed. Troops massing N. of Nancy (W. of Braye-en-Laonnois) dispersed. Attack Cerny—Ailles repulsed. Artillery violent near Craonne, notably N. of California Plateau. Bombs on Nancy and S. of town. 24th, successful attacks Casemates—California Plateau: all ground lost on latter on 22nd recovered, except small demolished salient mutually abandoned: counter-attacks repulsed. Very active artillery duel in Champagne, and on left bank of the Meuse.

25TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Artillery activity E. of Monchy-le-Preux and near Lombartzyde. 25th, advanced posts on 250 yards front on Infantry Hill lost. Raids repulsed N. of Bullecourt. Successful raids N. of Ypres. Thick haze. 4 aircraft damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 24th—25th. Attack repulsed on ground recaptured 24th on California Plateau: all gains retained. Raids beaten off on Hurtebise Monument, near Mont Cornillet, and Anspach le Haut (Alsace). 25th, artillery lively Casemates—California Plateau. Reims received 567 shells.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Successful raids S.E. of Armentières. 26th, thick mist. One aircraft brought down. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 25th—26th, 7 p.m. Two enemy divisions attacked on 2-mile front E. of Hurtebise—S. of Bovel: S. of Ailles some first-line elements lost: near Hurtebise and further E., repeated assaults broken. Attack "in rapid and violent manner" near Mont Haut repulsed after all-night fighting. Successful raid N. of Auberville. Artillery duel on left bank of the Meuse. 26th, all-day battle Hurtebise—Ailles: some lost ground recovered. Bombardment Mont Blond—the Casque: enemy infantry stopped. Artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse.

27TH, *British*.—Night 26th—27th. Basseville captured: abandoned before counter-attack in force. Successful raids near Monchy-le-Preux, S.W. of La Bassée, and N.E. of Ypres. Raid repulsed S.E. of Gouzeaucourt. 27th, artillery activity near Armentières. Evening, 2 hours' aircraft fighting. One aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Artillery activity Cerny—Hurtebise Farm. Five attacks S. and W. of Moronvillers repulsed. Artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse. 27th, artillery activity Ailles—Hurtebise, near Mont Haut, and on both banks of the Meuse. Attack on Hartmannsweilerkopf repulsed.

28TH, *British*.—Night 27th—28th. Successful raids near Armentières. Raid repulsed E. of Oosttaerne. Artillery activity near Armentières, N. of Ypres, and near Nieuport. Important railway stations, 2 aerodromes, bombed. 28th, patrols captured 2 officers, 45 other ranks, near Ypres. Artillery activity N. of the Lys. After 1 p.m., great aerial activity: many photographs taken. 4 aerodromes bombed. 15 aircraft brought down: 16 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 27th—28th. Violent attacks, principally on Braye-en-Laonnois, Chevrengy Ridge, and Hurtebise Monument, "failed completely." Artillery duel near Mont Haut, and on both banks of the Meuse. 28th, artillery activity Ailles—Hurtebise, and on both banks of the Meuse.

29TH, *British*.—Night 28th—29th. Successful raids N.E. of Epéhy, S.E. of Havrincourt, W. of Fontaine les Croisilles, and near Fleurbain (S.E. of Armentières). Near Roeux chemical works, 30 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, 1 trench mortar, taken. Near Ypres, 54 prisoners, 2 machine-guns, taken. Raid repulsed S.E. of Messines. One aerodrome, 2 important railway stations, 1 ammunition dépôt, bombed.

French.—Night 28th—29th. Attack on 650 yards front W. of Hurtebise "collapsed." Progress Hurtebise—La Bovel, especially near the Monument. Attempt repulsed near Tahure (Champagne). Attack on new position Avocourt Wood—Hill 304 broken. Attempt E. of Moulainville (E. of Verdun) smashed. 29th, artillery activity Cerny—Craonne. 3 p.m., attempt on Hurtebise "frustrated."

30TH, *British*.—Night 29th—30th. Patrol activity near Bullecourt and Acheville (S.E. of Lens). Successful raid near Lombartzyde. 30th, artillery activity near Armentières. 10 a.m., sudden severe thunderstorm. 4 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged. 6 of ours missing.

artillery duel N. of the Aisne, S. of Moronvillers massif, and on both banks of the Meuse.

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. Successful raids on Greenland Hill (N. of Roeux), S.W. of La Bassée, and S. of Armentières. Raids repulsed N. of Havrincourt, and S. of Armentières. 21st, artillery activity near Lombartzyde. 4 aerodromes, 1 railway junction, bombed. Evening, 3 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 20th—21st. "Particularly disturbed" on the Aisne sector. Heavy bombardment. N. of Braye-en-Laonnois, attempt repulsed. S. of Cerny, enemy twice penetrated first-line elements on 275 yards front: ejected. W. of Cerny, attempt failed. S. of Ailles, 2 attacks broken. In Champagne, artillery activity. On Meuse Heights, raid repulsed near Bois des Chevaliers. 21st, artillery duel Cerny—Craonne. Troops massing N. of Carlifornia Plateau dispersed.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. Successful patrol actions N.W. of St. Quentin and S.E. of Lens. Progress S.E. of Monchy-le-Preux. Artillery activity near Lens, Armentières, and coast. 22nd, raid repulsed E. of Verguier (N.W. of St. Quentin). Thick haze till evening: then, 2 aircraft, 1 observation balloon, brought down: 4 aircraft damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. Artillery activity S. of the Oise. Attempt repulsed at St. Firmin Cemetery (W. suburb of La Fère). Heavy bombardment Hurtebise—Craonne. Daybreak, strong attack with fresh troops: between Hurtebise—the Casemates, broken: further E. on Casemates—California Plateau, "brilliantly repulsed." Artillery "brisk" near Avocourt, Bezonvaux, and St. Mihiel. Attack repulsed N. of Bezonvaux. Two attempts "proved futile" on the Meuse Heights near Bois Bouchet and Bois des Chevaliers. E. of Seppois (Alsace) attempted surprise smashed. 22nd, fighting all day. Bombardment of "extraordinary intensity." Casemate and California Plateau "incessantly attacked with powerful effectives": thrown back from the Casemates: after repeated defeats, footing gained in first-line elements on the California Plateau.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. Successful raids S. of Avion (S. of Lens: position penetrated on 600 yards front to depth of 300 yards: 50 prisoners taken), S. of Havrincourt, near Bullecourt, and Hollebeke. Raids repulsed E. of Loos and near Lombartzyde. 23rd, successful raid on a farm E. of Oostaverne. Raid repulsed N.W. of Cherisy. Aerial activity. 9 aircraft, 1 observation balloon, brought down: 4 aircraft damaged. 9 of ours missing.

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. Between Craonne—the Casemates, enemy penetrated first line: driven out of greater portion by counter-attack. On California Plateau, all attempts against supply trenches repulsed. 23rd, progress E. of Cerny. "Very violent" bombardment Hurtebise—Craonne. 850 shells on Reims. Attack N.W. of Mont Cornillet "completely repulsed after a heavy fight." 100 shells N. of Nancy. In reprisal, bombarded works at Chateau Salins.

24TH, *British*. Night 23rd—24th. Successful raids W. of Havrincourt, E. of Vermelles, and S. of Hollebeke. Raids repulsed E. of Laventie, and E. of Givenchy. 24th, raids repulsed E. and N.E. of Ypres: 2 officers, 114 other ranks, taken. Fewer aircraft met. 3 brought down: 3 damaged. None missing.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. Two attacks N. of Braye-en-Laonnois repulsed. Troops massing N. of Sancy (W. of Braye-en-Laonnois) dispersed. Attack Cerny—Ailles repulsed. Artillery violent near Craonne, notably N. of California Plateau. Bombs on Nancy and S. of town. 24th, successful attacks Casemates—California Plateau: all ground lost on latter on 22nd recovered, except small demolished salient mutually abandoned: counter-attacks repulsed. Very active artillery duel in Champagne, and on left bank of the Meuse.

25TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Artillery activity E. of Monchy-le-Preux and near Lombartzyde. 25th, advanced posts on 250 yards front on Infantry Hill lost. Raids repulsed N. of Bullecourt. Successful raids N. of Ypres. Thick haze. 4 aircraft damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 24th—25th. Attack repulsed on ground recaptured 24th on California Plateau: all gains retained. Raids beaten off on Hurtebise Monument, near Mont Cornillet, and Anspach le Haut (Alsace). 25th, artillery lively Casemates—California Plateau. Reims received 567 shells.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Successful raids S.E. of Armentières. 26th, thick mist. One aircraft brought down. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 25th—26th, 7 p.m. Two enemy divisions attacked on 2-mile front E. of Hurtebise—S. of Bovel: S. of Ailles some first-line elements lost: near Hurtebise and further E., repeated assaults broken. Attack "in rapid and violent manner" near Mont Haut repulsed after all-night fighting. Successful raid N. of Auberville. Artillery duel on left bank of the Meuse. 26th, all-day battle Hurtebise—Ailles: some lost ground recovered. Bombardment Mont Blond—the Casque: enemy infantry stopped. Artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse.

27TH, *British*.—Night 26th—27th. Basseville captured: abandoned before counter-attack in force. Successful raids near Monchy-le-Preux, S.W. of La Bassée, and N.E. of Ypres. Raid repulsed S.E. of Gouzeaucourt. 27th, artillery activity near Armentières. Evening, 2 hours' aircraft fighting. One aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Artillery activity Cerny—Hurtebise Farm. Five attacks S. and W. of Moronvillers repulsed. Artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse. 27th, artillery activity Ailles—Hurtebise, near Mont Haut, and on both banks of the Meuse. Attack on Hartmannsweilerkopf repulsed.

28TH, *British*.—Night 27th—28th. Successful raids near Armentières. Raid repulsed E. of Oosttaverne. Artillery activity near Armentières, N. of Ypres, and near Nieuport. Important railway stations, 2 aerodromes, bombed. 28th, patrols captured 2 officers, 45 other ranks, near Ypres. Artillery activity N. of the Lys. After 1 p.m., great aerial activity: many photographs taken. 4 aerodromes bombed. 15 aircraft brought down: 16 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 27th—28th. Violent attacks, principally on Braye-en-Laonnois, Chevreigny Ridge, and Hurtebise Monument, "failed completely." Artillery duel near Mont Haut, and on both banks of the Meuse. 28th, artillery activity Ailles—Hurtebise, and on both banks of the Meuse.

29TH, *British*.—Night 28th—29th. Successful raids N.E. of Epéhy, S.E. of Havrincourt, W. of Fontaine les Croisilles, and near Fleurbain (S.E. of Armentières). Near Roex chemical works, 30 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, 1 trench mortar, taken. Near Ypres, 54 prisoners, 2 machine-guns, taken. Raid repulsed S.E. of Messines. One aerodrome, 2 important railway stations, 1 ammunition dépôt, bombed.

French.—Night 28th—29th. Attack on 650 yards front W. of Hurtebise "collapsed." Progress Hurtebise—La Bovel, especially near the Monument. Attempt repulsed near Tahure (Champagne). Attack on new position Avocourt Wood—Hill 304 broken. Attempt E. of Moulainville (E. of Verdun) smashed. 29th, artillery activity Cerny—Craonne. 3 p.m., attempt on Hurtebise "frustrated."

30TH, *British*.—Night 29th—30th. Patrol activity near Bullecourt and Acheville (S.E. of Lens). Successful raid near Lombartzyde. 30th, artillery activity near Armentières. 10 a.m., sudden severe thunderstorm. 4 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged. 6 of ours missing.

French.—Night 29th—30th. "Fairly violent" bombardment Braye-en-Laonnois—Chevregny Ridge, near Hurtebise Monument, and on both banks of the Meuse. 30th, artillery activity Chevregny Ridge—California Plateau, near Auberive (Champagne), and on both banks of the Meuse.

31st, *British.*—Night 30th—31st. In conjunction with French, attack on wide front N. of the Lys. On left, French early gained objective in capture of Steenstraete: penetrated 2 miles into enemy defences: carried Bixschoote and positions S.E. and W. of village including Kortekeer Cabaret, to depth of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Afternoon, repulsed counter-attack. Centre, stormed 2 powerful defensive systems: captured Verlorenhoek, Frezenberg, St. Julien, Pilkem, several farms and woods: secured crossings of River Steenbeek. Penetrated 2 miles. Right centre, gained objectives, Hooze and Sanctuary Wood: advanced "against very obstinate resistance in difficult country": captured Westhoek: penetrated 1 mile. Counter-attacks repulsed: heavy fighting all day. Right, carried La Basseville and Hollebeke. Total advance 15-mile front to a depth of 1 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles: 6,122 prisoners, including 132 officers, taken. Despite bad weather, aerial activity. 6 machines brought down: 3 of ours missing.

During July, approximately 427 aircraft brought down, 338 of them German. We accounted for 253, including 125 damaged: 92 of ours officially returned missing. Total captures during July (up to those counted by 6 p.m., 31st): 4,039 prisoners, including 85 officers, 8 field guns, 53 machine-guns, 32 trench mortars.

French.—Night 30th—31st, 8.15 p.m. Attacked on 1-mile front S. of La Royère: counter-attack broken: 2 officers, over 200 other ranks, taken. Cerny—Hurtebise, "very lively artillery struggle." On both banks of the Meuse, artillery activity. Attempt defeated N.W. of Prosnes (Champagne). 31st, 11 a.m., attempt repulsed W. of Chevregny Ridge. Assault on 1-mile front E. of Cerny driven back: counter-attack effected progress. "Reciprocal" artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse.

ITALIAN FRONT.

1st.—Night, June 30th—July 1st. Enemy active Lake Garda—Ledro Valley (W. Trentino). Minor attacks repulsed between San Giovanni and Biacesa (S.W. of Riva); N. of Malga Giumella and N.E. of Mezzalago (N. of Ledro Lake). 1st, artillery activity Lake Garda—the Adige.

2nd.—Artillery activity Lake Garda—the Adige.

3rd.—Night 2nd—3rd. Successful raid S. of Kostanjevica. 3rd, artillery activity in Monte Croce Pass and N. of Pontebba (Carnia), near Monte Vedici and E. of Gorizia.

4th.—Artillery activity on whole front. Successful raids N. and E. of Gorizia. S. of Kostanjevica, attack "completely smashed."

5th.—Night 4th—5th. Progress N.W. of Selo (Carso). Counter-attack broken.

6th.—Patrols repulsed near Pasubio (Trentino), Piccolo Lagazuoi (Dolomites), and Vodil (Tolmino).

7th.—Night 6th—7th. Raid repulsed in Upper Val Telina (W. Trentino). 7th, aerial activity. 2 craft brought down: 1 damaged.

8th.—Patrol encounters.

9th.—Night 8th—9th. Attack in violent thunderstorm on the Vodil smashed. Attempts broken in the Upper Cordovole, and on Piccolo Lagazuoi. Artillery activity in Trentino and Carnia areas.

10th.—Successful raid in the Sief (Upper Cordovole). Progress N.W. of Selo (Carso).

11th.—Attempt repulsed on 2nd peak of Col Bricon (Travignola Valley, Dolomites).

12TH.—"Considerable" artillery activity. Successful raids in the Sief, and S. of Kostanjevica.

13TH.—Night 12th—13th. Surprised and destroyed post in Upper Cia Valley (Varoi): prisoners and material taken. 13th, artillery and aerial activity.

14TH.—Reconnaissances broken between Lake Garda—Leno (Vallarso), and on Hill 126 (E. of Gorizia).

15TH.—Night 14th—15th. Successful raid S.E. of Hill 247 (N.W. of Monte Hermada): 11 officers, 264 other ranks, machine-guns, and material taken. Artillery active in Trentino, Carnia, and Julian area. 15th, air raid E. of Selo (S. of Versic). 3 craft brought down, 3 missing.

16TH.—Mined enemy work on 2nd peak of Col Bricon. Several reconnaissances driven off.

17TH.—Raids repulsed near Buchenstein (Livinallongo), Monte Piana, Monte Croce Pass, and Cigini (S.W. of Tolmino). Artillery activity.

18TH.—Attacks W. of Versic, and near Melino (Giudicaria Valley) repulsed. Post destroyed on the Potoce (Monte Nero). Bombardment E. of Santa Caterina, on the Dosso Fatti, and S.W. of Versic.

19TH.—Night 18th—19th. Attack W. of Versic failed completely. Near Melino (Giudicaria Valley), patrols repulsed. Troops dispersed "in the rear of Monte Santo." 19th, artillery activity E. of Sta Caterina, on Dosso Fatti, and W. of Versic.

20TH.—Minor encounters. Artillery activity. Aircraft bombed batteries on Monte Hermada, and Opicina—Glabrovia Railway, near Trieste.

21ST.—Increased activity in Trentino. Surprised detachment in Rimbianco Valley (left of Rienz). Patrol fights.

22ND.—Artillery duels in Plezzo basin, Carso, and E. of Jamiano.

23RD.—Isolated attack S.W. of Kostanjevica broken. Normal.

24TH.—Violent bombardment Dosso Fatti—Kostanjevica. Patrol fights.

25TH.—Patrol encounters Magna Zugna, Cordevole, and Upper Boite Valleys. Attempts repulsed on Dogna Valley, Monte Rombon, and Dosso Fatti. Artillery "violent" Dosso Fatti—Kostanjevica.

26TH.—Artillery activity in Trentino, and Lagarina Valley. Successful patrol fights in Upper Valfurva, near Loppio (E. of Lake Garda), S. of Pellegrino Valley, and near Monte Piana.

27TH.—Successful patrol fight in Travignolo Valley.

28TH.—Attack heavily repulsed Baite Promenti—Cina Palone (Chiesi Valley). Violent mountain storms.

RUSSIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Successful raid near Rudka Sitovitskaya (on the Stokhod). Near Zloczow, "after two days' artillery preparation, attacked" Koniuchy—Byski (10 miles N. and N.E. of Brzezany). Captured three lines of trenches and Koniuchy village. Advanced to Koniuchy stream, S. of village: 164 officers, 8,400 other ranks, 7 guns, 7 machine-guns, taken. British armoured cars engaged. S.W. of Brzezany, captured some positions. German and Turk counter-attacks repulsed: 9 officers, 1,700 other ranks taken. S.E. of Brzezany, 53 officers, 2,200 other ranks taken.

2ND.—3 p.m. Captured Presowce village, fortified positions on heights W. and S.W. of Zborow (20 miles N. of Brzezany), Korszyłow village, and three lines of trenches. Enemy retreated across the Lower Strypa. Stormed position W. of Josefowka (N. of Koniuchy): 6,300 prisoners of all ranks, 21 guns, 16 machine-guns, several bomb throwers, taken. S.E. of Brzezany, action less intense.

3RD.—Near Kovel, artillery activity. Near Zloczow, carried Godow village: 11 German machine gunners taken. E. and S.E. of Brzezany, artillery duels. "An attack by one of our storming groups did not materialise." S.E. of Mieczyszców (6 miles S.S.W. of Brzezany), counter-attacks repulsed. "Preliminary estimate" of captures 1st and 2nd: 300 officers, 18,000 other ranks, 29 guns, 33 machine-guns.

4TH.—Attacks repulsed E. of Brzezany, and E. of Lipnica Dolna (on the Narajowka, 9 miles S.W. of Brzezany).

5TH.—Offensive resumed. Near Zloczow, increased artillery duel. Near Ozikelany (on the Złota Lipa, 6 miles S. of Brzezany), "brief but sharp encounters." Intense fire on our positions E. of Lipnica Dolna.

6TH.—Near Zloczow, 3 lines of trenches captured: lost in counter-attacks. Stubborn fighting all day on heights N. of Presowce, Lowrykowce, Trawotłoki, and Hadow. Many counter-attacks: the most formidable from direction of Urłow, and woods W. of Koniuchy. Heights N. of Presowce, and Hadow, Lowrykowce, and Trawotłoki villages, retained: 17 officers, 672 other ranks, taken. (According to Austrian reports, 19 Divisions engaged: at some points 15 assaulting waves advanced on 10-mile front). Near Oolina (N.W. of Stanisław), captured trenches Jamnica—Paszczna sector: 360 prisoners. S.W. of Bohorodczany (S.W. of Stanisław), carried Dwiniaż and advanced post Jablonca—Porohy sector. Counter-attacks repulsed.

7TH.—Night 6th—7th. Counter-attacks on new positions near Zloczow repulsed. 7th, E. and S.E. of Brzezany, "intense artillery fire." Reconnaissances repulsed S.W. of Szybałin.

8TH.—S. of Brzezany, artillery activity. Noon, near Oolina, attacked on 8-mile front Jamnica sector: pierced most important Austrian position. Advanced to and captured Jezupol town (on the Bytrzyca), Ciezow, Pawelcze, Rybna, and Story Liesic villages (W. of the river). Cavalry crossed Czanny Las Ridge (1,000 feet), and reached River Lukowia (S.W. of Halicz), 8 miles behind enemy position: 131 officers, 7,000 other ranks, 48 (12 heavy) guns; many machine-guns taken.

9TH.—Near Brzezany, "violent artillery duels." Near Oolina, "stubborn and sanguinary fighting" round villages of Huciska, Pacykow, and Pawalez, on roads to Halicz (right bank of Dniester). Towards evening, occupied Wiktorow (5 miles S. of Halicz), Majdan, Huciska, and Pacykow: reached the Lukowia. Enemy retreated across River Lomnica (4 miles W. of Lukowia, 13 from Stanisław): 1,000 Austro-German prisoners, field guns, machine-guns, and material taken. Result of operations, 8th—9th, advance through enemy positions on 14-mile front, to a depth of 3—4 miles.

10TH.—Halicz entered. Detachments thrown to left bank of the Dniester. Towards evening, occupied 20 miles right bank of the Lomnica, from its mouth to Dobrowlany. Advanced detachments occupied Bludniki and Babin on left bank. S. of Stanisław, defeated enemy Bohorodczany—Solotwina: reached Pisiecz—Lesiowka—Kosmacz: 2,000 prisoners, about 30 guns, taken.

11TH.—"After stubborn and sanguinary battle," Kalicz captured. W. of Bohorodczany, progress slow in "an extremely intricate terrain."

12TH.—Vladimir—Volynski area (Volkynia) attack repulsed.

13TH.—Attack on Kalusz (25 miles S.W. of Halicz) repulsed. Novica (S.W. of Kalusz) captured.

14TH.—Attack S.W. of Kalusz repulsed. Near Ldziany (a ford on the Lomnica 10 miles S.W. of Kalusz), Austrian position carried: over 1,000 prisoners. At ford near Perehinsko (6 miles S. of Ldziany), Sliwki—Jasien (further S.), stubborn resistance. Heavy rains, rivers rapidly rising, roads inundated.

15TH.—On the Lower Lomnica, "fusillades" and artillery activity. Left bank of Lomnica, N.E. of Kalusz, attacks repulsed: successful counter-attack. Right bank of Lomnica, Landestreu—Ldziany—Krasna, Ldziany village captured: W. end abandoned under counter-attack: E. end entrenched: 16 officers, 900 Austro-German other ranks, numerous machine-guns, taken. Total captures, 1st—13th, 834 officers, 35,809 other ranks, 93 guns, 28 trench mortars, 403 machine-guns, 43 mine throwers, 45 bomb throwers, 3 fire throwers, 2 aeroplanes, a vast quantity of stores and material.

16TH.—N.E. of Kalusz, "for tactical considerations," troops on left bank of Lomnica withdrawn to right bank. Kalusz evacuated. Important fords of the Lomnica secured. Novica—Ldzinay—Masna, "swaying fight." Novica village lost and recaptured.

17TH.—Artillery activity intense near Potutory (S. of Brzezany), and Halicz. S. of Novica, 7 p.m., "one of our regiments began to leave": a height lost: retirement to River Bereznica. 8 p.m., height recovered: 8 officers, 220 other ranks, taken.

18TH.—W. end of Novica recaptured and lost: two attacks repulsed on E. end.

19TH.—Attack repulsed Pieniaki—Hambuzow (10—20 miles N. of Zborow). 10 a.m., a "regiment situated between Batkow and Manajow left their trenches voluntarily and retired, with the result that the neighbouring regiments had to retire also." Position lost. E. of Brzezany, and S. of Szybalin, part of first-line trench lost. S. of Brzezany, attacks broken. W. of Halicz, detachment holding Bludnicki retired: village lost: counter-attack failed.

20TH.—N. of Brzezany, "our troops, on the whole, not showing the necessary stability," retired to Raniow—Hladki—Pokropuvna—Wybudow, on roads to Tarnapol. Byski—Polutory, heavy bombardment. On the Lomnica, near Novica, several attacks repulsed: a height lost.

21ST.—Vilna—Baronovitchi (S.W. of Dvinsk), intense artillery duel. Further S., "our troops have shown complete disobedience towards their commanders, and are continuing their retreat beyond the Sereth. Only the 155th Division resisted" near Dolzanka—Domomorycz (6 miles W. of Tarnapol). Towards evening, a stand on 27-mile front, Zalocze—Tarnapol—Myszkowice (left bank of Sereth). Zagrobela (Tarnapol suburb, right bank of Sereth) lost. On the Lomnica, Babin village lost: retreat to right bank.

22ND.—Near Vilna, captured part of position Tsary—Bogushi (8 miles N. to 3 N.E. of Krevo), penetrating 2 miles: 1,000 German prisoners. "Further success jeopardised by instability and moral weakness of certain detachments." Heroism of officers. On Upper Sereth, Zalocze—Tarnapol, "rifle firing." To S. of Berezwica—Wielke (left bank of Sereth, S. of Tarnapol), intense artillery activity. Between the Sereth, Strypa, and Zlota Lipa, villages of Nastasow, Bieniawa (on the Strypa), Uswie, and Slawentyn (4 to 7 miles S. of Tarnapol—Brzezany Railway) lost.

23RD.—S.W. of Dvinsk, captured positions astride Dvinsk—Vilna Railway. Some units "voluntarily retired to their trenches." Heroism of loyal corps and officers. On the Sereth, "fusillades as far as Tarnapol." Furious bombardment of Zagrobela. Village of Wola Mazowiecka (on left bank of Sereth, near Mykulince), lost. On the Strypa, Bernadowka, Darachow, and Burkanov lost. N.W. of Buszeez—Najworonka—Monasterzyska, line held. S. of Oniertes, retirement to E. Stanislaw evacuated after "stubborn bayonet engagements. The inhabitants threw hand grenades from their balconies and windows upon our departing troops."

24TH.—Near Vilna, position captured N.E. of Krevo on 22nd abandoned: retired to former line. Corps holding Tarnapol "voluntarily retired" E. Loyal units maintained their ground S.E. of the town. On the left bank of the Sereth.

Berezowica—Czartorya—Mikulinu lost: retirement to Snykowce—Gniezna River—Trembowla. Fighting E. of Myskowice (left bank of the Sereth, below Tarnapol), and between the Sereth and Strypa. N.W. of Romanowka, 3 divisions "moved to the rear": halting in the evening Romanowka—Petaskowce—Getidowce. W. of the Strypa, position near Olesza lost: retreat to Przewloka—Lezierzany—Barysz: loyal units fought well.

25TH.—Near Vilna and Smorgon, artillery activity. E. of Tarnapol, "under pressure," retirement to Hniedezno and Gniezna Rivers (5 and 8 miles from the town). N.E. of Trembowla, position on the Gniezna near Losniow lost: efforts to restore situation unsuccessful. S. of Trembowla, position on the Sereth lost. Zalawie—Podhujczski, retirement E.: counter-attacks with "no definite result." On right bank of the Sereth, Janow, Budzanow, and Zwiniacz lost. Left bank near Kabylowloki bombarded. Towards evening, river abandoned, retirement E. "Certain units mutinous, others devotedly fulfilling their duty to their Fatherland." From the Sereth to the Dniester, retreat continued S.E. Kossow—Barysz (8 to 23 miles N. of the Dniester), enemy "engaged in battle." From the Dniester to the Carpathians, retirement E. Nizniow (on the Dniester) and Clumacz (to S.) evacuated. Korosciatyn—Komasowka (near Monasterzyska) enemy repulsed: thrown back N.W.

26TH.—N. of the Pripet, "fusillades": "particularly animated" Smorgon—Krevo. N.E. of Tarnapol, attacks repulsed Lozowa—Smykowce. S.E. of Tarnapol, Plotycz, and Czystylow (both on the Sereth) lost. Retirement for short distance. Attacks N. of Tudorow (N. of Czortkow) repulsed. From the Dniester to the Carpathians, retreat E.

27TH.—Mount Botosul—Kirlibaba, pressed back.

28TH.—Baltic—the Pripet, "rifle firing and aerial activity." W. of Zbarag (N.E. Galicia), attack repulsed.

29TH.—Zbaraz bombarded. S. of Husiatyn (on Russian frontier), attempted crossing of River Zbrucz defeated. Attack on bridgehead near Zaleszezyki (on the Dniester) repulsed. S.W. of Zaleszezyki, after "a number of stubborn attacks" driven back slightly Zwiniacze—Kisselu—Stechowa—Carpathians. E. of Mount Tomnatik and Capul retirement "under pressure" on Szipoth—Kamerale—Moldawa (S. Buckovina).

30TH.—N. of Husiatyn, 2 lines of trenches penetrated: "after a bayonet fight, the situation restored." Near Pukliary, attempted crossing of the Zbrucz repulsed. Attacks on Germanovka beaten off. "Under pressure," Zaleszezyki evacuated. S. of the Dniester, after "a series of stubborn encounters, pressed back" from Zaleszezyki—Sniatyn, Dorochoutz, Zastavna, Werenczanaka, and Orocher.

31ST.—S.W. of Brody, near Dubie—Zarkov, attack repulsed. In Trembovla area, "a partial offensive" carried position near Grzjimalov. "Repeated attempts" to cross the Zbrucz frustrated N. of the Husiatyn and S. of Zbrzyz. Zbrucz—Dniester Rivers, position Zabutz—Germanovka—confluence of Biskuppe forced: "great losses, especially amongst officers." "After repelling a series of attacks chiefly along S. bank of the Dniester and Czernowitz road, retired over the Zbucz, Dniester, and Pruth Rivers somewhat to E. of Gerement." Near Sipitul (Carpathians) attempts beaten off. Slight retirement near Bratz.

RUMANIAN FRONT.

18TH.—Revival of artillery activity Susitza and Sereth Valleys.

20TH.—Attack repulsed near confluence of Rimnic and Sereth Rivers.

23RD.—Russians penetrated position Domuc—Patak: 50 prisoners. "The battalion then returned to its own trenches." In S. Carpathians, attack repulsed

near Mount Oitoz. N. of the Putna, Rumanians captured position Campurile—de Sus: advanced on Guerile—Volocsany.

24TH.—Successful raid Bystro—Patak: 33 prisoners, 2 machine-guns, taken. Position Maresti—Volocsany captured: "several hundred" prisoners, 19 guns (some heavy), taken. By evening, line broken on "wide front."

25TH.—Putna—Sereth Valleys, "mutual bombardments." Advance W. up Susitza Valley on Soveja—Guerile—Vidra. To date, over 1,000 prisoners, 33 guns, 17 machine-guns, 10 mine throwers, much material, taken.

26TH.—Advance continued $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles between Casin and Putna Valleys: 450 prisoners, 10 villages (including Soveja, Dragoslav, Negrulesti, Topesti, Valeasarci, and Colacul), 2 batteries 4-inch howitzers, 9 3-inch guns, etc., taken. Whole of "old position" now captured on 19-mile front to depth of 9 miles. Enemy retreated "in disorder."

27TH.—Towards Kezdi, Vasarhely, carried heights $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles S.W. of Monastirka, Casin, Dragoslav, Barsesti, and heights S.W. of Barsesti. Some prisoners, 1 battery, taken. Counter-attacks repulsed. Crossed the Putna near Colacul: occupied Boduple on left bank.

28TH.—Carried heights 7 miles W. of Monastirka. Near Poiana, on right bank of the Putna, heavy fighting for Magura—Casinulvi heights. Casin—Putna Valleys, "reciprocal" artillery activity. 24th—28th, in this direction, 4,500 prisoners, 98 guns, etc., taken by Allies.

29TH.—N. of Jacobini (Putna Valley)—Kimpolung road, Russians repulsed attack. Evening, S. of the road, pressed back on heights W. of Fundul Moldavi. Attacks repulsed Dornei—Bursul, and astride Focsani—Adjudul Railway.

30TH.—Magura—Casinului heights captured.

31ST.—Near Negrey, S.W. of Kimpolung, Russians thrust back to E.

BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—British captured trench near Dodzeli. Our airmen bombed Porna station and camps near Demir Hissar. Italian Albanians raided near Panaret: took some Austrian regulars.

2ND.—Patrol fighting on the Struma sector. Artillery activity near Lake Doiran. (Both in British sphere.)

4TH.—Two strong patrols repulsed on right of Italian sphere.

5TH.—British repulsed attack on trenches between Lake Doiran and the Vardar, captured in April. Our airmen bombed Drama, Porna, and Angista stations (Struma Valley): camps and dumps elsewhere.

8TH.—Night 7th—8th. Attack on the Tcherma bend repulsed. 8th, artillery "moderately active" on the Tcherma, and N. of Monastir.

9TH.—British airmen bombed Petric (Strumnitza Valley, Bulgaria). Tcherma bend bombarded.

11TH.—British airmen bombed Angista station (17 miles E. of Seres, in Struma Valley). Patrol encounters in Vardar Valley.

14TH.—On the Vardar sector, strong patrol repulsed.

15TH.—Bombardment on the Vardar, and N.W. of Monastir. Serbs repulsed raid near Crvena Stena (N.W. of Monastir).

18TH.—Italian aircraft bombed Berat and other camps.

19TH.—British bombed Petric. Artillery activity near Monastir.

20TH.—British bombed Porna and Dedeli (N. of Lake Doiran). Patrol activity in Vardar Valley. Serbs repulsed attack near Crvena Stena.

21ST.—Serbs repulsed fresh attack on Crvena Stena. Serb aerial activity.

22ND.—Successful British raids near Homondos (5 miles S.W. of Seres), in Vardar Valley, and near Puljovo.

23RD.—British bombed camps near Demir Hissar and Staravina.

25TH.—Aerial activity.

29TH.—Grenade fighting near Huma (N.W. of Liumnica). Violent bombardment of our lines. Near Staravina, raid smashed. Near Lake Prespa, concentration broken.

30TH.—Night 29th—30th. Successful Italian raid near Dörza (30 miles N.E. of Argyrokastron, Albania). 30th, patrol activity near Barakli and Lunzi (on right bank of the Vardar). Patrols repulsed near the Tchernia bend. Artillery activity on wide front.

CAUCASIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Repulsed "series of attacks on our positions near Bistan." N.W. of Sinna, advanced detachment reached Lake Zeribar: "attacked enemy, who is defending roads to Penjvin." (80 miles N. of Khanikin.)

2ND.—Enemy in retreat. Cavalry entered Engidja village (N. of Lake Zeribar). "Stronghold" of Kala Merivan (S.E. of Lake Zeribar), Abahen, and Derehue villages, occupied.

3RD.—Captured Penjvin: enemy retired to heights W. and S. "offering stubborn resistance."

5TH.—Repulsed enemy: re-occupied Serdesht.

7TH.—"Under pressure," Penjvin, Khanikin, and Kasr-i-Shirin abandoned. Touch lost with British in Mesopotamia.

13TH.—Near Van, threw enemy advanced parties back over Arish Darassi River (7 miles W. of Vastan). "Dislodged" enemy N. of Sirdesht and heights 13 miles S.W. of Bana.

15TH.—Repulsed attacks S.W. of Gumishkhanch (S. of Trebizond). Stopped advance near Mount Gurran. (near Penjvin.)

16TH.—Captured 3 patrols 10 miles S. of Petra Kale (S.W. of Pleu, on Black Sea coast). Destroyed bridge across the Karshut Darassi.

MESOPOTAMIA FRONT.

9TH.—Thermometer 119° in shade. Raiders at Bakuba, June 28th, followed and bombed.

11TH.—Detachment from Feluja on the Euphrates attacked column near Ramadieh (28 miles W. above Feluja). Further advance suspended owing to heat.

EGYPTIAN FRONT.

Early in month, Grand Sheriff of Mecca defeated Turks. Arabs advanced to Akaba (at head of E. gulf of Red Sea), and Maan (on Hedjaz Railway, 65 miles S. of Dead Sea): in touch with our troops in Palestine and Sinai, and isolating Turks in Yemen.

14TH.—Near Gaza, successful raid near coast: some prisoners taken.

19TH.—Two cavalry regiments driven from El Buggar—El Girjeir (9 miles W. of Beersheba).

21ST.—Night 20th—21st. Near Gaza, successful raid: 17 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, 1 trench mortar, many rifles, etc., taken.

28TH.—Night 27th—28th. Near Gaza, successful raid: 20 prisoners.

EAST AFRICA.

11TH—15TH.—Near Kilwa. Encircling movement continued on Mtshakama—Utigeri (in hills 30 miles S.W. of Kilwa). 12th, right column captured Utigeri: advanced 6 miles. 13th, advanced from Mainokwe on Mtshakama, co-operating

with centre and left columns advancing from N. and N.E. 14th, right column drove enemy N.E. out of Mtandawala. 15th, reached Rungo ($7\frac{1}{2}$ miles S.W. of Mtshakama): cut through bush to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of position. S.E. of Iringa (160 miles N.E. of Lake Nyassa), one column drove enemy from Ruipa River, advanced on Ikfara's: another from Lupembe (80 miles N.E. of Lake Nyassa), advanced towards Mpepo's and Mahenge (100 miles E. of Lupembe). 13th, in Sonoga area (near Portuguese border), enemy rearguard retreating on Mahenge engaged 6 miles N. of Luguruka (33 miles S. of Mponda's, on road to Mahenge). 11th, in Portuguese Nyassaland, enemy driven from Mwembe (90 miles S. of Rovuma River), pursued 30 miles N.E. Portuguese co-operated from Mlange (S.E. of Lake Nyassa). In N. area, Belgians advanced towards Ikoma against enemy detachment W. of Lake Natron (150 miles E. of Lake Victoria Nyanza).

17TH.—Enemy evacuated Mtshakama: part retreating to Likawayu, main body on Naramgombe (33 miles S.W. of Lindi).

18TH.—Ridge occupied 2 miles N. of Naramgombe.

19TH.—After severe fight, Naramgombe captured: enemy main body retired towards Mbemkuru Valley (60 miles distant), a small detachment through Lukawayu towards Liwali (120 miles S.W. of Kilwa). Heavy rains delayed pursuit.

20TH.—In N. area, enemy reported on N. shore of Lake Manyara (46 miles E. of Arusha).

21ST.—In Rufiji area, Kitope (95 miles N.W. of Kilwa) occupied. In Songea area, column in touch near Liwuka with enemy retreating to Mahenge (58 miles N.) In Portuguese East Africa, enemy retiring "hastily" towards Rovuma River making for Sassawara and the Ukula Hills: close pursuit. In N. enemy detachment retreated through Engaruku (W. of Arusha), pursued by Belgians from Ikoma.

By 29TH.—Positions captured on Lugungu River (62 miles S.E. of Iringa) and at Bytuliras (55 miles S. of Mahenge).

DIARY 1st—31st AUGUST, 1917.

BRITISH—FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night July 31st—August 1st. Progress on Zillebeke—Zandvoorde road S. of Ypres—Comines Canal. Counter-attacks repulsed on new positions near Basseville, the Canal, and Westhoek—St. Julien. Attack near Ypres—Roulers Railway broken. Successful raid E. of Bois Grenier. 1st, St. Julien evacuated. 3rd, attack on Ypres—Roulers Railway gained footing.

French.—Night July 31st—August 1st. Artillery activity on the Aisne sector. Progress E. of Cerny: 30 prisoners. 1st, attack repulsed on position Avocourt Wood—Hill 304 captured July 17th. Artillery activity Craonne—Hurtebise. W. of Cerny, attacks repulsed: 30 prisoners.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. Ground lost on Ypres—Roulers Railway recovered. Successful raid S.E. of Hargicourt. Heavy rain. 2nd, attacks repulsed N.E. of Ypres, and Ypres—Roulers Railway—St. Julien. Successful raid N.E. of Gouzeaucourt.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. Artillery activity E. of Braye-en-Laonnois—W. of Craonne. S.E. of Vauxaillon, 24 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, taken. On left bank of the Meuse, violent bombardment. Three attacks on Avocourt Wood, raids in Apremont Forest and S.E. of St. Mihiel, completely failed. 2nd, two attacks E. of Cerny stopped. In Champagne, patrol: on left bank of Meuse, artillery activity.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. Still wet and stormy. Attack on Infantry Hill (E. of Monchy-le-Preux) gained footing at two points. Raids repulsed S.E. of Quéant, and on new post N.W. of Warneton. Progress S. of Hollebeke 3rd,

St. Julien re-occupied. Concentration near Ypres—Roulers Railway broken. Raids repulsed N.E. of Gouzeaucourt, and S.E. of Fontaine-les-Croisilles. Successful raid near Lombartzyde.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. E. and S. of Cerny, violent attacks on 1,600 yards-front heavily repulsed. Artillery duel, especially Avocourt Wood—Hill 304. 3rd, attack on Cerny broken.

4TH, *British.*—Night 3rd—4th. Infantry Hill cleared. French progressed E. of Kortikeer Cabaret. Heavy rain. 4th, progress N.W. of St. Julien. Artillery activity E. of Messines, and near Nieuport.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. Two attempts repulsed on Avocourt Wood. 4th, E. of Cerny, two attacks repulsed. Artillery activity "marked" near Avocourt and Douaumont.

5TH, *British.*—Night 4th—5th. Great artillery activity near Hollebeke, and Ypres—Comines Canal. French progress W. of Bixschoote. Raid repulsed S. of Arleux-en-Gohelle (S.E. of Vimy). Successful raid E. of Vermelles. 5th, attack repulsed on Hollebeke: some prisoners. Raid repulsed S. of Quéant. Weather better. 5 aircraft brought down: 3 damaged. One of ours missing.

French.—Night 4th—5th. Two "small" attempts on the Casemates "easily" repulsed. 12.30 a.m., "serious attack" S. of Juvincourt (E. of Craonne): part of a trench lost and regained after "a very lively fight." Artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse, notably near Mort Homme and Caurières Wood. 5th, artillery activity La Royère Farm—Craonne, and "in the region of the mountains," Champagne.

6TH, *British.*—Night 5th—6th. Attacks repulsed near Hollebeke and Westhoek. Successful raid E. of Epéhy (W. of Le Catelet). 6th, raid repulsed N. of Arleux. Progress S.W. and W. of Lens.

French.—Night 5th—6th. Attempts foiled E. of Moisy Farm (E.S.E. of Vauxaillon), S. of La Bodelle (N.E. of Cerny), near Avocourt Wood, and in Alsace. 6th, artillery activity in Champagne, near Avocourt and Louvemont (Meuse).

7TH, *British.*—"Nothing of special interest." Bombed railway 40 miles behind enemy lines.

French.—Night 6th—7th. Artillery activity near Bixschoote, N. of the Aisne, and Hurtebise—Craonne. Three successful raids in Champagne. On left bank of Meuse, attack Avocourt Wood—Hill 304: "under the violence of our well-directed fire, assailants forced at once to return to their trenches of departure, having sustained appreciable loss." In Upper Alsace, patrol encounters. 8th, "In Belgium, artillery duel assumed a certain violence." On right bank of the Meuse, attack on Caurières Wood gained "lodging: immediately ejected." Artillery "lively" W. of Cerny and near Hurtebise.

8TH, *British.*—Night 7th—8th. Successful raid near Lombartzyde. Artillery activity near Westhoek, and Ypres—Staden Railway. Raids repulsed S. of Roeux, and near Oppy. 8th, artillery activity E. of Ypres. French progress N.W. of Bixschoote. Heavy rain. 2 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. None of ours missing.

French.—Night 7th—8th. Artillery activity on the Aisne. Attempts E. of Vauxaillon and W. of California Plateau broken. Raids near St. Mihiel and in Upper Alsace "completely failed." 8th, "Fairly violent artillery actions" near the Panthéon and Royère Farm: in Caurières Wood and near Douaumont (right bank of Meuse).

9TH, *British.*—Night 8th—9th. French progress S. of Langemarck (N.W. of Bixschoote). Attempt repulsed N. of Roeux. 9th, artillery activity near Ypres and Nieuport. Successful raid near Lens. 5 aircraft brought down: 2 balloons destroyed, 4 damaged. 4 of our aircraft missing. Weather bad.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Artillery duels near the Panthéon and Chevregny Ridge. Successful raids E. of Moisy Farm (E.S.E. of Vauxaillon), and N. of Vaux-le-Palameix, near Eparges (S.E. of Verdun). 9th, artillery activity near the Panthéon, Chevregny Ridge, Auberive, and on both banks of the Meuse. Bombed aerodromes at Colmar, and Habbheim (E.S.E. of Mulhouse).

10TH, *British.*—Night 9th—10th. Successful raid E. of Monchy-le-Preux : 86 prisoners. Attacked on 2-mile front near Frezenberg—S. and S.E. of Westhoek : captured remainder of Westhoek, positions on Westhoek Ridge, and Glencorse Wood : 9 officers, 445 other ranks, 6 guns taken. French progressed N. and E. of Bixschoote : some machine-guns taken. Raids repulsed S.E. of Guemappe, and N.E. of Gouzeaucourt. 10th, 11 aircraft brought down, 5 damaged : 12 of ours missing. 6½ tons of bombs dropped.

French.—Night 9th—10th. Near Fayet (N. of St. Quentin), attack on 1,000 yards gained a "small" footing in centre. On the Aisne, bombardment Allemant—Filain. 4 a.m., violent attacks Panthéon—Chevregny Ridge repulsed : 100 prisoners. Attempts broken S. of Ailles, S.E. of Chevreux, near Vauquois—Avocourt, and N.W. of Fliry (E. of St. Mihiel). 10th, artillery duel near Fayet (N. of St. Quentin). 3 p.m., 2 attacks stopped Mennechet Mill—Cepy Farm. Violent artillery duel Panthéon—Chevregny spur. Attack E. of Maisons de Champagne broken on wings : after temporary success in centre, line restored. Violent artillery duels near Hill 304, Mort Homme, and Bezonvaux.

11TH, *British.*—Night 10th—11th. Six attacks repulsed on positions E. of Ypres won night 9th—10th : "fierce fighting" : progress near Ypres—Menin road. Successful raid near Armentières. 11th, counter-attack near Ypres—Menin road : after "heavy fighting, line pressed back slightly in Glencorse Wood. Near Ypres—Staden Railway, progress on right bank of the Steenbeek. 124 prisoners taken during the day. 3 machines brought down : 4 damaged. 5 of ours missing.

French.—Night, 10th—11th. N. of St. Quentin, recovered most of the elements lost near Fayet 9th—10th : 15 prisoners. S. of Ailles, captured "an important trench solidly held" : 10 prisoners : counter-attacks repulsed. In Champagne, several attacks on Mont Cornillet : E. and W. "stopped dead" : N. 50 yards advanced line lost. Attacks broken near Mont Haut and Mont Blond. Successful raid near the Casque. 11th, N. of St. Quentin, fresh attack near Fayet smashed. Artillery "somewhat slackened" in the Moronvillers area. "Intermittent elsewhere."

12TH, *British.*—Night 11th—12th. Wet and stormy. Seized near lip of mine crater E. of Givenchy-lez—La Bassée : counter-attack repulsed. Artillery activity N.E. of Ypres. 12th, Portuguese repulsed raid S. of Armentières. Stormy, 9 aircraft brought down : 8 damaged. 7 of ours missing.

French.—Night 11th—12th. N. of St. Quentin, remainder of ground lost E. of Fayet 9th—10th recovered : 20 prisoners. Successful raids Moisy Farm—Laffaux Mill. S. of Ailles, two attacks (one "very violent") repulsed on trench captured 10th—11th. In Champagne and on both banks of the Meuse, "fairly lively artillery duel." W. of Avocourt, attempt "stopped." Patrol encounters in Carspach Wood (Alsace). 12th, artillery activity near Hurtebise, and on both banks of the Meuse. Reims shelled.

13TH, *British.*—Artillery activity S. of Arras—Cambrai road, and near Neuport. 7 aircraft brought down : 4 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 12th—13th. Artillery activity Cerny—Craonne, especially S. of Ailles. Attack repulsed on trench S. of Ailles captured 10th—11th. Fairly lively artillery E. of Reims, near the Casque and Teton (Champagne), and on both banks of the Meuse. Two attacks on Caurières Wood and Bezonvaux broken. 13th, lively artillery duels. S. of Ailles, several attacks repulsed : progress to E. 850 shells on Reims, many incendiary. Artillery violent near Mont Cornillet, on both

banks of the Meuse, and in Parroy Forest (N.E. of Lunéville). 2 aircraft, 1 balloon, brought down: 3 damaged.

14TH, British.—Night 13th—14th. Successful raids N.E. of Gouzeaucourt, and E. of Vermelles. Raids repulsed N. of Roeux, E. of Laventie, and by Portuguese E. of Neuve Chapelle. Artillery "more active than usual" E. and N.E. of Ypres, and near Lombartzyde. 14th, attack repulsed E. of Westhoek. Progress on right bank of the Steenbeek. 9 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. 7 of ours missing (2 caught in storm over enemy line).

French.—Night 13th—14th. Successful raid N.W. of Reims. Attempts near Mont Cornillet repulsed. 14th, artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse. Raids repulsed E. of Cerny, E. of Caurières Wood, and near Carspach.

15TH, British.—Night 14th—15th. French progress W. of Dixmude road, N.W. of Bixschoote. Raid repulsed on new position E. of Klein Zillebeke: 14 prisoners. Heavy rain. 4.45 a.m., attacked on "wide front" N.W. outskirts of Lens—Bois Hugo, N.E. of Loos. 15th, positions S.E. and E. of Loos stormed on 2-mile front. "Formidable defences" of Hill 70, Cité Ste. Elizabeth, Cité St. Emile, Cité St. Laurent, Bois Rasé, and W. half of Bois Hugo, captured. All objectives gained: line advanced 1 mile. Five counter-attacks repulsed. Up to 9 p.m., 15 officers, 267 other prisoners, counted. Attack near Pilkem—Langemarck road repulsed. 12 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 14th—15th. Hurtebise—Craonne, "rather lively bombardment." Vauclerc Plateau, attack on small post failed. Artillery duel on both banks of the Meuse. Attempt W. of Hill 304 failed. "Night calm everywhere else." 15th, "Relatively calm." Artillery duels N. of the Aisne, in Champagne, on both banks of the Meuse, and in Upper Alsace. Successful raid near Four de Paris (Argonne). Reims bombarded. 100 shells on Pont-à-Mousson.

16TH, British.—Night 15th—16th. Three counter-attacks on new positions near Lens repulsed. Concentration near Cité St. Auguste (E. of Hill 70) broken. French repulsed attack astride the Steenbeek. 4.45 a.m., attacked on "wide front" E. and N. of Ypres. 16th, on left, French captured bridgehead of Drie Graschten: 3 officers, 400 other ranks, taken. Centre, captured Langemarck: advanced $\frac{1}{2}$ mile beyond: heavy fighting. Right, seized high ground N. of Menin road: repeated counter-attacks: afternoon, part of new ground lost: evening, fresh counter-attacks broken. By 10 p.m. 38 officers, 1,800 other prisoners, counted. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs dropped on aerodromes, stations, and camps. 15 aircraft, 1 balloon brought down: 11 aircraft damaged. 11 of ours missing. R.N.A.S. bombed Ostend, Thourout Station, Ghistelle, Engel, and Vytkerke aerodromes. Progress E. of Loos. In this sector, 22 officers, 874 other prisoners, now counted.

French.—Night 15th—16th. Camps bombed E. of Houthulst Forest (S.E. of Dixmude), and Lichtervelde Station (12 miles E. of Dixmude). S. of Ailles, captured nearly 1 mile of solidly held trench system: four counter-attacks repulsed: 1 officer, 120 other ranks, taken. Progress near Hurtebise Monument: 20 prisoners. Artillery activity in Champagne, and on both banks of the Meuse. Successful attack near Louvemont (Verdun). 16th, artillery activity Hurtebise—Laffaux. In Alsace, raids repulsed on the Barenkopf, and S. of the Hartsmannswellerkopf. St. Quentin Cathedral fired.

Belgian.—One aircraft brought down.

17TH, British.—Night 16th—17th. French repulsed attack astride the Steenbeek: captured post E. of the stream. Now taken by them, over 400 prisoners, 15 guns, many machine-guns. Two attacks repulsed near Cité St. Auguste, E. of Loos: in second, slight ground lost and recovered. A third attack broken. Artillery activity E. of Ypres. Successful raid near Vermelles. 17th, progress W. of Lens. Now taken in this direction, 23 officers, 1,117 other ranks, 9 guns. 12 aircraft brought down: 18 damaged. 12 of ours missing (2 collided).

French.—Night 16th—17th. Attack on $\frac{1}{4}$ -mile front Vauclerc Mill—California Plateau repulsed. "Violent and repeated attacks" on new positions E. of Cerny beaten off. Attempt W. of Braye-en-Laonnois frustrated. Attack N. part of Caurières Wood—Bezonvaux repulsed; slight footing lost. Bombed Cortemarck station (10 miles E. of Dixmude). 17th, "Cannonade rather lively" along the Aisne, especially near Craonne: "violent" Caurières Wood—Bezonvaux. 250 shells on Reims. 7 aircraft, 1 balloon, brought down: 8 aircraft damaged.

18TH, *British.*—Night 17th—18th. Attacks repulsed N.W. of Lens, E. of Loos, and near Bois Hugo. Artillery activity N.E. of Ypres. 18th, N.E. of Ypres, "quieter." 3 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. 8 of ours missing.

French.—Night 17th—18th. N. of the Aisne, "various raids" repulsed, notably E. of Froidmont Farm (N.W. of Braye-en-Laonnois). Massed troops dispersed near Main des Messiges (Champagne). Attempt foiled near Carspach (Alsace). During 17th and night 17th—18th, 111 aircraft made "various flights," dropping 13,000 kilograms of projectiles. Bombed aviation camps at Colmar, Frescati, and Halsheim (just E. of Mulhouse): stations of Freiburg, Breisgau, Longuyon (10 miles S.W. of Longwy), Montmédy (19 miles S. of Longwy), Pierrepont (17 miles S. of Longwy), St. Juvin, Grand Pré, Challerange (all three S.W. of Dun-sur-Meuse), Dun-sur-Meuse, etc.: bivouacs in Spincourt Forest (17 miles N.E. of Verdun). 18th, "considerable" artillery activity Vauclerc—California Plateau, and on both banks of Meuse. 11 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. Bombed stations at Cortemarck, Thourout, Lichtervelde, Ostend, Cambrai, and Dun-sur-Meuse: hutments in Houthulst Forest: and munition dump at Bantheville (S.W. of Dun).

Belgian.—One aircraft brought down.

19TH, *British.*—Night 18th—19th. Captured trenches near Gillemont Farm (S.E. of Epéhy): "several" prisoners. Successful raid S.W. of Havrincourt (N. of Epéhy). 19th, near Ypres—Poelcapelle road, advanced 500 yards on 1-mile front: "several" prisoners. 6 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged. 6 of ours missing. Total prisoners taken 16th, now "ascertained" as 55 officers, 2,059 other ranks. R.N.A.S. bombed Ghent and Thourout stations, Snelleghem aerodrome (5 miles S.W. of Bruges).

French.—Night 18th—19th. Artillery duels N.W. and E. of Reims. Raids repulsed N. of Braye-en-Laonnois, near Berméricourt (N.W. of Reims), and La Pompelle (S.E. of Reims). Artillery duels both banks of the Meuse. Attempts broken in the Bois de Prêtre (W. of the Moselle), E. of Badonvillers, and N. of Celles-sur-Plaine (both S.E. of Bois de Prêtre). 19th, "marked" artillery activity near Braye-en-Laonnois, Cerny, and on both banks of the Meuse, especially near Bezonvaux. 600 shells on Reims. 1 aircraft, 1 balloon, brought down.

20TH, *British.*—Night 19th—20th. Attack on new position S.E. of Epéhy repulsed. Successful raid S. of Lens. Progress S.E. of St. Janshoek (N.N.E. of Bixshoote). 20th, concentration S.E. of Epéhy dispersed. Patrol encounters N.W. outskirts of Lens. Raid repulsed E. of Armentières. Nine aircraft brought down: 7 damaged. Four of ours missing.

French.—Night 19th—20th. Raid repulsed near Badonviller. Artillery activity in Alsace. In Belgium, aircraft bombed Thourout, Roulers, Staden, and Gits stations: near Verdun, Dun-sur-Meuse, Brielles, Fléville stations, Bantheville dump. 20th, on both banks of the Meuse, attacked on $11\frac{1}{4}$ -mile front Avocourt Wood—N. of Bezonvaux. On left bank, captured whole of Avocourt Wood, both summits of the Mort Homme, Corbeaux and Caurières Woods. On right bank, carried Talou Hill, Champneuville, Hill 344, Mormont Farm, Hill 240 (N. of Louvemont). Advanced in Fosse and Chaumes Woods. At some points, penetrated to over 1 mile. Over 4,000 prisoners taken. Violent counter-attacks repulsed on Avocourt Wood, the Mort Homme, and Hill 344. 23 aircraft brought down.

21ST, British.—Night 20th—21st. Third attack S.E. of Epéhy "completely repulsed." Successful raid E. of Epéhy, near St. Quentin Canal: "number of prisoners." Progress N. of Ypres—Messines road. 21st, early, W. and N.W. of Lens, captured trenches on 2,000 yards front. Noon: two counter-attacks N.W., one S. of Lens broken. Raid repulsed near Messines. Near Lens, 194 prisoners taken. Total captures since 15th now counted 1,378 prisoners, 34 machine-guns, 21 trench mortars. 12 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. 12 of ours missing (2 collided).

French.—Night 20th—21st. Attacks at three points Cerny Plateau—W. of Hurtebise repulsed. N. of Verdun, violent counter-attacks, especially on Avocourt and Caurières Woods, broken. Unwounded prisoners taken 19th, over 5,000, including 116 officers. 21st, "Inconsiderable artillery activity" near Vauxaillon and Cerny—Craonne Plateaux. In Champagne, gas reservoirs blown up near St. Hilaire: trenches found evacuated and full of corpses. Near Verdun: on left bank of the Meuse, captured Côte de l'Oie (S.W. of Regneville), and Regneville: on right bank carried Sampogneux and trenches thence to Hill 344. Counter-attacks repulsed. In the Vosges, raid on Hartmannsweilerkopf repulsed.

22ND, British.—Night 21st—22nd. Progress S, W., and N.W. of Lens. 22nd, E. and N.E. of Ypres, captured high ground near Ypres—Menin road: advanced 500 yards on 1-mile front: occupied W. part of "Inverness Copse." Further N. advanced over $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile on $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles front. Hard fighting: 250 prisoners. 12 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. On the Aisne, strong attacks repulsed near Mennejean Farm, E. of Braye, S. of La Bodelle, near Ailles and Hurtebise Monument. On left bank of the Meuse, violent counter-attacks repulsed Hill 304—Mort Homme: 80 prisoners. On right bank, violent attacks, especially on Marmont Farm—Hill 344 and N. of Caurières Wood, broken. 22nd, "somewhat violent artillery duel" Cerny—Braye. In Champagne, destroyed more gas reservoirs. Artillery activity near Verdun. 6 aircraft brought down, 5 damaged. Since 20th, now 6,116 unwounded prisoners, including 174 officers; 600 wounded, taken. In three tunnels under Mort Homme, "immense booty," a regimental staff, a chef-de-corps, and an engineer officer.

23RD, British.—Night 22nd—23rd. Progress S.W. of Lens. Attack E. of Langemarck repulsed. 23rd, early, fighting on "Spoil Heap": all day, for "Green Crassier" (huge slag heap) close S. of Lens. Attack repulsed on new position N. of Ypres—Roulers road. Progress N.E. of Langemarck. 1 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged. Three of ours missing. Enemy "showed little activity." R.N.A.S. bombed dumps at Middelkerke and Raversyde (near Ostend), Houtave aerodrome (10 miles N.W. of Bruges).

French.—Night, 22nd—23rd. On the Aisne, "great artillery activity" Braye—Hurtebise. Raids repulsed near Laffaux Mill, Cerny, and Ailles. On left bank of the Meuse, artillery activity. On right bank, "an isolated centre of resistance" captured N.E. of Mormont Farm: 17 prisoners. 23rd, artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse. Captured since 20th, 7,640 unwounded prisoners, including 186 officers; 600 wounded, 24 guns, over 200 machine-guns.

24TH, British.—Night 23rd—24th. "Fierce fighting" S. of Lens: trenches immediately N.W. of the "Green Cassier" captured. Portuguese repulsed two raids N.W. of La Bassée. Artillery activity N.E. of Ypres. Progress S.E. of St. Julien. 24th, advanced troops forced back on new position N. of Ypres—Menin road. "Fierce fighting" in "Inverness Copse" and "Glencorse Wood." "Numerous concentrations dealt with effectively."

French.—Night 23rd—24th. In Champagne, artillery activity. Patrols penetrated lines near Soissons and St. Hilaire. On left bank of the Meuse, 4.50 a.m., attacked Avocourt Wood—Mort Homme. "In a single rush" carried

"formidably organised" Hill 304 and Bois Camard (to W.). Pressing on N., stormed line of fortified works and reached S. bank of Forges Brook between Harcourt—Béthincourt. Average depth advanced $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Over 100 prisoners. E. of Esnes—Béthincourt, widened position N. of Mort Homme to depth of 1 mile: 450 unwounded prisoners. Total now 8,100. In Lorraine, raid repulsed near Moncel. 24th, in Champagne, "rather lively artillery duel" near the Teton. Near Verdun, "energetic" artillery duel, especially N. of Hill 304, and Samogneux—Chambrettes Farm. 6 aircraft brought down.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. Progress W. and N.W. of Lens. Artillery activity E. of Epéhy. Post gained and lost W. of Galeide Creek, near Lombartzyde. 25th, attack on new position at Gillemont Farm (S.E. of Epéhy). Slight ground lost N.E. of Farm: at other points, attack repulsed. Raid repulsed N.E. of Gouzeaucourt (N. of Epéhy). Weather bad. 3 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 24th—25th. Successful raids S.E. of St. Quentin, and W. of Panthéon. In Champagne, "fairly great artillery intensity in the mountain region" (Moronvillers). Surprise attack on Vauquois foiled. On left bank of the Meuse, advance N. of Hill 304: 3 fortified works S. of Béthincourt captured. 25th, artillery duels near Laffaux, Braye-en-Laonnois, and Cerny. On left bank of the Meuse, "weak artillery reply": on right bank, "somewhat lively."

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Ground lost at Gillemont Farm regained: counter-attack repulsed. Portuguese beat off raid S.E. of Laventie. Artillery activity E. of Ypres, and near Lombartzyde. 26th, early, captured position on over 1-mile front E. of Hargicourt (N.W. of St. Quentin): stormed Cologne and Malakoff Farms: penetrated to $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile depth: 136 prisoners. Near Ypres—Menin road, attack with liquid fire repulsed after momentary success in N.W. corner of "Inverness Copse." Progress S.E. of St. Julien. 4 aircraft brought down: 3 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 25th—26th. N. of Verdun, great artillery activity on right bank of Meuse, Samogneux—Chaumie Wood. On left bank, progress to S. outskirts of Béthincourt. On heights, two attacks repulsed. 26th, near Navarin Farm (Champagne), gas reservoirs destroyed. On right bank of the Meuse, attacked "vigorously" Mormont Farm—Chaumie Wood. Carried position on $2\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front to 1,000 yards depth: whole of Fosse and Beaumont Woods: advanced to S. outskirts of Beaumont. On left bank, hard fighting N. of Hill 304. Over 1,100 prisoners, including 32 officers. 4 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. Near Verdun, Eix aerodrome, Foameix hutments, Grémilly, and Wavrille bivouacs, bombed.

27TH, *British*.—Successful raid E. of Oosttaverne. Raid repulsed N. of Lens. Afternoon, attacked E. and S.E. of Langemarck. Heavy rain.

French.—26th—27th. On the Aisne, series of attacks repulsed, especially heavy E. of Moisy Farm (N. of Laffaux), E. and W. of Cerny, and near Hurtebise Monument. On right bank of the Meuse, counter-attack on S. outskirts of Beaumont "annihilated." Raids repulsed N. and N.E. of Vaux-les-Palameix. Shells on Commercy. 27th, on left bank of the Meuse, artillery "fairly lively." In Lorraine, surprise attempts repulsed near Seicheprey and Hartmannswellerkopf.

28TH, *British*.—Night 27th—28th.—Advanced 2,000 yards astride St. Julien—Poelcapelle road: occupied further portions of enemy's third system. Two attacks repulsed on "Inverness Copse." 28th, heavy rain and squalls.

French.—Night 27th—28th. California Plateau—Chevreux, "heavy bombardment checked." Successful raid on the Butte-de-Bouain (near Auberive). Raids repulsed near Mont Muret and Arracourt (N. of Lunéville)—Verdun. Artillery activity near Avocourt Wood and Beaumont. Two raids repulsed near Vaux-les-

Palameix (E. of Troyan). 28th, on the left bank of the Meuse, artillery "fairly lively."

29TH, *British*.—Night 28th—29th. Successful raids N.E. of Gouzeaucourt and S.W. of Hulluch. "Cleared up a strong point" close to our line S.E. of Lange-marck. 29th, attempt E. of Oostaverne driven off. Stormy weather.

French.—Night 28th—29th. Artillery activity on the Aisne, and Avocourt—Hill 304. Dump blown up near Courtecon (Aisne). Reconnaissance repulsed N. of Caurières Wood. Since 26th, 1,470 unwounded prisoners, including 37 officers, taken near Beaumont. 29th, artillery duels near Hurtebise Monument, and on both banks of the Meuse.

30TH, *British*.—Night 29th—30th. Artillery activity near Nieuport. Wet and stormy. 30th, progress S.E. of St. Janshoek. "Considerable artillery activity" near Lens, E. and N. of Ypres.

French.—Night 29th—30th. On the Aisne, "considerable artillery activity" near Braye-en-Laonnois, and Craonne. Attempt S. of Chevreux failed. In Champagne, E. of the Teton, successful raid: attempt repulsed. On both banks of the Meuse "reciprocal artillery activity." Attempts N. of Caurières Wood and near Vaux-les-Palameix "completely defeated." 30th, artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse.

31ST, *British*.—Night 30th—31st. Raid repulsed N. of Arleux-en-Gohelle. Enemy raid entered post E. of Oostaverne. 31st, heavy bombardment E. of Hargicourt—Epéhy—Gouzeaucourt. Isolated knoll N. of Gillemont Farm lost. Attack E. of Gouzeaucourt repulsed. Weather unsettled.

French.—Night 30th—31st. E. of Cerny, attempt repulsed. On both banks of the Meuse, artillery activity. In Alsace, surprise on Hartmannsweilerkopf failed. 31st, "artillery duel fairly lively" E. of Cerny, N. of Hill 304 (Verdun), and near Drei Grachten—Bixschoote. Near Vauxaillon, raid repulsed.

Total British captures since morning July 31st, 234 officers, 10,463 other ranks, 58 guns (6 heavy), 200 machine guns, 72 trench mortars (excluding French captures).

During August, allies brought down 179 aircraft, 9 balloons: damaged 118 aircraft, 2 balloons: 86 British aircraft reported missing, no French report. Germans claimed 131 aircraft, 15 balloons, brought down: 5 missing.

[Unofficial: August 14th—21st. British aircraft flew 12,000 hours, engaged 700 batteries, destroyed 128 gunpits, caused 321 explosions, took over 5,000 photographs, dropped 36 tons of bombs, and fired 30,000 rounds at troops from low altitudes: 68 brought down, 98 missing.]

War Office report: April 9th—August 22nd. French captured 46,155 Germans. British, 43,723. Italians, 40,681, chiefly Austrians. Russians, 37,221. Total enemy prisoners, 167,760. Since beginning of war, we captured 102,218 Germans: lost (including Indian troops), approximately 43,000. In all theatres (excluding African native troops) we captured 131,776: lost (excluding African native, but including Indian troops), approximately, 56,500.

ITALIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Attempts repulsed near Conca Laghi (Posina), E. of Maoro Valley (Brenta), S.W. of Monte Croce (Comalico), Monte Rizzoni (S. Pelligrino Valley), and N.E. of Plava. Some prisoners. Artillery activity Julian area.

2ND.—Night, 1st—2nd. "Large flights" bombed arsenal and works at Pola. 2nd, enemy "restless." Fighting all along line.

3RD.—Night, 2nd—3rd. Attack repulsed E. of Vertoiba (S.E. of Gorizia). 3rd, artillery and patrol activity "again desultory."

4TH.—Night 3rd—4th. Attack repulsed near Monte Rombon (Julian Alps). Pola arsenal bombed.

5TH.—Patrol activity in Rio d'Andraz Valley (Trentino). Attacks repulsed in Fella Valley, Monte Granuda (Carnia): and, after "keen struggle," near Monte Rombon. Progress S.E. of Boscomalo. Patrol encounter near Flondar.

6TH.—Artillery duel Julian area. Bombed depôts in Chiapovano Valley (N.E. of Gorizia).

7TH.—Artillery activity in Trentino and Carso. Chiapovano depôts bombed.

8TH.—Artillery "brisker" on the middle Isonzo, and in the Carso. Chiapovano depôts bombed.

9TH.—Night 8th—9th. Arsenal and fleet at Pola bombed. 9th, dawn, attacks broken in Coalba Valley (Brenta), and N. of Sta Caterina (Gorizia): 20 prisoners taken.

10TH.—Night 9th—10th. S.W. of Mori (Lagarina Valley) enemy penetrated advanced post: driven out. Chiapovano depôts bombed. 10th, artillery and patrol activity Julian area. Progress between Boscomalo and Kostanjevica.

11TH.—Night 10th—11th. Chiapovano depôts bombed.

12TH.—Artillery duel E. of Gorizia, and near Dosso Fajti (Carso). Patrols active Chiese—Astico (Trentino), and in Padola Valley.

13TH.—Attack on Vodice broken. Works at Modrea and Modrejce (S. of Tolmino) bombed and bombarded.

14TH.—Night 13th—14th. Successful reconnaissances near Monte Piana (Carnia), Scapapani (Frigido, or Vippacco), and Dosso Fajti (Carso). Attack repulsed near head of Padola Valley (Rio Andraz): 6½ tons of bombs dropped on railway centre at Assling, Sava Valley (S.E. of Villach).

15TH.—"Limited" artillery activity.

16TH.—Camps bombed E. of Comen (fifteen miles N.E. of Monfalcone).

17TH.—Raids repulsed in Upper Genova Valley (W. Trentino), S.W. of Paralba (Carnia), near Cima and Costabella (S. Peligrino Valley). Patrol of officers captured near Bordaglia (Carnia). "At intervals," intense artillery activity Julian area.

18TH.—Night 17th—18th. Bombed works at Comen. 18th, dawn, opened bombardment on 38-miles front, Monte Nero—the sea.

19TH.—Night 18th—19th. Bombardment continued, fourteen pontoon bridges thrown across the Isonzo, Anhovo—Auzza, N. of Anhovo. Occupied Monte Frata, villages on left bank of the Isonzo, and Ruccagliano: advanced on Kuk—Sommer. Plava—the sea, crossed first line (completely destroyed). "Brought pressure to bear." Kostanjevica—Brestovizza Valley, approached Selo. 208 aircraft "indefatigably participated." Up to evening, over 100 officers, 7,500 other ranks taken.

20TH.—Night 19th—20th. Local attacks repulsed Trentino and Carnia. Strong parties destroyed in Lagarina Valley: driven out of advanced post S.E. of Monte Maco. 20th, "Battle proceeding uninterruptedly, efficaciously supported on the extreme right wing" by naval monitors, etc., Carso. Positions carried Korite—Selo, near "strongly fortified" Stari Lokva. Selo occupied. Position stormed S.E. of Dosso Fajti (Fajti Hrib). Bainsizza Plateau, captured Vhr, and part Jelinik. 261 aeroplanes engaged. Bombed troops massed Selo—Comen, and E. slopes Monte Hermada: Tarvis railway works, etc. 1 aircraft brought down: 1 missing. Total prisoners now 243 officers, 10,103 other ranks.

21ST.—"New successes along the whole line." Jelenick captured. Advanced up Descla Valley on Kobelik, turning Kuk. Trentino and Carnia, "small attacks" repulsed: Ledro Valley, "bigger attack put to flight." Aircraft bombed Chiapovano Valley, and E. slopes of Monte Hermada. "Able-bodied prisoners" now 311 officers, over 13,000 men: 30 guns, "large and increasing booty."

22ND.—“Considerable progress” N. “New successes” S. Kobelik captured. Prisoners now 350 officers, over 16,000 men. Trentino and Carnia, “recurrence of small local actions.”

23RD.—“New positions carried, violent counter-attacks broken up.” Occupied Avsek Valley. Over 500 officers, 20,000 men, 60 guns, numerous trench mortars and machine-guns, now taken. Small attacks repulsed in Giudicaria and Zugna (Lagarina) Valleys, and at Seekoff (Monte Croce of Comelico, Tirol).

24TH.—Footing established on summit of Monte Junto and head of Gargaro Valley (E. of Monte Santo). Occupied Dol Pass (Monte Santo—Monte San Gabriele). Line advanced to centre of Plateau. Carso, “vain” counter-attacks on new positions. 223 aircraft engaged: bombed Chiapovano Valley, “crowded with troops.” 1 missing.

25TH.—Advance continued to E. border of Bainsizza Plateau. Captured Veliki Hrib (N. spur of Monte San Gabriele). Attacked Volnik. Crossed to E. slopes of Lower Chiapovano Valley. Carso, “standstill.” Captures now over 600 officers, 23,000 men, 75 guns, many machine-guns, trench mortars, etc.

26TH.—Bainsizza Plateau, “intensity of struggle increased. New resistance overcome at various points.” Advance beyond Chiapovano Valley. 500 more prisoners.

27TH.—Bainsizza Plateau, “intensity of struggle increased.” “Some positions captured.”

28TH.—“Mainly artillery actions.” Bainsizza Plateau, “closer contact.” Successful local attacks repulsed. “Unfavourable atmospheric conditions.”

Evening, attack broken Vippacco River—Dosso Falti. Trentino, “concentrated fire and numerous reconnoitring actions kept enemy busy.”

29TH.—Bainsizza Plateau, rearguards “overcome,” “powerful line of resistance” attacked. On heights E. of Gorizia, “some gains.” Over 1,000 prisoners, “several” machine-guns, taken. 246 aircraft “participated”: 40 dropped seven tons of bombs on batteries in Panovizza Wood (1—2½ miles E. of Gorizia).

30TH.—Bainsizza Plateau, attacks “everywhere driven back,” at some points advance: 561 prisoners. Panovizza Wood bombed. Dolomites, three attacks at mouth of Travenanzes Valley “completely repulsed.” Progress in Brestovizza Valley (S. Carso).

31ST.—Attacks on new positions on N. slopes of Monte San Gabriele and E. of Gorizia repulsed. Progress in Brestovizza Valley. Railway bombed near Grahovo (Tolmino). Trentino, patrol activity. Small attacks repulsed: 32 officers, 685 other ranks, taken. Total now 720 officers, 26,581 men.

RUSSIAN FRONT.

1ST.—N.W. of Khotin (between the Zbrucz and the Dniester), Kudrynce—Michalowka abandoned. Between the Dniester and the Pruth, Peribijkovry, Czarny Polok, Dobronoutz, Horoschoutz, and Kuczurmik (N. of Czernovitz) lost. In the Carpathians, “pressed back” to W. of River Putna (35 miles S.S.W. of Czernovitz). Near the Moldavica (N.E. of Kimpolung), Austrian attack repulsed: 2 officers, 152 other ranks, 8 machine-guns, taken in counter-attack.

2ND.—Near confluence of the Zbrucz and the Dniester, “after a stubborn battle, our troops retired in places across the Zbrucz.” Latkowce, Trubezyn, and Walkowce (on N. bank of the Dniester), lost. Dniester—Pruth, retirement E. In the Carpathians, Falkeu (in the Suczawa Valley, between Czernovitz and Kimpolung) lost. Fighting near the Moldavica.

3RD.—Night 2nd—3rd. Czernovitz abandoned: bridge over the Pruth blown up. 3rd, N. of Husiatyn, enemy on E. bank of the Zbrucz driven across the stream: 43 prisoners, 7 machine-guns, taken. S. of Skala (E. bank of Zbrucz),

Shustovtsy and Chornnokozintsy captured. Dniester—Pruth, retreat E. Enemy occupied Rashkoff, Poliana, Rarancze, and Czernovitz. In Carpathians, retreat E.

4TH.—Near Kovel, minor attack repulsed Velitsk—Kukhary. Near Bojan, captured Dolzok Wood (10 miles E. of Czernovitz): 20 officers, over 500 other ranks, 3 machine-guns, taken. S.W. of Bojan, Molodia and Kotul Bainski lost. W. of Sereth, Nev Fratautz (on the Suczawa) lost.

5TH.—N.E. of Czernovitz, "a series of heights occupied," enemy driven back to Toporoutz—Rarancze: 4 gun battery, some machine-guns, taken: retirement before counter-attack. S. of Czernovitz, retirement on Dolina, and Sereth and Suczawa Rivers. Hliboka, Kamenka, Wolczynitz, Chdikralva, and Radautz lost. Attack N.W. of Radautz unsuccessful.

6TH.—S.W. of Brody, "intense" bombardment Dubie—Zarkow. S. of Grzymalow (midway between the Sereth and the Zbrucz), drove back an advanced post. In the Sereth and Suczawa Valleys, retirement. Waschkoutz, Satulmare, Radautz, Burla, and Glitt lost.

7TH.—Near Semerinki (Vladimir—Volynski area), attack repulsed. Near Boldury (Brody area), patrol repulsed. Near Iwaszkowce (W. of Zbaraz, N.E. Galicia), advanced post pressed back. Near confluence of Dniester and Zbrucz Rivers, "energetic offensive" captured Boryszkowce, Wygoda, and heights W. of Wygoda: 7 officers, 300 other ranks, 4 machine-guns, taken. Waschkoutz—Oprischeny (N.W. of Sereth town), "persistent attacks" repulsed. S.W. of Sereth, trenches penetrated: "situation restored" by a counter-attack.

8TH.—Near Brody, "fusillades of greater intensity."

9TH.—Dubie—N. of Zarkow (near Brody), attack in "dense waves everywhere repulsed."

10TH.—"Fusillades" of "more than average intensity" near Lida (S.E. of Vilna).

11TH.—Increased artillery activity near Zbaraz (N.E. of Tarnopol), and Volochisk (on Russian frontier). Near Husiatyn, patrol crossed the Zbrucz, captured 21 prisoners, 2 machine-guns, in Austrian Husiatyn.

14TH.—"Animated fusillade" near Vilna and Tarnapol.

15TH.—The same near Dvinsk, Vilna and Baronovitchi.

16TH.—The same near Vilna and Jacobstadt.

17TH.—Slight attack broken near Stakhovtsy (S.W. of Lake Norotch).

19TH.—[German report. Since July 19th, in Eastern Galicia, the Bukovina, and Moldavia, total Austro-German captures, 655 officers, 41,300 other ranks, 257 guns, 548 machine-guns, 191 mine-throwers, 50,000 rifles, and immense quantities of material, etc.]. Riga—Mitau, artillery activity.

20TH.—Near Dvinsk, "animated fusillades." N. of Lake Drisviaty, "intense artillery activity." N. of Zaturty (Vladimir—Volyanki sector) attempt frustrated.

21ST.—Near Riga, 8 a.m., attacks Tirul Marsh—River Aa. Advanced posts retired $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles N. Bombardment on Leding (E. of the Aa). W. of Tirul Marsh, cavalry outposts retired to Anting and Kemmen. Near Dvinsk, "animated artillery firing." Near Brody, bombardment astride Brode—Krasny Railway.

22ND.—W. of Riga, retired from Ruggazem—Kemmen, 3—8 miles to Bigaum—Franksfort (Lake Stozzen). Raid repulsed S.W. of Lake Babit. "More vigorous" artillery activity. "Increased activity" near Keckau River (10 miles S. of Riga). Near Sokal (Volhynia sector), attack repulsed on Zboryskeff (25 miles N. of Brody).

24TH.—Near Baronovitchi (junction on Riga—Dvinsk—Vilna—Rovno Railway), "intense bombardment," especially on Labuzy. On Oginski Canal, attack repulsed after slight gain. At confluence of the Zbrucz, successful reconnaissance.

25TH.—Night 24th—25th. Vladimir—Volynski. "offensive repelled" near Shelvoff. 25th, near Baronvitchi, artillery and aerial activity.

28TH.—Near Brody, "more intense fusillades."

29TH.—Near Vilna, the same.

30TH.—The same S.W. of Lake Narotch, and Smorgon—Krevo (S.E. of Vilna).

RUMANIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Mount Paucha—Mount La Muntelu (N.E. Transylvania), Russians "pressed back somewhat" to E.

2ND.—Kimpolung evacuated. Fighting on the Bistritz.

3RD.—Fighting near the Moldovica (N.E. of Kimpolung). Watra (on the river) lost.

4TH.—Near Kimpolung, retired E. Wama lost. Successful raid near Cotul Mihalea (near mouth of the Rumanian Sereth).

5TH.—Near Kimpolung, retired E. Enemy crossed the Bistritz.

6TH.—Near Kimpolung, heights N. of Molit station lost. W. of Dzemine (Moldavia), attacks repulsed. On the Bistritz, two regiments "voluntarily" abandoned Cotirgasi—Kochna—Borea: causing retirement E. Position Focsani—Marasesti Railway—Focsani Ciuslea road lost.

7TH.—Kimpolung road—Mount La Muntelu (S. Bukovina and N. Moldavia) "a large number of attacks" repulsed. "Certain of our gallant regiments having used up all their cartridges, fought at the point of the bayonet and with stones, which they threw down the mountain side." Two heights lost, W. of Dzemine, and S.W. of Soci (on the Bistritz). Focsani—Marasesti Railway—River Sereth, pressed back N. of Bizighești.

8TH.—Night 7th—8th. Retirement E. from Kimpolung road. 8th, S. of the Pruth—Solka (S. of Radautz, Bukovina), attacks "of inconsiderable intensity" repulsed. N.W. of Sipot (in Bukovina, S.E. of Kimpolung), and Katurgali (? Cotirgasi, N.W. Moldavia), "a series of heights" lost: retirement to E. "Between the rivelets" Slucza and Dovtiana (W. of Ocna in the Trotus Valley), attacks beaten off. On one height, 8 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, taken by counter-attack. Rivers Oitoz—Casin, Rumanians "pressed back in some districts." S. of the Casin, attack repulsed. Strong enemy offensive opened on Comesti bridge over the Sereth. Attacks astride Focsani—Marasesti Railway forced Russians N. Petrechikani—Doago (on the Susitza near confluence with the Sereth).

9TH.—S. of the Pruth, attack repulsed Lukawitza—Slobizia (on Rumanian frontier): over 200 prisoners, 3 machine-guns, taken. S. of Wammamy, regained heights lost on 8th. Attacks repulsed in upper reaches of the Sakki. Attacks Vidra—Voloscany—Cifesti dispersed: enemy driven across the Putna. Attempt near Doago foiled. Between the Trotus and the Putna, Rumanians "completely repulsed" five attacks: "one single point" in the Oituz Valley lost. On the Putna and Sereth, the Allies maintained all their positions despite repeated attacks by superior numbers and bombardment "night and day."

10TH.—Attacks repelled in the Sereth Valley (Bukovina), and in the Suczawa Valley, near Tereschiny—Hadikjalwa (near Radautz). Slight retirement in upper reaches of the Bobra. S.W. of Ocna, "stubborn battles." Evening, Rumanians retired three miles E. on Ocna—Grozesti. W. of Focsani—Marasesti Railway, Russians retired across the Susitza. E. of Railway, attacks repulsed, 300 prisoners. Evening, counter-attacks: "in places" recrossed to S. bank of Susitza.

11TH.—In Upper Bobra Valley (N. of the Dortiana, a tributary of the Trotus), fighting "with variable success." W. of Ocna—Grozesti, "battles of great intensity." Evening, retirement on Ocna by Enile—Mosorele road, and to W. of Grozesti. Near Focsani, "stubborn defence against considerably superior

numbers" near Focsani—Marasesti road: 1,200 prisoners taken in counter-attacks. Evening, retirement on Focsani—Marasesti. Near mouth of the Buzeu, captured part position "as the result of a rapid onslaught." Many prisoners 4 guns, 8 machine-guns taken.

12TH.—Near Sipot (S. Bukovina), attack repulsed. Ocna-Grozești, "stubborn battle" all day. Rumanians, supported by Russians, captured a "series of heights." Counter-attacks in the Slanic Valley (S.W. of Ocna) repulsed: over 600 prisoners, 4 machine-guns, taken. Near Focsani, Rumanians attacked W. of Focsani—Ajudul Railway: 500 prisoners. Evening, "under pressure" retired on Siraski—Diochetsi.

13TH.—Ocna—Grozești, continuous fighting. Rumanians captured Slanic, and heights 4 miles W. of Grozești. Near Focsani, Allies repulsed attacks towards Marasesti and from Doaga. Near Maxineni (Lower Sereth) attacks broken.

14TH.—Near Ocna, fighting of "lesser intensity." A height lost seven miles W. of Ocna. In Casin Valley, attacks repulsed. Near Focsani, lull. Near Kredchini, attack gained footing, counter-attack "restored situation."

15TH.—Dneister—Pruth Rivers, "lively" artillery duel. Near Renza, Russians captured position on 3½-mile front E. of Mount Bermalui. Near Ocna, lull. In Susitza Valley, Rumanians repulsed "a series of attacks" Volocsany—Iresti de Sus. Near Focsani, "energetic attacks" Stracani—Crucea de Sus, forced Russian retirement on Manetu—Monassiera, Rumanian on Movilitza.

16TH.—Night 15th—16th. Near Focsani, attacks repulsed Surdesti—Muncelu—Movilitza. 16th, near Ocna, after momentary success, attacks repulsed near Slanic and Staklerie factory. In Susitza Valley, N.W. of Soveja, "a series of obstinate attacks beaten off." Near Marasesti, Hill 334 (1½ miles N. of Panciu) lost and recovered: counter-attacks repulsed. S. of Marasesti, attacks repulsed. E. to the Sereth, artillery activity.

17TH.—Slanic—Grozești—Staklerie, attacks repulsed: "a few trenches" lost S. of the Trotus near Slanic. Near Focsani, artillery activity.

18TH.—In Trotus Valley, "weak artillery activity." Russians repulsed attacks Trotus—Dovtiana Valleys. Slanic—Tirgu—Ocna—Grozești—Staklerie factory—Casin, Rumanians threw enemy back in disorder, taking prisoners and material.

19TH.—"Persistent attacks" Ocna—Onesti—Slanic: Rumanians "pushed back" to S.W. of Ocna. Attack Grozești—Staklerie, "forced its way into the factory." Near Focsani, attack astride Focsani—Ajudul Railway: on W. repulsed after temporary success: on E. Rumanians retired S. of Marasesti. Near Tulcea (on the Danube), Russians exploded ammunition dump.

20TH.—S.W. of Krutche (on the Bistritz), Russians repulsed attack. Near Ocna, "energetic offensive" by enemy, Slanic—Oitoz Valley, made slight advance. Fighting for Staklerie factory. N. and N.E. of Soveja, Custa—Marasita, "a little ground lost." Rumanians, "desiring to avenge themselves," counter-attacked: drove enemy to S. in Susitza Valley and on to Saturnu (S.E. of Panciu). Over 500 prisoners, some guns, 5 machine-guns, taken. Astride Focsani—Ajudul Railway: on W. attacks repulsed, on E. recovered ground lost 19th.

21ST.—Near Ocna, fighting "with varying success." In Susitza Valley, advance continued E.: 100 prisoners, 2 machine-guns, taken.

22ND.—Night 21st—22nd. Russians repulsed attack N.W. of Jaglowetz (Bukovina, 25 miles N.E. of Kimpolung). Five attacks broken Monastiora—Marasesti. 22nd, "Relatively calm."

23RD.—Night 22nd—23rd. Attack repulsed near Kredchini (Lower Sereth). 23rd, attacks repulsed N. of Grozești, near Soveja.

24TH.—Near Ocna, "insignificant attacks" repulsed.

25TH.—“Firing” in Bukovina and Trotus Valley. Successful Russian raid on Mount Steghi. Dovtiana—Putna Valley, Rumanians repulsed two attacks S.E. of Casin, one on Mount Machibon. Near Focsani—Izvesti—Marasesti, artillery duel. On the Sereth, Movalenide—Tos—Candria violently bombarded “without results.” Namaloasa—Corbul, some abandoned positions gained by enemy: counter-attack recovered.

26TH.—Night 25th—26th. Attack S. of Ocna repulsed. 26th, several attacks N.E. of Soveja repulsed.

27TH.—Enemy offensive from Czernovitz on Novo Sielitsa (30 miles E. on the Pruth). Bombardment Rakitna—the Pruth. Near Bojan, “our infantry left their trenches” and retired E.: Dolgok height (900 feet) lost. 8 p.m., fighting E. of Lehuegeny (five miles W. of Novo Sielitsa). N.E. of Soveja, “engagement with varying success for a commanding height.”

28TH.—N. of Grozesti—N.E. of Soveja, “stubborn attacks” held up by Rumanians. “Reciprocal bombardment more intense” Ocna—Marasesti—Comesti—Namoloasa. Near Focsani, enemy attacked Russians near Muncelu. “One of our divisions abandoned their position and fled in disorder.” Enemy advanced on Iresti de Sus—Varnitza—Fitimesti (five miles S. of Ajudul Junction)—Chiolianitchi.

29TH.—Night 28th—29th. Attack repulsed near Solka (S. of Radautz, Bukovina). Successful reconnaissance S. of Burla. Near Focsani, position near Varnitza “penetrated”: Russians “dislodged” from that near Iresti (20 miles N.W. of Focsani). 29th, near Focsani, “battle renewed.” Two regiments “retired” N., one of them “dispersed.” Rumanians repulsed “repeated attacks” Piscal—Cocosila (two miles N. of Soveja). “Intense” artillery activity Ocna—Grozesti—Muncelu—Marasesti. In Bukovina, successful Russian reconnaissance to summit of Mount Lipornitza: over 100 prisoners.

30TH.—S. of Ocna, and near Iresti, attacks repulsed.

31ST.—6 p.m., N.W. of Iresti, attack repulsed.

BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—Night July 31st—August 1st. Violent bombardment, Tcherma bend. French bombed depôts N. of Monastir and N. of Koritza (Albania). British bombed camps and dumps N. of Seres and E. of Petric. Successful Italian raid across Verjusa River, E. of Dorsa (Albania).

2ND.—French artillery activity, Tcherma bend. British bombed camps near Demir Hissar and Lake Malik (S. of Lake Ochrida).

4TH.—Italians captured “large” Austrian patrol (Albania. No locality given). British repulsed raid on Tsutuluk. Lake Doiran—the Vardar, artillery activity “at times above normal.” “Marked improvement” in health.

5TH.—Night 4th—5th. British bombed aerodrome at Livanovo (on the Struma, N.E. of Petritch). 5th, patrol activity in the Struma Valley. Attacks repulsed in the Tcherma bend and between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida. A “mobile column” from Koritza captured Kacaka Heights (W. of Lake Malik).

7TH.—Attempts on Serb and French posts in the Tcherma bend repulsed. “Medium” artillery activity. British bombed camps S. of Veles (Serbia).

9TH.—Night 8th—9th. Attack repulsed by French and Venizelist Greeks near Huma (on the Vardar).

10TH.—Night 9th—10th. Serbs repulsed attack near Budimicci (Tcherma bend). 10th, British bombed Drama (Struma sector).

11TH.—Attempts repulsed near Lake Doiran, in the Tcherma bend, and between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida. Successful British raid near Krastali (S.W. of Lake Doiran).

12TH.—Patrol encounters in the Struma Valley. "Somewhat lively" artillery duel, especially in the Tchernia bend. British bombed airsheds at Xanthi (Bulgaria, on Salonika—Constantinople Railway). French bombed camps between Lakes Malik and Ochrida. Serb airmen active.

14TH.—British bombed aerodromes at Livunovo (N.E. of Petric), Drama and Gereviz (S.E. of Xanthi). "Fairly lively artillery duels" in the Vardar Valley and near Budimicci. British repulsed patrols in the Struma Valley.

15TH.—"Weak artillery activity." Patrols active in the Struma Valley, near Nonte (between Tchernia and Vardar Rivers), and between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida). 23 French, 5 Italian aircraft bombed camp near Pogradec (S. of Lake Ochrida). British bombed camp near Seres.

17TH.—2,000 shells on Monastir: town in flames.

19TH.—Violent artillery duel in the Tchernia bend and N. of Monastir. 50 aircraft dropped 147 tons of explosives near Prilep (25 miles N.E. of Monastir).

20TH.—Night 19th—20th. Artillery activity in the Struma Valley and near Monastir. 20th, British airmen bombed Staff quarters at Prilep.

21ST.—Night 20th—21st. Strong reconnaissances repulsed near Staravina (E. of the Tchernia) and N. of Monastir. Camps bombed near Capari (9½ miles W.N.W. of Monastir). 3 aircraft brought down. On right bank of the Middle Vojusa (Albania), Italian patrol "destroyed an enemy party."

22ND.—Attacks repulsed near Nonte (Moglena) and N. of Vetrenik (Dobropolie). Bombed Razimbi (Tchernia Valley).

23RD (17TH—23RD).—British bombed dumps near Sarmasakli (E. of Seres), Dutli (N. of Seres), Demir Hissar, Prilep, "and neighbouring places." Patrol repulsed N. of Monastir.

24TH.—Artillery activity in the Vardar Valley and near Koritza. Patrols repulsed on right bank of the Tchernia. British bombed dépôts N. of Doiran.

25TH.—"Several detachments" repulsed Lakes Prespa—Ochrida. Outskirts of Demir Hissar, camps N. of Lake Malik, bombed.

26TH.—Artillery activity. Bombed Lebnitza (between Lakes Malik—Ochrida).

27TH.—Patrols repulsed W. of the Vardar. Artillery activity near Monastir.

28TH.—Patrol encounters near Doiran. Greeks repulsed attack on the Vardar. "Very lively artillery duel" in the Tchernia bend and near Monastir.

29TH.—British bombarded positions Lake Doiran—the Vardar (27th—29th) "with good results." Bombed camps of Dutli (N. of Seres), Demir Hissar, and Stojakovo (E. of the Vardar).

30TH.—Night 29th—30th. Near Sirka di Legen (E. of Liumnica) two enemy attacks gained slight footing in advanced trenches. 30th, dawn, "almost entirely driven out." Renewed attacks repulsed. S. of Dobropolie (W. Moglena) Serbs captured advanced trenches: 50 prisoners, 1 machine-gun. Doiran—Monastir, "very lively artillery duel."

31ST.—British raided Doiran—the Vardar. Counter-attack N. of Doldzeli (S.W. of Doiran) repulsed. Successful allied raid to summit of Hill 1050 (Tchernia bend). "Some score of German prisoners." N.E. of Monastir and in the Tchernia bend, "violent artillery action." Near the Dobropolie, fighting continued.

CAUCASIAN FRONT.

2ND.—Attack repulsed N.E. of Kyghi (between Erzincan—Mush).

7TH.—Kurd bands scattered near Heshaba (27 miles S.E. of Van) and W. of Dizi (53 miles W. of Urmia).

13TH.—Patrol made "daring surprise attack" near Tereboli (W. of Trebizond).

14TH.—Attacks repulsed near Mount Salpus—Pulumer (30—40 miles S.E. of Erzincan).

18TH.—Near Kharput, some trenches lost and regained. Near Pulumer, occupied Agred—Mount Limos—Vagadjik—Memdan. Near Penjvin, successful patrol action near Lake Zeribar.

21ST.—Near Penjvin (Persian frontier), advanced from Mount Gunnar (near Lake Zeribar), occupied the "Gates of Merivan" (W. of Aserabad).

23RD.—Captured heights N.W. of Ushnu (Persia, between Lake Urumiah and Turkish frontier).

24TH.—Successful raid S.W. of Gumish Khane. In Kialkit Chaya Valley, advanced W. of Ushnu, occupied heights near Mount Gevredag. Enemy retired on Mount Sheikh Iva.

25TH.—Successful raid on Ordu (100 miles W. of Trebizond).

28TH.—Successful reconnaissance to S. of Mush.

29TH.—Near Penjvin, two villages occupied S.E. of Lake Zeribar.

EGYPTIAN FRONT.

6TH.—Near Gaza, "minor activities."

9TH.—Night 8th—9th. Successful "bayonet encounter" with patrols.

21ST.—During past few days Arabs destroyed railway N. of Medina, defeated Turks at Maan, and other places.

24TH (War Office report).—Successful raids. Some Turkish desertions.

28TH—29TH.—Bombed camps and railway near Maan.

30TH.—S.W. of Gaza, line advanced 800 yards.

MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

7TH.—"Climatic conditions improving."

19TH.—Captured Shahroban (on left bank of the Dialah, 50 miles from Baghdad). Enemy fled to Jebel Hamrin.

EAST AFRICA.

LINDI AREA.—2nd Column advanced on road to Nyanza and Massassi (40 and 75 miles S.W. of Lindi). Drove advanced posts from Mihumbia stream (10½ miles S.W. of Lindi): occupied Schaedel's Farm. 3rd, attacked main position on the Mihumbia. Severe fighting: result indecisive: entrenched on ground gained. Enemy retreated on Massassi road. After pause due to heavy rains, pursued and driven back eight miles. Many food stores destroyed. Enemy reinforced.

KILWA AREA.—3rd Column reached Msindye River (53 miles S.W. of Kilwa). Enemy (defeated at Narongombe July 19th) at Mihumbia (42 miles S.S.W. of Kilwa): reinforced.

RUFJI AREA.—Enemy driven from Madaba and Kitope districts (50 miles S. of confluence of Rufiji and Ruaha Rivers), retired on Mahenge before columns from Kibambawe (in Rufiji Valley, 70 miles S. of Mrogoro on Central Railway).

IRINGA AREA.—Column from Iringa (160 miles N.E. of Lake Nyassa), and Belgian column from Kilossa (on Central Railway, 150 miles W. of Dar-es-Salaam), cleared the 50 miles between Ruaha and Kilombero Rivers. Enemy driven S. of the Kilombero (or Ulunga). 24th, Belgians captured 2 Europeans, 7 Askiras: 6 British prisoners released. "A considerable German force" invested at Mpepo's (53 miles S. of Mahenge), escaped on 27th in small parties towards Mahenge. Belgians crossed the Kilombero 10 miles E. of Fakara's (33 miles from Mahenge).

In S., column from Fort Johnston (on S. shore of Lake Nyassa) drove enemy from Lujenda and Luchilingo Valleys across Portuguese border. On 23rd, occupied supply centre at Tunturu. "Several minor encounters." 30th, 21 deserters surrendered.

All converging operations on Mahenge proceeding successfully.

SEPTEMBER 1st—30th, 1917.

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night August 31st—September 1st. Unsettled weather. Artillery activity S. of Lens and near coast. R.N.A.S. bombed Ghistelle aerodrome, Ostend—Thourout Railway. 1st, successful raid E. of Wystchaete. Raid driven off S.W. of Havrincourt. Evening, weather cleared two hours. 1 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged: 1 of ours missing.

French.—Night August 31st—September 1st, 7 p.m., attacked N.W. of Hurtebise. "At one bound" carried objectives on 1,650 yards front to 230 yards depth: 150 prisoners, including 5 officers. Successful raid S.E. of Corbeny: 220 yards front penetrated: 12 prisoners. In Champagne, successful raid near Butte-du-Mesnil: 10 prisoners. 1st, enlarged ground gained N.W. of Hurtebise: carried trench on 220 yards front: 30 more prisoners, 1 officer. Later, counter-attack broken. Attack repulsed near Butte-du-Mesnil: O.C. and other prisoners. On left bank of the Meuse, "fairly vigorous artillery activity" N. of Hill 304—Mort Homme.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. Advanced posts S.W. of Havrincourt lost and recaptured. Raids repulsed N.W. of Lens, and S.W. of La Bassée. Artillery activity E. of Ypres. Bombing activity. 1 aircraft brought down: 2 of ours missing. 2nd, mutual artillery activity E. of Ypres. 1 aircraft brought down: 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night, 1st—2nd. On the Aisne, "very lively" artillery activity. Surprise attack near Cerny failed. N.W. of Hurtebise, counter-attack on new position broken. On left bank of the Meuse, "intermittent" artillery activity N. of Hill 304. On heights of the Meuse, two attempts stopped. "Night calm everywhere else." 2nd, "considerable artillery activity" near Hurtebise, Maisons de Champagne and (Verdun) Hill 304, Samogneau—Beaumont.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. 3rd, attack repulsed S.W. of Havrincourt. Successful raid S.E. of Monchy-le-Preux. Aerodromes bombed. 3rd, raid broken S.W. of La Bassée. Artillery activity N. of Ypres. 1 aircraft brought down: 1 damaged: 1 of ours missing.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. On the Aisne, "violent artillery duel" Cerny—Hurtebise, four attacks stopped W. of Hurtebise. Attack near Ailles broken. On right bank of the Meuse, "great artillery activity" Samogneau—Beaumont. In the Woeuvre, surprise attack N.W. of Limey "without result." 3rd, Champagne, successful raid W. of St. Hilaire—St. Souplet road. 13 aircraft brought down.

4TH, *British*.—Night 3rd—4th. Successful raid N. of Lens: "a number of prisoners": 4 machine-guns. Raid repulsed S.W. of La Bassée. Great artillery activity N.E. of Ypres. Progress N.E. of St. Julien. R.N.A.S. bombed works near Bruges and Ostend. Enemy bombed behind our lines: 1 aircraft brought down. 4th, artillery activity near Ypres and Nieuport. 5 aircraft brought down: 0 damaged: 7 of ours missing. Aerial raids.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. Near Hurtebise Farm attack "smashed up." Successful raid E. of Sapigneul. Champagne, astride Scuain—Somme Py road "important raid" penetrated whole depth of position on $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front: gas tanks and dug outs destroyed: 40 prisoners, 4 machine-guns, 1 trench gun, much material, taken. Argonne, successful raid N. of Vienne-le-Chateau. On left bank of the Meuse, three attempts N. of Caurières Wood stopped. Fifteen tons of bombs dropped on aerodromes and stations. 4th, artillery activity near Laffaux Mill, Cerny—Ailles, and on both banks of the Meuse. 6 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged.

5TH, *British*.—Night 4th—5th. Raids repulsed near Armentières, E. of Klein Zillebeke, and by Portuguese. Enemy bombed three hospitals. One aircraft brought down. Aerial raids. 5th, mutual artillery activity near Ypres. Aerial raids.

French.—Night 4th—5th. Attacks broken on Casemates Plateau and N. of the Casque (Moronvillers). Successful raid N. of the Teton (Moronvillers). On both banks of the Meuse, "artillery struggle violent." Upper Alsace, patrol encounters near Seppois. 5th, two attacks repulsed on California Plateau. On both banks of the Meuse "lively artillery duels."

6TH, *British*.—Night 5th—6th. "Local fighting" E. of Fleurbaix (below Armentières) and St. Julien. Heavy rain. 6th, progress S.W. of Lens: counter-attack repulsed. Two raids repulsed E. of Armentières. "After sharp fighting," progress N. of Frezenberg: noon, counter-attack heavily repulsed: 28 prisoners. Armentières shelled all day. Weather bad. 2 aircraft, 1 balloon, brought down: 2 aircraft damaged: 1 of ours missing.

French.—Night 5th—6th. "Fairly violent artillery struggle" near Cerny. N. of the Aisne, raids repulsed near Quincy Basse (S. of Courcy Forest) and E. of Laffaux Mill. Successful raids S. of the Bovettes (E. of Laffaux) and near Reims. Champagne, Butte-du-Mesnil—Main de Massiges, concentration broken. On both banks of the Meuse, "reciprocal artillery activity." Reconnaissance N. of Vaux-le-Palameix dispersed. Lorraine, raid repulsed E. of Limey. Bombed stations at Thionville, Metz, and Woippy (near Metz). Enemy again bombed hospital at Vadelaincourt (Meuse). 6th, artillery activity on both banks of the Meuse, and in Champagne near Souain, Tahure, Mont Haut. 5 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged: 3 of ours missing: 12 damaged.

7TH, *British*.—Night 6th—7th. Rushed post W. of Quéant: 1 machine-gun taken. Repulsed raids near Lens and N.E. of Armentières. New ground N. of Frezenberg lost. Artillery activity near Lens and Ypres—Menin road. 7th, progress in Avion and E. of Eleu-dit-Leauvette.

French.—Night 6th—7th. Raid repulsed S. of Ailles. Artillery duel of "considerable intensity" near Souain and on both banks of the Meuse. 7th, artillery activity E. of Vauxaillon, in Champagne, on Heights and both banks of the Meuse.

8TH, *British*.—Night 7th—8th. Successful raid near Gavrelle. Patrol fighting N.E. of St. Julien. Langemarck heavily shelled. 8th, artillery activity near Hargicourt (N.W. of St. Quentin): "less marked" elsewhere.

French.—Night 7th—8th. Raids near Cerny, N. of Courcy, E. of Reims, and in Lorraine, "came to nothing." Successful raids near Chevreigny Ridge and N. of Hill 344 (right bank of the Meuse). On both banks, "violent artillery duel." Patrol activity near Forges brook and Avocourt. "Quiet night" elsewhere. 8th, Champagne, E. of St. Hilaire—St. Souplet road, successful raid: material "and a score of prisoners, including 3 officers," taken. Right bank of the Meuse, attacked on 2,750 yards front Fosses—Caurières Woods. Advanced N. of Fosses Wood: captured whole of Chaume Wood and crest dominating Caurières Wood: 800 prisoners, including 15 officers. Left bank, "fairly lively artillery duel." Elsewhere, "only slight artillery activity."

9TH, *British*.—Night 8th—9th. Successful raids near Gavrelles and E. of Vermelles. Artillery activity near Westhoek. Patrol fighting N.E. of Ypres. S.W. of Hollebeke, two raids beaten off after one had gained small temporary footing. Improved position N.E. of St. Julien. 9th, early, E. of Villaret (S.E. of Hargicourt), captured 600 yards of trench S. of position won August 26th and a trench E. of Malakoff Farm: 52 prisoners, 2 trench mortars. Raid on Inverness Copse repulsed. Thick mist. 3 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. 5 of ours missing.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Successful raids towards La Royère Farm (W. of Chevreigny Ridge), E. of Reims, and near Maisons de Champagne: material and

"a certain number of prisoners." Right bank of the Meuse, violent counter-attack on new position Fosses—Caurières Woods broken. Left bank, "very active" artillery. 9th, morning, attack "in force" on 3,300 yards front on both sides of Hill 344 broken: "a few detachments" gaining temporary footing "ejected." Afternoon, four fresh attacks N. of Chaume Wood smashed: "some prisoners." N. of Wavrille Wood, "columns caught under artillery fire and severely punished." Elsewhere, "intermittent cannonade."

10TH, *British*.—Night 9th—10th. Raid repulsed E. of Loos, three E. of Armentières. Patrol encounters N.E. of Monchy-le-Preux. N. of Langemarck, S.E. of St. Julien, and near Lagnicourt, prisoners taken. Post S.E. of St. Tanshoek raided and re-established. 10th, artillery activity E. of Ypres. Hazy. Two aerodromes bombed near Cambrai, rest camp at Douai. 3 aircraft brought down: 7 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 9th—10th. Successful raids in Champagne and Argonne. Artillery duel on both banks of the Meuse. Elsewhere "calm." 10th, "violent artillery duels" near Hill 344 and Fosses Wood. Elsewhere "calm."

11TH, *British*.—Night 10th—11th. Near Villaret, captured another 400 yards trench: "several prisoners." Bombed Courtrai aerodrome. 11th, attacks on new positions near Villaret repulsed. Aerial activity. Bombed works near Lille and Roulers. 8 aircraft brought down: 12 damaged. 8 of ours missing.

French.—Night 10th—11th. Raids repulsed N. of Jouy, and N.E. of Courcy. Successful raids S.E. of Vauxaillon, and N. of the Casque (Champagne). S. of Jouvincourt (E. of Craonne) troops caught under fire. "Intermittent artillery struggle on both banks of the Meuse." Dunkirk Hospital bombed. 11th, "fairly great artillery activity" in Belgium, near Casemates Plateau (Aisne), and on both banks of the Meuse. Aerial activity: 4 aircraft brought down: 10 damaged. Works bombed near Roulers, Courtemarck, Staden, Colmar, Ferny, and Saarburg.

12TH, *British*.—Night 11th—12th. Raid repulsed E. of Hargicourt. Successful raids N.E. of Bullecourt, and S. of Lombartzyde. Artillery activity near Neuve Chapelle and Ypres. Works bombed at Courtrai, and by R.N.A.S. near Thourout, Bruges, and Ghent. 12th, patrol encounters N.W. of St. Quentin, and near Ypres. Aerial activity: 3 aircraft damaged: 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 11th—12th. Artillery "very lively" Drei Grachten—Bixschoote. Champagne, successful raids E. of Auberville, and E. of St. Hilaire—St. Souplet road: latter penetrated to third line. Attempt N.E. of Tahure smashed. Right bank of the Meuse. Attacks repulsed N. of Caurières Wood and N. of Ronvaux. 12th, "moderate artillery activity" in Belgium and on right bank of the Meuse.

13TH, *British*.—Night 12th—13th. "Some" artillery activity near Bullecourt, S.E. of Messines, and N. of Langemarck. "After sharp fighting," raid repulsed E. of Bullecourt. Successful raid near Oppy. 13th, "after stiff fighting," attack on one-mile front N. and N.W. of Langemarck repulsed. Billets E. of Lens bombed. 2 of our aircraft missing.

French.—Night 12th—13th. "Artillery duel violent" near Bixschoote. N. of the Aisne, "our artillery, dominating the German batteries, made impossible any infantry attacks." Champagne, raids repulsed near Main-de-Messiges, E. of Butte-du-Mesnil, and N. and N.W. of St. Hilaire. Right bank of the Meuse, "mutual artillery activity" near Caurières Wood. Alsace. Successful raid near Bon Homme. 13th, "intermittent artillery activity" S. of Nordschoote (below Dixmude), and N. of Aisne. On the Meuse, "enemy batteries silenced at several points."

14TH, *British*.—Local fighting near "Winnipeg" cross roads, N.E. of St. Julien: ground gained. Artillery activity near Lens and Ypres. Several stations bombed. 3 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 13th—14th. N. of the Aisne, attack on Casemates Plateau repulsed "after a hand-to-hand fight." Champagne, successful raid W. of Navarin. On both banks of the Meuse, "usual" artillery activity. 14th, Champagne, artillery "fairly lively." On right bank of the Meuse, attack on new positions N. of Caurières Wood penetrated advanced line on 500 yards front. 13th—14th, 4 aircraft brought down.

15th, *British.*—Night 14th—15th. Progress E. of Westhoek. Attack on new ground N.E. of St. Julien dispersed. Artillery activity N. of Langemarck. Works near Courtrai and Cambrai bombed: 6 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged: 4 of ours missing. 15th, N. of Inverness Copse, "a strong point," 36 prisoners, 1 machine-gun, captured by a London regiment. Successful raid by Durham L.I. W. of Cherisy (22 miles S.E. of Arras): 22 prisoners. Raids repulsed S. of Armentières, and by Portuguese near Neuve Chapelle.

French.—Night 14th—15th. Champagne, two raids repulsed N. of Prosnes. Artillery "fairly active" near the Cornillette and Mont Haut. Argonne, attempt near Boureuilles "failed completely." Right bank of the Meuse, greater part of trench lost N. of Caurières Wood recovered. "Calm everywhere else." 15th, artillery "fairly violent" near Laffaux Mill (Aisne), and on right bank of the Meuse. Champagne, successful raid near Mont Haut.

16th, *British.*—Night 15th—16th. Raid W. of Cherisy penetrated to outskirts of village, wrecked works: some prisoners, 2 machine-guns. Raid N. of Lens driven off. Attack on "strong point" N. of Inverness Copse repulsed. Artillery activity E. of Ypres. Enemy raided trenches Ypres—Comines Canal—E. of Messines: a few men missing. 16th, mutual artillery activity near Ypres. Aerial activity. Various works bombed: 2,000 infantry scattered from altitude of 100 ft. 7 aircraft down: 4 damaged. 8 of ours missing.

French.—Night 15th—16th. In Loire region, N.W., of Reims, attack "collapsed." Artillery "pretty lively" Maisons de Champagne—Massiges. Elsewhere, "quiet." 16th, Aisne, "considerable activity" near Braye and Cerny. Right bank of the Meuse, attack N. of Caurières Wood scotched. Left bank of the Meuse and near Mont Haut (Champagne), "lively artillery." Elsewhere "quiet." Fifteen tons of bombs dropped on works at Stuttgart, Colmar, Logelbach, Metz, Thionville, and Uckingen.

17th, *British.*—Night 16th—17th. Successful raids E. of Epéhy (Cambrai—St. Quentin), near Arras—Douai Railway, and S.E. of Gavrelle (between Arras—Douai Railway and road): works destroyed, several prisoners, 2 machine-guns. Artillery activity E. of Ypres. 17th, raid S. of Lombartzyde dispersed. Artillery activity near Ypres. 3 aircraft brought down. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 16th—17th. "Fairly lively" artillery near Froidmont Farm (W. of Craonne), and Massiges (Champagne). Argonne, attack on Apremont Forest driven off. Vosges, raid foiled near Voilu. 17th, right bank of the Meuse, "very considerable artillery activity" N. of Hill 344—Caurières Wood. Rhone—Rhine Canal, raid repulsed. 6 aircraft brought down. 6 damaged.

18th, *British.*—Night 17th—18th. Patrol encounters near Ypres. 18th, successful raid by York and Lancaster Regiment in Inverness Copse. Progress E. of St. Julien. Raid repulsed S. of Méricourt (S. of Lens). Artillery activity near Lagnicourt (12 miles S.S.E. of Arras), Vimy, and Nieuport. "Most unfavourable weather." 1 aircraft brought down. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 17th—18th. Attempts "stopped" S.E. of St. Quentin, and near Les Bovettes (Aisne). Successful raids near Itancourt (S.E. of St. Quentin), and La Royère Farm. S. of Le Miette, attempt repulsed near Neufchatel road (between Berry-au-Bac—Ville-au-Bois). Right bank of the Meuse, artillery activity near Fosses Wood. 18th, Aisne, attack repulsed S. of Ailles. Champagne,

lively artillery, Moronvillers, Aubeŕve. Right bank Meuse, "somewhat violent" artillery duel N. of Hill 344.

19TH, *British*.—"Great artillery activity" near Ypres. 6 aircraft brought down: 4 damaged. 7 of ours missing.

French.—Night 18th—19th. Aisne, "marked artillery activity" W. of Froidmont Farm, and near Hurtebise. Raid repulsed N.E. of Sancy (7 miles N.E. of Soissons). E. of Craonne, concentration dispersed. Successful raid near Godat (N.W. of Reims). Right bank of the Meuse, "violent artillery duel" Beaumont—Bezonsvaux. Successful raids N.W. of Limey (Woeuvre), and near Bioncourt (Lorraine). Alsace, patrol encounters near Amertzwiller. 19th, "after a short and violent struggle," attack repulsed W. of Froidmont Farm. Successful raid near Four-de-Paris. Champagne, "lively and sustained bombardment" near Souain and Mont Téton.

20TH, *British*.—5.40 a.m., attacked on eight-mile front, Ypres—Comines Canal—Ypres Staden Railway. Early, North Country regiments carried Inverness Cope: Australians, Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen: Scots and South African, Potsdam, Vampire, and Berry Farms: West Lancashire Territorials, Iberian Farm and Gallipoli "strong point." Before noon, final objectives. Right, English county troops, after "sharp fighting" in woods N. of Canal and near "Tower Hamlets." Centre, North Country and Australian battalions captured Veldhoek and W. part of Polygon Wood: penetrated over one mile. Left, London and Highland Territorials stormed Zevenkok, and Rose, Quebec, and Wurst Farms. Evening, "number of strong points cleared up" near Tower Hamlets and N.E. of Langemarck: many counter-attacks "destroyed." Great aerial activity. Ledeghem station, two aerodromes E. of Lille, dumps and billets bombed. 28,000 rounds fired at altitudes of 100 ft.—1,000 ft. 11 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 10 of ours missing.

French.—Night 19th—20th. Artillery activity S. of the Oise. Champagne, near Monts Cornillet and Haut: on both banks of the Meuse. 20th, afternoon, attack broken S.E. of Cerny. "Usual cannonade." Since 10th, 15 aircraft, 1 balloon, brought down. 29 aircraft damaged.

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. "Small attacks driven off" W. of Havrincourt and W. of Lens. Ledeghem, Roulers, Menin stations bombed. R.N.A.S. bombed works at Aertrycke, Sparrapelhoek, Thourout, and Ostend. 21st, "line advanced at a number of points, counter-attacks beaten off." Trenches and concreted strong points captured S. of Tower Hamlets: "powerful" counter-attacks repulsed. A farm and works cleared E. of St. Julien by Liverpools and Lancashires. Evening, attack E. of Langemarck broken. So far, over 3,000 prisoners counted. Aircraft "continued to harass" enemy. Bombed works near Roulers, Lille, and Cambrai. 10 brought down: 8 damaged: 12 of ours missing.

French.—Night 20th—21st. On the Aisne, attempts "easily repulsed" N. of Vauxaillon and near Cerny: near Verdun, on B  thincourt and Lamorville (5 miles N.E. of St. Mihiel). Champagne, "great artillery activity" Moronvillers region. Attack on Mont Haut dispersed. 21st, raid repulsed N. of Jouy (N.E. of Soissons). 11 aircraft brought down: 1 balloon.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. Near Ypres, "counter-attacks continued without result." At dusk, "powerful attack delivered with great determination" E. of St. Julien, driven off. Attacks repulsed "at all other points" by West Lancashire and London troops. Attack "with strong forces" astride Ypres—Menin road "completely repulsed." Third counter-attack E. of Langemarck broken. Bombed Roulers, Ledeghem, Menin stations: troops and transport on Ypres—Menin road from 400 feet. R.N.A.S. bombed Thourout and Cortemarck stations, Bruges docks. 22nd, early, raid repulsed near Arras—Cambrai road.

Successful raid near Monchy-le-Preux. Near Ypres, three strong counter-attacks N. of Tower Hamlets repulsed. Further S., slight retirement. No other attacks. All ground won 20th held. Great artillery activity. 5 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. 2 of ours missing.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. Aisne, artillery duel "somewhat lively." Raids near La Royère, S. of La Miette, and N.W. of Reims "failed." "Short and violent artillery actions" in Champagne and on both banks of the Meuse. 22nd, Aisne, artillery activity "marked" near Mennejean Farm, Cerny, and Courcy. Champagne, attack repulsed Maisons-de-Champagne—Main-de-Massiges. Successful raid near Beausejour. On right bank of the Meuse, artillery duels near Bezonvaux. Upper Alsace, patrol encounter E. of Seppois.

23RD, *British.*—Night 22nd—23rd. Successful raid by Glasgow troops N.E. of Gouzeaucourt (14 miles N.W. of St. Quentin). "Considerable artillery activity" near Ypres. 23rd, dawn, attack repulsed N.E. of Langemarck: 25 prisoners. Counter-attack by English rifle corps captured fresh ground and "a number of prisoners." Attack repulsed on new positions E. of Villaret (8 miles N. of St. Quentin). Since morning 20th, 3,243 prisoners, including 80 officers, taken. 8 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. Champagne, attack Maisons-de-Champagne—Main-de-Massiges broken. Artillery "lively" near Moronvillers, and on left bank of the Meuse. Woeuvre, attempt Fay—Regniéville failed. 22nd and night 22nd—23rd bombed works at Donon (Vosges), Thionville, Luxembourg, Metz, etc., and Staden, Roulers, and Cortemarck. 23rd, "artillery struggle somewhat violent" near Hurtebise, Craonne, and N. of Hill 304 (Meuse). 6 aircraft brought down.

24TH, *British.*—Night 23rd—24th. Raid repulsed near La Basseville. Artillery activity on both banks of the Scarpe, S. of Lens, and N.E. of Ypres. 24th, raids repulsed near Monchy-le-Preux, S. of Arras—Douai Railway, and W. of La Bassée. Patrol activity. 3 aircraft brought down: 5 damaged. 4 of ours missing.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. Aisne, "violent artillery actions" near Braye, Froidmont Farm, Hurtebise. Attempt on Hurtebise failed. Champagne, successful raid E. of Mont Téton. On left bank of the Meuse, reconnoitring parties dispersed. On right bank, "artillery duel reached extreme intensity" near Fosse and Chaume Woods. "Quiet everywhere else." 24th, Aisne, "artillery duel continued with much liveliness" Braye—Cerny—Hurtebise. Attempt repulsed near Braye-en-Laonnois. Right bank of the Meuse, attack on two-kilometre front N. of Chaume Wood repulsed: "furious combat" at some points. Two secondary attempts, N. of Bezonvaux and S.E. of Beaumont, "also suffered sanguinary defeat." Afternoon, fresh attack N. of Chaume Wood completely failed: 121 prisoners, including 4 officers. Bombed works at Cambrai, Luxembourg, Longuyon, Brielle, etc. 3 aircraft brought down.

25TH, *British.*—Night 24th—25th. Successful raid E. of Epéhy. Attempt N.E. of Lens repulsed. Artillery activity E. and N. of Ypres. 25th, dawn, "powerful" attack Tower Hamlets—Polygon Wood penetrated two points. "Fierce fighting." Noon, fresh "heavy" attack. Early afternoon, counter-attacks re-established position. Enemy raided post near Quéant. Great artillery activity E. of Ypres. Works bombed near Ghent, etc., troops at Menin and Wervicq. 18 aircraft brought down: 6 damaged. 1 of ours missing.

French.—Night 24th—25th. Aisne, artillery duel Hurtebise—S. of Juvincourt. Attempts stopped E. of Mont Téton (Champagne), and N. of Hill 304 (Meuse). Right bank of the Meuse, bombardment N. of Chaume Wood. Attack repulsed near Beaumont. Vosges, patrol encounters. 25th, artillery "very active" near Hurtebise, Craonne, and Chaume Wood. Various works "plentifully bombed." 2 aircraft brought down: 2 damaged.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. "In face of strong opposition," successful raid by Suffolks E. of Gouzeaucourt : a few prisoners, 1 machine-gun. R.N.A.S. bombed Thourout, Lichetervelde, Cortemarck stations. 26th, 5.30 a.m., attacked on six-mile front S. of Tower Hamlets—N. of St. Julien. S. of Ypres—Menin road, English troops completed capture of Tower Hamlets spur, stormed works on E. slope. "Powerful counter-attack" from Ghelevelt repulsed. N. of the road, after "a severe struggle," English and Scots relieved two companies Argyll and Sutherland, who had held isolated forward position during the night, drove enemy back. Australians captured Polygon Wood and works to E. English, Scots, and Welsh penetrated one mile, stormed Zonnebeke. North, Midland, and London Territorials advanced astride Wietje—Gravenstafel and St. Julien—Gravenstafel roads : repulsed counter-attack. All objectives gained. 4 to 7 p.m., seven counter-attacks "in great strength, most severe" on Polygon Wood, broken. Evening, "left in possession" of ground gained : 1,614 prisoners, including 48 officers. Great aerial activity. 12 machines brought down : 3 damaged. 13 of ours missing.

French.—Night 25th—26th. Aisne, "brief but violent artillery activity" Hurtebise—Craonne. Repulsed raid N. of Jouy. Successful raids S. of Cerny, N.W. of Berméricourt (N.N.W. of Reims), and near Tahure (Champagne). Right bank of the Meuse, "intense artillery activity" Beaumont—Bezonvaux. 26th, "marked artillery activity" on the Aisne, and right bank of the Meuse. N. of Beaumont concentration dispersed.

27TH, *British*.—Considerable artillery activity at intervals. Bombed St. Denis Westrem aerodrome, etc. 7 aircraft brought down : 3 damaged. 1 of ours missing.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Aisne, attacks repulsed S. of Arbre-de-Cerny and Casemates—California Plateaux. Successful raid W. of Froimont Farm. Raids dispersed near Beaumont (Meuse), and Linge (Alsace). 27th, artillery activity "most marked" S. of Ailles and N. of Douaumont. Raid near Beaumont "collapsed." Works near Metz, etc., "abundantly" bombed. 2 aircraft brought down.

28TH, *British*.—Night 27th—28th. Attack on new positions in Zonnebeke "broken up." S. of Polygon Wood—Tower Hamlets, "isolated strong points cleared up." Successful raid S.W. of Cherisy (S. of Arras—Cambrai road). "Considerable artillery activity on battle front" and S. of Lens. R.N.A.S. bombed works at Zeebrugge, St. Denis Westrem, Gontrode, and Houltave. 28th, patrol encounters : 100 prisoners. "Strong party" killed or captured E. of Polygon Wood. Bombed two aerodromes, etc. 10 aircraft brought down : 4 damaged. 3 of ours missing.

French.—Night 27th—28th. "Disturbed." On the Aisne, raids repulsed near the Panthéon, S. of La Royère, S. of Ailles, and N.E. of Courcy. Champagne, attacks broken near Four-de-Paris, N.W. of Tahure, and W. of Navarin. "Artillery lively," especially near Hill 304 (Meuse). Bombed works at Staden, Roulers, and Cortemarck. 28th, right bank of the Meuse, artillery activity near Beaumont.

29TH, *British*.—Night 28th—29th. "Usual artillery activity." Bombed Gontrode aerodrome, etc. 29th, two raids repulsed on Hill 70 (N. of Lens). Successful patrol encounters near Bapaume—Cambrai road. Artillery activity near Ypres. Again bombed Gontrode aerodrome, etc. 1 aircraft brought down. 2 of ours missing. R.N.A.S. bombed St. Denis Westrem aerodrome, etc.

French.—Night 28th—29th. Artillery activity on right bank of the Meuse. Raids driven off S.E. of St. Quentin, near Ailles, and N. of Caurières Wood. Successful raid E. of Seppois (Upper Alsace). Bombed works at Colmar and N. of Soissons. 29th, "artillery duel assumed fairly great intensity" on the Aisne, especially Panthéon—Hurtebise. Right bank of the Meuse, artillery "violent" N. of Chaume Wood. 2 aircraft brought down.

30TH, *British*.—Night 29th—30th. Artillery activity. Concentration E. of Polygon Wood dispersed. Successful patrol encounters S. of Lens. R.N.A.S. bombed works at Zeebrugge, St. Denis Westrem, Thourout. 30th, three attacks Tower Hamlets—Polygon Wood broken. Astride Ypres—Menin road, advanced post lost and recovered: "a number of prisoners and machine-guns" taken. Later attempt dispersed. E. of Loos, trench raided, one man taken: raiders pursued, killed or captured, prisoner rescued. Artillery activity Ypres—Comines Canal—Zonnebeke, and near Nieuport. Bombed Gontrode aerodrome, Cambrai billets, etc.

French.—Night 29th—30th. "Considerable" artillery activity Panthéon—Hurtebise, near Craonne, and on right bank of the Meuse. Champagne, raid repulsed E. of Auberive. Successful raid W. of Mont Cornillet. 30th, Aisne, attempt N. of Berry-au-Bac "stopped": party reaching advanced element, "immediately ejected." On both banks of the Meuse, "very lively artillery duel," especially N. of Hill 344, and near Chaume Wood. 5 aircraft brought down, 7 damaged. Bombed works at Fresnoy-le-Grand, Thionville, Mézières, Dieuze, Hagondange, and Stuttgart (in reprisal for bombing Bar-le-Duc overnight).

During September, British captured 5,296 prisoners, including 146 officers, 11 guns (3 heavy), 57 trench mortars, 377 machine-guns.

British brought down 143 aircraft, damaged 142, lost 112.

French brought down 91 aircraft and 3 balloons, damaged 79.

Germans claimed 242 allied aircraft, 8 balloons, brought down: admitted 3 lost.

ITALIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Counter-attacks repulsed on S. of Bainsizza Plateau, N. slopes Monte San Gabriele, and N.W. of Tivoli. Reverse slopes of Monte San Gabriele bombed. At Gabrijj (E. of San Gabriele) enemy "repeatedly shelled a field dressing station." Brestovizza Valley, positions taken August 30th—31st extended. So far, 1,400 rifles, 9 machine-guns, 5 trench mortars, etc., "removed." Above Belluno, 1 aircraft brought down. Upper Zebro Valley (Stelvio, near Swiss frontier). Glacier post (11,000 feet), lost August 27th, recovered.

2ND.—Artillery activity "more intense" E. of Gorizia and Carso Plateau. "After a very bitter struggle" further progress E. in Brestovizza Valley: violent counter-attack broken. 1st—2nd, 8 officers, 339 other ranks, taken.

3RD.—"Usual" activities.

4TH.—Night 3rd—4th. Thirty aircraft dropped eight tons of bombs on works and fleet in Pola Harbour and Fasana Canal. 4th, "battle renewed violently." Bainsizza Plateau, "important position" captured S.W. of Okroglo (6 miles E. of the Isonzo): 86 officers, 1,602 men, taken. Carso, Kostanjevica—the sea, attack repulsed after temporary success between Hill 146 and tunnel N.E. of Lakavac: 402 prisoners, including 14 officers: 261 aircraft "participated."

5TH.—N.E. of Gorizia, "struggle" continued: 26 officers, over 500 men, taken. Carso, "repeated attacks" S. of Brestovizza Valley "broken": 200 prisoners. Troops bombed in Buzza Valley (Tolmino), E. of Chiapovano Valley, near Voiseizza (2 miles S.E. of Kostanjevica) and on reverse slopes of Monte Hermada. Trentino, posts destroyed near Daone (Chiese) and Zurez (W. of Lake Garda).

6TH.—N.E. of Gorizia, "desperate resistance against our pressure": 3 officers, 201 men, taken. Carso, local actions and intense bombardments.

7TH.—N.E. of Gorizia, "energetic pressure continued." Carso, artillery duels. Concei Valley (W. of Lake Garda), local attacks repulsed. Total captures now 858 officers, 30,671 other ranks.

8TH.—N.E. of Gorizia, ceaseless artillery struggle. Elsewhere, usual activities.

9TH.—"Reconnoitring parties put to flight" in Cima di Cady (Tonale), near Zurez (E. of Lake Garda), and on Col di Lana. Carnia, attacks on Monte Granuda and Cuel Tarond "completely failed." N.E. of Gorizia, three attacks "promptly repulsed." S. Carso, "very great" artillery activity. Batteries bombed in Ternova Forest. Booty so far ascertained, 143 guns (80 medium calibre), 94 trench mortars, 322 machine-guns, 11,196 rifles.

10TH.—Mainly artillery activity. W. of Lake Garda, attacks Concei Valley—Lake Ledro repulsed. At mouth of the Timavo (Gulf of Trieste), storming parties put to flight.

11TH.—Bainsizza Plateau, "various attacks," especially N.E. of Gorizia, repulsed. "After most violent fire for several hours," positions along crest and W. slopes of Monte San Gabriele attacked at dawn from E. and S. "Bitter struggle became more pronounced" W. of Santa Caterina. By noon, "enemy beaten and repulsed."

12TH.—"Furious attacks" on Monte San Gabriele failed. Trentino, patrols "put to flight." 1 aircraft brought down near Duino (Gulf of Trieste).

13TH.—"Heavy rain greatly impeded fighting."

14TH.—Trentino and Julian areas, artillery activity of "noticeable intensity." Progress near Log, N. Bainsizza Plateau. Carso, lines of communication bombed. 1 aircraft brought down in Auzza Torrent (Avscek).

15TH.—Progress on S.E. Bainsizza Plateau: 17 officers, 400 other ranks, "some" machine-guns, taken. E. of Monte San Gabriele, troops massed near Ravnica bombed.

16TH.—Night 15th—16th. Bainsizza Plateau. Four successive counter-attacks repulsed: 73 prisoners, including 3 officers, taken. 16th, Trentino, Giudicaria Valley, patrols dispersed. Carnia, Upper But and Fella Valley, "brisk" artillery duel. Enemy exploded "completely ineffective" mine on Cengia Martini (Piccolo Lagazuoi, Dolomites).

17TH.—S.E. Bainsizza Plateau, "counter-attacks promptly repulsed." Carso, "brisk artillery duels."

18TH.—Trentino, artillery and patrol activity. Near Carzano (Val. Sugana) successful raid crossed the Maso Torrent, took 200 prisoners. Bainsizza Plateau, "local attacks energetically repulsed."

19TH.—"Moderate activity." On Col. Bricon, enemy tunnel works blown up.

20TH.—Trentino, attack repulsed S. of Cima Zigolon (head of Genova Valley). On Cima Sief (Hill 2426, Upper Cordevole) raid penetrated defence.

21ST.—Artillery duels "intense" in Upper Cordevole. Kal Valley (Bainsizza Plateau), and near Selo (Carso). N.E. of Gorizia, patrol encounters.

22ND.—Night 21st—22nd. Marmolada, exploded mine, captured two advanced positions. Bombed troops and works in Chiapovano Valley, near Grahovo, and Prosecco (Gulf of Trieste). 22nd, Bainsizza Plateau, attacks in Kal Valley, and near Volnik, "had no result whatever." Carso, progress near Raccogliano and Selo. Artillery duel "more active than usual."

23RD.—Artillery activity. Marmolada, counter-attack repulsed. Bombed works in Buzza Valley, near Grahovo, and Polmelec (Tolmino): troops in Chiapovano Valley. 2 aircraft brought down.

24TH.—"Profitable" patrol and "moderate" artillery activity. Near Monte Nero (Upper Isonzo), enemy exploded mine: attack dispersed. Bainsizza Plateau, local attacks repulsed. Carso, "captured some prisoners." Bombed works in Buzza Valley, near Rafenberg (Carso), and in Chiapovano Valley.

25TH.—Patrol and aerial activity.

26TH.—Night 25th—26th. Arsenal and submarine base at Pola bombed. 26th, patrols repulsed. Marmolada, attempt on positions captured 21st—22nd

failed. Carso, increased activity. Works bombed at Podberdo (Buzza Valley), Grahovo, and Dottogliano: "very lively reaction." 1 aircraft brought down over Ariago. 1 missing.

27TH.—Night 26th—27th. Raids repulsed in Camonica and Giudicaria Valleys (W. and E. of Adamello Massif). 27th, artillery "particularly intense" N. of Adamello.

28TH.—"Surprise attack and rectified line" Sella di Dol—N. slopes of Monte San Gabriele: 8 officers, 216 men, "few" machine guns taken. Repeated counter-attacks repulsed. Bombed works at Voiscizza (Carso), and Pola. 1 aircraft brought down near Santa Lucia (Tolmino).

29TH.—S.E. Bainsizza Plateau, "sudden and bold action" captured some high ground S. of Podlaka and S.E. of Madoni: 49 officers, 1,360 other ranks, taken. "Violent" counter-attacks repulsed. Attacks on new positions Sella di Dol—San Gabriele "failed completely": 86 prisoners, including 6 officers. Bombed Berje (Gulf of Trieste), and Pola. "Vigorous reaction." 2 aircraft brought down. 1 missing.

30TH.—S.E. Bainsizza Plateau, attacks on new positions "completely repulsed." Since 28th, 2,019 prisoners, including 63 officers. Carso, "lively patrol activity." Val di Fumo (Adamello), reconnoitring parties della Porta—Forcel Rosso Passes "repulsed and pursued."

RUSSIAN FRONT.

1ST.—Riga. Enemy crossed the Dvina near Uexkull (18 miles S.E. of Riga); occupied Kupfer—Mammer: developed success N. Vladimir—Volynsky. Temporarily successful attack repulsed Zubitno—Preshem (between Volynsky—Lutz). Near Dvinsk, 1 aircraft brought down. Near Brody, 1 down, 1 damaged, 1 missing.

2ND.—Night, 1st—2nd. S.E. of Kovel, attack repulsed Velitsk—Kukhary. On left bank of the Dvina, retirement on Bilderlingshof (on the Gulf of Riga, 10 miles W. of the town)—Medem—Dahlen (88 miles upstream from Riga). During 1st—2nd, on right bank of the Dvina, near Uexkull, "stubborn attacks" Stal—Melmugor—Skripto penetrated. "Some left voluntarily, retiring N." Counter-attacks "gained no definite results." S.W. of Riga, "enemy also assumed offensive" astride Mitau road. Elsewhere "fusillades, more intense" near Vilna.

3RD.—Early. Riga evacuated: forts and bridges blown up: retirement N.E. Submarine shelled Kabli, Hairasch, Koshkul, and Pidde (on N.E. shore of Gulf). Near Uexkull, enemy advanced N. on Valdenrode—Pskoff road, and N.E. towards Kranzem. Evening, near Valdenrode, position penetrated on eight-mile front: village lost: retirement N. Milden—Rybnak—Kranzem (on the Lesser Jaegel, N.N.E. of Uexkull) abandoned: retirement N.E. Near Dvinsk, "considerable artillery activity."

4TH.—N.E. of Riga, crossed the Livonian Aa, retired N.E. along coast. Enemy reached the Aa near Abrant (3 miles N. of Hintzenberg station) and Lower Hintzenberg (on Wenden Railway, 33 miles N.E. of Riga). E. of Riga, retirement "under pressure" on Segewold (on the railway, 6 miles N.E. of Hintzenberg)—Lemburg (half way Segewold—the Oger)—Detzshubrazd. Near Dvinsk, "lively artillery firing." Elsewhere, "fusillades."

5TH.—N.E. of Riga, retired across the Melupe (5 miles N. of the Aa): on Pskoff road, to Segewold—Ligut (17 miles S.W. of Wenden) E. of Riga, reached Klintenberg (S.E. of Segewold)—Mortizburg (E. of Lemburg)—Kastran (half way Segewold—the Dvina)—Friederichstadt. Elsewhere "fusillades." [Germans claimed 120 officers, over 7,500 rank and file, 180 guns, 300 machine guns, etc.].

6TH.—Night 5th—6th. Bombed Baronovitchi station. Near Boyary (65 miles S. of Dvinsk), 1 aircraft brought down. 6th, Riga, rearguard encounters near Segewold. Elsewhere, "fusillades."

7TH.—Near Jacobstadt (on the left bank of the Dvina, 20 miles S.E. of Kokenhusen) enemy aerial activity.

8TH.—Enemy concentrating on N. bank of Livonian Aa. Rearguard fighting near Segewold. "Further S. on bank of the Dvina, fusillades."

9TH.—Astride Pskoff road, "rearguards holding back enemy on the Burtnek line." Near Segewold, "offensive in certain sectors." Near Mulde (3 miles S.E. of Segewold) enemy "thrown back" : 10 prisoners, 4 machine-guns. Checked N.E. of Friederichstadt.

10TH.—N.E. Riga, "advanced detachments moved to River Melupe—Loisa—Pauske (N. of the Livonian Aa, W. of Segewold) : meeting with slight opposition." Pskoff road—the Dvina, "encounters, for the most part ended favourably." Elsewhere "fusillades." S.E. of Kovel, bombed depôts near Doubrowa.

11TH.—"Vanguard elements" captured massif S. of Lake Plaushe (S. of Nitau), and footing Shkorstin—Sitamuya (S. to the Dvina). "Vanguard elements" advancing on Riga "occupied line of the Melupe—Tseghenof (N.W. of Pauske)—Pauske (midway coast—Segewold)—Segewold Lepsala (S.E. of Segewold)—Bayar (W. of Nitau). Near Jacobstadt, "fusillades." "Intense artillery activity" near Svientsiany, whence enemy bombarded at Germanovshchizna, S. of Vidzy (S. of Dvinsk).

12TH.—N.E. of Riga, advance continued : occupied Kuile (E. of Pauske). S. of Pskoff road, occupied Pelne (N. of Moritzberg) : "capturing prisoners and booty" : advanced S. beyond Rentzon to Moritzberg—Wetz Wake—Dosurun—Skerste—Myza—Alt Kaipen—Miltin—Niga (all N.N.E. of Friederichstadt).

13TH.—N.E. of Riga, two companies attacked S. of Pauske : repulsed. Enemy fortifying Medug. On Pskoff road, captured Kronenberg (S.W. of Segewold), "some Guardsmen and machine-guns." S. of Pskoff road, advanced "800 paces under strong fire" on Spita—Runen. "A unit of partisans" occupied Zirin, S.W. of Pelne (N. of Moritzberg), advanced on Lemburg. Advanced parties "with a sudden rush" seized Keitzen and Sisseral (16 miles N. of Friederichstadt).

14TH.—Riga. An "important sector" near Kronenberg Farm captured and lost.

15TH.—Riga. Near Segewold Farm, attacks repulsed.

16TH.—Riga, N.E., "at certain points progress." Occupied cemetery S.W. of Hapsal (on N. bank near mouth of the Aa), and Sadzem Farm (S. of Sisseral). Near Lida (60 miles S.E. of Vilna), successful raid W. of Sabilki.

17TH.—Captured wood S. of Bildag (10 miles N. of Friederichstadt) : 1 machine-gun.

18TH.—"No military operations."

19TH.—Riga. Successful attack E. of Lemburg.

20TH.—"Nothing to report."

21ST.—Riga. Attack near Sisseral "broke down owing to the tenacity of our troops." "Fierce bombardment" Dokter—Neu Selburg (20—10 miles N.W. of Jacobstadt). Positions pierced S.W. of Admin, and 2 miles from the Dvina. Retirement to N. bank. Elsewhere, "fusillades, liveliest" near Svientsiany (S.W. of Postavy).

22ND.—Riga. Advance near Rudna. Near Jacobstadt, "fortified" right bank of the Dvina : shelled enemy on left bank. [Germans claimed capture of Jacobstadt bridgehead, 25 miles Lievenhof—Stockmannshof : 400 prisoners, 50 guns.]

23RD.—Riga. Captured position one mile N.E. of Spitali—Timerman (8 miles S. of Segewold) : 60 prisoners, 10 machine-guns.

24TH.—Riga. Two counter-attacks repulsed on new position near Rumeni Farm.

25TH.—Riga. S. of Pskoff road, reconnaissance repulsed near Allazhi Castle.

26TH.—2 aircraft brought down near Tarnapol: 1 near Husiatyn: 1 near Focsani (Rumania).

28TH.—2 aircraft brought down near Ohlenorovka.

30TH.—Riga. Four miles S. of Spitali Farm, enemy "pressed back" 800—1,000 yards.

RUMANIAN FRONT.

1ST.—6 p.m., Rumanians repulsed attack N.W. of Iresti. Russians did the same N.W. of Buzea River (W. of Braila).

2ND.—Night 1st—2nd. Powerful attacks N. and N.E. of Iresti repulsed: "we captured a number of prisoners." Dniester—Casin Valleys, "rifle fire." S. of Susitza Valley, "reciprocal artillery bombardment." All attacks Volocsany Hill—Varnitza repulsed. Varnitza—Marasesti, operations hindered by bad weather. On the Sereth and Danube, "sharp struggle" since August 31st. Near Iresti, Rumanians "showing their customary valour."

3RD.—Near Czernovitz, Russians repulsed two attacks S. of Slobozia. Dniester—Trotus Valleys, artillery and patrol activity. Trotus Valley—Varnitza, attacks repulsed S. of Mamonitza. Susitza Valley, "less activity." Momaia—Varnitza—Marasesti, concentrations dispersed. Varnitza—Monasteria, "as result of heavy fighting enemy repulsed." Near Maximimi, Russians repulsed attack.

4TH.—Fighting on N.E. slopes of the Carpathians.

5TH.—Attacks S. of Slobozia (9 miles S.E. of Czernowitz) repulsed by Russians.

6TH.—Two fortified heights near Slobozia lost and retaken by Russians: 200 prisoners.

7TH.—Local fighting near Muncelu (18 miles N.N.W. Focsani).

8TH.—Evening. Russians repulsed attack S. of Arbora (S. of Radautz, Bukovina). Elsewhere, "fusillades" and patrol activity.

9TH.—W. of Ocna, Allies "engaged in battle" for heights N.W. of Slanic. E. of Iresti, "increased liveliness" of enemy scouts. 4 aircraft brought down.

10TH.—S. of Radantz, Russians repulsed attack near Solka (E. of Kimpolung). Near Ocna, "violent bombardments." N.W. of Slanic, "enemy offensive" repulsed. 1 aircraft brought down.

11TH.—Russians captured height S. of Solka: over 400 Austrian prisoners, including 12 officers, 6 machine-guns. N.W. of Slanic, Rumanians captured but "had to abandon" a height.

12TH.—W. of Ocna, Rumanians repulsed attack.

13TH.—Near Kovel, "lively fusillades" Mesinska—Rudka. Near Husiatyn, captured wood near Baerzisk. Enemy retired on Myzskowce Height—Warylkowce (5 miles W. of the Zbrucz at Husiatyn). 1 aircraft brought down. 1 damaged. Works bombed near Horosemkov (Husiatyn—Trembovla).

14TH.—Near Focsani, Rumanians drove off patrols Fitonesti—Marasesti: repulsed attack N.W. of Marasesti.

15TH.—Scouting parties driven off Fitonesti—Marasesti.

16TH.—Evening. Near Focsani, Rumanians "frustrated" attacks Panciu—Marasesti.

17TH.—Rumanians captured part of position near Varnitza.

18TH.—Near Ocna, Rumanians captured a height S. of Grozesti: 2 officers, 33 other ranks. Later, part of position abandoned. "Fusillades more intense" N. of Iresti, and E. of Gerlesti.

19TH.—4 aircraft brought down.

20TH.—Rumanians repulsed three attacks N. of Muncelu (N.W. of Panciu, Susitza Valley).

21ST.—Attack N. of Grozesti repulsed.

22ND.—Two attacks N. of Muncelu repulsed.

23RD.—Artillery activity on the lower Sereth. Galatz bombarded.

24TH.—S.E. of Kimpolung, successful Russian raid.

25TH.—S.W. of Gory—the Sereth—Onoudory, attack repulsed after temporary success.

26TH.—Near Orufri (20 miles S. of Czernovitz), repulsed attack.

27TH—30TH.—“ Nothing important.”

BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—E. of Dobropolie, fighting on new ground gained by Serbs August 30th. In Tchernia bend and N.E. of Monastir, “ violent artillery activity.”

2ND.—Successful raid (French) W. of the Tchernia.

3RD.—Successful raid (French) near Brantindol (4 miles N.W. of Monastir). Lively artillery activity on right bank of the Vardar. British took prisoners on left bank of the Struma: bombed camps near Demir Hissar.

5TH.—British repulsed two attacks near Dova Tepe (E. of Lake Doiran). Artillery duel on the Vardar.

6TH.—British patrol activity on the Struma. Raid repulsed N. of Dodzeli. Artillery duel on the Vardar. Two raids on Russian positions Lake Ochreda—Lake Prespa, gained slight footing.

7TH.—“ Fairly violent struggle ” near Doiran and Karasinanci (four miles S. of Ghevgeli, British sector). Fighting near Russian positions.

8TH.—Artillery duel N. of Monastir. Lakes Melik—Ochrida, French and Russians captured heights W. and N.W. of Blaca. Crossed Devoli River: 30 Austrian prisoners.

9TH.—Advanced N. 1—4 miles, captured Gradista, Bubuc, Monasterie, Gora, and Gribac (? Garic).

10TH.—Occupied Grabovica—heights near the Arava—Premisti. 9th—10th, 150 prisoners, including 4 officers, 3 guns, 3 machine-guns, taken. Italians captured trench near the Mipdlosum, S.E. of Berat (40 miles W. of Devoli Valley).

11TH.—Advance continued. “ Lively ” artillery duel near Monastir.

12TH.—Reached Momilista (on W. shore of Lake Ochrida)—Hill 1704 (6 miles N.W. of Momilista, 20 miles N. of Lake Mulik). 11th—12th, 160 prisoners, 2 mountain-, 2 machine-guns, taken.

13TH.—Serbs repulsed reconnaissances near Dobropolie and N.W. of Monastir. Artillery activity near Nonte (midway Vardar—Tchernia Rivers), and Monastir. French and Russians “ consolidated ” new positions near Pogradec (S.W. shore of Lake Ochrida). Captures now 378 prisoners, including 4 officers and 6 cadets: 1 1½-inch, 4 mountain-, 8 machine-guns, “ important material.”

14TH.—Between 8th—14th, British bombed camps, etc., near Rupel, Vetrina, and Cernista (Struma Valley).

15TH.—“ Generally quiet.”

16TH.—Night 15th—16th. Vardar Valley, artillery activity. 16th, “ quiet.”

17TH.—Vardar Valley and Tchernia bend, artillery activity.

18TH.—French captured height 5½ miles N.W. of Momilista. Repulsed “ small attack ” W. of Lake Prespa. Artillery activity in the Tchernia bend and hills to E.

19TH.—Artillery duel near Monastir and W. of Lake Ochrida.

20TH.—“ A certain recrudescence of artillery activity.” British bombed camps N. of Doiran. Successful French and Albanian raid in Skumbi Valley (10 miles W. of Lake Ochrida): 442 unwounded Austrian prisoners, 2 machine-guns, taken.

21ST.—Increased artillery activity on the Vardar and N. of Monastir. British bombed works near Demir Hissar.

22ND.—Continuous artillery duel Doiran—the Vardar. Several attempts repulsed, especially on Italian sector. Between 15th—22nd, British bombed Puljovo, Kara Oglular (N.W. of Doiran), etc. Drove a detachment out of Kumli (10 miles N.W. of Seres). Russians repulsed attack E. of Lake Prespa.

23RD.—“Considerable artillery activity” on the Vardar, in the Tchernia bend, and near Doiran.

24TH.—Artillery and aerial activity.

25TH.—On the lower Struma, artillery duel of “certain intensity.” British bombed works near Demir Hissar and Doiran: Serbs near Nonte.

26TH.—“Quiet.” French counter-battery work N. of Monastir.

27TH.—British dispersed mounted patrol near Butkova River (tributary of the Struma, E. of Lake Doiran). Several successful air raids. “Intermittent” artillery activity on the Struma, Vardar, and W. of Monastir.

28TH.—“Fairly heavy artillery duels” on the Struma and Vardar. Patrol encounters in Strym and Devoli Valleys.

29TH.—Lakes Prespa—Ochrida, two attacks “vigorously repulsed.” On extreme left, Albanians captured Cesme (Skumbi Valley).

30TH.—French “carried out destructive fire” in Tchernia bend, and N. of Monastir. Italians repulsed two reconnoitring parties.

CAUCASIAN FRONT.

14TH.—Near Turko—Persian frontier, “pressed back” from Mounts Shiva—Rechtu—Boubereh (33 miles E. of Revanduz).

19TH.—E. of Van, Kurds repulsed: 4 ft. snowfall on mountains.

24TH.—Successful raid near Ortoba (Bitlis).

26TH.—Van. Near Shatakh, Kurds engaged: near Rua, driven 20 miles N.W. to Oromara.

29TH.—Successful raid S.W. of Oghaut (Erzinjan—Mush), 20 miles N.W. of Menne, Kurds engaged: driven from Erazseyali heights.

EGYPTIAN FRONTS.

No reports.

MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

25TH.—2 aircraft missing N. of Samarra. Heat showed “signs of abating.”

27TH.—N.E. of Bagdad, “sharp skirmish”: 4 prisoners, 300 supply camels, taken.

28TH.—Dawn, attacked advanced position at Mushaid (4 miles E. of Ramadie on the Euphrates, 28 miles above Feluja). “Ridge occupied with little difficulty.” Attacked main positions about Ramadie from S.E.: cavalry moved to W. of town. By nightfall, positions carried: Ramadie encircled on E., S.E., and S., two miles from town: cavalry on W.: river on N.

29TH.—Night 28th—29th. Attempts to break out W. “headed back” by cavalry. 29th, dawn, attack resumed. 9 a.m., enemy surrendered. (Later report).—Commander, staff, 145 officers, 3,120 unwounded, 190 wounded, prisoners.

EAST AFRICA.

1ST.—At beginning of September main German forces : 1, in Mbemkuru Valley (midway Kilwa—Portuguese frontier) : 2, in Lukeledi Valley (S.W. of Lindi, 50 miles S. of the Mbemkuru) : 3, based on Mahenge. At 1 and 2 over half of total force.

9TH.—10TH.—Belgians, advancing from N., captured Madege.

16TH.—Belgians captured Kalimoto.

19TH.—Kilwa column captured "water holes" at Mihumbia (42 miles S.W. of Kilwa, 21 miles N. of Nakiu and Natshihu fords on the Mbemkuru). Enemy retired 8 miles to Mpingo. Other columns advanced on "a larger German group strongly established" at Ndessa (15 miles S.W. of Mihumbia).

21ST.—Enemy evacuated Ndessa. A party retiring to Mponda's from N. surprised and dispersed whilst crossing the Liwegu.

23RD.—"Entire enemy force" retiring to the Mbemkuru, found way barred near Mawerenye (13 miles S. of Ndessa) by Nigerian infantry. "After severe fighting," enemy dispersed in small parties across the river. Advance hampered by waterless bush.

Position : Columns from S. and S.W. in contact with enemy detachments at Mponda's (on the Liwegu, 53 miles S. of Mahenge), and N.E. of Ligamba hills (33 miles S.W. of Mahenge). Belgians from N. approaching Mahenge, Mganziira, and Liwale (60 and 120 miles S.E. of Mahenge).

24TH.—Kilwa columns concentrated at Mawerenye. Mounted troops on left flank destroyed depôts Mbemkuru River—Kilwa Liwale road. Lindi column attacked Mtua (22 miles S.W. of Lindi, important road junction to Mbemkuru and Lukeledi Valleys). Belgians within 10 miles of Mahenge.

25TH.—Kilwa column secured Nakiku ford, detachment marched on Nahungo (34 miles S.E. of Liwali, at ford of the Mbemkuru, on Liwali—Massassi road). Mounted troops close to Nahungo.

26TH.—Lukeledi Valley. Enemy evacuated "strong position" near Mtua : retired to Mtama (5 miles N.E. of Nyangao, on roads to Mbemkuru and Lukeledi Valleys).

27TH.—Mbemkuru Valley. Fighting all day on Nakiku—Nahungo road, N. of the river.

28TH.—"After considerable resistance" captured Nahungo (important depôt, 82 miles S.W. of Kilwa) : 1 gun taken. Progress in Lukeledi Valley. In W. area, Rhodesian troops from Songea reached ford of Songea—Liwale—Kilwa road across Njinji River (66 miles S.W. of Liwale). Belgians within 7 miles of Mahenge.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE UNITED STATES' NATIONAL ANTHEM.

To the Editor of the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

Woodstock House, Woodstock, Oxfordshire,

DEAR SIR,—

20th August, 1917.

As considerable uncertainty appears to prevail as to what is the United States' National Anthem, I send you these notes. About thirty years ago it was laid down that it should be "The Star Spangled Banner," the first line of which, curiously enough, begins, "Oh, say." This was composed during the War of 1812, soon after the capture of the city of Washington by our troops. The earlier National Anthems were "My Country, 'tis of Thee," to the air of "God Save the King," and "Hail, Columbia," to a variation of "Rule, Britannia." At the time of the Civil War "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" was used. This was by far the best. The words are rather fine, and the air vulgarised in "John Brown's Body," when properly played, compares to the "Marseillaise." "Yankee Doodle" was originally played in the old French War by some British regiments in derision of Colonial ones. This was stopped as not making for the *entente cordiale*. The British regiments played it again in the Revolution at Bunker's Hill, and afterwards the Americans took it up and played it out of bravado, but it was never in any sense a National Anthem. I would like to add that the word Yankee means English. It is the Indian rendering. The English colonists were called by the Indians Yengees, and in speaking to the Indians this became colloquially Yankees among the Colonists themselves.

Yours very truly,

LAWRENCE TIMPSON, Captain

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

August—September—October, 1917.

- SERVANTS OF THE GUNS. By Jeffery E. Jeffery. Crown 8vo. 5s. (Smith, Elder & Co.). London, 1917.
- IN SALONICA WITH OUR ARMY. By Harold Lake. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Andrew Melrose, Ltd.). London, 1917.
- THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH OVERSEAS ENTERPRISE—A PRELUDE TO THE EMPIRE. By Sir C. P. Lucas. 8vo. 6s. 6d. (Clarendon Press). Oxford, 1917.
- ESSAI SUR L'ART DE LA GUERRE. By le Comte Turpin de Crissé, Brigadier des Armées du Roi, etc. 2 Vols. 4to. (Presented by the Dowager Viscountess Wolseley). (Prault et Jouebert). Paris, 1754.

(This work was the property of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton and of Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, and contains the autographs of both these distinguished soldiers.)

- HISTORY OF SERBIA. By Captain H. W. V. Temperley. 8vo. 6s. 6d. (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd.). London, 1917.
- THE SILESIAN LOAN AND FREDERICK THE GREAT. By the Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow. 8vo. 14s. (Clarendon Press). Oxford, 1915.
- THE IRISH AT THE FRONT. By Michael McDonagh. Crown 8vo. 1s. 3d. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1916.
- THE IRISH ON THE SOMME. By Michael McDonagh. Crown 8vo. 2s. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1917.
- THE WONDER BOOK OF THE NAVY. Edited by Harry Golding. 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Ward, Lock & Co., Ltd.). London, 1917.
- MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE THE SECOND. By Horace Walpole. 3 Vols. 8vo. 25s. (Second-hand). (Henry Colburn). London, 1846-47.
- A CANADIAN SUBALTERN. By "Billy." Crown 8vo. 2s. (Constable & Co., Ltd.). London, 1917.
- LIGHT AND SHADE IN WAR. By Captain Malcolm Ross and Neil Ross. Crown 8vo. 5s. (Edward Arnold). London, 1917.
- THE ADVENTURES OF AN ENSIGN. By "Vedette." Crown 8vo. 5s. (William Blackwood & Sons). Edinburgh and London, 1917.
- FOURTEEN MONTHS AT THE FRONT. By William J. Robinson. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1916.
- THE GERMAN SPY IN AMERICA. By John Price Jones. With a Foreword by Theodore Roosevelt. Crown 8vo. 5s. (Hutchinson & Co.). London, 1917.
- BESIEGED IN KUT AND AFTER. By Major C. H. Barber, I.M.S. Crown 8vo. 5s. (William Blackwood). Edinburgh and London, 1917.
- THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH STANDING ARMY, A.D. 1660 TO 1700. By Colonel Clifford Walton, C.B., A.A.G. 8vo. (Presented by Mrs. A. E. Winterne). (Harrison & Sons). London, 1894.
- A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF MILITARY PUNISHMENTS, IN AS FAR AS REGARDS NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATE SOLDIERS. By Henry Marshall. 8vo. (Presented by Mrs. A. E. Winterne). (*United Service Magazine*). London, n.d.
- ADVICE TO OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY, WITH SOME HINTS TO THE DRUMMER AND PRIVATE SOLDIER. 9th Edition. 12mo. (Presented by Mrs. A. E. Winterne). London, 1787.
- BATTLES OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 2 Vols. By Joseph Allen. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (Henry G. Bohn). London, 1852.
- THE VICTORIES OF WELLINGTON AND THE BRITISH ARMIES. By W. H. Maxwell. New Edition. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (Henry G. Bohn). London, 1852.
- COLLECTION DE DOUZE VUES DE WATERLOO. Dressé par le Général Baron de Joacini. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). Brussels, n.d.
- THE LIFE OF LORD VISCOUNT NELSON. By T. O. Churchill. 4to. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (T. Bensley). London, 1808.
- THE LIFE OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 2 Vols. By J. H. Stocqueler. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (Ingram, Cooke & Co.). London, 1852.
- ENGLISH BATTLES AND SIEGES OF THE PENINSULA. By Lieut. General Sir W. Napier. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (John Murray). London, 1855.
- THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA. By W. H. Russell. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (G. Routledge & Co.). London, 1858.
- NAVAL AND MILITARY HEROES OF GREAT BRITAIN. By Major Johns, R.M., and Lieutenant P. H. Nicolas, R.M. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (Henry G. Bohn). London, 1860.
- THE CONQUEST OF SCINDE. By Major-General W. F. P. Napier. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel A. G. Hutchins). (T. & W. Boone). London, 1845.

- EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS. 8vo. (Presented by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B.). (H.M. Stationery Office). London, 1917.
- THEORIE NOUVELLE SUR LE MÉCANISME DE L'ARTILLERIE. Parle Capitaine Dulacq. 4to. (Presented by Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.). (Charles-Antoine Jouebert). Paris, 1741.
- THE LIFE OF SIR CHARLES DILKE. 2 Vols. By Stephen Gwynne and Gertrude M. Tuckwell. 8vo. 36s. (John Murray). London, 1917.
- A HISTORY OF POLAND. By Major F. E. Whitton. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Constable & Co., Ltd.). London, 1917.
- TRENCH PICTURES FROM FRANCE. By Major William Redmond, M.P. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Andrew Melrose, Ltd.). London, 1917.
- PRINTS OF NAVAL UNIFORMS, 1777. By Dominic Serres. 4to. £35. London, 1777.
- OUR SEA POWER, ITS STORY AND ITS MEANING. By H. W. Household. With a Foreword by Admiral Lord Beresford, G.C.B., etc. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.). London, 1917.
- MARCHING ON TANGA. By Francis Brett Young. Crown 8vo. 6s. (W. Collins, Sons & Co., Ltd.). London, 1917.
- GUIDES MICHELIN POUR LA VISITE DES CHAMPS DE BATAILLE. BATAILLE DE LA MARNE. 1.—L'OURCO, MEAUX—SENLIS—CHANTILLY. 8vo. (Presented by the Publishers). (Berger-Levrault). Paris, 1917.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Storming of London and the Thames Valley Campaign. By Major P. T. Godsall: Harrison & Sons.

The majority of our early and latter-day historians have, in regard to the invasion and conquest of England by the English or Angles, usually adopted or blindly followed the view that this great amphibious operation was the result of a number of independent and disconnected raids, a theory which, however conveniently fitting in with certain necessary premises, takes no account of any military organization which one may reasonably credit the Britons with possessing after very many years of government by the greatest military power of the world. The history of the invasion and conquest of England by the Angles has never before been seriously studied from the purely military point of view, and in the words of the writer of this very interesting, and, indeed, fascinating work, the great conquest has usually been treated and regarded as though it had "been effected by a fortuitous concourse of patriarchally-conducted family parties." The subject, it may be conceded, is primarily antiquarian, but any proper consideration of all its features cannot be divorced from its military study; the antiquarians have ere this said probably all that they have to say from their point of view in regard to the landing in, the conquest, and the settlement of England by the English; and it was high time that some soldier-writer should arise to re-construct the main fabric of these stupendous operations, and afford us a military study of one of the greatest of military achievements.

Much of what the author describes as happening is, of course, pure conjecture—such procedure is probably inevitable when dealing with events which occurred so long ago, and in regard to which any records that exist are scanty and written down from recollection or tradition; but Major Godsall certainly provides a perfectly coherent explanation of how the invasion was projected and systematically prepared for; how the invaders not only conquered by slow and deliberate but sure methods the country westwards and northwards from their landing places, but settled it with colonists, whom they had brought with them, and to ensure whose co-operation they had left desolate the home land they had definitely and formally abandoned. Such evidence as is forthcoming in contemporary and later works the writer adduces in support of his contentions, even occasionally, in a manner unusual with historians, does he admit that such evidence may be weighed against the claims he puts forward; but he finds and indicates a mass of evidence of a contributory kind in the place-names, boundaries, earthworks, fords, and other less-known archaeological features and factors of the period with which he deals, which all tend to add realism to his narrative and to help the reader more readily to appreciate the soundness of the plan of invasion, devised and directed by the first Bretwalda, and the soldierly manner in which, during a campaign of many years' duration, it was methodically followed to its successful conclusion.

The study of the Thames Valley campaign, the operations of Cerdic, and the account we are given of the personality of the several leaders, make up a deeply interesting story, one, moreover, which is coherent, reasonable, and impressive. It will certainly satisfy those soldier-readers who study its main features, and who will probably be found to agree that it presents a most plausible narrative of what happened in the way in which alone success could have been anticipated and achieved. This book has now been for some time before the public; its contentions do not appear to have been seriously questioned by those historians who have dealt with the period and events as antiquarians, and so it may be perhaps accepted that Major Godsall has written history, and history which will endure.

Air Power: Naval, Military, Commercial. By Claude Grahame-White and Harry Harper. With illustrations. Demy 8vo. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd.: 1917. 7s. 6d. net.

This book is good in parts; the joint authors have provided some very interesting reading-matter on the subject of aeroplanes and their employment in war and peace, but the title is, perhaps, too comprehensive and too ambitious for the contents. To begin with, there is no reference at all to air-power from the naval point of view, though this aspect of the subject is given precedence in the title; and, secondly, there is no discussion of those lighter-than-air craft, which both the Allies and the Central Powers have found, in one type or another, to be of considerable utility, within limits, during a war carried on in all parts of the world for over three years already, as, for instance, in patrolling the coast, acting with and against submarines, for naval reconnaissance and the direction of artillery fire on land and sea. On the other hand, considerable space is devoted to details of the construction of aeroplanes, factors of safety, and popularizing air travel—matters which, while interesting in themselves in varying degree, have little to do with "air power" as a subject of discussion.

Part I., on "The War by Air," is excellent, and sets forth very clearly the gradual evolution of methods of employment of the aeroplane in the campaign in France and Flanders from 1914 to 1916, but one misses any allusion to the remarkable achievements of the Italian air-service in the teeth of tremendous difficulties, and to the methods by which the Italians, who were originally faced

by marked aerial superiority on the part of the Austro-German forces arrayed against them, have in course of time completely reversed the position. This is surely an instance of the development of air-power which should point a moral. The portion of the work devoted to "Problems of Construction" is exceedingly interesting, tracing as it does the evolution of the aeroplane from the beginning without too many details, and discussing the question of engines for aeroplanes briefly, but with lucidity and to the point. In "Our Policy after the War," the authors rightly criticize our general attitude as a nation towards flying before the war, our indifference, and the conservative and unimaginative attitude of the higher authorities. The discussion of the commercial and legal aspects of flight is naturally more or less speculative; but there is no doubt that the Empire should have an Imperial air policy, and that money spent in the development of aircraft should be regarded as a form of national insurance. Our sea-power without air-power will be robbed of much of its significance, and our aerial forces must be as ready for immediate action in any future war as our Navy was in 1914, or our civilian population will suffer and our armed forces on land or sea will be heavily handicapped in the ensuing struggle.

The Wonder Book of the British Navy. Edited by Harry Golding : Ward, Lock & Co.

Messrs. Ward, Lock & Co., and their most able editor, have produced a succession of very notable "Wonder Books," but nothing quite like this has before been published, and the "Wonder Book of the Navy" certainly does something like justice to the great subject with which it is concerned. All the best-known naval writers have contributed to its pages a number of vivid and instructive articles, on subjects about which each is specially qualified to deal. Captain Alan Burgoyne, M.P., writes an appreciative foreword; Mr. Archibald Hurd explains in his best manner for the benefit of young readers, "Why we have a Navy," tells us of the many occasions when the Senior Service has proved our salvation, writes on "Big Guns" and "Types of Warships." Mr. Gerard Fiennes has much that is illuminating to say about "Blockade and Patrol," "The Empire and the Navy," "Life and Routine in a War Ship," and about the navies of our Allies; while "Turret," "J.J.B.," and others, deftly handle such absorbing subjects as "Submarines," "The Naval Air Service," and "Wireless." Everything is dealt with in a suitably non-technical way, and the book is beautifully and profusely illustrated by such well-known marine artists as the late C. Napier-Hemy, and Messrs. Gribble, Burgess, de Lacy, and Randall. The book contains some minor mistakes, but these do not in any way detract from the merits of a gift book of rare attraction.

JOURNAL
OF THE
Royal United Service Institution,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL.

Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.

VOL. LXII.

FEBRUARY TO NOVEMBER, 1917.



LONDON
J. J. KELIHER & CO., LIMITED, CRAVEN HOUSE, KINGSWAY, W.C.2
AND MARSHALSEA WORKS, S.E.1.

1917.

[Entered at Stationers' Hall. All rights reserved.]

LONDON :
J. J. KELIHER AND CO., LIMITED,
1917.

INDEX.

FEBRUARY TO NOVEMBER, 1917.

	PAGE
AUXILIARY, An Excellent · The Motor Transport Volunteers ...	812
BLAKE, ROBERT, Admiral and General at Sea, The Missing Fifteen Years in the Life of (C. R. B. Barrett) ...	98
BRITISH FORCES, A French Estimation of the (Louis Cazamian) ...	111
BUSINESS Man and the Army, The (Major R. H. Beadon) ...	286
"CALLIOPE," Samoa, and Germany ...	308
CAMPAIGNS of 1803 and 1804 in India, Extracts from a Journal of the (Cornet George Call, 27th Light Dragoons) ...	581
CARLISTS, Some Account of the British Operations against the (Colonel C. Field) ...	209
CHARACTER, Military (Vice-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy) ...	699
COAT in the Armies of Europe, The Red (Lieut.-General F. A. Tyrrell)	787
COLOURS, Guidons, and Standards, Notes on Regimental (D. Hastings Irwin) ...	567
CORFU : A Memory (Major Morris Bent) ...	816
CRAUFURD'S Light Brigade to Talavera, The March of (C. Oman) ...	692
DARDANELLES EXPEDITION, A German Staff Officer on the (Thomas F. A. Smith, Ph.D.) ...	342
EAST AFRICA, The Campaign in, under Brig.-General E. Northey ...	269
"ENDEN"; Account by Kaptän-Leutnant von Mücke (Translation by A. C. Hearn) ...	770
FERDINAND of Brunswick, From the Order Book of ...	818
FLANDERS, An Authentick Narrative of the Campaign in, in the year 1744 ...	116
FRANCE, A Letter from ...	557
GOMMECOURT, Report on the Defence of, on July 1st, 1916 ...	535
GRAVES, Registration and Care of Military, during the War ...	297
INDIAN Irregular Horse, Some Leaders of (Colonel R. G. Burton) ...	85
IRISH Troops in the Service of France, 1691-1791 (Colonel C. N. Watts)	332
JUTLAND BATTLE, The (Translated and Abridged from Captain Scheibe's "Die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak") ...	31
KING WILLIAM III. Flag, The (Colonel C. Field and C. R. B. Barrett)	688
KNIFE in Trench Warfare, The (Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir John Mac- donald, G.C.B.) ...	64, 691
LANDING OPERATIONS (Translated, by permission, from an article in the <i>Revue des Deux Mondes</i> for October 15th, 1916, by Admiral Degouy) ...	318

	PAGE
LITERATURE, French War (Major T. E. Compton)	747
LORRAINE and the Ardennes, The Battles of August, 1914, in (Major T. E. Compton)	517
MAHRATTA and Pindari War of 1817-18, A Hundred Years ago; The (Colonel R. G. Burton)	800
MARINES in the Great Naval Mutinies of 1797-1802, The (Colonel C. Field)	720
MEDITERRANEAN, 1793-1801, The Naval Operations in the. Naval History Essay for 1916 (Lieut. John S. Mackenzie Grieve, R.N.)	506
METAPHYSICS, Military (Poultney Bigelow)	1
MOTOR Transport Volunteers, The : An Excellent Auxiliary	812
NAVAL Operations in the Mediterranean, 1793-1801, The. Naval History Essay for 1916 (Lieut. John S. Mackenzie Grieve, R.N.)	506
NYANZA, A Voyage on the Great (W. T.)	73
PIPECLAY AFLOAT (Colonel C. Field, R.M.L.I., Retd.)	5
SAILOR, The Lot of the Wounded (Surgeon Horace E. R. Stephens, M.B., R.N.)	19
TALAVERA, The March of Craufurd's Light Brigade to (C. Oman) ...	692
"U"-BOAT WARFARE, German War Writers on the (Thomas F. A. Smith)	793
UNIFORM, Military ("Snipster")	572
UNITED STATES, The War Policy of the (T. Miller Maguire, LL.D.) ...	260
VERDUN and the Somme (Major T. E. Compton)	46
VETERINARY Service in 1914-16, The Army (Major J. W. Rainey, R. of O., A.V.C.)	232
WAR POLICY of the United States, The (T. Miller Maguire, LL.D.)	260
WOUNDED SAILOR, The Lot of the (Surgeon Horace E. R. Stephens, M.B., R.N.)	19
YOUNG OFFICER, An Open Letter to the Very (C. N. W.)	69

AUTHORS AND TRANSLATORS.

ANDERSON, Lieutenant R. C. (The Naval Operations in the Mediter- ranean during the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-4)	224
BARRETT, C. R. B. (The Missing Fifteen Years in the Life of Robert Blake, Admiral and General at Sea)	98
(The King William III. Flag)	303
BEADON, Major R. H. (The Business Man and the Army)	286
BENT, Major Morris (Corfu : A Memory)	816
BIGELOW, Poultney (Military Metaphysics)	1
BURTON, Colonel R. G. (Some Leaders of Indian Irregular Horse) ...	85
(A Hundred Years Ago : The Mahratta and Pindari War of 1817-18)	800

INDEX

v
PAGE

CALL, Cornet George, 27th Light Dragoons (Extracts from a Journal of the Campaigns of 1803 and 1804 in India)	581
CAZAMIAN, Louis (A French Estimation of the British Forces)	111
COMPTON, Major T. E. (Verdun and the Somme)	46
(The Battles of August, 1914, in Lorraine and the Ardennes)	517
(French War Literature)	747
FIELD, Colonel C. (Pipeclay Afloat)	5
(Some Account of the British Operations against the Carlists)	209
(The Marines in the Great Naval Mutinies, 1797-1802)	720
FREMANTLE, Admiral the Hon. Sir E., G.C.B., C.M.G. (Sea Power and the American War of Independence)	471
GRIEVE, Lieut. John S. Mackenzie, R.N. (The Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1793-1801. Naval History Essay for 1916) ...	506
HEARN, A. C. ("Emden." Translation from Kapitän Leut. von Mücke)	770
IRWIN, D. Hastings (Notes on Regimental Colours, Standards, and Guidons)	567
MACDONALD, Colonel the Hon. Sir J. (The Knife in Trench Warfare)	64
(The Knife in Trench Warfare)	691
MAGUIRE, T. M. (The War Policy of the United States)	260
MÜCKE, Kapitän-Leutnant Helmuth von ("Emden")	770
OMAN, C. (The March of Craufurd's Light Brigade to Talavera) ...	692
RAINEY, Major J. W. (The Army Veterinary Service, 1914-1916) ...	232
SIMS, Vice-Admiral Wm. S., United States Navy (Military Character)	699
Character)	699
SMITH, Thomas F. A. (A German Staff Officer on the Dardanelles Expedition)	342
(German War-Writers on the "U"-Boat Warfare)	793
"SNIPSTER" (Military Uniform)	572
STEPHENS, Surgeon Horace E. R., R.N. (The Lot of the Wounded Sailor)	19
TYRRELL, Lieut.-General F. A. (The Red Coat in the Armies of Europe)	787
TIMPSON, Captain Lawrence (The American National Anthem)	
"W. T." (A Voyage on the Great Nyanza)	73
WATTS, Colonel C. N. (The Irish Troops in the Service of France, 1691-1791)	332
W., C. N. (An Open Letter to the Very Young Officer)	69

FRONTISPIECES.

FIELD-MARSHAL Sir D. Haig and General Nivelle ... facing page	i.
THE Battle of Ernani	vii.
ADMIRAL Lord Graves	xiii.
CAPTAIN and Private of Marines, 1790-1796	xvii.

MISCELLANEOUS.

INTRODUCTION to Diary of Second-Lieutenant Hough	208
CORRESPONDENCE	688, 898
NOTICES of Books	205, 467, 697, 907
PRINCIPAL Additions to Library	202, 465, 694, 898
SECRETARY'S NOTES	i, vii, xiii, xvii.
THE WAR: Its Naval Side	154, 349, 606, 825
THE WAR: Its Military Side	187, 383, 649, 849





Hotel Rubens

BUCKINGHAM PALACE ROAD, S.W. 1

Telegrams—"RUBOTELIER, Sowest LONDON." Telephone (10 lines)—VICTORIA 6600

This Hotel is the Newest and most Up-to-date Establishment.
Within 2 minutes' walk of Victoria Station.

■ ■ ■

Hotel Rembrandt

THURLOE PLACE, S.W. 7 (FACING VICTORIA
& ALBERT MUSEUM)

Telegrams—"CHOICEST, LONDON."

Telephone—KENSINGTON 4300

■ ■ ■

Hotel Vandyke

CROMWELL ROAD, SOUTH — S.W. 7.
KENSINGTON,

Telegrams—"HOTEL VANDYKE, LONDON."

Telephone—KENSINGTON 2892

DUTTON'S

24 - HOUR

SHORTHAND

Dutton's new Shorthand is the simplest and highest speed system in the world. Only 6 rules and 29 characters to learn. At recent 3-day classes students took down Business Letter from dictation, after practice, at 70 words a minute. The system is accepted in Government Offices. £100 Scholarship offered annually to boys and girls. Send stamp to-day for first lesson to—

DUTTON'S BUSINESS COLLEGE,
DESK 104, SKEGNESS.

TRY FIRST LESSON

(London : 92 & 93, Great Russell Street, W.C. 1.)

THE FINEST BOOK ON SHOOTING EVER PUBLISHED!

THE GUN AT HOME & ABROAD

By SELOUS, ABE CHAPMAN, HARTING, MILLAIS, OGILVIE-GRANT,
FREEMANTLE, BRYDEN, and other well-known Authors.

Illustrated with **59 Magnificent Coloured Plates** and hundreds of other illustrations, by
THORBURN, LODGE, and other Artists.

Four thick 4to Volumes, handsomely bound in Full Morocco. Gilt Tops, 1912-15.

Published at **£42 net.**

Now offered for **£17 10s.**

Vol. I. British Game Birds and Wild Fowl.

Vol. III. Big Game of Africa and Europe.

Vol. II. British Deer and Ground Game, Dogs,
Guns, and Rifles.

Vol. IV. Big Game of Asia and North
America.

Each Volume is complete in itself, and is also issued with a separate title page. A few copies of each Volume may be had separately; price on application.

INDIAN SPORTING BIRDS

By FRANK FINN, B.A., F.Z.S.

*Author of "The Waterfowl of India and Asia," "The Game Birds of India and Asia,"
"How to Know the Indian Waders," etc., etc.*

With over **100 Original Coloured Plates** from Hume & Marshall's
"Game Birds of India, Burmah and Ceylon."

Price **£1 10s. net.**

This re-issue of a large proportion of the plates from Hume and Marshall's Work, accompanied by letterpress written by that well-known observer, Mr. Frank Finn (late of the Indian Museum, Calcutta), should meet with a welcome from all Indian Sportsmen.

FRANCIS EDWARDS, Bookseller, Printseller, and
Dealer in Autographs,

83, HIGH STREET, MARYLEBONE, LONDON, W. 1.

How's HOTELS

LONDON

Telephone No.
Museum 4060 (4 lines).

PALACE HOTEL,

(250 Rooms)

Bloomsbury Street, W.C.

(2 Passenger Lifts.)

En Pension Terms, from 10/6 per day, or 3 guineas weekly;
Bedroom, Attendance, Baths, Table d'Hote Breakfast, from 6/6.

Telephone No.
Museum 976.

MORTON HOTEL,

Southampton Row, W.C.

(Passenger Lift.)

En Pension Terms: Single Rooms from 2½ guineas weekly.
Double Rooms from 4 guineas weekly, or from 8/6 per day.

Telephone No.
Park 3897.

GROSVENOR HOTEL,

18 (late 17a), Pembridge Square, Bayswater, W.

En Pension Terms: Single Rooms from £1 15s. weekly. Double
Rooms from 3 guineas weekly, or 6/6 per day.

Telephone No.
Western 652.

LINDEN HALL,

131, 133, 135 & 137, Cromwell Road, South Kensington.

(Passenger Lift)

Telephone No.
Western 3448.

THE CENTRAL,

123 & 125, Cromwell Road, South Kensington.

Telephone No.
Paddington 7199.

LEINSTER COURT,

18, 19 & 20, Leinster Gardens.

A few minutes from Hyde Park.

En Pension Terms: Single Rooms from 2 guineas weekly.
Double Rooms from 4 guineas weekly, or from 7/6 per day.

Telephone No.
Paddington 4494.

THE ROYAL,

68 & 69, Lancaster Gate, W.

(Waygood's Passenger Lift.)

Telephone No.
Paddington 4876.

THE FLORENCE,

19 & 20, Lancaster Gate, W.

(Waygood's Passenger Lift.)

Within three minutes of Hyde Park and Lancaster Gate Tube, and
within ten minutes from Bond Street. Twenty minutes from Bank.

**THESE HOTELS ARE OF THE HIGHEST CLASS AND CONSIDERED
THE MOST COMFORTABLE AND UP-TO-DATE IN LONDON.**

CUISINE of the above Hotels equal to, if not better than
the most expensive Hotels. Inspection cordially invited.

IMPORTANT NOTICE TO ADVERTISERS.

The "R.U.S.I." Journal is now published Quarterly, and will in future appear on
the 15th day of February, May, August and November of each year.

C. GILBERT-WOOD

NOTICE TO ADVERTISERS.

"The Journal of the R.U.S.I." is now a Quarterly Publication.

C. GILBERT-WOOD.

The Portsmouth United Breweries

LIMITED.

Brewers to His Majesty's Forces

Head Offices :


THE BREWERY, ELDON
STREET, PORTSMOUTH.

Branches :

9, STATION ROAD, ALDERSHOT.
55a, GREAT WESTERN DOCKS,
PLYMOUTH.
STONEHENGE INN, SALISBURY
PLAIN.

Agencies at

WOOLWICH, BRIGHTON, GIBRALTAR, MALTA,
and all NAVAL AND MILITARY PORTS AND STATIONS.

**Unrivalled facilities for the supply
of Officers' Messes, Sergeants'
Messes and Canteens.  PRICE LISTS ON
APPLICATION**

